

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST**

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT
OF 8440522 CANADA INC., DATA & AUDIO-VISUAL ENTERPRISES WIRELESS INC., AND
DATA & AUDIO-VISUAL ENTERPRISES HOLDINGS INC.

Applicants

**BOOK OF AUTHORITIES
(Plan Filing and Meeting Order and Stay Extension Motion)
(Returnable April 23, 2014)**

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TAB 1

Indexed as:
Elan Corp. v. Comiskey

**Elan Corp. and Nova Metal Products Inc.
v. Michael Comiskey, trustee of a debenture issued
to Joseph Comiskey and all secured creditors of Elan Corp.
and Nova Metal Products Inc.**

[1990] O.J. No. 2180

1 O.R. (3d) 289

41 O.A.C. 282

1 C.B.R. (3d) 101

23 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1192

Action Nos. 684/90 and 685/90

Court of Appeal for Ontario

Finlayson, Krever and Doherty JJ.A.

November 2, 1990*

*Released November 23, 1990

Counsel:

F.J.C. Newbould, Q.C., and G.B. Morawetz, for Bank of Nova Scotia.

John Little, for Elan Corp. and Nova Metal Products Inc.

Michael B. Rotsztain, for RoyNat Inc.

Kim Twohig and M. Olanow, for Ontario Development Corp.

K.P. McElcheran, for monitor Ernst & Young.

1 **FINLAYSON J.A.** (KREVER J.A. concurring) (orally):-- This is an appeal by the Bank of Nova Scotia (the Bank) from orders made by Mr. Justice Hoolihan as hereinafter described. The Bank of Nova Scotia was the lender to two related companies, namely, Elan Corporation (Elan) and Nova Metal Products Inc. (Nova), which commenced proceedings under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the CCAA) for the purposes of having a plan of arrangement put to a meeting of secured creditors of those companies.

2 The orders appealed from are:

- (i) An order of September 11, 1990 which directed a meeting of the secured creditors of Elan and Nova to consider the plan of arrangement filed, or other suitable plan. The order further provided that for three days until September 14, 1990, the Bank be prevented from acting on any of its security or paying down any of its loans from accounts receivable collected by Elan and Nova and that Elan and Nova could spend the accounts receivable assigned to the Bank that would be received.
- (ii) an order dated September 14, 1990 extending the terms of the order of September 11, 1990 to remain in effect until the plan of arrangement was presented to the court no later than October 24, 1990. This order continued the stay against the Bank and the power of Elan and Nova to spend the accounts receivable assigned to the Bank. Further orders dated September 27, 1990 and October 18, 1990 have extended the stay and the power of Elan and Nova to spend the accounts receivable that have been assigned to the Bank. The date of the meetings of creditors has been extended to November 9, 1990. The application to sanction the plan of arrangement must be heard by November 14, 1990.
- (iii) An order dated October 18, 1990 directing that there be two classes of secured creditors for the purposes of voting at the meeting of secured creditors. The first class is to be comprised of the Bank, RoyNat Inc. (RoyNat), the Ontario Development Corporation (O.D.C.), the City of Chatham and the Village of Glencoe. The second class is to be comprised of persons related to Elan and Nova that acquired debentures to enable the companies to apply under the CCAA.

3 There is very little dispute about the facts in this matter, but the chronology of events is important and I am setting it out in some detail.

4 The Bank has been the banker to Elan and Nova. At the time of the application in August 1990 it was owed approximately \$1,900,000. With interest and costs, including receivers' fees, it is now owed in excess of \$2,300,000. It has a first registered charge on the accounts receivable and inventory of Elan and Nova and a second registered charge on the land, buildings and equipment. It also has security under s. 178 [am. R.S.C. 1985, c. 25 (3rd Supp.), s. 26] of the Bank Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1. The terms of credit between the Bank and Elan as set out in a commitment agreement provide that Elan and Nova may not encumber their assets without the consent of the Bank.

5 RoyNat is also a secured creditor of Elan and Nova and it is owed approximately \$12,000,000. It holds a second registered charge on the accounts receivable and inventory of Elan and Nova and a first registered charge on the land, buildings and equipment. The Bank and RoyNat entered into a priority agreement to define with certainty the priority which each holds over the assets of Elan and Nova.

6 The O.D.C. guaranteed payment of \$500,000 to RoyNat for that amount lent by RoyNat to Elan. The O.D.C. holds debenture security from Elan to secure the guarantee which it gave to RoyNat. That security ranks third to the Bank and RoyNat. The O.D.C. has not been called upon by RoyNat to pay under its guarantee. O.D.C. has not lent any money directly to Elan or Nova.

7 Elan owes approximately \$77,000 to the City of Chatham for unpaid municipal taxes. Nova owes approximately \$18,000 to the Village of Glencoe for unpaid municipal taxes. Both municipalities have a lien on the real property of the respective companies in priority to every claim except the Crown under s. 369 of the Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 302.

8 On May 8, 1990 the Bank demanded payment of all outstanding loans owing by Elan and Nova to be made by June 1, 1990. Extensions of time were granted and negotiations directed to the settlement of the debt took place thereafter. On August 27, 1990, the Bank appointed Coopers & Lybrand Ltd. as receiver and manager of the assets of Elan and Nova and as agent under the Bank's security to realize upon the security. Elan and Nova refused to allow the receiver and manager to have access to their premises on the basis that insufficient notice had been provided by the Bank before demanding payment.

9 Later on August 27, 1990 the Bank brought a motion in an action against Elan and Nova (Doc. No. 54033/90) for an order granting possession of the premises of Elan and Nova to Coopers & Lybrand. On the evening of August 27, 1990 at approximately 9:00 p.m., Mr. Justice Saunders made an order adjourning the motion on certain conditions. The order authorized Coopers & Lybrand access to the premises to monitor Elan's business and permitted Elan to remain in possession and carry on its business in the ordinary course. The Bank was restrained in the order, until the motion could be heard, from selling inventory, land, equipment or buildings or from notifying account debtors to collect receivables, but was not restrained from applying accounts receivables that were collected against outstanding bank loans.

10 On Wednesday, August 29, 1990 Elan and Nova each issued a debenture for \$10,000 to a friend of the principals of the companies, Joseph Comiskey, through his brother Michael Comiskey as trustee, pursuant to a trust deed executed the same day. The terms were not commercial and it does not appear that repayment was expected. It is conceded by counsel for Elan that the sole purpose of issuing the debentures was to qualify as a "debtor company" within the meaning of s. 3 of the CCAA. Section 3 reads as follows:

3. This Act does not apply in respect of a debtor company unless

(a) the debtor company has outstanding an issue of secured or unsecured bonds of the debtor company or of a predecessor in title of the debtor company issued under a trust deed or other instrument running in favour of a trustee; and

(b) the compromise or arrangement that is proposed under section 4 or 5 in respect of the debtor company includes a compromise or an arrangement between the debtor company and the holders of an issue referred to in paragraph (a).

11 The debentures conveyed the personal property of Elan and Nova as security to Michael Comiskey as trustee. No consent was obtained from the Bank as required by the loan agreements,

nor was any consent obtained from the receiver. Cheques for \$10,000 each, representing the loans secured in the debentures were given to Elan and Nova on Wednesday, August 29, 1990 but not deposited until six days later on September 4, 1990 after an interim order had been made by Mr. Justice Farley in favour of Elan and Nova staying the Bank from taking proceedings.

12 On August 30, 1990 Elan and Nova applied under s. 5 of the CCAA for an order directing a meeting of secured creditors to vote on a plan of arrangement. Section 5 provides:

5. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

13 The application was heard by Farley J. on Friday, August 31, 1990 at 8:00 a.m. Farley J. dismissed the application on the grounds that the CCAA required that there be more than one debenture issued by each company. Later on the same day, August 31, 1990, Elan and Nova each issued two debentures for \$500 to the wife of the principal of Elan through her sister as trustee. The debentures provided for payment of interest to commence on August 31, 1992. Cheques for \$500 were delivered that day to the companies but not deposited in the bank account until September 4, 1990. These debentures conveyed the personal property in the assets of Elan and Nova to the trustee as security. Once again it is conceded that the debentures were issued for the sole purpose of meeting the requirements of s. 3 of the CCAA. No consent was obtained from the Bank as required by the loan terms, nor was any consent obtained from the receiver.

14 On August 31, 1990, following the creation of the trust deeds and the issuance of the debentures, Elan and Nova commenced new applications under the CCAA which were heard late in the day by Farley J. He adjourned the applications to September 10, 1990 on certain terms, including a stay preventing the Bank from acting on its security and allowing Elan to spend up to \$321,000 from accounts receivable collected by it.

15 The plan of arrangement filed with the application provided that Elan and Nova would carry on business for three months, that secured creditors would not be paid and could take no action on their security for three months and that the accounts receivable of Elan and Nova assigned to the Bank could be utilized by Elan and Nova for purposes of its day to day operations. No compromise of any sort was proposed.

16 On September 11, 1990, Hoolihan J. ordered that a meeting of the secured creditors of Elan and Nova be held no later than October 22, 1990 to consider the plan of arrangement that had been filed, or other suitable plan. He ordered that the plan of arrangement be presented to the secured creditors no later than September 27, 1990. He made further orders effective for three days until September 14, 1990, including orders:

- (i) that the companies could spend the accounts receivable assigned to the Bank that would be collected in accordance with a cash flow forecast filed with the court providing for \$1,387,000 to be spent by September 30, 1990; and

- (ii) a stay of proceedings against the Bank acting on any of its security or paying down any of its loans from accounts receivable collected by Elan and Nova.

17 On September 14, 1990, Hoolihan J. extended the terms of his order of September 11, 1990 to remain in effect until the plan of arrangement was presented to the court no later than October 24, 1990 for final approval. This order continued the power of Elan and Nova to spend up to \$1,387,000 of the accounts receivable assigned to the Bank in accordance with the projected cash flow to September 30, 1990, and to spend a further amount to October 24, 1990 in accordance with a cash flow to be approved by Hoolihan J. prior to October 1, 1990. Further orders dated September 27 and October 18 have extended the power to spend the accounts receivable to November 14, 1990.

18 On September 14, 1990 the Bank requested Hoolihan J. to restrict his order so that Elan and Nova could use the accounts receivable assigned to the Bank only so long as they continued to operate within the borrowing guidelines contained in the terms of the loan agreements with the Bank. These guidelines require a certain ratio to exist between Bank loans and the book value of the accounts receivable and inventory assigned to the Bank and are designed in normal circumstances to ensure that there is sufficient value in the security assigned to the Bank. Hoolihan J. refused to make the order.

19 On October 18, 1990 Hoolihan J. ordered that the composition of the classes of secured creditors for the purposes of voting at the meeting of secured creditors shall be as follows:

- (a) The Bank, RoyNat, O.D.C., the City of Chatham and the Village of Glencoe shall comprise one class.
- (b) The parties related to the principal of Elan that acquired their debentures to enable the companies to apply under the CCAA shall comprise a second class.

20 On October 18, 1990, at the request of counsel for Elan and Nova, Hoolihan J. further ordered that the date for the meeting of creditors of Elan and Nova be extended to November 9, 1990 in order to allow a new plan of arrangement to be sent to all creditors, including unsecured creditors of those companies. Elan and Nova now plan to offer a plan of compromise or arrangement to the unsecured creditors of Elan and Nova as well as to the secured creditors.

21 There are five issues in this appeal.

- (1) Are the debentures issued by Elan and Nova for the purpose of permitting the companies to qualify as applicants under the CCAA, debentures within the meaning of s. 3 of the CCAA?
- (2) Did the issue of the debentures contravene the provisions of the loan agreements between Elan and Nova and the Bank? If so, what are the consequences for CCAA purposes?
- (3) Did Elan and Nova have the power to issue the debentures and make application under the CCAA after the Bank had appointed a receiver and after the order of Saunders J.?
- (4) Did Hoolihan J. have the power under s. 11 of the CCAA to make the interim orders that he made with respect to the accounts receivable?
- (5) Was Hoolihan J. correct in ordering that the Bank vote on the proposed plan of arrangement in a class with RoyNat and the other secured creditors?

22 It is well established that the CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Such a resolution can have significant benefits for the company, its shareholders and employees. For this reason the debtor companies, Elan and Nova, are entitled to a broad and liberal interpretation of the jurisdiction of the court under the CCAA. Having said that, it does not follow that, in exercising its discretion to order a meeting of creditors under s. 5 of the CCAA, the court should not consider the equities in this case as they relate to these companies and to one of its principal secured creditors, the Bank.

23 The issues before Hoolihan J. and this court were argued on a technical basis. Hoolihan J. did not give effect to the argument that the debentures described above were a "sham" and could not be used for the purposes of asserting jurisdiction. Unfortunately, he did not address any of the other arguments presented to him on the threshold issue of the availability of the CCAA. He appears to have acted on the premise that if the CCAA can be made available, it should be utilized.

24 If Hoolihan J. did exercise any discretion overall, it is not reflected in his reasons. I believe, therefore, that we are in a position to look at the uncontested chronology of these proceedings and exercise our own discretion. To me, the significant date is August 27, 1990 when the Bank appointed Coopers & Lybrand Ltd. as receiver and manager of the undertaking, property and assets mortgaged and charged under the demand debenture and of the collateral under the general security agreement, both dated June 20, 1979. On the same date it appointed the same company as receiver and manager for Nova under a general security agreement dated December 5, 1988. The effect of this appointment is to divest the companies and their boards of directors of their power to deal with the property comprised in the appointment (Kerr on Receivers, 16th ed. by Raymond Walton (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983), p. 292). Neither Elan nor Nova had the power to create further indebtedness and thus to interfere with the ability of the receiver to manage the two companies (Re Hat Development Ltd. (1988), 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 17, 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 264 (Q.B.), affd (1989), 65 Alta. L.R. (2d) 374 (C.A.)).

25 Counsel for the debtor companies submitted that the management powers of the receiver were stripped from the receiver by Saunders J. in his interim order when he allowed the receiver access to the companies' properties but would not permit it to realize on the security of the Bank until further order. He pointed out that the order also provided that the companies were entitled to remain in possession and "to carry on business in the ordinary course" until further order.

26 I do not agree with counsel's submission covering the effect of the order. It certainly restricted what the receiver could do on an interim basis, but it imposed restrictions on the companies as well. The issue of these disputed debentures in support of an application for relief as insolvent companies under the CCAA does not comply with the order of Saunders J. This is not carrying on business in the ordinary course. The residual power to take all of these initiatives for relief under the CCAA remained with the receiver, and if trust deeds were to be issued, an order of the court in Action 54033/90 was required permitting their issuance and registration.

27 There is another feature which, in my opinion, affects the exercise of discretion and that is the probability of the meeting achieving some measure of success. Hoolihan J. considered the calling of the meeting at one hearing, as he was asked to do, and determined the respective classes of creditors at another. This latter classification is necessary because of the provisions of s. 6(a) of the CCAA which reads as follows:

6. Where a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding

(a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company ...

28 If both matters had been considered at the same time, as in my view they should have been, and if what I regard as a proper classification of the creditors had taken place, I think it is obvious that the meeting would not be a productive one. It was improper, in my opinion, to create one class of creditors made up of all the secured creditors save the so-called "sham" creditors. There is no true community of interest among them and the motivation of Elan and Nova in striving to create a single class is clearly designed to avoid the classification of the Bank as a separate class.

29 It is apparent that the only secured creditors with a significant interest in the proceeding under the CCAA are the Bank and RoyNat. The two municipalities have total claims for arrears of taxes of less than \$100,000. They have first priority in the lands of the companies. They are in no jeopardy whatsoever. The O.D.C. has a potential liability in that it can be called upon by RoyNat under its guarantee to a maximum of \$500,000 and this will trigger default under its debentures with the companies, but its interests lie with RoyNat.

30 As to RoyNat, it is the largest creditor with a debt of some \$12,000,000. It will dominate any class it is in because under s. 6 of the CCAA the majority in a class must represent three-quarters in value of that class. It will always have a veto by reason of the size of its claim but requires at least one creditor to vote for it to give it a majority in number (I am ignoring the municipalities). It needs the O.D.C.

31 I do not base my opinion solely on commercial self-interest but also on the differences in legal interest. The Bank has first priority on the receivables referred to as the "quick assets", and RoyNat ranks second in priority. RoyNat has first priority on the buildings and realty, the "fixed assets", and the Bank has second priority.

32 It is in the commercial interests of the Bank with its smaller claim and more readily realizable assets to collect and retain the accounts receivable. It is in the commercial interests of RoyNat to preserve the cash flow of the business and sell the enterprise as a going concern. It can only do that by overriding the prior claim of the Bank to these receivables. If it can vote with the O.D.C. in the same class as the Bank it can achieve that goal and extinguish the prior claim of the Bank to realize on the receivables. This it can do despite having acknowledged its legal relationship to the Bank in the priority agreement signed by the two. I can think of no reason why the legal interest of the Bank as the holder of the first security on the receivables should be overridden by RoyNat as holder of the second security.

33 The classic statement on classes of creditors is that of Lord Esher M.R. in *Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd*, [1892] 2 Q.B. 573, [1891-4] All E.R. Rep. 246, 41 W.R. 4 (C.A.), at pp. 579-80 Q.B.:

The Act (Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act, 1870) says that the persons to be summoned to the meeting (all of whom, be it said in passing, are creditors) are persons who can be divided into different classes -- classes which the Act of Parliament recognises, though it does not define them. This, therefore, must be done: they must be divided into different classes. What is the reason for such a course? It is because the creditors composing the different classes have different interests; and, therefore, if we find a different state of facts existing among different creditors which may differently affect their minds and their judgment, they must be divided into different classes.

34 The *Sovereign Life* case was quoted with approval by Kingstone J. in *Re Wellington Building Corp. Ltd.*, [1934] O.R. 653, 16 C.B.R. 48, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 626 (H.C.J.), at p. 659 O.R. He also quoted another English authority [*Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas & Pacific Junction Railway Co.*, [1891] 1 Ch. 213, [1886-90] All E.R. Rep. Ext. 1143, 60 L.J. Ch. 221 (C.A.)] at p. 658 O.R.:

In *Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Ry. Co.*, [1891] 1 Ch. 213, a scheme and arrangement under the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act (1870), was submitted to the Court for approval. Lord Justice Bowen, at p. 243, says: --

Now, I have no doubt at all that it would be improper for the Court to allow an arrangement to be forced on any class of creditors, if the arrangement cannot reasonably be supposed by sensible business people to be for the benefit of that class as such, otherwise the sanction of the Court would be a sanction to what would be a scheme of confiscation. The object of this section is not confiscation. ... Its object is to enable compromises to be made which are for the common benefit of the creditors as creditors, or for the common benefit of some class of creditors as such.

35 Kingstone J. set aside a meeting where three classes of creditors were permitted to vote together. He said at p. 660 O.R.:

It is clear that Parliament intended to give the three-fourths majority of any class power to bind that class, but I do not think the Statute should be construed so as to permit holders of subsequent mortgages power to vote and thereby destroy the priority rights and security of a first mortgagee.

36 We have been referred to more modern cases including two decisions of Trainor J. of the British Columbia Supreme Court, both entitled *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* One case is reported in (1988), 31 B.C.L.R. (2d) 35, 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 166, and the other in the same volume [of C.B.R.] at p. 175. Trainor J. was upheld on appeal on both judgments. The first judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal is unreported (September 16, 1988) [now reported 32 B.C.L.R. (2d) 309].

The judgment in the second appeal is reported sub nom. *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada* at (1989), 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122, 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363.

37 In the first *Northland* case, Trainor J. held that the difference in the terms of parties to and priority of different bonds meant that they should be placed in separate classes. He relied upon *Re Wellington Building Corp.*, supra. In the second *Northland* case he dealt with 15 mortgagees who were equal in priority but held different parcels of land as security. Trainor J. held that their relative security positions were the same notwithstanding that the mortgages were for the most part secured by charges against separate properties. The nature of the debt was the same, the nature of the security was the same, the remedies for default were the same, and in all cases they were corporate loans by sophisticated lenders. In specifically accepting the reasoning of Trainor J., the Court of Appeal held that the concern of the various mortgagees as to the quality of their individual securities was "a variable cause arising not by any difference in legal interests, but rather as a consequence of bad lending, or market values, or both" (p. 203 C.B.R.).

38 In *Re NsC Diesel Power Inc.* (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 97 N.S.R. (2d) 295, 258 A.P.R. 295 (T.D.) the court stressed that a class should be made up of persons "whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to a common interest" (p. 8 C.B.R.).

39 My assessment of these secured creditors is that the Bank should be in its own class. This being so, it is obvious that no plan of arrangement can succeed without its approval. There is no useful purpose to be served in putting a plan of arrangement to a meeting of creditors if it is known in advance that it cannot succeed. This is another cogent reason for the court declining to exercise its discretion in favour of the debtor companies.

40 For all the reasons given above, the application under the CCAA should have been dismissed. I do not think that I have to give definitive answers to the individual issues numbered (1) and (2). They can be addressed in a later case where the answers could be dispositive of an application under the CCAA. The answer to (3) is that the combined effect of the receivership and the order of Saunders J. disentitled the companies to issue the debentures and bring the application under the CCAA. It is not necessary to answer issue (4) and the answer to (5) is no.

41 Accordingly, I would allow the appeal, set aside the three orders of Hoolihan J., and in their place, issue an order dismissing the application under the CCAA. The Bank should receive its costs of this appeal, the applications for leave to appeal, and the proceedings before Farley and Hoolihan JJ., to be paid by Elan, Nova and RoyNat.

42 Ernst & Young were appointed monitor in the order of Hoolihan J. dated September 14, 1990 to monitor the operations of Elan and Nova and give effect to and supervise the terms and conditions of the stay of proceedings in accordance with Appendix C appended to the order. The monitor should be entitled to be paid for all services performed to date including whatever is necessary to complete its reports for past work as called for in Appendix C.

DOHERTY J.A. (dissenting):--

I. BACKGROUND

43 On November 2, 1990, this court allowed the appeal brought by the Bank of Nova Scotia (the Bank) and vacated several orders made by Hoolihan J. Finlayson J.A. delivered oral reasons on behalf of the majority. At the same time, I delivered brief oral reasons dissenting in part from the conclusion reached by the majority and undertook to provide further written reasons. These are those reasons.

44 The events relevant to the disposition of this appeal are set out in some detail in the oral reasons of Finlayson J.A. I will not repeat that chronology but will refer to certain additional background facts before turning to the legal issues.

45 Elan Corporation (Elan) owns the shares of Nova Metal Products Inc. (Nova Inc.). Both companies have been actively involved in the manufacture of automobile parts for a number of years. As of March 1990, the companies had total annual sales of about \$30,000,000 and employed some 220 people in plants located in Chatham and Glencoe, Ontario. The operation of these companies no doubt plays a significant role in the economy of these two small communities.

46 In the four years prior to 1989, the companies had operated at a profit ranging from \$287,000 (1987) to \$1,500,000 (1986). In 1989, several factors, including large capital expenditures and a downturn in the market, combined to produce an operational loss of about \$1,333,000. It is anticipated that the loss for the year ending June 30, 1990, will be about \$2.3 million. As of August 1, 1990, the companies continued in full operation and those in control anticipated that the financial picture would improve significantly later in 1990 when the companies would be busy filling several contracts which had been obtained earlier in 1990.

47 The Bank has provided credit to the companies for several years. In January of 1989 the Bank extended an operating line of credit to the companies. The line of credit was by way of a demand loan that was secured in the manner described by Finlayson J.A. Beginning in May 1989, and from time to time after that, the companies were in default under the terms of the loan advanced by the Bank. On each occasion the Bank and the companies managed to work out some agreement so that the Bank continued as lender and the companies continued to operate their plants.

48 Late in 1989, the companies arranged for a \$500,000 operating loan from RoyNat Inc. It was hoped that this loan, combined with the operating line of \$2.5 million from the Bank, would permit the company to weather its fiscal storm. In March 1990, the Bank took the position that the companies were in breach of certain requirements under their loan agreements and warned that if the difficulties were not rectified the Bank would not continue as the company's lender. Mr. Patrick Johnson, the president of both companies, attempted to respond to these concerns in a detailed letter to the Bank dated March 15, 1990. The response did not placate the Bank. In May 1990, the Bank called its loan and made a demand for immediate payment. Mr. Spencer, for the Bank, wrote: "We consider your financial condition continues to be critical and we are not prepared to delay further making formal demand". He went on to indicate that, subject to further deterioration in the companies' fiscal position, the Bank was prepared to delay acting on its security until June 1, 1990.

49 As of May 1990, Mr. Johnson, to the Bank's knowledge, was actively seeking alternative funding to replace the Bank. At the same time, he was trying to convince the union which represented the workers employed at both plants to assist in a co-operative effort to keep the plants operational during the hard times. The union had agreed to discuss amendment of the collective bargaining agreement to facilitate the continued operation of the companies.

50 The June 1, 1990, deadline set by the Bank passed without incident. Mr. Johnson continued to search for new financing. A potential lender was introduced to Mr. Spencer of the Bank on August 13, 1990, and it appeared that the Bank, through Mr. Spencer, was favourably impressed with this potential lender. However, on August 27, 1990, the Bank decided to take action to protect its position. Coopers & Lybrand Ltd. was appointed by the Bank as receiver-manager under the terms of the security agreements with the companies. The companies denied the receiver access to their plants. The Bank then moved before the Honourable Mr. Justice E. Saunders for an order giving the receiver possession of the premises occupied by the companies. On August 27, 1990, after hearing argument from counsel for the Bank and the companies, Mr. Justice Saunders refused to install the receivers and made the following interim order:

1. THIS COURT ORDERS that the receiver be allowed access to the property to monitor the operations of the defendants but shall not take steps to realize on the security of The Bank of Nova Scotia until further Order of the Court.

2. THIS COURT ORDERS that the defendants shall be entitled to remain in possession and to carry on business in the ordinary course until further Order of this Court.

3. THIS COURT ORDERS that until further order the Bank of Nova Scotia shall not take steps to notify account debtors of the defendants for the purpose of collecting outstanding accounts receivable. This Order does not restrict The Bank of Nova Scotia from dealing with accounts receivable of the defendants received by it.

4. THIS COURT ORDERS that the motion is otherwise adjourned to a date to be fixed.

51 The notice of motion placed before Saunders J. by the Bank referred to "an intended action" by the Bank. It does not appear that the Bank took any further steps in connection with this "intended action".

52 Having resisted the Bank's efforts to assume control of the affairs of the companies on August 27, 1990, and realizing that their operations could cease within a matter of days, the companies turned to the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the Act) in an effort to hold the Bank at bay while attempting to reorganize their finances. Finlayson J.A. has described the companies' efforts to qualify under that Act, the two appearances before the Honourable Mr. Justice Farley on August 31, 1990, and the appearances before the Honourable Mr. Justice Hoolihan in September and October 1990, which resulted in the orders challenged on this appeal.

II. THE ISSUES

53 The dispute between the Bank and the companies when this application came before Hoolihan J. was a straightforward one. The Bank had determined that its best interests would be served by the immediate execution of the rights it had under its various agreements with the companies. The Bank's best interest was not met by the continued operation of the companies as going con-

cerns. The companies and their other two substantial secured creditors considered that their interests required that the companies continue to operate, at least for a period which would enable the companies to place a plan of reorganization before its creditors.

54 All parties were pursuing what they perceived to be their commercial interests. To the Bank these interests entailed the "death" of the companies as operating entities. To the companies these interests required "life support" for the companies through the provisions of the Act to permit a "last ditch" effort to save the companies and keep them in operation.

55 The issues raised on this appeal can be summarized as follows:

- (i) Did Hoolihan J. err in holding that the companies were entitled to invoke the Act?
- (ii) Did Hoolihan J. err in exercising his discretion in directing that a meeting of creditors should be held under the Act?
- (iii) Did Hoolihan J. err in directing that the Bank and RoyNat Inc. should be placed in the same class of creditors for the purposes of the Act?
- (iv) Did Hoolihan J. err in the terms of the interim orders he made pending the meeting of creditors and the submission to the court of a plan of reorganization?

III. THE PURPOSE AND SCHEME OF THE ACT

56 Before turning to these issues, it is necessary to understand the purpose of the Act and the scheme established by the Act for achieving that purpose. The Act first appeared in the midst of the Great Depression (Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1933, S.C. 1932-33, c. 36). The Act was intended to provide a means whereby insolvent companies could avoid bankruptcy and continue as ongoing concerns through a reorganization of their financial obligations. The reorganization contemplated required the co-operation of the debtor companies' creditors and shareholders: *Re Avery Construction Co.* (1942), 24 C.B.R. 17, [1942] 4 D.L.R. 558 (Ont. H.C.J.), Stanley E. Edwards, "Reorganizations under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947), 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587, at pp. 592-93; David H. Goldman, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)" (1985), 55 C.B.R. (N.S.) 36, at pp. 37-39.

57 The legislation is remedial in the purest sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor-initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.

58 The purpose of the Act was artfully put by Gibbs J.A., speaking for the British Columbia Court of Appeal (Carrothers, Cumming and Gibbs J.J.A.) in *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. HongKong Bank of Canada*, an unreported judgment released October 29, 1990 [summarized 23 A.C.W.S. (3d) Paragraph 976], at pp. 11 and 6 of the reasons. In referring to the purpose for which the Act was initially proclaimed, he said:

Almost inevitably liquidation destroyed the shareholders' investment, yielded little by way of recovery to the creditors, and exacerbated the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment. The government of the day sought, through the C.C.A.A. (the Act), to create a regime whereby the principals of the company and the creditors could be brought together under the supervision of the court to

attempt a reorganization or compromise or arrangement under which the company could continue in business ...

In an earlier passage His Lordship had said:

The purpose of the C.C.A.A. is to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors to the end that the company is able to continue in business.

59 Gibbs J.A. also observed (at p. 13 of the reasons) that the Act was designed to serve a "broad constituency of investors, creditors and employees". Because of that "broad constituency" the court must, when considering applications brought under the Act, have regard not only to the individuals and organizations directly affected by the application, but also to the wider public interest. That interest is generally, but not always, served by permitting an attempt at reorganization: see Edwards, "Reorganizations under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act", *supra*, at p. 593.

60 The Act must be given a wide and liberal construction so as to enable it to effectively serve this remedial purpose: Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 12; Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. HongKong Bank of Canada, *supra*, at p. 14 of the reasons.

61 The Act is available to all insolvent companies, provided the requirements of s. 3 of the Act are met. That section provides:

3. This Act does not apply in respect of a debtor company unless

(a) the debtor company has outstanding an issue of secured or unsecured bonds of the debtor company or of a predecessor in title of the debtor company issued under a trust deed or other instrument running in favour of a trustee; and

(b) the compromise or arrangement that is proposed under section 4 or 5 in respect of the debtor company includes a compromise or an arrangement between the debtor company and the holders of an issue referred to in paragraph (a).

62 A debtor company, or a creditor of that company, invokes the Act by way of summary application to the court under s. 4 or s. 5 of the Act. For present purposes, s. 5 is the relevant section:

5. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

63 Section 5 does not require that the court direct a meeting of creditors to consider a proposed plan. The court's power to do so is discretionary. There will no doubt be cases where no order will be made, even though the debtor company qualifies under s. 3 of the Act.

64 If the court determines that a meeting should be called, the creditors must be placed into classes for the purpose of that meeting. The significance of this classification process is made apparent by s. 6 of the Act.

6. Where a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding

(a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and

(b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the Bankruptcy Act or is in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up Act, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

65 If the plan of reorganization is approved by the creditors as required by s. 6, it must then be presented to the court. Once again, the court must exercise a discretion and determine whether it will approve the plan of reorganization. In exercising that discretion, the court is concerned not only with whether the appropriate majority has approved the plan at a meeting held in accordance with the Act and the order of the court, but also with whether the plan is a fair and reasonable one: *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C. S.C.) [aff'd sub nom *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada* (1989), 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122, 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363 (C.A.)], at pp. 182-85 C.B.R.

66 If the court chooses to exercise its discretion in favour of calling a meeting of creditors for the purpose of considering a plan of reorganization, the Act provides that the rights and remedies available to creditors, the debtor company, and others during the period between the making of the initial order and the consideration of the proposed plan may be suspended or otherwise controlled by the court.

67 Section 11 gives a court wide powers to make any interim orders:

11. Notwithstanding anything in the Bankruptcy Act or the Winding-up Act, whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,

(a) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the Bankruptcy Act and the Winding-up Act or either of them;

(b) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and

(c) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

68 Viewed in its totality, the Act gives the court control over the initial decision to put the reorganization plan before the creditors, the classification of creditors for the purpose of considering the plan, conduct affecting the debtor company pending consideration of that plan, and the ultimate acceptability of any plan agreed upon by the creditors. The Act envisions that the rights and remedies of individual creditors, the debtor company, and others may be sacrificed, at least temporarily, in an effort to serve the greater good by arriving at some acceptable reorganization which allows the debtor company to continue in operation: *Icor Oil & Gas Co. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce* (No. 1) (1989), 102 A.R. 161 (Q.B.), at p. 165.

IV. DID HOOLIHAN J. ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE DEBTOR COMPANIES WERE ENTITLED TO INVOKE THE ACT?

69 The appellant advances three arguments in support of its contention that Elan and Nova Inc. were not entitled to seek relief under the Act. It argues first that the debentures issued by the companies after August 27, 1990, were "shams" and did not fulfil the requirements of s. 3 of the Act. The appellant next contends that the issuing of the debentures by the companies contravened their agreements with the Bank in which they undertook not to further encumber the assets of the companies without the consent of the Bank. Lastly, the appellant maintains that once the Bank had appointed a receiver-manager over the affairs of the companies on August 27, 1990, the companies had no power to create further indebtedness by way of debentures or to bring an application on behalf of the companies under the Act.

(i) Section 3 and "instant" trust deeds

70 The debentures issued in August 1990, after the Bank had moved to install a receiver-manager, were issued solely and expressly for the purpose of meeting the requirements of s. 3 of the Act. Indeed, it took the companies two attempts to meet those requirements. The debentures had no commercial purpose. The transactions did, however, involve true loans in the sense that monies were advanced and debt was created. Appropriate and valid trust deeds were also issued.

71 In my view, it is inappropriate to refer to these transactions as "shams". They are neither false nor counterfeit, but rather are exactly what they appear to be, transactions made to meet jurisdictional requirements of the Act so as to permit an application for reorganization under the Act. Such transactions are apparently well known to the commercial bar: B. O'Leary, "A Review of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1987), 4 *National Insolvency Review* 38, at p. 39; C.

Keith Ham, " 'Instant' Trust Deeds Under the CCAA" (1988), 2 Comm. Insol. R. 25; G. Morawetz, "Emerging Trends in the Use of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1990), Proceedings of the First Annual General Meeting and Conference of the Insolvency Institute of Canada.

Mr. Ham, *supra*, writes at p. 25, continued on p. 30:

Consequently, some companies have recently sought to bring themselves within the ambit of the CCAA by creating "instant" trust deeds, i.e., trust deeds which are created solely for the purpose of enabling them to take advantage of the CCAA.

72 Applications under the Act involving the use of "instant" trust deeds have been before the courts on a number of occasions. In no case has any court held that a company cannot gain access to the Act by creating a debt which meets the requirements of s. 3 for the express purpose of qualifying under the Act. In most cases, the use of these "instant" trust deeds has been acknowledged without comment.

73 The decision of Chief Justice Richard in *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op* (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44, 84 N.B.R. (2d) 415, 214 A.P.R. 415 (Q.B.), at pp. 55-56 C.B.R., speaks directly to the use of "instant" trust deeds. The Chief Justice refused to read any words into s. 3 of the Act which would limit the availability of the Act depending on the point at which, or the purpose for which, the debenture or bond and accompanying trust deed were created. He accepted [p. 56 C.B.R.] the debtor company's argument that the Act:

... does not impose any time restraints on the creation of the conditions as set out in s. 3 of the Act, nor does it contain any prohibition against the creation of the conditions set out in s. 3 for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction.

74 It should, however, be noted that in *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op*, *supra*, the debt itself was not created for the purpose of qualifying under the Act. The bond and the trust deed, however, were created for that purpose. The case is therefore factually distinguishable from the case at bar.

75 The Court of Appeal reversed the ruling of the Chief Justice ((1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161, 51 D.L.R. (4th) 618 sub nom. *Canadian Co-operative Leasing Services v. United Maritime Fishermen Co-op*, 88 N.B.R. (2d) 253, 224 A.P.R. 253) on the basis that the bonds required by s. 3 of the Act had not been issued when the application was made, so that on a precise reading of the words of s. 3 the company did not qualify. The court did not go on to consider whether, had the bonds been properly issued, the company would have been entitled to invoke the Act. Hoyt J.A., for the majority, did, however, observe without comment that the trust deeds had been created specifically for the purpose of bringing an application under the Act.

76 The judgment of MacKinnon J. in *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd. and Children's Corner Fashions Ltd.*, released January 24, 1990 (B.C. S.C.), is factually on all fours with the present case. In that case, as in this one, it was acknowledged that the sole purpose for creating the debt was to effect compliance with s. 3 of the Act. After considering the judgment of Chief Justice Richard in *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op*, *supra*, MacKinnon J. held, at p. 4 of the reasons:

The reason for creating the trust deed is not for the usual purposes of securing a debt but when one reads it, on its face, it does that. I find that it is a genuine trust deed and not a fraud and that the petitioners have complied with s. 3 of the statute.

77 *Re Metals & Alloys Co.* is a recent example of a case in this jurisdiction in which "instant" trust deeds were successfully used to bring a company within the Act. The company issued debentures for the purpose of permitting the company to qualify under the Act so as to provide it with an opportunity to prepare and submit a reorganization plan. The company then applied for an order, seeking inter alia a declaration that the debtor company was a corporation within the meaning of the Act. Houlden J.A., hearing the matter at first instance, granted the declaration requested in an order dated February 16, 1990. No reasons were given. It does not appear that the company's qualifications were challenged before Houlden J.A.; however, the nature of the debentures issued and the purpose for their issue was fully disclosed in the material before him. The requirements of s. 3 of the Act are jurisdictional in nature and the consent of the parties cannot vest a court with jurisdiction it does not have. One must conclude that Houlden J.A. was satisfied that "instant" trust deeds suffice for the purposes of s. 3 of the Act.

78 A similar conclusion is implicit in the reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. and HongKong Bank of Canada*, supra. In that case, a debt of \$50, with an accompanying debenture and trust deed, was created specifically to enable the company to make application under the Act. The court noted that the debt was created solely for that purpose in an effort to forestall an attempt by the bank to liquidate the assets of the debtor company. The court went on to deal with the merits and to dismiss an appeal from an order granting a stay pending a reorganization meeting. The court could not have reached the merits without first concluding that the \$50 debt created by the company met the requirements of s. 3 of the Act.

79 The weight of authority is against the appellant. Counsel for the appellant attempts to counter that authority by reference to the remarks of the Minister of Justice when s. 3 was introduced as an amendment to the Act in the 1952-53 sittings of Parliament (House of Commons Debates, 1952-53 (1-2 Eliz. 2), vol. II, pp. 1268-69). The interpretation of words found in a statute by reference to speeches made in Parliament at the time legislation is introduced has never found favour in our courts: *Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979*, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714, 123 D.L.R. (3d) 554, 37 N.R. 158, at p. 721 S.C.R., p. 561 D.L.R. Nor, with respect to Mr. Newbould's able argument, do I find the words of the Minister of Justice at the time the present s. 3 was introduced to be particularly illuminating. He indicated that the amendment to the Act left companies with complex financial structures free to resort to the Act, but that it excluded companies which had only unsecured mercantile creditors. The Minister does not comment on the intended effect of the amendment on the myriad situations between those two extremes. This case is one such situation. These debtor companies had complex secured debt structures but those debts were not, prior to the issuing of the debentures in August 1990, in the form contemplated by s. 3 of the Act. Like Richard C.J.Q.B. in *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op*, supra, at pp. 52-53 C.B.R., I am not persuaded that the comments of the Minister of Justice assist in interpreting s. 3 of the Act in this situation.

80 The words of s. 3 are straightforward. They require that the debtor company have, at the time an application is made, an outstanding debenture or bond issued under a trust deed. No more is needed. Attempts to qualify those words are not only contrary to the wide reading the Act deserves but can raise intractable problems as to what qualifications or modifications should be read into the

Act. Where there is a legitimate debt which fits the criteria set out in s. 3, I see no purpose in denying a debtor company resort to the Act because the debt and the accompanying documentation was created for the specific purpose of bringing the application. It must be remembered that qualification under s. 3 entitles the debtor company to nothing more than consideration under the Act. Qualification under s. 3 does not mean that relief under the Act will be granted. The circumstances surrounding the creation of the debt needed to meet the s. 3 requirement may well have a bearing on how a court exercises its discretion at various stages of the application, but they do not alone interdict resort to the Act.

81 In holding that "instant" trust deeds can satisfy the requirements of s. 3 of the Act, I should not be taken as concluding that debentures or bonds which are truly shams, in that they do not reflect a transaction which actually occurred and do not create a real debt owed by the company, will suffice. Clearly, they will not. I do not, however, equate the two. One is a tactical device used to gain the potential advantages of the Act. The other is a fraud.

82 Nor does my conclusion that "instant" trust deeds can bring a debtor company within the Act exclude considerations of the good faith of the debtor company in seeking the protection of the Act. A debtor company should not be allowed to use the Act for any purpose other than to attempt a legitimate reorganization. If the purpose of the application is to advantage one creditor over another, to defeat the legitimate interests of creditors, to delay the inevitable failure of the debtor company, or for some other improper purpose, the court has the means available to it, apart entirely from s. 3 of the Act, to prevent misuse of the Act. In cases where the debtor company acts in bad faith, the court may refuse to order a meeting of creditors, it may deny interim protection, it may vary interim protection initially given when the bad faith is shown, or it may refuse to sanction any plan which emanates from the meeting of the creditors: see L. Crozier "Good Faith and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1989), 15 Can. Bus. L.J. 89.

(ii) Section 3 and the prior agreement with the Bank limiting creation of new debt

83 The appellant also argues that the debentures did not meet the requirements of s. 3 of the Act because they were issued in contravention of a security agreement made between the companies and the Bank. Assuming that the debentures were issued in contravention of that agreement, I do not understand how that contravention affects the status of the debentures for the purposes of s. 3 of the Act. The Bank may well have an action against the debtor company for issuing the debentures, and it may have remedies against the holders of the debentures if they attempted to collect on their debt or enforce their security. Neither possibility, however, negates the existence of the debentures and the related trust deeds. Section 3 does not contemplate an inquiry into the effectiveness or enforceability of the s. 3 debentures, as against other creditors, as a condition precedent to qualification under the Act. Such inquiries may play a role in a judge's determination as to what orders, if any, should be made under the Act.

(iii) Section 3 and the appointment of a receiver-manager

84 The third argument made by the Bank relies on its installation of a receiver-manager in both companies prior to the issue of the debentures. I agree with Finlayson J.A. that the placement of a receiver, either by operation of the terms of an agreement or by court order, effectively removes those formerly in control of the company from that position and vests that control in the receiver-manager: *Re Hat Development Ltd.* (1988), 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 17, 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 264 (Q.B.),

affirmed without deciding this point (1989), 65 Alta. L.R. (2d) 374 (C.A.). I cannot, however, agree with his interpretation of the order of Saunders J. I read that order as effectively turning the receiver into a monitor with rights of access, but with no authority beyond that. The operation of the business is specifically returned to the companies. The situation created by the order of Saunders J. can usefully be compared to that which existed when the application was made in *Re Hat Development Ltd.*, supra. Forsyth J., at p. 268 C.B.R., states:

The receiver-manager in this case and indeed in almost all cases is charged by the court with the responsibility of managing the affairs of a corporation. It is true that is appointed pursuant, in this case, to the existence of secured indebtedness and at the behest of a secured creditor to realize on its security and retire the indebtedness. Nonetheless, this receiver-manager was court-appointed and not by virtue of an instrument. As a court-appointed receiver it owed the obligation and the duty to the court to account from time to time and to come before the court for the purposes of having some of its decisions ratified or for receiving advice and direction. It is empowered by the court to manage the affairs of the company and it is completely inconsistent with that function to suggest that some residual power lies in the hands of the directors of the company to create further indebtedness of the company and thus interfere however slightly, with the receiver-manager's ability to manage.

(Emphasis added)

85 After the order of Saunders J., the receiver-manager in this case was not obligated to manage the companies. Indeed, it was forbidden from doing so. The creation of the "instant" trust deeds and the application under the Act did not interfere in any way with any power or authority the receiver-manager had after the order of Saunders J. was made.

86 I also find it somewhat artificial to suggest that the presence of a receiver-manager served to vitiate the orders of Hoolihan J. Unlike many applications under s. 5 of the Act, the proceedings before Hoolihan J. were not ex parte and he was fully aware of the existence of the receiver-manager, the order of Saunders J., and the arguments based on the presence of the receiver-manager. Clearly, Hoolihan J. considered it appropriate to proceed with a plan of reorganization despite the presence of the receiver-manager and the order of Saunders J. Indeed, in his initial order he provided that the order of Saunders J. "remains extant". Hoolihan J. did not, as I do not, see that order as an impediment to the application for the granting of relief under the Act. Had he considered that the receiver-manager was in control of the affairs of the company he could have varied the order of Saunders J. to permit the applications under the Act to be made by the companies: *Re Hat Development Ltd.*, supra, at pp. 268-69 C.B.R. It is clear to me that he would have done so had he felt it necessary. If the installation of the receiver-manager is to be viewed as a bar to an application under this Act, and if the orders of Hoolihan J. were otherwise appropriate, I would order that the order of Saunders J. should be varied to permit the creation of the debentures and the trust deeds and the bringing of this application by the companies. I take this power to exist by the combined effect of s. 14(2) of the Act and s. 144(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, 1984, S.O. 1984, c. 11.

87 In my opinion, the debentures and "instant" trust deeds created in August of 1990 sufficed to bring the company within the requirements of s. 3 of the Act, even if in issuing those debentures the companies breached a prior agreement with the Bank. I am also satisfied that given the terms of the

order of Saunders J., the existence of a receiver-manager installed by the Bank did not preclude the application under s. 3 of the Act.

V. DID HOOLIHAN J. ERR IN EXERCISING HIS DISCRETION
IN FAVOUR OF DIRECTING THAT A CREDITORS MEETING
BE HELD TO CONSIDER THE PROPOSED PLAN
OF REORGANIZATION?

88 As indicated earlier, the Act provides a number of points at which the court must exercise its discretion. I am concerned with the initial exercise of discretion contemplated by s. 5 of the Act by which the court may order a meeting of creditors for purposes of considering a plan of reorganization. Hoolihan J. exercised that discretion in favour of the debtor companies. The factors relevant to the exercise of that discretion are as variable as the fact situations which may give rise to the application. Finlayson J.A. has concentrated on one such factor, the chance that the plan, if put before a properly constituted meeting of the creditors, could gain the required approval. I agree that the feasibility of the plan is a relevant and significant factor to be considered in determining whether to order a meeting of creditors: Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act", *supra*, at pp. 594-95. I would not, however, impose a heavy burden on the debtor company to establish the likelihood of ultimate success from the outset. As the Act will often be the last refuge for failing companies, it is to be expected that many of the proposed plans of reorganization will involve variables and contingencies which will make the plan's ultimate acceptability to the creditors and the court very uncertain at the time the initial application is made.

89 On the facts before Hoolihan J. there were several factors which supported the exercise of his discretion in favour of directing a meeting of the creditors. These included the apparent support of two of the three substantial secured creditors, the companies' continued operation, and the prospect (disputed by the Bank) that the companies' fortunes would take a turn for the better in the near future, the companies' ongoing efforts, that eventually met with some success, to find alternate financing, and the number of people depending on the operation of the company for their livelihood. There were also a number of factors pointing in the other direction, the most significant of which was the likelihood that a plan of reorganization acceptable to the Bank could not be developed.

90 I see the situation which presented itself to Hoolihan J. as capable of a relatively straightforward risk-benefit analysis. If the s. 5 order had been refused by Hoolihan J., it was virtually certain that the operation of the companies would have ceased immediately. There would have been immediate economic and social damage to those who worked at the plants and those who depended on those who worked at the plants for their well-being. This kind of damage cannot be ignored, especially when it occurs in small communities like those in which these plants are located. A refusal to grant the application would also have put the investments of the various creditors, with the exception of the Bank, at substantial risk. Finally, there would have been obvious financial damage to the owner of the companies. Balanced against these costs inherent in refusing the order would be the benefit to the Bank, which would then have been in a position to realize on its security in accordance with its agreements with the companies.

91 The granting of the s. 5 order was not without its costs. It has denied the Bank the rights it had bargained for as part of its agreement to lend substantial amounts of money to the companies. Further, according to the Bank, the order has put the Bank at risk of having its loans become under-secured because of the diminishing value of the accounts receivable and inventory which it holds as security and because of the ever increasing size of the companies' debt to the Bank. These

costs must be measured against the potential benefit to all concerned if a successful plan of reorganization could be developed and implemented.

92 As I see it, the key to this analysis rests in the measurement of the risk to the Bank inherent in the granting of the s. 5 order. If there was a real risk that the loan made by the Bank would become undersecured during the operative period of the s. 5 order, I would be inclined to hold that the Bank should not have that risk forced on it by the court. However, I am unable to see that the Bank is in any real jeopardy. The value of the security held by the Bank appears to be well in excess of the size of its loan on the initial application. In his affidavit, Mr. Gibbons of Coopers & Lybrand asserted that the companies had over-stated their cash flow projections, that the value of the inventory could diminish if customers of the companies looked to alternate sources for their product, and that the value of the accounts receivable could decrease if customers began to claim set-offs against those receivables. On the record before me, these appear to be no more than speculative possibilities. The Bank has had access to all of the companies' financial data on an ongoing basis since the order of Hoolihan J. was made almost two months ago. Nothing was placed before this court to suggest that any of the possibilities described above had come to pass.

93 Even allowing for some over-estimation by the companies of the value of the security held by the Bank, it would appear that the Bank holds security valued at approximately \$4 million for a loan that was, as of the hearing of this appeal, about \$2.3 million. The order of Hoolihan J. was to terminate no later than November 14, 1990. I am not satisfied that the Bank ran any real risk of having the amount of the loan exceed the value of the security by that date. It is also worth noting that the order under appeal provided that any party could apply to terminate the order at any point prior to November 14. This provision provided further protection for the Bank in the event that it wished to make the case that its loan was at risk because of the deteriorating value of its security.

94 Even though the chances of a successful reorganization were not good, I am satisfied that the benefits flowing from the making of the s. 5 order exceeded the risk inherent in that order. In my view, Hoolihan J. properly exercised his discretion in directing that a meeting of creditors should be held pursuant to s. 5 of the Act.

95 VI. DID HOOLIHAN J. ERR IN DIRECTING THAT THE BANK AND ROYNAT INC. SHOULD BE PLACED IN THE SAME CLASS FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE ACT?

96 I agree with Finlayson J.A. that the Bank and RoyNat Inc., the two principal creditors, should not have been placed in the same class of secured creditors for the purposes of ss. 5 and 6 of the Act. Their interests are not only different, they are opposed. The classification scheme created by Hoolihan J. effectively denied the Bank any control over any plan of reorganization.

97 To accord with the principles found in the cases cited by Finlayson J.A., the secured creditors should have been grouped as follows:

Class 1	--	The City of Chatham and the Village of Glencoe
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Class 2	--	The Bank of Nova Scotia
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Class 3 -- RoyNat Inc., Ontario Development Corporation, and those holding debentures issued by the company on August 29 and 31, 1990.

VII. DID HOOLIHAN J. ERR IN MAKING
VII. THE INTERIM ORDERS HE MADE?

98 Hoolihan J. made a number of orders designed to control the conduct of all of the parties pending the creditors' meeting and the placing of a plan of reorganization before the court. The first order was made on September 11, 1990, and was to expire on or before October 24, 1990. Subsequent orders varied the terms of the initial order somewhat and extended its effective date until November 14, 1990.

99 These orders imposed the following conditions pending the meeting:

- (a) all proceedings with respect to the debtor companies should be stayed, including any action by the Bank to realize on its security;
- (b) the Bank could not reduce its loan by applying incoming receipts to those debts;
- (c) the Bank was to be the sole banker for the companies;
- (d) the companies could carry on business in the normal course, subject to certain very specific restrictions;
- (e) a licensed trustee was to be appointed to monitor the business operations of the companies and to report to the creditors on a regular basis; and
- (f) any party could apply to terminate the interim orders, and the orders would be terminated automatically if the companies defaulted on any of the obligations imposed on them by the interim orders.

100 The orders placed significant restrictions on the Bank for a two-month period but balanced those restrictions with provisions limiting the debtor companies' activities and giving the Bank ongoing access to up-to-date financial information concerning the companies. The Bank was also at liberty to return to the court to request any variation in the interim orders which changes in financial circumstances might merit.

101 These orders were made under the wide authority granted to the court by s. 11 of the Act. L.W. Houlden and C.H. Morawetz in *Bankruptcy Law in Canada*, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, looseleaf), at p. 2-103, describe the purpose of the section:

The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allows a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and its creditors. This aim is facilitated by s. 11 of the Act which enables the court to restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company upon such terms as the court sees fit.

102 A similar sentiment appears in *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. HongKong Bank of Canada*, supra. Gibbs J.A., in discussing the scope of s. 11, said at p. 7 of the reasons:

When a company has recourse to the C.C.A.A. the court is called upon to play a kind of supervisory role to preserve the status quo and to move the process along to the point where a compromise or arrangement is approved or it is evident that the attempt is doomed to failure. Obviously time is critical. Equally obviously, if the attempt at compromise or arrangement is to have any prospect of success there must be a means of holding the creditors at bay, hence the powers vested in the court under s. 11.

103 Similar views of the scope of the power to make interim orders covering the period when reorganization is being attempted are found in *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank* (1984), 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 53 A.R. 39, 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215 (Q.B.), at pp. 42-45 A.R., pp. 114-18 C.B.R.; *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1 (Q.B.), at pp. 12-15 C.B.R.; *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* B.C. S.C., Thackray J., released June 18, 1990, at pp. 5-9 of the reasons [now reported 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193; and O'Leary, B., "A Review of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act", *supra*, at p. 41.

104 The interim orders made by Hoolihan J. are all within the wide authority created by s. 11 of the Act. The orders were crafted to give the company the opportunity to continue in operation pending its attempt to reorganize while at the same time providing safeguards to the creditors, including the Bank, during that same period. I find no error in the interim relief granted by Hoolihan J.

VIII. CONCLUSION

105 In the result, I would allow the appeal in part, vacate the order of Hoolihan J. of October 18, 1990, insofar as it purports to settle the class of creditors for the purpose of the Act, and I would substitute an order establishing the three classes referred to in Part VI of these reasons. I would not disturb any of the other orders made by Hoolihan J.

Appeal allowed.

TAB 2

Case Name:
ScoZinc Ltd. (Re)

**IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of
ScoZinc Limited**

[2009] N.S.J. No. 227

2009 NSSC 163

55 C.B.R. (5th) 205

2009 CarswellNS 283

177 A.C.W.S. (3d) 294

Docket: Hfx No. 305549

Registry: Halifax

Nova Scotia Supreme Court
Halifax, Nova Scotia

D.R. Beveridge J.

Heard: May 1, 2009.
Oral judgment: May 1, 2009.
Released: May 20, 2009.

(13 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Compromises and arrangements -- Proposals -- Meetings of creditors -- Sanction by court -- Motion by ScoZinc for a meeting of creditors under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, for extension of a stay of proceedings, and for approval that notice of the motion be given only to defined creditors allowed -- Court approval of the proposal was not necessary before it was presented to creditors; accordingly, the meeting was ordered -- The extension of the stay was granted -- Given the

volume of material involved, only creditors with claims over \$100,000 need be given notice of the motion.

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Proceedings -- Practice and procedure -- Notice -- Stays -- Motion by ScoZinc for a meeting of creditors under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, for extension of a stay of proceedings, and for approval that notice of the motion be given only to defined creditors allowed -- Court approval of the proposal was not necessary before it was presented to creditors; accordingly, the meeting was ordered -- The extension of the stay was granted -- Given the volume of material involved, only creditors with claims over \$100,000 need be given notice of the motion.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 4, s. 5, s. 11, s. 11(4), s. 11(6)

Counsel:

John D. Stringer, Q.C. and Ben Durnford, for the applicant.

Robbie MacKeigan, Q.C., for Daniel Rozon.

John McFarlane, Q.C. for Kamatsu.

1 D.R. BEVERIDGE J. (orally):-- ScoZinc brings a motion seeking an order to accomplish three things. The first is for a meeting of the creditors pursuant to ss. 4 and 5 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*. The second is a further extension of the stay of proceedings initially ordered by this Court on December 22, 2008 and extended from time to time. The third is approval of notice of this motion being given only to certain defined creditors.

2 The company has filed an affidavit of William Felderhof referred to as his seventh affidavit, sworn April 28, 2009 and the Monitor has filed its sixth report dated April 30, 2009.

3 As part of its submissions the company notes that there is nothing in the *CCAA* which requires the Court to give prior preliminary approval of ScoZinc's proposed plan before it is presented to the creditors. It notes that the jurisprudence establishes that this approval is generally desirable prior to calling a meeting of the creditors. Some, but not all of this jurisprudence was reviewed by MacAdam J. in *Re Federal Gypsum* 2007 NSSC 384.

4 Justice MacAdam in *Re Federal Gypsum* did refer to the two different standards that have been proposed or referred to in cases from Ontario and British Columbia. Some of these cases have expressed the view that the debtor company should establish that the plan has "a reasonable chance" that it would be accepted by the creditors. Other cases have referred to the appropriate test as simply a determination as to whether or not the proposed plan is one that would be "doomed to failure".

5 In a different context, Glube C.J.T.D. (as she then was) in *Fairview Industries* (1991), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 43 cautioned that it would be impractical and extremely costly to continue to prepare a plan when "there is no hope that it would be approved".

6 I think it fair to say that MacAdam J., although not expressly but by necessary implication, preferred the lower standard facing a debtor company in submitting its plan to the Court for a preliminary approval. At para. 12 he wrote:

[12] In view of the relatively low threshold on the Company in seeking Court approval to have a plan of arrangement submitted to the creditors for a vote, I am satisfied the plan should proceed and the creditors should determine whether they do, or do not accept the plan as finally filed.

7 In my opinion it should not be up to the Court to second guess the probability of success of a proposed plan of arrangement. Businessmen are free to make their own views known before and ultimately at the creditors' meeting. It seems to me that the Court should only decline to give preliminary approval and refuse to order a meeting if it was of the view that there was no hope that the plan would be approved by the creditors or, if it was approved by the creditors, it would not, for some other reason, be approved by the Court.

8 The Monitor in its sixth report says that the proposed plan is reasonable under the circumstances. This opinion appears to flow from its conclusion that if the plan is rejected and the company forced into receivership or bankruptcy, unsecured creditors will not recover the amount offered in the plan and it is highly unlikely that the secured creditors will recover the amount offered to them. I see no reason to disagree with the opinion offered by the Monitor.

9 Given that opinion and in light of the terms that are set out in the proposed plan I am certainly satisfied that the plan is far from one that is doomed to failure. It is one that should be put to the creditors for their consideration. It is therefore appropriate that I exercise the discretion that is set out in ss. 4 and 5 of the *CCAA* and order a meeting of the creditors on the terms set out in the proposed meeting order.

10 With respect to the extension of the stay of proceedings, as I noted at the outset there had been an initial order of this Court under s. 11 of the *CCAA*. This order was granted on December 22, 2008. It was, as required by the statute, limited to a period of 30 days. It has been extended on two previous occasions. It is now due to expire May 22nd, 2009. The meeting of the creditors is scheduled for May 21, 2009. There is a tentative return date scheduled for May 28, 2009 for the Court to consider sanctioning the plan, should it be approved by the creditors.

11 The test with respect to extending the stay of proceedings has been set out in a number of cases that have considered ss. 11(4) and (6) of the *CCAA*. These were reviewed by me in *Re Sco-Zinc Ltd.* 2009 NSSC 108. In these circumstances there is no need to review the test and the evidence in support of that test.

12 In light of my conclusion that the company had met the threshold for ordering a meeting of the creditors under ss. 4 and 5 of the *CCAA* the appropriateness of a further extension permitting the company to return to the Court within a very short period of time following that meeting of the creditors is patently obvious. The extension is therefore granted.

13 The last issue is the approval of notice of this motion being given only to certain defined creditors. Given the number of creditors that appeared early on in the proceedings it was somewhat impractical to give notice to each of them with the volumes of materials that would be required to be produced and served. With respect to the prior motions it was required that notice be given to all creditors asserting claims against the debtor company in excess of \$100,000.00 and all creditors as-

serting builders liens. In addition all creditors were apprised of these proceedings by way of the mail out to each and every creditor as required by the *CCAA* leading to filing of proofs of claim. The status of the proceedings, including this motion, have been posted on the Monitor's website. I see no reason to depart from the previous practice and this aspect of the motion is also granted.

D.R. BEVERIDGE J.

cp/e/qlrxg/qlpwb/qlaxw/qlced

TAB 3

[Indexed as: **Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp.
v. Bank of Nova Scotia**]

SKLAR-PEPPLER FURNITURE CORPORATION v.
BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA, 949073 ONTARIO INC.,
H & R PROPERTIES LIMITED, SHERMIC INC.,
JOANTE INVESTMENTS LTD., CANADIAN EQUIPMENT LEASING
(A DIVISION OF TRIATHLON LEASING INC.), PITNEY BOWES
LEASING (A DIVISION OF PITNEY BOWES OF
CANADA LTD.), MICHAEL WEINIG AG and all
other affected creditors of applicant

Ontario Court of Justice (General Division) [Commercial List],
Borins J.

Judgment – October 31, 1991.

**Corporations – Arrangements and compromises – Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act – Classification of creditors considered – Application by com-
pany granted – Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.**

A company delivered notice to each of three realty landlords advising them that due to its financial situation, it had vacated the premises in question and would make delivery of the keys to the premises. It was expected that each landlord would take appropriate steps to protect its interest and secure the leased premises. Each of the landlords replied to the notice stating, inter alia, that the company's letter constituted a repudiation of its lease. The company sought protection of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") and applied for approval of a plan of reorganization. The landlords objected to the plan because it purported to interfere with their contractual rights as landlords and their remedies against the company consequent to its repudiation of the lease. The application stated that if the plan was approved, realty leases would be terminated as of the date the order was granted, and the lessors would "be treated insofar as the situation permits in a matter equivalent to treatment to which they would be entitled if the company had gone into bankruptcy". The plan provided for two classes of creditors. The first class was comprised of the bank, a secured creditor and the guarantor that had given security to the bank. The second class contained all other affected creditors, numbering over 1,000, and included the holders of debentures issued by the company, all terminated employees, the three realty lessors and the three equipment lessors. The landlords also objected to the classification of the creditors.

Held – The company's application was granted.

A plan that proposes a regime for the court-supervised re-organization of a company intended to avoid the devastating social and economic effects of a creditor-initiated termination of ongoing business operations and enabling the company to carry on business in a manner intended to cause the least possible harm to the company, its creditors, its employees and former employees and the communities in which it carries on business exemplifies the policy and objectives of the CCAA.

Only after a plan has been approved by the creditors is it appropriate for the court, in considering whether or not court approval is to be given, to comment

specifically on a proposed plan, except in regard to the classification of creditors and its probability of success or failure in relation to the circumstances of the application.

With respect to classification of creditors, in placing a broad and purposive interpretation upon the provisions of the CCAA, the court should resist approaches that would potentially fragment creditors and thereby jeopardize potentially viable plans of arrangement. Not every difference in the nature of a debt due to a creditor or a group of creditors warrants the creation of a separate class. What is required is some community of interest and rights that are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for the creditors in the class to consult with a view towards a common interest. It would be improper to create a special class simply for the benefit of an opposing creditor that would give that creditor the potential to exercise an unwarranted degree of power.

The landlords were unsecured creditors, both in respect of the outstanding rent that was owed and any contingent claim for unliquidated damages to which the landlords might become entitled as a result of the company's repudiation of the lease. The classification of creditors on the basis of identity of interests, as suggested by the landlords, would in some instances result in the multiplicity of classes, which would make any re-organization difficult, if not impossible. Therefore, neither the realty lessors nor the equipment lessors and conditional-sales vendors should be in a separate class.

Cases considered

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 – referred to.
Wellington Building Corp., Re, 16 C.B.R. 48, [1934] O.R. 653, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 626 (S.C.) – applied.

Statutes considered

Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 –

s. 2

s. 3

s. 4

s. 5

s. 6

s. 11

Winding-Up Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11.

APPLICATION for relief under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

Barbara Grossman, for applicant and for respondent 949073 Ontario Inc.

L. Crozier and Catherine Francis, for H & R Properties Ltd.

Kent E. Thomson, for Bank of Nova Scotia.

- 1 October 31, 1991. BORINS J.: – This is an application brought by Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. (subsequently referred to as “Sklar”) pursuant to ss. 4, 5 and 11 of the *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (subsequently referred to as “C.C.A.A.”) for the relief contained in the draft order annexed to the notice of application.
- 2 The essential nature of the relief requested is the maintenance of the status quo in regard to the business operations conducted by Sklar by preventing any of its creditors from taking proceedings against it under the *Bankruptcy Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 and the *Winding-Up Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11, or commencing or continuing any lawsuit or related proceedings against Sklar until further order of the court, pending the consideration of a plan of compromise or arrangement between Sklar and the classes of its creditors affected by the proposed plan.
- 3 Before the court is the proposed plan. It is a most comprehensive document, 39 pages in length, to which is appended an additional 33 pages containing information referred to in the plan, including the classification of creditors for the purpose of voting in respect to the approval of the plan as required by s. 6 of the Act. The urgent nature of this application, with the resulting need to provide an early decision in respect to it, as well as a limited time available to me since the conclusion of submissions late yesterday, do not permit me to review in detail the provisions of the plan. However, I am able to say that I have examined in detail the plan and the evidence before the court and, subject to what follows, I would have had no hesitation in granting the order as sought because the order and the plan, in my view, provide a compelling example of the very situation to which the C.C.A.A. is intended to address. The proposed plan exemplifies the policy and objectives of the Act as it proposes a regime for the court-supervised re-organization of the applicant company intended to avoid the devastating social and economic effects of a creditor-initiated termination of its ongoing business operations and enabling the company to carry on its business in a manner in which it is intended to cause the least possible harm to the company, its creditors, its employees and former employees and the communities in which it carries on and carried on its business operations.
- 4 Two of the named respondents, the Bank of Nova Scotia and 949073 Ontario Inc., are the major creditors of Sklar and their combined indebtedness is about \$60,000,000. The bank is a secured creditor and 949073 Ontario Inc. is an unsecured creditor which is the guarantor of a debt of Sklar and which has given security to the bank. Counsel for the bank advised the court of the bank’s strong support for the order sought by Sklar. The applicant is indebted to trade and other secured creditors in the aggregate amount of about \$10,500,000.

There are six other named respondents. Three of these respondents are the landlords of premises under lease to Sklar which Sklar, as part of its proposed re-organization, can no longer afford and which, therefore, it no longer requires for what it hopes will be its continuing business operations. Two of the other three respondents are lessors of equipment to Sklar, the continued use of which Sklar also considers to be uneconomical. The sixth respondent is a conditional-sales vendor of certain equipment purchased by Sklar.

5 On October 24, 1991, Sklar delivered a notice to each of the three realty landlords advising them that due to its financial situation it was unable to continue to occupy the leased premises, that it has vacated the premises in question and that it would make delivery of the keys to the premises and expressing the view that each landlord would take appropriate steps to protect its interest and secure the leased premises. Each of the landlords replied to the notice stating, inter alia, that Sklar's letter constituted a repudiation of its lease.

6 As for the respondents, Mr. Hess was in attendance as a representative of Michael Weinig AG and through counsel for the applicant advised the court that Michael Weinig AG neither opposed nor consented to the granting of the order. A similar position was taken by two realty lessors, Shermic Inc. and Joante Investments Ltd., who appeared respectively by counsel and a representative. Nothing was heard from the remaining two equipment lessors, Triathlon Leasing Inc. and Pitney Bowes of Canada Ltd. The only opposition to the granting of the order was that of the realty lessor H & R Properties Ltd. As I will explain, as I understand, the principal objections of H & R Properties Ltd. are not to the plan as such, but are in respect to the way in which certain provisions of the plan purport to interfere with its contractual rights as landlord and its remedies against Sklar consequent to its repudiation of the lease and in respect to the classification of creditors for the purposes of the vote required to consider the approval or rejection of the plan.

7 However, before I discuss the submissions made by counsel for H & R Properties, there are some observations which I wish to make by way of background. Sklar is a long-established company, which has carried on the business of manufacturing and marketing wooden furniture and upholstered furniture for many years in southern Ontario. A subsidiary carries on its business in the United States. Until its financial circumstances caused the company to reduce its operations, it formerly employed approximately 212 people in Hanover and 60 people in Toronto. It now employs about 400 people in Whitby, and about 200 people are employed by the American subsidiary, in operations which it purposes to continue if the plan is approved.

8 Since late 1989 Sklar has experienced financial difficulties and

is now insolvent. Among the reasons for its insolvency are the combined effects of economic recession, the introduction of free trade, the strong Canadian dollar, the high volume of bankruptcies among Canadian furniture manufacturers and the effects of the Goods and Services Tax on consumer spending. It has already introduced economic measures designed to deal with its financial problems. If the plan is not approved, the Bank of Nova Scotia will enforce its security. This will result in Sklar's bankruptcy, which in turn will result in its remaining employees losing their jobs and no funds being available to satisfy the claims of unsecured creditors, including terminated employees. The plan provides for a fund of \$1.5 million to pay, on a pro rata basis, the amounts due to the over 1,000 unsecured creditors to whom the proposed plan will be mailed and who will be given the opportunity to vote, in person or by proxy, with respect to its approval or rejection. Sklar has issued the debentures necessary to qualify it as a debtor company within the meaning of ss. 2 and 3 of the C.C.A.A. Although an issue was raised as to whether H & R Properties Ltd. is an unsecured creditor within s. 2 of the Act, I am satisfied that under the broad definition of unsecured creditor contained in the Act in the cases in which I have considered the question, H & R Properties is an unsecured creditor both in respect to the outstanding rent which is now owed to it by Sklar, and any contingent claim for unliquidated damages to which it may become entitled as a result of Sklar's apparent repudiation of its lease.

- 9 This brings me to the objections raised by counsel for H & R Properties in their submissions. There are two main objections, which are, in a sense, related. The first objection relates to para. 20 of the draft order, which stipulates that H & R Properties is an "Affected Creditor" as defined in the order and the plan and provides that the claims of every such creditor include claims for contingent and unliquidated claims arising, inter alia, under any lease. The first objection relates as well to the provisions of para. 26 of the plan, which states that if the plan is approved, realty leases will be terminated as of the date the order is granted, and the lessors "will be treated insofar as the situation permits in a manner equivalent to treatment to which they would be entitled if the company had gone into bankruptcy" on the date the order is granted. The second objection relates to the classification of the creditors in the plan. The plan provides for two classes of creditors. The first class was comprised of the two secured creditors, Bank of Nova Scotia and 949073 Ontario Inc. The second class contains all other affected creditors, numbering over 1,000, and includes the holders of debentures issued by the company, all terminated employees of the company, the three realty lessors and the three equipment lessors.

- 10 In considering the objections raised by H & R Properties, I wish

to emphasize that while I have read the authorities provided by counsel for all parties, time has not permitted me to discuss and analyze them in these reasons. I have, however, in an appendix to my reasons, listed the authorities provided by counsel for all parties. I have also read the helpful article by D.H. Goldman, D.E. Baird and M.A. Weinczok, "Arrangements Under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*" (1991) 1 C.B.R. (3d) 135, in which the authorities are reviewed.

11 With respect to the first objection, I am satisfied that on the broad interpretation which the authorities have placed on s. 11 of the C.C.A.A. and the discretionary powers which it provides to the court in considering an application under the C.C.A.A. and the purposes of the legislation, the provisions of para. 20 of the draft order are appropriate to avoid impairment to the ability of Sklar to continue its business operations during the period while the plan of compromise or arrangement is under consideration. To the extent that it is appropriate to comment on para. 26 of the plan, I see nothing inappropriate in its terms. However, the plan is yet to be approved by the creditors and it is only after it has been approved by them that it is, in my view, appropriate for the court, in considering whether or not court approval is to be given, to comment specifically on a proposed plan except, of course, in regard to the classification of creditors and its probability of success or failure in relation to the circumstances of the application.

12 The second objection concerns the classification of creditors. This objection emanates from the fact that H & R Properties is displeased with the impact of the plan and in particular para. 26 on any claims which it might have for future rent subsequent to the date its lease with Sklar is terminated. It fears that because it is in a class with over 1,000 creditors the negative vote which one presumes it proposes to cast against the plan will be meaningless and the plan will be approved. It, therefore, submits that a third class of creditors should be established consisting of the three realty lessors and the other three respondents. It submits that because there is no community of interest between itself and the other creditors, the applicant is attempting to isolate it by placing it in a class in which it does not belong and to thereby force upon it conditions which it feels are unacceptable.

13 The subject of the appropriate classification of creditors has attracted considerable attention over the past decade. The earlier cases and the recent cases are discussed at pp. 157-169 of the article to which I have referred. In my view, an important principle to consider in approaching ss. 4 and 5 of the C.C.A.A. is that followed in *Re Wellington Building Corp.*, 16 C.B.R. 48, [1934] O.R. 653, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 626 (S.C.), in which it was emphasized that the object of ss. 4 and 5 is not confiscation but is to enable compromises to be made for

the common benefit of the creditors as creditors, or for the common benefit of some class of creditors as such. To this I would add that recognition must be given to the legislative intent to facilitate corporate re-organization and that in the modern world of large and complex business enterprises the excessive fragmentation of classes could be counter-productive to the fulfilment of this intent. In this regard, to approach the classification of creditors on the basis of identity of interest, as suggested by counsel for H & R Properties, would in some instances result in the multiplicity of classes, which would make any re-organization difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. In my view, in placing a broad and purposive interpretation upon the provisions of the C.C.A.A. the court should take care to resist approaches which would potentially fragment creditors and thereby jeopardize potentially viable plans of arrangement, such as the plan advanced in this application.

- 14 In *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289, Finlayson J.A. discussed the factors to be considered in the classification of shareholders. Based upon the factors considered by him, and agreed with by Doherty J.A. in his dissenting reasons, and the factors discussed in the various cases reviewed in the article, I am not persuaded that a separate class should be created consisting of the realty lessors, the equipment lessors and the conditional-sales vendor. Not every difference in the nature of a debt due to a creditor or a group of creditors warrants the creation of a separate class. What is required is some community of interest and rights which are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for the creditors in the class to consult with a view toward a common interest. I do not see any reason for lessors, simply because they are lessors, to constitute a separate class of creditors. In reaching this conclusion I have also considered that para. 26 of the plan does take into account the rights given to landlords under the *Bankruptcy Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 and incorporates these rights into the plan. By the same token it would be improper to create a special class simply for the benefit of the opposing creditor, which would give that creditor the potential to exercise an unwarranted degree of power. The proposed plan is not for the exclusive benefit of H & R Properties but is intended to be for the benefit of all of the creditors. In my view, it presents a realistic proposal of compromise and reorganization which has a probable chance of success if presented to the creditors for their consideration.

- 15 Accordingly, the order will go as asked.

Application under C.C.A.A. granted.

APPENDIX

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289.

Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank (1984), 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 53 A.R. 39, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Q.B.).

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 266, 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 146, 29 B.C.L.R. (2d) 257 (S.C.).

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C. S.C.).

Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.).

Quintette Coal Ltd., Re (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 165, (sub nom. *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*) 56 B.C.L.R. (2d) 80 (S.C.)

Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of) (1990), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 151, (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon*) 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.).

Royal Bank v. Perfection Foods Ltd. (1991), Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 302, 280 A.P.R. 302 (P.E.I. T.D.).

Stephanie's Fashions Ltd., Re (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.).

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TAB 4

Indexed as:
Canadian Airlines Corp. (Re)

**IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended;
AND IN THE MATTER OF the Business Corporations Act (Alberta)
S.A. 1981, c. B-15, as amended, Section 185
AND IN THE MATTER OF Canadian Airlines Corporation and
Canadian Airlines International Ltd.**

[2000] A.J. No. 771

2000 ABQB 442

[2000] 10 W.W.R. 269

84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9

265 A.R. 201

9 B.L.R. (3d) 41

20 C.B.R. (4th) 1

98 A.C.W.S. (3d) 334

Action No. 0001-05071

Alberta Court of Queen's Bench
Judicial District of Calgary

Paperny J.

Heard: June 5 - 19, 2000.
Judgment: filed June 27, 2000.

(185 paras.)

Counsel:

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L.R. Duncan, Q.C. and G. McCue, for Neil Baker, Michael Salter, Hal Metheral and Roger Midiaty.
F.R. Foran, Q.C. and P.T. McCarthy, Q.C., for the Monitor, PwC.
G.B. Morawetz, R.J. Chadwick and A. McConnell, for the Senior Secured Noteholders and the Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company.
C.J. Shaw, Q.C., for the unionized employees.
T. Mallett and C. Feasby, for Amex Bank of Canada.
E.W. Halt, for J. Stephens Allan, Claims Officer.
M. Hollins, for Pacific Coastal Airlines.
P. Pastewka, for JHHD Aircraft Leasing No. 1 and No. 2.
J. Thom, for the Royal Bank of Canada.
J. Medhurst-Tivadar, for Canada Customs and Revenue Agency.
R. Wilkins, Q.C., for the Calgary and Edmonton Airport Authority.

REASONS FOR DECISION

PAPERNY J.:--

I. INTRODUCTION

1 After a decade of searching for a permanent solution to its ongoing, significant financial problems, Canadian Airlines Corporation ("CAC") and Canadian Airlines International Ltd. ("CAIL") seek the court's sanction to a plan of arrangement filed under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") and sponsored by its historic rival, Air Canada Corporation ("Air Canada"). To Canadian, this represents its last choice and its only chance for survival. To Air Canada, it is an opportunity to lead the restructuring of the Canadian airline industry, an exercise many suggest is long overdue. To over 16,000 employees of Canadian, it means continued employment. Canadian Airlines will operate as a separate entity and continue to provide domestic and international air service to Canadians. Tickets of the flying public will be honoured and their frequent flyer points maintained. Long term business relationships with trade creditors and suppliers will continue.

2 The proposed restructuring comes at a cost. Secured and unsecured creditors are being asked to accept significant compromises and shareholders of CAC are being asked to accept that their shares have no value. Certain unsecured creditors oppose the plan, alleging it is oppressive and unfair. They assert that Air Canada has appropriated the key assets of Canadian to itself. Minority shareholders of CAC, on the other hand, argue that Air Canada's financial support to Canadian, before and during this restructuring process, has increased the value of Canadian and in turn their shares. These two positions are irreconcilable, but do reflect the perception by some that this plan asks them to sacrifice too much.

3 Canadian has asked this court to sanction its plan under s. 6 of the CCAA. The court's role on a sanction hearing is to consider whether the plan fairly balances the interests of all the stakeholders. Faced with an insolvent organization, its role is to look forward and ask: does this plan repre-

sent a fair and reasonable compromise that will permit a viable commercial entity to emerge? It is also an exercise in assessing current reality by comparing available commercial alternatives to what is offered in the proposed plan.

II. BACKGROUND

Canadian Airlines and its Subsidiaries

4 CAC and CAIL are corporations incorporated or continued under the Business Corporations Act of Alberta, S.A. 1981, c. B-15 ("ABCA"). 82% of CAC's shares are held by 853350 Alberta Ltd. ("853350") and the remaining 18% are held publicly. CAC, directly or indirectly, owns the majority of voting shares in and controls the other Petitioner, CAIL and these shares represent CAC's principal asset. CAIL owns or has an interest in a number of other corporations directly engaged in the airline industry or other businesses related to the airline industry, including Canadian Regional Airlines Limited ("CRAL"). Where the context requires, I will refer to CAC and CAIL jointly as "Canadian" in these reasons.

5 In the past fifteen years, CAIL has grown from a regional carrier operating under the name Pacific Western Airlines ("PWA") to one of Canada's two major airlines. By mid-1986, Canadian Pacific Air Lines Limited ("CP Air"), had acquired the regional carriers Nordair Inc. ("Nordair") and Eastern Provincial Airways ("Eastern"). In February, 1987, PWA completed its purchase of CP Air from Canadian Pacific Limited. PWA then merged the four predecessor carriers (CP Air, Eastern, Nordair, and PWA) to form one airline, "Canadian Airlines International Ltd.", which was launched in April, 1987.

6 By April, 1989, CAIL had acquired substantially all of the common shares of Wardair Inc. and completed the integration of CAIL and Wardair Inc. in 1990.

7 CAIL and its subsidiaries provide international and domestic scheduled and charter air transportation for passengers and cargo. CAIL provides scheduled services to approximately 30 destinations in 11 countries. Its subsidiary, Canadian Regional Airlines (1998) Ltd. ("CRAL 98") provides scheduled services to approximately 35 destinations in Canada and the United States. Through code share agreements and marketing alliances with leading carriers, CAIL and its subsidiaries provide service to approximately 225 destinations worldwide. CAIL is also engaged in charter and cargo services and the provision of services to third parties, including aircraft overhaul and maintenance, passenger and cargo handling, flight simulator and equipment rentals, employee training programs and the sale of Canadian Plus frequent flyer points. As at December 31, 1999, CAIL operated approximately 79 aircraft.

8 CAIL directly and indirectly employs over 16,000 persons, substantially all of whom are located in Canada. The balance of the employees are located in the United States, Europe, Asia, Australia, South America and Mexico. Approximately 88% of the active employees of CAIL are subject to collective bargaining agreements.

Events Leading up to the CCAA Proceedings

9 Canadian's financial difficulties significantly predate these proceedings.

10 In the early 1990s, Canadian experienced significant losses from operations and deteriorating liquidity. It completed a financial restructuring in 1994 (the "1994 Restructuring") which involved employees contributing \$200,000,000 in new equity in return for receipt of entitlements to

common shares. In addition, Aurora Airline Investments, Inc. ("Aurora"), a subsidiary of AMR Corporation ("AMR"), subscribed for \$246,000,000 in preferred shares of CAIL. Other AMR subsidiaries entered into comprehensive services and marketing arrangements with CAIL. The governments of Canada, British Columbia and Alberta provided an aggregate of \$120,000,000 in loan guarantees. Senior creditors, junior creditors and shareholders of CAC and CAIL and its subsidiaries converted approximately \$712,000,000 of obligations into common shares of CAC or convertible notes issued jointly by CAC and CAIL and/or received warrants entitling the holder to purchase common shares.

11 In the latter half of 1994, Canadian built on the improved balance sheet provided by the 1994 Restructuring, focussing on strict cost controls, capacity management and aircraft utilization. The initial results were encouraging. However, a number of factors including higher than expected fuel costs, rising interest rates, decline of the Canadian dollar, a strike by pilots of Time Air and the temporary grounding of Inter-Canadien's ATR-42 fleet undermined this improved operational performance. In 1995, in response to additional capacity added by emerging charter carriers and Air Canada on key transcontinental routes, CAIL added additional aircraft to its fleet in an effort to regain market share. However, the addition of capacity coincided with the slow-down in the Canadian economy leading to traffic levels that were significantly below expectations. Additionally, key international routes of CAIL failed to produce anticipated results. The cumulative losses of CAIL from 1994 to 1999 totalled \$771 million and from January 31, 1995 to August 12, 1999, the day prior to the issuance by the Government of Canada of an Order under Section 47 of the Canada Transportation Act (relaxing certain rules under the Competition Act to facilitate a restructuring of the airline industry and described further below), the trading price of Canadian's common shares declined from \$7.90 to \$1.55.

12 Canadian's losses incurred since the 1994 Restructuring severely eroded its liquidity position. In 1996, Canadian faced an environment where the domestic air travel market saw increased capacity and aggressive price competition by two new discount carriers based in western Canada. While Canadian's traffic and load factor increased indicating a positive response to Canadian's post-restructuring business plan, yields declined. Attempts by Canadian to reduce domestic capacity were offset by additional capacity being introduced by the new discount carriers and Air Canada.

13 The continued lack of sufficient funds from operations made it evident by late fall of 1996 that Canadian needed to take action to avoid a cash shortfall in the spring of 1997. In November 1996, Canadian announced an operational restructuring plan (the "1996 Restructuring") aimed at returning Canadian to profitability and subsequently implemented a payment deferral plan which involved a temporary moratorium on payments to certain lenders and aircraft operating lessors to provide a cash bridge until the benefits of the operational restructuring were fully implemented. Canadian was able successfully to obtain the support of its lenders and operating lessors such that the moratorium and payment deferral plan was able to proceed on a consensual basis without the requirement for any court proceedings.

14 The objective of the 1996 Restructuring was to transform Canadian into a sustainable entity by focussing on controllable factors which targeted earnings improvements over four years. Three major initiatives were adopted: network enhancements, wage concessions as supplemented by fuel tax reductions/rebates, and overhead cost reductions.

15 The benefits of the 1996 Restructuring were reflected in Canadian's 1997 financial results when Canadian and its subsidiaries reported a consolidated net income of \$5.4 million, the best results in 9 years.

16 In early 1998, building on its 1997 results, Canadian took advantage of a strong market for U.S. public debt financing in the first half of 1998 by issuing U.S. \$175,000,000 of senior secured notes in April, 1998 ("Senior Secured Notes") and U.S. \$100,000,000 of unsecured notes in August, 1998 ("Unsecured Notes").

17 The benefits of the 1996 Restructuring continued in 1998 but were not sufficient to offset a number of new factors which had a significant negative impact on financial performance, particularly in the fourth quarter. Canadian's eroded capital base gave it limited capacity to withstand negative effects on traffic and revenue. These factors included lower than expected operating revenues resulting from a continued weakness of the Asian economies, vigorous competition in Canadian's key western Canada and the western U.S. transborder markets, significant price discounting in most domestic markets following a labour disruption at Air Canada and CAIL's temporary loss of the ability to code-share with American Airlines on certain transborder flights due to a pilot dispute at American Airlines. Canadian also had increased operating expenses primarily due to the deterioration of the value of the Canadian dollar and additional airport and navigational fees imposed by NAV Canada which were not recoverable by Canadian through fare increases because of competitive pressures. This resulted in Canadian and its subsidiaries reporting a consolidated loss of \$137.6 million for 1998.

18 As a result of these continuing weak financial results, Canadian undertook a number of additional strategic initiatives including entering the oneworld™ Alliance, the introduction of its new "Proud Wings" corporate image, a restructuring of CAIL's Vancouver hub, the sale and leaseback of certain aircraft, expanded code sharing arrangements and the implementation of a service charge in an effort to recover a portion of the costs relating to NAV Canada fees.

19 Beginning in late 1998 and continuing into 1999, Canadian tried to access equity markets to strengthen its balance sheet. In January, 1999, the Board of Directors of CAC determined that while Canadian needed to obtain additional equity capital, an equity infusion alone would not address the fundamental structural problems in the domestic air transportation market.

20 Canadian believes that its financial performance was and is reflective of structural problems in the Canadian airline industry, most significantly, over capacity in the domestic air transportation market. It is the view of Canadian and Air Canada that Canada's relatively small population and the geographic distribution of that population is unable to support the overlapping networks of two full service national carriers. As described further below, the Government of Canada has recognized this fundamental problem and has been instrumental in attempts to develop a solution.

Initial Discussions with Air Canada

21 Accordingly, in January, 1999, CAC's Board of Directors directed management to explore all strategic alternatives available to Canadian, including discussions regarding a possible merger or other transaction involving Air Canada.

22 Canadian had discussions with Air Canada in early 1999. AMR also participated in those discussions. While several alternative merger transactions were considered in the course of these discussions, Canadian, AMR and Air Canada were unable to reach agreement.

23 Following the termination of merger discussions between Canadian and Air Canada, senior management of Canadian, at the direction of the Board and with the support of AMR, renewed its efforts to secure financial partners with the objective of obtaining either an equity investment and support for an eventual merger with Air Canada or immediate financial support for a merger with Air Canada.

Offer by Onex

24 In early May, the discussions with Air Canada having failed, Canadian focussed its efforts on discussions with Onex Corporation ("Onex") and AMR concerning the basis upon which a merger of Canadian and Air Canada could be accomplished.

25 On August 23, 1999, Canadian entered into an Arrangement Agreement with Onex, AMR and Airline Industry Revitalization Co. Inc. ("AirCo") (a company owned jointly by Onex and AMR and controlled by Onex). The Arrangement Agreement set out the terms of a Plan of Arrangement providing for the purchase by AirCo of all of the outstanding common and non-voting shares of CAC. The Arrangement Agreement was conditional upon, among other things, the successful completion of a simultaneous offer by AirCo for all of the voting and non-voting shares of Air Canada. On August 24, 1999, AirCo announced its offers to purchase the shares of both CAC and Air Canada and to subsequently merge the operations of the two airlines to create one international carrier in Canada.

26 On or about September 20, 1999 the Board of Directors of Air Canada recommended against the AirCo offer. On or about October 19, 1999, Air Canada announced its own proposal to its shareholders to repurchase shares of Air Canada. Air Canada's announcement also indicated Air Canada's intention to make a bid for CAC and to proceed to complete a merger with Canadian subject to a restructuring of Canadian's debt.

27 There were several rounds of offers and counter-offers between AirCo and Air Canada. On November 5, 1999, the Quebec Superior Court ruled that the AirCo offer for Air Canada violated the provisions of the Air Canada Public Participation Act. AirCo immediately withdrew its offers. At that time, Air Canada indicated its intention to proceed with its offer for CAC.

28 Following the withdrawal of the AirCo offer to purchase CAC, and notwithstanding Air Canada's stated intention to proceed with its offer, there was a renewed uncertainty about Canadian's future which adversely affected operations. As described further below, Canadian lost significant forward bookings which further reduced the company's remaining liquidity.

Offer by 853350

29 On November 11, 1999, 853350 (a corporation financed by Air Canada and owned as to 10% by Air Canada) made a formal offer for all of the common and non-voting shares of CAC. Air Canada indicated that the involvement of 853350 in the take-over bid was necessary in order to protect Air Canada from the potential adverse effects of a restructuring of Canadian's debt and that Air Canada would only complete a merger with Canadian after the completion of a debt restructuring transaction. The offer by 853350 was conditional upon, among other things, a satisfactory resolution of AMR's claims in respect of Canadian and a satisfactory resolution of certain regulatory issues arising from the announcement made on October 26, 1999 by the Government of Canada regarding its intentions to alter the regime governing the airline industry.

30 As noted above, AMR and its subsidiaries and affiliates had certain agreements with Canadian arising from AMR's investment (through its wholly owned subsidiary, Aurora Airline Investments, Inc.) in CAIL during the 1994 Restructuring. In particular, the Services Agreement by which AMR and its subsidiaries and affiliates provided certain reservations, scheduling and other airline related services to Canadian provided for a termination fee of approximately \$500 million (as at December 31, 1999) while the terms governing the preferred shares issued to Aurora provided for exchange rights which were only retractable by Canadian upon payment of a redemption fee in excess of \$500 million (as at December 31, 1999). Unless such provisions were amended or waived, it was practically impossible for Canadian to complete a merger with Air Canada since the cost of proceeding without AMR's consent was simply too high.

31 Canadian had continued its efforts to seek out all possible solutions to its structural problems following the withdrawal of the AirCo offer on November 5, 1999. While AMR indicated its willingness to provide a measure of support by allowing a deferral of some of the fees payable to AMR under the Services Agreement, Canadian was unable to find any investor willing to provide the liquidity necessary to keep Canadian operating while alternative solutions were sought.

32 After 853350 made its offer, 853350 and Air Canada entered into discussions with AMR regarding the purchase by 853350 of AMR's shareholding in CAIL as well as other matters regarding code sharing agreements and various services provided to Canadian by AMR and its subsidiaries and affiliates. The parties reached an agreement on November 22, 1999 pursuant to which AMR agreed to reduce its potential damages claim for termination of the Services Agreement by approximately 88%.

33 On December 4, 1999, CAC's Board recommended acceptance of 853350's offer to its shareholders and on December 21, 1999, two days before the offer closed, 853350 received approval for the offer from the Competition Bureau as well as clarification from the Government of Canada on the proposed regulatory framework for the Canadian airline industry.

34 As noted above, Canadian's financial condition deteriorated further after the collapse of the AirCo Arrangement transaction. In particular:

- a) the doubts which were publicly raised as to Canadian's ability to survive made Canadian's efforts to secure additional financing through various sale-leaseback transactions more difficult;
- b) sales for future air travel were down by approximately 10% compared to 1998;
- c) CAIL's liquidity position, which stood at approximately \$84 million (consolidated cash and available credit) as at September 30, 1999, reached a critical point in late December, 1999 when it was about to go negative.

35 In late December, 1999, Air Canada agreed to enter into certain transactions designed to ensure that Canadian would have enough liquidity to continue operating until the scheduled completion of the 853350 take-over bid on January 4, 2000. Air Canada agreed to purchase rights to the Toronto-Tokyo route for \$25 million and to a sale-leaseback arrangement involving certain unencumbered aircraft and a flight simulator for total proceeds of approximately \$20 million. These transactions gave Canadian sufficient liquidity to continue operations through the holiday period.

36 If Air Canada had not provided the approximate \$45 million injection in December 1999, Canadian would likely have had to file for bankruptcy and cease all operations before the end of the holiday travel season.

37 On January 4, 2000, with all conditions of its offer having been satisfied or waived, 853350 purchased approximately 82% of the outstanding shares of CAC. On January 5, 1999, 853350 completed the purchase of the preferred shares of CAIL owned by Aurora. In connection with that acquisition, Canadian agreed to certain amendments to the Services Agreement reducing the amounts payable to AMR in the event of a termination of such agreement and, in addition, the unanimous shareholders agreement which gave AMR the right to require Canadian to purchase the CAIL preferred shares under certain circumstances was terminated. These arrangements had the effect of substantially reducing the obstacles to a restructuring of Canadian's debt and lease obligations and also significantly reduced the claims that AMR would be entitled to advance in such a restructuring.

38 Despite the \$45 million provided by Air Canada, Canadian's liquidity position remained poor. With January being a traditionally slow month in the airline industry, further bridge financing was required in order to ensure that Canadian would be able to operate while a debt restructuring transaction was being negotiated with creditors. Air Canada negotiated an arrangement with the Royal Bank of Canada ("Royal Bank") to purchase a participation interest in the operating credit facility made available to Canadian. As a result of this agreement, Royal Bank agreed to extend Canadian's operating credit facility from \$70 million to \$120 million in January, 2000 and then to \$145 million in March, 2000. Canadian agreed to supplement the assignment of accounts receivable security originally securing Royal's \$70 million facility with a further Security Agreement securing certain unencumbered assets of Canadian in consideration for this increased credit availability. Without the support of Air Canada or another financially sound entity, this increase in credit would not have been possible.

39 Air Canada has stated publicly that it ultimately wishes to merge the operations of Canadian and Air Canada, subject to Canadian completing a financial restructuring so as to permit Air Canada to complete the acquisition on a financially sound basis. This pre-condition has been emphasized by Air Canada since the fall of 1999.

40 Prior to the acquisition of majority control of CAC by 853350, Canadian's management, Board of Directors and financial advisors had considered every possible alternative for restoring Canadian to a sound financial footing. Based upon Canadian's extensive efforts over the past year in particular, but also the efforts since 1992 described above, Canadian came to the conclusion that it must complete a debt restructuring to permit the completion of a full merger between Canadian and Air Canada.

41 On February 1, 2000, Canadian announced a moratorium on payments to lessors and lenders. As a result of this moratorium Canadian defaulted on the payments due under its various credit facilities and aircraft leases. Absent the assistance provided by this moratorium, in addition to Air Canada's support, Canadian would not have had sufficient liquidity to continue operating until the completion of a debt restructuring.

42 Following implementation of the moratorium, Canadian with Air Canada embarked on efforts to restructure significant obligations by consent. The further damage to public confidence which a CCAA filing could produce required Canadian to secure a substantial measure of creditor support in advance of any public filing for court protection.

43 Before the Petitioners started these CCAA proceedings, Air Canada, CAIL and lessors of 59 aircraft in its fleet had reached agreement in principle on the restructuring plan.

44 Canadian and Air Canada have also been able to reach agreement with the remaining affected secured creditors, being the holders of the U.S. \$175 million Senior Secured Notes, due 2005, (the "Senior Secured Noteholders") and with several major unsecured creditors in addition to AMR, such as Loyalty Management Group Canada Inc.

45 On March 24, 2000, faced with threatened proceedings by secured creditors, Canadian petitioned under the CCAA and obtained a stay of proceedings and related interim relief by Order of the Honourable Chief Justice Moore on that same date. Pursuant to that Order, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Inc. was appointed as the Monitor, and companion proceedings in the United States were authorized to be commenced.

46 Since that time, due to the assistance of Air Canada, Canadian has been able to complete the restructuring of the remaining financial obligations governing all aircraft to be retained by Canadian for future operations. These arrangements were approved by this Honourable Court in its Orders dated April 14, 2000 and May 10, 2000, as described in further detail below under the heading "The Restructuring Plan".

47 On April 7, 2000, this court granted an Order giving directions with respect to the filing of the plan, the calling and holding of meetings of affected creditors and related matters.

48 On April 25, 2000 in accordance with the said Order, Canadian filed and served the plan (in its original form) and the related notices and materials.

49 The plan was amended, in accordance with its terms, on several occasions, the form of Plan voted upon at the Creditors' Meetings on May 26, 2000 having been filed and served on May 25, 2000 (the "Plan").

The Restructuring Plan

50 The Plan has three principal aims described by Canadian:

- (a) provide near term liquidity so that Canadian can sustain operations;
- (b) allow for the return of aircraft not required by Canadian; and
- (c) permanently adjust Canadian's debt structure and lease facilities to reflect the current market for asset values and carrying costs in return for Air Canada providing a guarantee of the restructured obligations.

51 The proposed treatment of stakeholders is as follows:

1. Unaffected Secured Creditors- Royal Bank, CAIL's operating lender, is an unaffected creditor with respect to its operating credit facility. Royal Bank holds security over CAIL's accounts receivable and most of CAIL's operating assets not specifically secured by aircraft financiers or the Senior Secured Noteholders. As noted above, arrangements entered into between Air Canada and Royal Bank have provided CAIL with liquidity necessary for it to continue operations since January 2000.

Also unaffected by the Plan are those aircraft lessors, conditional vendors and secured creditors holding security over CAIL's aircraft who have entered into agreements with CAIL and/or Air Canada with respect to the restructuring of CAIL's obligations. A number of such agreements, which were initially contained in the form of letters of intent ("LOIs"), were entered into prior to the commencement of the CCAA proceedings, while a total of 17 LOIs were completed after that date. In its Second and Fourth Reports the Monitor reported to the court on these agreements. The LOIs entered into after the proceedings commenced were reviewed and approved by the court on April 14, 2000 and May 10, 2000.

The basis of the LOIs with aircraft lessors was that the operating lease rates were reduced to fair market lease rates or less, and the obligations of CAIL under the leases were either assumed or guaranteed by Air Canada. Where the aircraft was subject to conditional sale agreements or other secured indebtedness, the value of the secured debt was reduced to the fair market value of the aircraft, and the interest rate payable was reduced to current market rates reflecting Air Canada's credit. CAIL's obligations under those agreements have also been assumed or guaranteed by Air Canada. The claims of these creditors for reduced principal and interest amounts, or reduced lease payments, are Affected Unsecured Claims under the Plan. In a number of cases these claims have been assigned to Air Canada and Air Canada disclosed that it would vote those claims in favour of the Plan.

2. Affected Secured Creditors- The Affected Secured Creditors under the Plan are the Senior Secured Noteholders with a claim in the amount of US\$175,000,000. The Senior Secured Noteholders are secured by a diverse package of Canadian's assets, including its inventory of aircraft spare parts, ground equipment, spare engines, flight simulators, leasehold interests at Toronto, Vancouver and Calgary airports, the shares in CRAL 98 and a \$53 million note payable by CRAL to CAIL.

The Plan offers the Senior Secured Noteholders payment of 97 cents on the dollar. The deficiency is included in the Affected Unsecured Creditor class and the Senior Secured Noteholders advised the court they would be voting the deficiency in favour of the Plan.

3. Unaffected Unsecured Creditors-In the circular accompanying the November 11, 1999 853350 offer it was stated that:

The Offeror intends to conduct the Debt Restructuring in such a manner as to seek to ensure that the unionized employees of Canadian, the suppliers of new credit (including trade credit) and the members of the flying public are left unaffected.

The Offeror is of the view that the pursuit of these three principles is essential in order to ensure that the long term value of Canadian is preserved.

Canadian's employees, customers and suppliers of goods and services are unaffected by the CCAA Order and Plan.

Also unaffected are parties to those contracts or agreements with Canadian which are not being terminated by Canadian pursuant to the terms of the March 24, 2000 Order.

4. Affected Unsecured Creditors- CAIL has identified unsecured creditors who do not fall into the above three groups and listed these as Affected Unsecured Creditors under the Plan. They are offered 14 cents on the dollar on their claims. Air Canada would fund this payment.

The Affected Unsecured Creditors fall into the following categories:

- a. Claims of holders of or related to the Unsecured Notes (the "Unsecured Noteholders");
- b. Claims in respect of certain outstanding or threatened litigation involving Canadian;
- c. Claims arising from the termination, breach or repudiation of certain contracts, leases or agreements to which Canadian is a party other than aircraft financing or lease arrangements;
- d. Claims in respect of deficiencies arising from the termination or re-negotiation of aircraft financing or lease arrangements;
- e. Claims of tax authorities against Canadian; and
- f. Claims in respect of the under-secured or unsecured portion of amounts due to the Senior Secured Noteholders.

52 There are over \$700 million of proven unsecured claims. Some unsecured creditors have disputed the amounts of their claims for distribution purposes. These are in the process of determination by the court-appointed Claims Officer and subject to further appeal to the court. If the Claims Officer were to allow all of the disputed claims in full and this were confirmed by the court, the aggregate of unsecured claims would be approximately \$1.059 million.

53 The Monitor has concluded that if the Plan is not approved and implemented, Canadian will not be able to continue as a going concern and in that event, the only foreseeable alternative would be a liquidation of Canadian's assets by a receiver and/or a trustee in bankruptcy. Under the Plan, Canadian's obligations to parties essential to ongoing operations, including employees, customers, travel agents, fuel, maintenance and equipment suppliers, and airport authorities are in most cases to be treated as unaffected and paid in full. In the event of a liquidation, those parties would not, in most cases, be paid in full and, except for specific lien rights and statutory priorities, would rank as ordinary unsecured creditors. The Monitor estimates that the additional unsecured claims which would arise if Canadian were to cease operations as a going concern and be forced into liquidation would be in excess of \$1.1 billion.

54 In connection with its assessment of the Plan, the Monitor performed a liquidation analysis of CAIL as at March 31, 2000 in order to estimate the amounts that might be recovered by CAIL's creditors and shareholders in the event of disposition of CAIL's assets by a receiver or trustee. The Monitor concluded that a liquidation would result in a shortfall to certain secured creditors, including the Senior Secured Noteholders, a recovery by ordinary unsecured creditors of between one cent and three cents on the dollar, and no recovery by shareholders.

55 There are two vociferous opponents of the Plan, Resurgence Asset Management LLC ("Resurgence") who acts on behalf of its and/or its affiliate client accounts and four shareholders of CAC. Resurgence is incorporated pursuant to the laws of New York, U.S.A. and has its head office in White Plains, New York. It conducts an investment business specializing in high yield distressed debt. Through a series of purchases of the Unsecured Notes commencing in April 1999, Resurgence clients hold \$58,200,000 of the face value of or 58.2% of the notes issued. Resurgence purchased 7.9 million units in April 1999. From November 3, 1999 to December 9, 1999 it purchased an additional 20,850,000 units. From January 4, 2000 to February 3, 2000 Resurgence purchased an additional 29,450,000 units.

56 Resurgence seeks declarations that: the actions of Canadian, Air Canada and 853350 constitute an amalgamation, consolidation or merger with or into Air Canada or a conveyance or transfer of all or substantially all of Canadian's assets to Air Canada; that any plan of arrangement involving Canadian will not affect Resurgence and directing the repurchase of their notes pursuant to the provisions of their trust indenture and that the actions of Canadian, Air Canada and 853350 are oppressive and unfairly prejudicial to it pursuant to section 234 of the Business Corporations Act.

57 Four shareholders of CAC also oppose the plan. Neil Baker, a Toronto resident, acquired 132,500 common shares at a cost of \$83,475.00 on or about May 5, 2000. Mr. Baker sought to commence proceedings to "remedy an injustice to the minority holders of the common shares". Roger Midiaty, Michael Salter and Hal Metheral are individual shareholders who were added as parties at their request during the proceedings. Mr. Midiaty resides in Calgary, Alberta and holds 827 CAC shares which he has held since 1994. Mr. Metheral is also a Calgary resident and holds approximately 14,900 CAC shares in his RRSP and has held them since approximately 1994 or 1995. Mr. Salter is a resident of Scottsdale, Arizona and is the beneficial owner of 250 shares of CAC and is a joint beneficial owner of 250 shares with his wife. These shareholders will be referred in the Decision throughout as the "Minority Shareholders".

58 The Minority Shareholders oppose the portion of the Plan that relates to the reorganization of CAIL, pursuant to section 185 of the Alberta Business Corporations Act ("ABCA"). They characterize the transaction as a cancellation of issued shares unauthorized by section 167 of the ABCA or alternatively is a violation of section 183 of the ABCA. They submit the application for the order of reorganization should be denied as being unlawful, unfair and not supported by the evidence.

III. ANALYSIS

59 Section 6 of the CCAA provides that:

6. Where a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either

- as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding
- (a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and
- (b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or is in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

60 Prior to sanctioning a plan under the CCAA, the court must be satisfied in regard to each of the following criteria:

- (1) there must be compliance with all statutory requirements;
- (2) all material filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to be done which is not authorized by the CCAA; and
- (3) the plan must be fair and reasonable.

61 A leading articulation of this three-part test appears in *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C.S.C.) at 182-3, *aff'd* (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C.C.A.) and has been regularly followed, see for example *Re Sammi Atlas Inc.* (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 172 and *Re T. Eaton Co.*, [1999] O.J. No. 5322 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) at paragraph 7. Each of these criteria are reviewed in turn below.

1. Statutory Requirements

62 Some of the matters that may be considered by the court on an application for approval of a plan of compromise and arrangement include:

- (a) the applicant comes within the definition of "debtor company" in section 2 of the CCAA;
- (b) the applicant or affiliated debtor companies have total claims within the meaning of section 12 of the CCAA in excess of \$5,000,000;
- (c) the notice calling the meeting was sent in accordance with the order of the court;
- (d) the creditors were properly classified;
- (e) the meetings of creditors were properly constituted;
- (f) the voting was properly carried out; and
- (g) the plan was approved by the requisite double majority or majorities.

63 I find that the Petitioners have complied with all applicable statutory requirements. Specifically:

- (a) CAC and CAIL are insolvent and thus each is a "debtor company" within the meaning of section 2 of the CCAA. This was established in the affidavit evidence of Douglas Carty, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Canadian, and so declared in the March 24, 2000 Order in these proceedings and confirmed in the testimony given by Mr. Carty at this hearing.

- (b) CAC and CAIL have total claims that would be claims provable in bankruptcy within the meaning of section 12 of the CCAA in excess of \$5,000,000.
- (c) In accordance with the April 7, 2000 Order of this court, a Notice of Meeting and a disclosure statement (which included copies of the Plan and the March 24th and April 7th Orders of this court) were sent to the Affected Creditors, the directors and officers of the Petitioners, the Monitor and persons who had served a Notice of Appearance, on April 25, 2000.
- (d) As confirmed by the May 12, 2000 ruling of this court (leave to appeal denied May 29, 2000), the creditors have been properly classified.
- (e) Further, as detailed in the Monitor's Fifth Report to the Court and confirmed by the June 14, 2000 decision of this court in respect of a challenge by Resurgence Asset Management LLC ("Resurgence"), the meetings of creditors were properly constituted, the voting was properly carried out and the Plan was approved by the requisite double majorities in each class. The composition of the majority of the unsecured creditor class is addressed below under the heading "Fair and Reasonable".

2. Matters Unauthorized

64 This criterion has not been widely discussed in the reported cases. As recognized by Blair J. in *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.) and Farley J. in *Cadillac Fairview (Re)*, [1995] O.J. No. 274, 53 A.C.W.S. (3d) 305 (Ont. Gen. Div.), within the CCAA process the court must rely on the reports of the Monitor as well as the parties in ensuring nothing contrary to the CCAA has occurred or is contemplated by the plan.

65 In this proceeding, the dissenting groups have raised two matters which in their view are unauthorized by the CCAA: firstly, the Minority Shareholders of CAC suggested the proposed share capital reorganization of CAIL is illegal under the ABCA and Ontario Securities Commission Policy 9.1, and as such cannot be authorized under the CCAA and secondly, certain unsecured creditors suggested that the form of release contained in the Plan goes beyond the scope of release permitted under the CCAA.

a. Legality of proposed share capital reorganization

66 Subsection 185(2) of the ABCA provides:

- (2) If a corporation is subject to an order for reorganization, its articles may be amended by the order to effect any change that might lawfully be made by an amendment under section 167.

67 Sections 6.1(2)(d) and (e) and Schedule "D" of the Plan contemplate that:

- a. All CAIL common shares held by CAC will be converted into a single retractable share, which will then be retracted by CAIL for \$1.00; and
- b. All CAIL preferred shares held by 853350 will be converted into CAIL common shares.

68 The Articles of Reorganization in Schedule "D" to the Plan provide for the following amendments to CAIL's Articles of Incorporation to effect the proposed reorganization:

- (a) consolidating all of the issued and outstanding common shares into one common share;
- (b) redesignating the existing common shares as "Retractable Shares" and changing the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attaching to the Retractable Shares so that the Retractable Shares shall have attached thereto the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions as set out in the Schedule of Share Capital;
- (c) cancelling the Non-Voting Shares in the capital of the corporation, none of which are currently issued and outstanding, so that the corporation is no longer authorized to issue Non-Voting Shares;
- (d) changing all of the issued and outstanding Class B Preferred Shares of the corporation into Class A Preferred Shares, on the basis of one (1) Class A Preferred Share for each one (1) Class B Preferred Share presently issued and outstanding;
- (e) redesignating the existing Class A Preferred Shares as "Common Shares" and changing the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attaching to the Common Shares so that the Common Shares shall have attached thereto the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions as set out in the Schedule of Share Capital; and
- (f) cancelling the Class B Preferred Shares in the capital of the corporation, none of which are issued and outstanding after the change in paragraph (d) above, so that the corporation is no longer authorized to issue Class B Preferred Shares;

Section 167 of the ABCA

69 Reorganizations under section 185 of the ABCA are subject to two preconditions:

- a. The corporation must be "subject to an order for re-organization"; and
- b. The proposed amendments must otherwise be permitted under section 167 of the ABCA.

70 The parties agreed that an order of this court sanctioning the Plan would satisfy the first condition.

71 The relevant portions of section 167 provide as follows:

167(1) Subject to sections 170 and 171, the articles of a corporation may by special resolution be amended to

- (e) change the designation of all or any of its shares, and add, change or remove any rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions, including rights to accrued dividends, in respect of all or any of its shares, whether issued or unissued,
- (f) change the shares of any class or series, whether issued or unissued, into a different number of shares of the same class or series into the same or a different number of shares of other classes or series,
- (g.1) cancel a class or series of shares where there are no issued or outstanding shares of that class or series,

72 Each change in the proposed CAIL Articles of Reorganization corresponds to changes permitted under s. 167(1) of the ABCA, as follows:

Proposed Amendment
in Schedule "D"

Subsection 167(1),
ABCA

(a) - consolidation of Common Shares	167(1)(f)
(b) - change of designation and rights	167(1)(e)
(c) - cancellation	167(1)(g.1)
(d) - change in shares	167(1)(f)
(e) - change of designation and rights	167(1)(e)
(f) - cancellation	167(1)(g.1)

73 The Minority Shareholders suggested that the proposed reorganization effectively cancels their shares in CAC. As the above review of the proposed reorganization demonstrates, that is not the case. Rather, the shares of CAIL are being consolidated, altered and then retracted, as permitted under section 167 of the ABCA. I find the proposed reorganization of CAIL's share capital under the Plan does not violate section 167.

74 In R. Dickerson et al, *Proposals for a New Business Corporation Law for Canada, Vol.1: Commentary* (the "Dickerson Report") regarding the then proposed Canada Business Corporations Act, the identical section to section 185 is described as having been inserted with the object of enabling the "court to effect any necessary amendment of the articles of the corporation in order to achieve the objective of the reorganization without having to comply with the formalities of the Draft Act, particularly shareholder approval of the proposed amendment".

75 The architects of the business corporation act model which the ABCA follows, expressly contemplated reorganizations in which the insolvent corporation would eliminate the interest of common shareholders. The example given in the Dickerson Report of a reorganization is very similar to that proposed in the Plan:

For example, the reorganization of an insolvent corporation may require the following steps: first, reduction or even elimination of the interest of the common shareholders; second, relegation of the preferred shareholders to the status of common shareholders; and third, relegation of the secured debenture holders to the status of either unsecured Noteholders or preferred shareholders.

76 The rationale for allowing such a reorganization appears plain; the corporation is insolvent, which means that on liquidation the shareholders would get nothing. In those circumstances, as described further below under the heading "Fair and Reasonable", there is nothing unfair or unreasonable in the court effecting changes in such situations without shareholder approval. Indeed, it would be unfair to the creditors and other stakeholders to permit the shareholders (whose interest has the lowest priority) to have any ability to block a reorganization.

77 The Petitioners were unable to provide any case law addressing the use of section 185 as proposed under the Plan. They relied upon the decisions of *Royal Oak Mines Inc.*, [1999] O.J. No. 4848 and *Re T Eaton Co.*, supra in which Farley J. of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice emphasized that shareholders are at the bottom of the hierarchy of interests in liquidation or liquidation related scenarios.

78 Section 185 provides for amendment to articles by court order. I see no requirement in that section for a meeting or vote of shareholders of CAIL, quite apart from shareholders of CAC. Further, dissent and appraisal rights are expressly removed in subsection (7). To require a meeting and vote of shareholders and to grant dissent and appraisal rights in circumstances of insolvency would frustrate the object of section 185 as described in the Dickerson Report.

79 In the circumstances of this case, where the majority shareholder holds 82% of the shares, the requirement of a special resolution is meaningless. To require a vote suggests the shares have value. They do not. The formalities of the ABCA serve no useful purpose other than to frustrate the reorganization to the detriment of all stakeholders, contrary to the CCAA.

Section 183 of the ABCA

80 The Minority Shareholders argued in the alternative that if the proposed share reorganization of CAIL were not a cancellation of their shares in CAC and therefore allowed under section 167 of the ABCA, it constituted a "sale, lease, or exchange of substantially all the property" of CAC and thus required the approval of CAC shareholders pursuant to section 183 of the ABCA. The Minority Shareholders suggested that the common shares in CAIL were substantially all of the assets of CAC and that all of those shares were being "exchanged" for \$1.00.

81 I disagree with this creative characterization. The proposed transaction is a reorganization as contemplated by section 185 of the ABCA. As recognized in *Savage v. Amoco Acquisition Company Ltd*, [1988] A.J. No. 68 (Q.B.), aff'd, 68 C.B.R. (3d) 154 (Alta. C.A.), the fact that the same end might be achieved under another section does not exclude the section to be relied on. A statute may well offer several alternatives to achieve a similar end.

Ontario Securities Commission Policy 9.1

82 The Minority Shareholders also submitted the proposed reorganization constitutes a "related party transaction" under Policy 9.1 of the Ontario Securities Commission. Under the Policy, transactions are subject to disclosure, minority approval and formal valuation requirements which have not been followed here. The Minority Shareholders suggested that the Petitioners were therefore in breach of the Policy unless and until such time as the court is advised of the relevant requirements of the Policy and grants its approval as provided by the Policy.

83 These shareholders asserted that in the absence of evidence of the going concern value of CAIL so as to determine whether that value exceeds the rights of the Preferred Shares of CAIL, the Court should not waive compliance with the Policy.

84 To the extent that this reorganization can be considered a "related party transaction", I have found, for the reasons discussed below under the heading "Fair and Reasonable", that the Plan, including the proposed reorganization, is fair and reasonable and accordingly I would waive the requirements of Policy 9.1.

b. Release

85 Resurgence argued that the release of directors and other third parties contained in the Plan does not comply with the provisions of the CCAA.

86 The release is contained in section 6.2(2)(ii) of the Plan and states as follows:

As of the Effective Date, each of the Affected Creditors will be deemed to forever release, waive and discharge all claims, obligations, suits, judgments, damages, demands, debts, rights, causes of action and liabilities...that are based in whole or in part on any act, omission, transaction, event or other occurrence taking place on or prior to the Effective Date in any way relating to the Applicants and Subsidiaries, the CCAA Proceedings, or the Plan against: (i) The Applicants and Subsidiaries; (ii) The Directors, Officers and employees of the Applicants or Subsidiaries in each case as of the date of filing (and in addition, those who became Officers and/or Directors thereafter but prior to the Effective Date); (iii) The former Directors, Officers and employees of the Applicants or Subsidiaries, or (iv) the respective current and former professionals of the entities in subclauses (1) to (3) of this s. 6.2(2) (including, for greater certainty, the Monitor, its counsel and its current Officers and Directors, and current and former Officers, Directors, employees, shareholders and professionals of the released parties) acting in such capacity.

87 Prior to 1997, the CCAA did not provide for compromises of claims against anyone other than the petitioning company. In 1997, section 5.1 was added to the CCAA. Section 5.1 states:

- 5.1 (1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.
- (2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that:
- (a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or
 - (b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.
- (3) The Court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

88 Resurgence argued that the form of release does not comply with section 5.1 of the CCAA insofar as it applies to individuals beyond directors and to a broad spectrum of claims beyond obligations of the Petitioners for which their directors are "by law liable". Resurgence submitted that the addition of section 5.1 to the CCAA constituted an exception to a long standing principle and urged the court to therefore interpret s. 5.1 cautiously, if not narrowly. Resurgence relied on *Barrette v. Crabtree Estate*, [1993], 1 S.C.R. 1027 at 1044 and *Bruce Agra Foods Limited v. Proposal of Everfresh Beverages Inc. (Receiver of)* (1996), 45 C.B.R. (3d) 169 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 5 in this regard.

89 With respect to Resurgence's complaint regarding the breadth of the claims covered by the release, the Petitioners asserted that the release is not intended to override section 5.1(2). Canadian suggested this can be expressly incorporated into the form of release by adding the words "excluding the claims excepted by s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA" immediately prior to subsection (iii) and clarifying the language in Section 5.1 of the Plan. Canadian also acknowledged, in response to a concern raised by Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, that in accordance with s. 5.1(1) of the CCAA, directors of CAC and CAIL could only be released from liability arising before March 24, 2000, the date these proceedings commenced. Canadian suggested this was also addressed in the proposed amendment. Canadian did not address the propriety of including individuals in addition to directors in the form of release.

90 In my view it is appropriate to amend the proposed release to expressly comply with section 5.1(2) of the CCAA and to clarify Section 5.1 of the Plan as Canadian suggested in its brief. The additional language suggested by Canadian to achieve this result shall be included in the form of order. Canada Customs and Revenue Agency is apparently satisfied with the Petitioners' acknowledgement that claims against directors can only be released to the date of commencement of proceedings under the CCAA, having appeared at this hearing to strongly support the sanctioning of the Plan, so I will not address this concern further.

91 Resurgence argued that its claims fell within the categories of excepted claims in section 5.1(2) of the CCAA and accordingly, its concern in this regard is removed by this amendment. Unsecured creditors JHHD Aircraft Leasing No. 1 and No. 2 suggested there may be possible wrongdoing in the acts of the directors during the restructuring process which should not be immune from scrutiny and in my view this complaint would also be caught by the exception captured in the amendment.

92 While it is true that section 5.2 of the CCAA does not authorize a release of claims against third parties other than directors, it does not prohibit such releases either. The amended terms of the release will not prevent claims from which the CCAA expressly prohibits release. Aside from the complaints of Resurgence, which by their own submissions are addressed in the amendment I have directed, and the complaints of JHHD Aircraft Leasing No. 1 and No. 2, which would also be addressed in the amendment, the terms of the release have been accepted by the requisite majority of creditors and I am loathe to further disturb the terms of the Plan, with one exception.

93 Amex Bank of Canada submitted that the form of release appeared overly broad and might compromise unaffected claims of affected creditors. For further clarification, Amex Bank of Canada's potential claim for defamation is unaffected by the Plan and I am prepared to order Section 6.2(2)(ii) be amended to reflect this specific exception.

3. Fair and Reasonable

94 In determining whether to sanction a plan of arrangement under the CCAA, the court is guided by two fundamental concepts: "fairness" and "reasonableness". While these concepts are always at the heart of the court's exercise of its discretion, their meanings are necessarily shaped by the unique circumstances of each case, within the context of the Act and accordingly can be difficult to distill and challenging to apply. Blair J. described these concepts in *Olympia and York Dev. Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.*, supra, at page 9:

"Fairness" and "reasonableness" are, in my opinion, the two keynote concepts underscoring the philosophy and workings of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. Fairness is the quintessential expression of the court's equitable jurisdiction - although the jurisdiction is statutory, the broad discretionary powers given to the judiciary by the legislation which make its exercise an exercise in equity - and "reasonableness" is what lends objectivity to the process.

95 The legislation, while conferring broad discretion on the court, offers little guidance. However, the court is assisted in the exercise of its discretion by the purpose of the CCAA: to facilitate the reorganization of a debtor company for the benefit of the company, its creditors, shareholders, employees and, in many instances, a much broader constituency of affected persons. Parliament has recognized that reorganization, if commercially feasible, is in most cases preferable, economically and socially, to liquidation: *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleum Ltd.*, [1989] 2 W.W.R. 566 at 574 (Alta.Q.B.); *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363 at 368 (B.C.C.A.).

96 The sanction of the court of a creditor-approved plan is not to be considered as a rubber stamp process. Although the majority vote that brings the plan to a sanction hearing plays a significant role in the court's assessment, the court will consider other matters as are appropriate in light of its discretion. In the unique circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to consider a number of additional matters:

- a. The composition of the unsecured vote;
 - b. What creditors would receive on liquidation or bankruptcy as compared to the Plan;
 - c. Alternatives available to the Plan and bankruptcy;
 - d. Oppression;
 - e. Unfairness to Shareholders of CAC; and
 - f. The public interest.
- a. Composition of the unsecured vote

97 As noted above, an important measure of whether a plan is fair and reasonable is the parties' approval and the degree to which it has been given. Creditor support creates an inference that the plan is fair and reasonable because the assenting creditors believe that their interests are treated equitably under the plan. Moreover, it creates an inference that the arrangement is economically feasible and therefore reasonable because the creditors are in a better position than the courts to gauge business risk. As stated by Blair J. at page 11 of *Olympia & York Developments Ltd.*, *supra*:

As other courts have done, I observe that it is not my function to second guess the business people with respect to the "business" aspect of the Plan or descending into the negotiating arena or substituting my own view of what is a fair and reasonable compromise or arrangement for that of the business judgment of the participants. The parties themselves know best what is in their interests in those areas.

98 However, given the manner of voting under the CCAA, the court must be cognizant of the treatment of minorities within a class: see for example *Quintette Coal Ltd.*, (1992) 13 C.B.R. (3d) 146 (B.C.S.C) and *Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Co.* (1890) 60

L.J. Ch. 221 (C.A.). The court can address this by ensuring creditors' claims are properly classified. As well, it is sometimes appropriate to tabulate the vote of a particular class so the results can be assessed from a fairness perspective. In this case, the classification was challenged by Resurgence and I dismissed that application. The vote was also tabulated in this case and the results demonstrate that the votes of Air Canada and the Senior Secured Noteholders, who voted their deficiency in the unsecured class, were decisive.

99 The results of the unsecured vote, as reported by the Monitor, are:

1. For the resolution to approve the Plan: 73 votes (65% in number) representing \$494,762,304 in claims (76% in value);
2. Against the resolution: 39 votes (35% in number) representing \$156,360,363 in claims (24% in value); and
3. Abstentions: 15 representing \$968,036 in value.

100 The voting results as reported by the Monitor were challenged by Resurgence. That application was dismissed.

101 The members of each class that vote in favour of a plan must do so in good faith and the majority within a class must act without coercion in their conduct toward the minority. When asked to assess fairness of an approved plan, the court will not countenance secret agreements to vote in favour of a plan secured by advantages to the creditor: see for example, *Hochberger v. Rittenberg* (1916), 36 D.L.R. 450 (S.C.C.)

102 In *Northland Properties Ltd. (Re)* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 at 192-3 (B.C.S.C.) aff'd 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C.C.A.), dissenting priority mortgagees argued the plan violated the principle of equality due to an agreement between the debtor company and another priority mortgagee which essentially amounted to a preference in exchange for voting in favour of the plan. Trainor J. found that the agreement was freely disclosed and commercially reasonable and went on to approve the plan, using the three part test. The British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld this result and in commenting on the minority complaint McEachern J.A. stated at page 206:

In my view, the obvious benefits of settling rights and keeping the enterprise together as a going concern far outweigh the deprivation of the appellants' wholly illusory rights. In this connection, the learned chambers judge said at p.29:

I turn to the question of the right to hold the property after an order absolute and whether or not this is a denial of something of that significance that it should affect these proceedings. There is in the material before me some evidence of values. There are the principles to which I have referred, as well as to the rights of majorities and the rights of minorities.

Certainly, those minority rights are there, but it would seem to me that in view of the overall plan, in view of the speculative nature of holding property in the light of appraisals which have been given as to value, that this right is something which should be subsumed to the benefit of the majority.

103 Resurgence submitted that Air Canada manipulated the indebtedness of CAIL to assure itself of an affirmative vote. I disagree. I previously ruled on the validity of the deficiency when approving the LOIs and found the deficiency to be valid. I found there was consideration for the assignment of the deficiency claims of the various aircraft financiers to Air Canada, namely the provision of an Air Canada guarantee which would otherwise not have been available until plan sanction. The Monitor reviewed the calculations of the deficiencies and determined they were calculated in a reasonable manner. As such, the court approved those transactions. If the deficiency had instead remained with the aircraft financiers, it is reasonable to assume those claims would have been voted in favour of the plan. Further, it would have been entirely appropriate under the circumstances for the aircraft financiers to have retained the deficiency and agreed to vote in favour of the Plan, with the same result to Resurgence. That the financiers did not choose this method was explained by the testimony of Mr. Carty and Robert Peterson, Chief Financial Officer for Air Canada; quite simply it amounted to a desire on behalf of these creditors to shift the "deal risk" associated with the Plan to Air Canada. The agreement reached with the Senior Secured Noteholders was also disclosed and the challenge by Resurgence regarding their vote in the unsecured class was dismissed. There is nothing inappropriate in the voting of the deficiency claims of Air Canada or the Senior Secured Noteholders in the unsecured class. There is no evidence of secret vote buying such as discussed in *Northland Properties Ltd. (Re)*.

104 If the Plan is approved, Air Canada stands to profit in its operation. I do not accept that the deficiency claims were devised to dominate the vote of the unsecured creditor class, however, Air Canada, as funder of the Plan is more motivated than Resurgence to support it. This divergence of views on its own does not amount to bad faith on the part of Air Canada. Resurgence submitted that only the Unsecured Noteholders received 14 cents on the dollar. That is not accurate, as demonstrated by the list of affected unsecured creditors included earlier in these Reasons. The Senior Secured Noteholders did receive other consideration under the Plan, but to suggest they were differently motivated suggests that those creditors did not ascribe any value to their unsecured claims. There is no evidence to support this submission.

105 The good faith of Resurgence in its vote must also be considered. Resurgence acquired a substantial amount of its claim after the failure of the Onex bid, when it was aware that Canadian's financial condition was rapidly deteriorating. Thereafter, Resurgence continued to purchase a substantial amount of this highly distressed debt. While Mr. Symington maintained that he bought because he thought the bonds were a good investment, he also acknowledged that one basis for purchasing was the hope of obtaining a blocking position sufficient to veto a plan in the proposed debt restructuring. This was an obvious ploy for leverage with the Plan proponents.

106 The authorities which address minority creditors' complaints speak of "substantial injustice" (*Keddy Motor Inns Ltd. (Re)* (1992) 13 C.B.R. (3d) 245 (N.S.C.A.), "confiscation" of rights (*Campeau Corp. (Re)* (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 104 (Ont. Ct. (Gen.Div.); *Skydome Corp. (Re)*, [1999] O.J. No. 1261, 87 A.C.W.S (3d) 421 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.)) and majorities "feasting upon" the rights of the minority (*Quintette Coal Ltd. (Re)*, (1992), 13 C.B.R.(3d) 146 (B.C.S.C.). Although it cannot be disputed that the group of Unsecured Noteholders represented by Resurgence are being asked to accept a significant reduction of their claims, as are all of the affected unsecured creditors, I do not see a "substantial injustice", nor view their rights as having been "confiscated" or "feasted upon" by being required to succumb to the wishes of the majority in their class. No bad faith has been demonstrated in this case. Rather, the treatment of Resurgence, along with all other affected unsecured creditors, represents a reasonable balancing of interests. While the court is directed to consid-

er whether there is an injustice being worked within a class, it must also determine whether there is an injustice with respect to the stakeholders as a whole. Even if a plan might at first blush appear to have that effect, when viewed in relation to all other parties, it may nonetheless be considered appropriate and be approved: *Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank* (1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.) and *Northland Properties (Re)*, supra at 9.

107 Further, to the extent that greater or discrete motivation to support a Plan may be seen as a conflict, the Court should take this same approach and look at the creditors as a whole and to the objecting creditors specifically and determine if their rights are compromised in an attempt to balance interests and have the pain of compromise borne equally.

108 Resurgence represents 58.2% of the Unsecured Noteholders or \$96 million in claims. The total claim of the Unsecured Noteholders ranges from \$146 million to \$161 million. The affected unsecured class, excluding aircraft financing, tax claims, the noteholders and claims under \$50,000, ranges from \$116.3 million to \$449.7 million depending on the resolutions of certain claims by the Claims Officer. Resurgence represents between 15.7% - 35% of that portion of the class.

109 The total affected unsecured claims, excluding tax claims, but including aircraft financing and noteholder claims including the unsecured portion of the Senior Secured Notes, ranges from \$673 million to \$1,007 million. Resurgence represents between 9.5% - 14.3% of the total affected unsecured creditor pool. These percentages indicate that at its very highest in a class excluding Air Canada's assigned claims and Senior Secured's deficiency, Resurgence would only represent a maximum of 35% of the class. In the larger class of affected unsecured it is significantly less. Viewed in relation to the class as a whole, there is no injustice being worked against Resurgence.

110 The thrust of the Resurgence submissions suggests a mistaken belief that they will get more than 14 cents on liquidation. This is not borne out by the evidence and is not reasonable in the context of the overall Plan.

b. Receipts on liquidation or bankruptcy

111 As noted above, the Monitor prepared and circulated a report on the Plan which contained a summary of a liquidation analysis outlining the Monitor's projected realizations upon a liquidation of CAIL ("Liquidation Analysis").

112 The Liquidation Analysis was based on: (1) the draft unaudited financial statements of Canadian at March 31, 2000; (2) the distress values reported in independent appraisals of aircraft and aircraft related assets obtained by CAIL in January, 2000; (3) a review of CAIL's aircraft leasing and financing documents; and (4) discussions with CAIL Management.

113 Prior to and during the application for sanction, the Monitor responded to various requests for information by parties involved. In particular, the Monitor provided a copy of the Liquidation Analysis to those who requested it. Certain of the parties involved requested the opportunity to question the Monitor further, particularly in respect to the Liquidation Analysis and this court directed a process for the posing of those questions.

114 While there were numerous questions to which the Monitor was asked to respond, there were several areas in which Resurgence and the Minority Shareholders took particular issue: pension plan surplus, CRAL, international routes and tax pools. The dissenting groups asserted that

these assets represented overlooked value to the company on a liquidation basis or on a going concern basis.

Pension Plan Surplus

115 The Monitor did not attribute any value to pension plan surplus when it prepared the Liquidation Analysis, for the following reasons:

- 1) The summaries of the solvency surplus/deficit positions indicated a cumulative net deficit position for the seven registered plans, after consideration of contingent liabilities;
- 2) The possibility, based on the previous splitting out of the seven plans from a single plan in 1988, that the plans could be held to be consolidated for financial purposes, which would remove any potential solvency surplus since the total estimated contingent liabilities exceeded the total estimated solvency surplus;
- 3) The actual calculations were prepared by CAIL's actuaries and actuaries representing the unions could conclude liabilities were greater; and
- 4) CAIL did not have a legal opinion confirming that surpluses belonged to CAIL.

116 The Monitor concluded that the entitlement question would most probably have to be settled by negotiation and/or litigation by the parties. For those reasons, the Monitor took a conservative view and did not attribute an asset value to pension plans in the Liquidation Analysis. The Monitor also did not include in the Liquidation Analysis any amount in respect of the claim that could be made by members of the plan where there is an apparent deficit after deducting contingent liabilities.

117 The issues in connection with possible pension surplus are: (1) the true amount of any of the available surplus; and (2) the entitlement of Canadian to any such amount.

118 It is acknowledged that surplus prior to termination can be accessed through employer contribution holidays, which Canadian has taken to the full extent permitted. However, there is no basis that has been established for any surplus being available to be withdrawn from an ongoing pension plan. On a pension plan termination, the amount available as a solvency surplus would first have to be further reduced by various amounts to determine whether there was in fact any true surplus available for distribution. Such reductions include contingent benefits payable in accordance with the provisions of each respective pension plan, any extraordinary plan wind up cost, the amounts of any contribution holidays taken which have not been reflected, and any litigation costs.

119 Counsel for all of Canadian's unionized employees confirmed on the record that the respective union representatives can be expected to dispute all of these calculations as well as to dispute entitlement.

120 There is a suggestion that there might be a total of \$40 million of surplus remaining from all pension plans after such reductions are taken into account. Apart from the issue of entitlement, this assumes that the plans can be treated separately, that a surplus could in fact be realized on liquidation and that the Towers Perrin calculations are not challenged. With total pension plan assets of over \$2 billion, a surplus of \$40 million could quickly disappear with relatively minor changes in the market value of the securities held or calculation of liabilities. In the circumstances, given all the variables, I find that the existence of any surplus is doubtful at best and I am satisfied that the Monitor's Liquidation Analysis ascribing it zero value is reasonable in this circumstances.

CRAL

121 The Monitor's liquidation analysis as at March 31, 2000 of CRAL determined that in a distress situation, after payments were made to its creditors, there would be a deficiency of approximately \$30 million to pay Canadian Regional's unsecured creditors, which include a claim of approximately \$56.5 million due to Canadian. In arriving at this conclusion, the Monitor reviewed internally prepared unaudited financial statements of CRAL as of March 31, 2000, the Houlihan Lokey Howard and Zukin, distress valuation dated January 21, 2000 and the Simat Helliesen and Eichner valuation of selected CAIL assets dated January 31, 2000 for certain aircraft related materials and engines, rotables and spares. The Avitas Inc., and Avmark Inc. reports were used for the distress values on CRAL's aircraft and the CRAL aircraft lease documentation. The Monitor also performed its own analysis of CRAL's liquidation value, which involved analysis of the reports provided and details of its analysis were outlined in the Liquidation Analysis.

122 For the purpose of the Liquidation Analysis, the Monitor did not consider other airlines as comparable for evaluation purposes, as the Monitor's valuation was performed on a distressed sale basis. The Monitor further assumed that without CAIL's national and international network to feed traffic into and a source of standby financing, and considering the inevitable negative publicity which a failure of CAIL would produce, CRAL would immediately stop operations as well.

123 Mr. Peterson testified that CRAL was worth \$260 million to Air Canada, based on Air Canada being a special buyer who could integrate CRAL, on a going concern basis, into its network. The Liquidation Analysis assumed the windup of each of CRAL and CAIL, a completely different scenario.

124 There is no evidence that there was a potential purchaser for CRAL who would be prepared to acquire CRAL or the operations of CRAL 98 for any significant sum or at all. CRAL has value to CAIL, and in turn, could provide value to Air Canada, but this value is attributable to its ability to feed traffic to and take traffic from the national and international service operated by CAIL. In my view, the Monitor was aware of these features and properly considered these factors in assessing the value of CRAL on a liquidation of CAIL.

125 If CAIL were to cease operations, the evidence is clear that CRAL would be obliged to do so as well immediately. The travelling public, shippers, trade suppliers, and others would make no distinction between CAIL and CRAL and there would be no going concern for Air Canada to acquire.

International Routes

126 The Monitor ascribed no value to Canadian's international routes in the Liquidation Analysis. In discussions with CAIL management and experts available in its aviation group, the Monitor was advised that international routes are unassignable licenses and not property rights. They do not appear as assets in CAIL's financials. Mr. Carty and Mr. Peterson explained that routes and slots are not treated as assets by airlines, but rather as rights in the control of the Government of Canada. In the event of bankruptcy/receivership of CAIL, CAIL's trustee/receiver could not sell them and accordingly they are of no value to CAIL.

127 Evidence was led that on June 23, 1999 Air Canada made an offer to purchase CAIL's international routes for \$400 million cash plus \$125 million for aircraft spares and inventory, along with the assumption of certain debt and lease obligations for the aircraft required for the interna-

tional routes. CAIL evaluated the Air Canada offer and concluded that the proposed purchase price was insufficient to permit it to continue carrying on business in the absence of its international routes. Mr. Carty testified that something in the range of \$2 billion would be required.

128 CAIL was in desperate need of cash in mid December, 1999. CAIL agreed to sell its Toronto - Tokyo route for \$25 million. The evidence, however, indicated that the price for the Toronto - Tokyo route was not derived from a valuation, but rather was what CAIL asked for, based on its then-current cash flow requirements. Air Canada and CAIL obtained Government approval for the transfer on December 21, 2000.

129 Resurgence complained that despite this evidence of offers for purchase and actual sales of international routes and other evidence of sales of slots, the Monitor did not include Canadian's international routes in the Liquidation Analysis and only attributed a total of \$66 million for all intangibles of Canadian. There is some evidence that slots at some foreign airports may be bought or sold in some fashion. However, there is insufficient evidence to attribute any value to other slots which CAIL has at foreign airports. It would appear given the regulation of the airline industry, in particular, the Aeronautics Act and the Canada Transportation Act, that international routes for a Canadian air carrier only have full value to the extent of federal government support for the transfer or sale, and its preparedness to allow the then-current license holder to sell rather than act unilaterally to change the designation. The federal government was prepared to allow CAIL to sell its Toronto - Tokyo route to Air Canada in light of CAIL's severe financial difficulty and the certainty of cessation of operations during the Christmas holiday season in the absence of such a sale.

130 Further, statements made by CAIL in mid-1999 as to the value of its international routes and operations in response to an offer by Air Canada, reflected the amount CAIL needed to sustain liquidity without its international routes and was not a representation of market value of what could realistically be obtained from an arms length purchaser. The Monitor concluded on its investigation that CAIL's Narita and Heathrow slots had a realizable value of \$66 million, which it included in the Liquidation Analysis. I find that this conclusion is supportable and that the Monitor properly concluded that there were no other rights which ought to have been assigned value.

Tax Pools

131 There are four tax pools identified by Resurgence and the Minority Shareholders that are material: capital losses at the CAC level, undepreciated capital cost pools, operating losses incurred by Canadian and potential for losses to be reinstated upon repayment of fuel tax rebates by CAIL.

Capital Loss Pools

132 The capital loss pools at CAC will not be available to Air Canada since CAC is to be left out of the corporate reorganization and will be severed from CAIL. Those capital losses can essentially only be used to absorb a portion of the debt forgiveness liability associated with the restructuring. CAC, who has virtually all of its senior debt compromised in the plan, receives compensation for this small advantage, which cost them nothing.

Undepreciated capital cost ("UCC")

133 There is no benefit to Air Canada in the pools of UCC unless it were established that the UCC pools are in excess of the fair market value of the relevant assets, since Air Canada could create the same pools by simply buying the assets on a liquidation at fair market value. Mr. Peterson understood this pool of UCC to be approximately \$700 million. There is no evidence that the UCC

pool, however, could be considered to be a source of benefit. There is no evidence that this amount is any greater than fair market value.

Operating Losses

134 The third tax pool complained of is the operating losses. The debt forgiven as a result of the Plan will erase any operating losses from prior years to the extent of such forgiven debt.

Fuel tax rebates

135 The fourth tax pool relates to the fuel tax rebates system taken advantage of by CAIL in past years. The evidence is that on a consolidated basis the total potential amount of this pool is \$297 million. According to Mr. Carty's testimony, CAIL has not been taxable in his ten years as Chief Financial Officer. The losses which it has generated for tax purposes have been sold on a 10 - 1 basis to the government in order to receive rebates of excise tax paid for fuel. The losses can be restored retroactively if the rebates are repaid, but the losses can only be carried forward for a maximum of seven years. The evidence of Mr. Peterson indicates that Air Canada has no plan to use those alleged losses and in order for them to be useful to Air Canada, Air Canada would have to complete a legal merger with CAIL, which is not provided for in the plan and is not contemplated by Air Canada until some uncertain future date. In my view, the Monitor's conclusion that there was no value to any tax pools in the Liquidation Analysis is sound.

136 Those opposed to the Plan have raised the spectre that there may be value unaccounted for in this liquidation analysis or otherwise. Given the findings above, this is merely speculation and is unsupported by any concrete evidence.

c. Alternatives to the Plan

137 When presented with a plan, affected stakeholders must weigh their options in the light of commercial reality. Those options are typically liquidation measured against the plan proposed. If not put forward, a hope for a different or more favourable plan is not an option and no basis upon which to assess fairness. On a purposive approach to the CCAA, what is fair and reasonable must be assessed against the effect of the Plan on the creditors and their various claims, in the context of their response to the plan. Stakeholders are expected to decide their fate based on realistic, commercially viable alternatives (generally seen as the prime motivating factor in any business decision) and not on speculative desires or hope for the future. As Farley J. stated in *Re T. Eaton Co.*, [1999] O.J. No. 4216 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) at paragraph 6:

One has to be cognizant of the function of a balancing of their prejudices. Positions must be realistically assessed and weighed, all in the light of what an alternative to a successful plan would be. Wishes are not a firm foundation on which to build a plan; nor are ransom demands.

138 The evidence is overwhelming that all other options have been exhausted and have resulted in failure. The concern of those opposed suggests that there is a better plan that Air Canada can put forward. I note that significant enhancements were made to the plan during the process. In any case, this is the Plan that has been voted on. The evidence makes it clear that there is not another plan forthcoming. As noted by Farley J. in *T. Eaton Co*, supra, "no one presented an alternative plan for the interested parties to vote on" (para. 8).

d. Oppression

Oppression and the CCAA

139 Resurgence and the Minority Shareholders originally claimed that the Plan proponents, CAC and CAIL and the Plan supporters 853350 and Air Canada had oppressed, unfairly disregarded or unfairly prejudiced their interests, under Section 234 of the ABCA. The Minority Shareholders (for reasons that will appear obvious) have abandoned that position.

140 Section 234 gives the court wide discretion to remedy corporate conduct that is unfair. As remedial legislation, it attempts to balance the interests of shareholders, creditors and management to ensure adequate investor protection and maximum management flexibility. The Act requires the court to judge the conduct of the company and the majority in the context of equity and fairness: *First Edmonton Place Ltd. v. 315888 Alberta Ltd.*, (1988) 40 B.L.R.28 (Alta. Q.B.). Equity and fairness are measured against or considered in the context of the rights, interests or reasonable expectations of the complainants: *Re Diligenti v. RWMD Operations Kelowna* (1976), 1 B.C.L.R. 36 (S.C.).

141 The starting point in any determination of oppression requires an understanding as to what the rights, interests, and reasonable expectations are and what the damaging or detrimental effect is on them. MacDonald J. stated in *First Edmonton Place*, *supra* at 57:

In deciding what is unfair, the history and nature of the corporation, the essential nature of the relationship between the corporation and the creditor, the type of rights affected in general commercial practice should all be material. More concretely, the test of unfair prejudice or unfair disregard should encompass the following considerations: The protection of the underlying expectation of a creditor in the arrangement with the corporation, the extent to which the acts complained of were unforeseeable where the creditor could not reasonably have protected itself from such acts and the detriment to the interests of the creditor.

142 While expectations vary considerably with the size, structure, and value of the corporation, all expectations must be reasonably and objectively assessed: *Pente Investment Management Ltd. v. Schneider Corp.* (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 177 (C.A.).

143 Where a company is insolvent, only the creditors maintain a meaningful stake in its assets. Through the mechanism of liquidation or insolvency legislation, the interests of shareholders are pushed to the bottom rung of the priority ladder. The expectations of creditors and shareholders must be viewed and measured against an altered financial and legal landscape. Shareholders cannot reasonably expect to maintain a financial interest in an insolvent company where creditors' claims are not being paid in full. It is through the lens of insolvency that the court must consider whether the acts of the company are in fact oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarded. CCAA proceedings have recognized that shareholders may not have "a true interest to be protected" because there is no reasonable prospect of economic value to be realized by the shareholders given the existing financial misfortunes of the company: *Re Royal Oak Mines Ltd.*, *supra*, para. 4., *Re Cadillac Fairview*, [1995] O.J. 707 (Ont. Sup. Ct), and *Re T. Eaton Company*, *supra*.

144 To avail itself of the protection of the CCAA, a company must be insolvent. The CCAA considers the hierarchy of interests and assesses fairness and reasonableness in that context. The court's mandate not to sanction a plan in the absence of fairness necessitates the determination as to

whether the complaints of dissenting creditors and shareholders are legitimate, bearing in mind the company's financial state. The articulated purpose of the Act and the jurisprudence interpreting it, "widens the lens" to balance a broader range of interests that includes creditors and shareholders and beyond to the company, the employees and the public, and tests the fairness of the plan with reference to its impact on all of the constituents.

145 It is through the lens of insolvency legislation that the rights and interests of both shareholders and creditors must be considered. The reduction or elimination of rights of both groups is a function of the insolvency and not of oppressive conduct in the operation of the CCAA. The antithesis of oppression is fairness, the guiding test for judicial sanction. If a plan unfairly disregards or is unfairly prejudicial it will not be approved. However, the court retains the power to compromise or prejudice rights to effect a broader purpose, the restructuring of an insolvent company, provided that the plan does so in a fair manner.

Oppression allegations by Resurgence

146 Resurgence alleges that it has been oppressed or had its rights disregarded because the Petitioners and Air Canada disregarded the specific provisions of their trust indenture, that Air Canada and 853350 dealt with other creditors outside of the CCAA, refusing to negotiate with Resurgence and that they are generally being treated inequitably under the Plan.

147 The trust indenture under which the Unsecured Notes were issued required that upon a "change of control", 101% of the principal owing thereunder, plus interest would be immediately due and payable. Resurgence alleges that Air Canada, through 853350, caused CAC and CAIL to purposely fail to honour this term. Canadian acknowledges that the trust indenture was breached. On February 1, 2000, Canadian announced a moratorium on payments to lessors and lenders, including the Unsecured Noteholders. As a result of this moratorium, Canadian defaulted on the payments due under its various credit facilities and aircraft leases.

148 The moratorium was not directed solely at the Unsecured Noteholders. It had the same impact on other creditors, secured and unsecured. Canadian, as a result of the moratorium, breached other contractual relationships with various creditors. The breach of contract is not sufficient to found a claim for oppression in this case. Given Canadian's insolvency, which Resurgence recognized, it cannot be said that there was a reasonable expectation that it would be paid in full under the terms of the trust indenture, particularly when Canadian had ceased making payments to other creditors as well.

149 It is asserted that because the Plan proponents engaged in a restructuring of Canadian's debt before the filing under the CCAA, that its use of the Act for only a small group of creditors, which includes Resurgence is somehow oppressive.

150 At the outset, it cannot be overlooked that the CCAA does not require that a compromise be proposed to all creditors of an insolvent company. The CCAA is a flexible, remedial statute which recognizes the unique circumstances that lead to and away from insolvency.

151 Next, Air Canada made it clear beginning in the fall of 1999 that Canadian would have to complete a financial restructuring so as to permit Air Canada to acquire CAIL on a financially sound basis and as a wholly owned subsidiary. Following the implementation of the moratorium, absent which Canadian could not have continued to operate, Canadian and Air Canada commenced efforts to restructure significant obligations by consent. They perceived that further damage to pub-

lic confidence that a CCAA filing could produce, required Canadian to secure a substantial measure of creditor support in advance of any public filing for court protection. Before the Petitioners started the CCAA proceedings on March 24, 2000, Air Canada, CAIL and lessors of 59 aircraft in its fleet had reached agreement in principle on the restructuring plan.

152 The purpose of the CCAA is to create an environment for negotiations and compromise. Often it is the stay of proceedings that creates the necessary stability for that process to unfold. Negotiations with certain key creditors in advance of the CCAA filing, rather than being oppressive or conspiratorial, are to be encouraged as a matter of principle if their impact is to provide a firm foundation for a restructuring. Certainly in this case, they were of critical importance, staving off liquidation, preserving cash flow and allowing the Plan to proceed. Rather than being detrimental or prejudicial to the interests of the other stakeholders, including Resurgence, it was beneficial to Canadian and all of its stakeholders.

153 Resurgence complained that certain transfers of assets to Air Canada and its actions in consolidating the operations of the two entities prior to the initiation of the CCAA proceedings were unfairly prejudicial to it.

154 The evidence demonstrates that the sales of the Toronto - Tokyo route, the Dash 8s and the simulators were at the suggestion of Canadian, who was in desperate need of operating cash. Air Canada paid what Canadian asked, based on its cash flow requirements. The evidence established that absent the injection of cash at that critical juncture, Canadian would have ceased operations. It is for that reason that the Government of Canada willingly provided the approval for the transfer on December 21, 2000.

155 Similarly, the renegotiation of CAIL's aircraft leases to reflect market rates supported by Air Canada covenant or guarantee has been previously dealt with by this court and found to have been in the best interest of Canadian, not to its detriment. The evidence establishes that the financial support and corporate integration that has been provided by Air Canada was not only in Canadian's best interest, but its only option for survival. The suggestion that the renegotiations of these leases, various sales and the operational realignment represents an assumption of a benefit by Air Canada to the detriment of Canadian is not supported by the evidence.

156 I find the transactions predating the CCAA proceedings, were in fact Canadian's life blood in ensuring some degree of liquidity and stability within which to conduct an orderly restructuring of its debt. There was no detriment to Canadian or to its creditors, including its unsecured creditors. That Air Canada and Canadian were so successful in negotiating agreements with their major creditors, including aircraft financiers, without resorting to a stay under the CCAA underscores the serious distress Canadian was in and its lenders recognition of the viability of the proposed Plan.

157 Resurgence complained that other significant groups held negotiations with Canadian. The evidence indicates that a meeting was held with Mr. Symington, Managing Director of Resurgence, in Toronto in March 2000. It was made clear to Resurgence that the pool of unsecured creditors would be somewhere between \$500 and \$700 million and that Resurgence would be included within that class. To the extent that the versions of this meeting differ, I prefer and accept the evidence of Mr. Carty. Resurgence wished to play a significant role in the debt restructuring and indicated it was prepared to utilize the litigation process to achieve a satisfactory result for itself. It is therefore understandable that no further negotiations took place. Nevertheless, the original offer to affected unsecured creditors has been enhanced since the filing of the plan on April 25, 2000. The enhance-

ments to unsecured claims involved the removal of the cap on the unsecured pool and an increase from 12 to 14 cents on the dollar.

158 The findings of the Commissioner of Competition establishes beyond doubt that absent the financial support provided by Air Canada, Canadian would have failed in December 1999. I am unable to find on the evidence that Resurgence has been oppressed. The complaint that Air Canada has plundered Canadian and robbed it of its assets is not supported but contradicted by the evidence. As described above, the alternative is liquidation and in that event the Unsecured Noteholders would receive between one and three cents on the dollar. The Monitor's conclusions in this regard are supportable and I accept them.

e. Unfairness to Shareholders

159 The Minority Shareholders essentially complained that they were being unfairly stripped of their only asset in CAC - the shares of CAIL. They suggested they were being squeezed out by the new CAC majority shareholder 853350, without any compensation or any vote. When the reorganization is completed as contemplated by the Plan, their shares will remain in CAC but CAC will be a bare shell.

160 They further submitted that Air Canada's cash infusion, the covenants and guarantees it has offered to aircraft financiers, and the operational changes (including integration of schedules, "quick win" strategies, and code sharing) have all added significant value to CAIL to the benefit of its stakeholders, including the Minority Shareholders. They argued that they should be entitled to continue to participate into the future and that such an expectation is legitimate and consistent with the statements and actions of Air Canada in regard to integration. By acting to realign the airlines before a corporate reorganization, the Minority Shareholders asserted that Air Canada has created the expectation that it is prepared to consolidate the airlines with the participation of a minority. The Minority Shareholders take no position with respect to the debt restructuring under the CCAA, but ask the court to sever the corporate reorganization provisions contained in the Plan.

161 Finally, they asserted that CAIL has increased in value due to Air Canada's financial contributions and operational changes and that accordingly, before authorizing the transfer of the CAIL shares to 853350, the current holders of the CAIL Preferred Shares, the court must have evidence before it to justify a transfer of 100% of the equity of CAIL to the Preferred Shares.

162 That CAC will have its shareholding in CAIL extinguished and emerge a bare shell is acknowledged. However, the evidence makes it abundantly clear that those shares, CAC's "only asset", have no value. That the Minority Shareholders are content to have the debt restructuring proceed suggests by implication that they do not dispute the insolvency of both Petitioners, CAC and CAIL.

163 The Minority Shareholders base their expectation to remain as shareholders on the actions of Air Canada in acquiring only 82% of the CAC shares before integrating certain of the airlines' operations. Mr. Baker (who purchased after the Plan was filed with the Court and almost six months after the take over bid by Air Canada) suggested that the contents of the bid circular misrepresented Air Canada's future intentions to its shareholders. The two dollar price offered and paid per share in the bid must be viewed somewhat skeptically and in the context in which the bid arose. It does not support the speculative view that some shareholders hold, that somehow, despite insolvency, their shares have some value on a going concern basis. In any event, any claim for misrepresentation that

Minority Shareholders might have arising from the take over bid circular against Air Canada or 853350, if any, is unaffected by the Plan and may be pursued after the stay is lifted.

164 In considering Resurgence's claim of oppression I have already found that the financial support of Air Canada during this restructuring period has benefited Canadian and its stakeholders. Air Canada's financial support and the integration of the two airlines has been critical to keeping Canadian afloat. The evidence makes it abundantly clear that without this support Canadian would have ceased operations. However it has not transformed CAIL or CAC into solvent companies.

165 The Minority Shareholders raise concerns about assets that are ascribed limited or no value in the Monitor's report as does Resurgence (although to support an opposite proposition). Considerable argument was directed to the future operational savings and profitability forecasted for Air Canada, its subsidiaries and CAIL and its subsidiaries. Mr. Peterson estimated it to be in the order of \$650 to \$800 million on an annual basis, commencing in 2001. The Minority Shareholders point to the tax pools of a restructured company that they submit will be of great value once CAIL becomes profitable as anticipated. They point to a pension surplus that at the very least has value by virtue of the contribution holidays that it affords. They also look to the value of the compromised claims of the restructuring itself which they submit are in the order of \$449 million. They submit these cumulative benefits add value, currently or at least realizable in the future. In sharp contrast to the Resurgence position that these acts constitute oppressive behaviour, the Minority Shareholders view them as enhancing the value of their shares. They go so far as to suggest that there may well be a current going concern value of the CAC shares that has been conveniently ignored or unquantified and that the Petitioners must put evidence before the court as to what that value is.

166 These arguments overlook several important facts, the most significant being that CAC and CAIL are insolvent and will remain insolvent until the debt restructuring is fully implemented. These companies are not just technically or temporarily insolvent, they are massively insolvent. Air Canada will have invested upward of \$3 billion to complete the restructuring, while the Minority Shareholders have contributed nothing. Further, it was a fundamental condition of Air Canada's support of this Plan that it become the sole owner of CAIL. It has been suggested by some that Air Canada's share purchase at two dollars per share in December 1999 was unfairly prejudicial to CAC and CAIL's creditors. Objectively, any expectation by Minority Shareholders that they should be able to participate in a restructured CAIL is not reasonable.

167 The Minority Shareholders asserted the plan is unfair because the effect of the reorganization is to extinguish the common shares of CAIL held by CAC and to convert the voting and non-voting Preferred Shares of CAIL into common shares of CAIL. They submit there is no expert valuation or other evidence to justify the transfer of CAIL's equity to the Preferred Shares. There is no equity in the CAIL shares to transfer. The year end financials show CAIL's shareholder equity at a deficit of \$790 million. The Preferred Shares have a liquidation preference of \$347 million. There is no evidence to suggest that Air Canada's interim support has rendered either of these companies solvent, it has simply permitted operations to continue. In fact, the unaudited consolidated financial statements of CAC for the quarter ended March 31, 2000 show total shareholders equity went from a deficit of \$790 million to a deficit of \$1.214 million, an erosion of \$424 million.

168 The Minority Shareholders' submission attempts to compare and contrast the rights and expectations of the CAIL preferred shares as against the CAC common shares. This is not a meaningful exercise; the Petitioners are not submitting that the Preferred Shares have value and the evidence demonstrates unequivocally that they do not. The Preferred Shares are merely being utilized

as a corporate vehicle to allow CAIL to become a wholly owned subsidiary of Air Canada. For example, the same result could have been achieved by issuing new shares rather than changing the designation of 853350's Preferred Shares in CAIL.

169 The Minority Shareholders have asked the court to sever the reorganization from the debt restructuring, to permit them to participate in whatever future benefit might be derived from the restructured CAIL. However, a fundamental condition of this Plan and the expressed intention of Air Canada on numerous occasions is that CAIL become a wholly owned subsidiary. To suggest the court ought to sever this reorganization from the debt restructuring fails to account for the fact that it is not two plans but an integral part of a single plan. To accede to this request would create an injustice to creditors whose claims are being seriously compromised, and doom the entire Plan to failure. Quite simply, the Plan's funder will not support a severed plan.

170 Finally, the future profits to be derived by Air Canada are not a relevant consideration. While the object of any plan under the CCAA is to create a viable emerging entity, the germane issue is what a prospective purchaser is prepared to pay in the circumstances. Here, we have the one and only offer on the table, Canadian's last and only chance. The evidence demonstrates this offer is preferable to those who have a remaining interest to a liquidation. Where secured creditors have compromised their claims and unsecured creditors are accepting 14 cents on the dollar in a potential pool of unsecured claims totalling possibly in excess of \$1 billion, it is not unfair that shareholders receive nothing.

e. The Public Interest

171 In this case, the court cannot limit its assessment of fairness to how the Plan affects the direct participants. The business of the Petitioners as a national and international airline employing over 16,000 people must be taken into account.

172 In his often cited article, *Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (1947), 25 Can.Bar R.ev. 587 at 593 Stanley Edwards stated:

Another reason which is usually operative in favour of reorganization is the interest of the public in the continuation of the enterprise, particularly if the company supplies commodities or services that are necessary or desirable to large numbers of consumers, or if it employs large numbers of workers who would be thrown out of employment by its liquidation. This public interest may be reflected in the decisions of the creditors and shareholders of the company and is undoubtedly a factor which a court would wish to consider in deciding whether to sanction an arrangement under the C.C.A.A.

173 In *Re Repap British Columbia Inc.* (1998), 1 C.B.R. (4th) 49 (B.C.S.C.) the court noted that the fairness of the plan must be measured against the overall economic and business environment and against the interests of the citizens of British Columbia who are affected as "shareholders" of the company, and creditors, of suppliers, employees and competitors of the company. The court approved the plan even though it was unable to conclude that it was necessarily fair and reasonable. In *Re Quintette Coal Ltd.*, *supra*, Thackray J. acknowledged the significance of the coal mine to the British Columbia economy, its importance to the people who lived and worked in the region and to the employees of the company and their families. Other cases in which the court considered the public interest in determining whether to sanction a plan under the CCAA include *Canadian Red*

Cross Society (Re), (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div.) and *Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank of Canada* (Trustee of), [1992] O.J. No. 795 (Ont. Gen. Div.)

174 The economic and social impacts of a plan are important and legitimate considerations. Even in insolvency, companies are more than just assets and liabilities. The fate of a company is inextricably tied to those who depend on it in various ways. It is difficult to imagine a case where the economic and social impacts of a liquidation could be more catastrophic. It would undoubtedly be felt by Canadian air travellers across the country. The effect would not be a mere ripple, but more akin to a tidal wave from coast to coast that would result in chaos to the Canadian transportation system.

175 More than sixteen thousand unionized employees of CAIL and CRAL appeared through counsel. The unions and their membership strongly support the Plan. The unions represented included the Airline Pilots Association International, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Transportation District 104, Canadian Union of Public Employees, and the Canadian Auto Workers Union. They represent pilots, ground workers and cabin personnel. The unions submit that it is essential that the employee protections arising from the current restructuring of Canadian not be jeopardized by a bankruptcy, receivership or other liquidation. Liquidation would be devastating to the employees and also to the local and national economies. The unions emphasize that the Plan safeguards the employment and job dignity protection negotiated by the unions for their members. Further, the court was reminded that the unions and their members have played a key role over the last fifteen years or more in working with Canadian and responsible governments to ensure that Canadian survived and jobs were maintained.

176 The Calgary and Edmonton Airport authorities, which are not for profit corporations, also supported the Plan. CAIL's obligations to the airport authorities are not being compromised under the Plan. However, in a liquidation scenario, the airport authorities submitted that a liquidation would have severe financial consequences to them and have potential for severe disruption in the operation of the airports.

177 The representations of the Government of Canada are also compelling. Approximately one year ago, CAIL approached the Transport Department to inquire as to what solution could be found to salvage their ailing company. The Government saw fit to issue an order in council, pursuant to section 47 of the Transportation Act, which allowed an opportunity for CAIL to approach other entities to see if a permanent solution could be found. A standing committee in the House of Commons reviewed a framework for the restructuring of the airline industry, recommendations were made and undertakings were given by Air Canada. The Government was driven by a mandate to protect consumers and promote competition. It submitted that the Plan is a major component of the industry restructuring. Bill C-26, which addresses the restructuring of the industry, has passed through the House of Commons and is presently before the Senate. The Competition Bureau has accepted that Air Canada has the only offer on the table and has worked very closely with the parties to ensure that the interests of consumers, employees, small carriers, and smaller communities will be protected.

178 In summary, in assessing whether a plan is fair and reasonable, courts have emphasized that perfection is not required: see for example *Wandlyn Inns Ltd. (Re)* (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 316 (N.B.Q.B.), *Quintette Coal*, supra and *Repap*, supra. Rather, various rights and remedies must be sacrificed to varying degrees to result in a reasonable, viable compromise for all concerned. The court

is required to view the "big picture" of the plan and assess its impact as a whole. I return to *Algoma Steel v. Royal Bank of Canada*, supra at 9 in which Farley J. endorsed this approach:

What might appear on the surface to be unfair to one party when viewed in relation to all other parties may be considered to be quite appropriate.

179 Fairness and reasonableness are not abstract notions, but must be measured against the available commercial alternatives. The triggering of the statute, namely insolvency, recognizes a fundamental flaw within the company. In these imperfect circumstances there can never be a perfect plan, but rather only one that is supportable. As stated in *Re Sammi Atlas Inc.*, (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 at 173 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) at 173:

A plan under the CCAA is a compromise; it cannot be expected to be perfect. It should be approved if it is fair, reasonable and equitable. Equitable treatment is not necessarily equal treatment. Equal treatment may be contrary to equitable treatment.

180 I find that in all the circumstances, the Plan is fair and reasonable.

IV. CONCLUSION

181 The Plan has obtained the support of many affected creditors, including virtually all aircraft financiers, holders of executory contracts, AMR, Loyalty Group and the Senior Secured Noteholders.

182 Use of these proceedings has avoided triggering more than \$1.2 billion of incremental claims. These include claims of passengers with pre-paid tickets, employees, landlords and other parties with ongoing executory contracts, trade creditors and suppliers.

183 This Plan represents a solid chance for the continued existence of Canadian. It preserves CAIL as a business entity. It maintains over 16,000 jobs. Suppliers and trade creditors are kept whole. It protects consumers and preserves the integrity of our national transportation system while we move towards a new regulatory framework. The extensive efforts by Canadian and Air Canada, the compromises made by stakeholders both within and without the proceedings and the commitment of the Government of Canada inspire confidence in a positive result.

184 I agree with the opposing parties that the Plan is not perfect, but it is neither illegal nor oppressive. Beyond its fair and reasonable balancing of interests, the Plan is a result of bona fide efforts by all concerned and indeed is the only alternative to bankruptcy as ten years of struggle and creative attempts at restructuring by Canadian clearly demonstrate. This Plan is one step toward a new era of airline profitability that hopefully will protect consumers by promoting affordable and accessible air travel to all Canadians.

185 The Plan deserves the sanction of this court and it is hereby granted. The application pursuant to section 185 of the ABCA is granted. The application for declarations sought by Resurgence are dismissed. The application of the Minority Shareholders is dismissed.

PAPERNY J.

TAB 5

Case Name:
Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re)

**IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement
Act, R.S.C. 1985, C-36, as amended
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Proposed Plan of Compromise or
Arrangement of Canwest Global Communications Corp. and
the other applicants listed on Schedule "A"**

[2009] O.J. No. 4788

Court File No. CV-09-8241-OOCL

Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List

S.E. Pepall J.

November 12, 2009.

(43 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Compromises and arrangements -- Applications -- Sanction by court -- Application by a group of debtor companies for approval of an agreement that would enable them to restructure their business affairs, allowed -- Applicants were under the protection of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Agreement was approved because it facilitated the restructuring of the applicants to enable them to become viable and competitive industry participants and it was fair -- Related transaction regarding the transfer of the business and assets of a newspaper that the applicants had an interest in did not require Court approval under s. 36 of the Act because it was an internal corporate reorganization which was in the ordinary course of business -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 36.

Application by a group of debtor companies and entities for an order approving a Transition and Reorganization Agreement between them and other related parties. The applicants were granted protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act on October 6, 2009. They were engaged in the newspaper, digital media and television business. The Agreement pertained to the restructuring of the applicants' business affairs. It was an internal reorganization transaction that was designed to realign shared services and assets within the corporate family that the applicants belonged to. The Agreement was entered into after extensive negotiations between the parties who

were affected by it. The Monitor, who was appointed under the Act, concluded that this transaction had several advantages over a liquidation.

HELD: Application allowed. Court approval under s. 36 of the Act was required if a debtor company under the protection of the Act proposed to sell or dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business. It did not apply to a transaction regarding the transfer of the assets and business of a newspaper that the applicants had an interest in because it was an internal corporate reorganization which was in the ordinary course of business. The Agreement was approved because it facilitated the restructuring of the applicants to enable them to become viable and competitive industry participants and it was fair. It also allowed a substantial number of the businesses operated by the applicants to continue as going concerns. The Agreement did not prejudice the applicants' major creditors. In the absence of the Agreement the newspaper would have to shut down and most of its employees would lose their employment. The stay that was granted under the Act was extended to enable the applicants to continue to work with their various stakeholders on the preparation and filing of a proposed plan of arrangement.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act,

Bulk Sales Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.14,

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 2(1), s. 2(1), s. 36, s. 36(1), s. 36(4), s. 36(7)

Counsel:

Lyndon Barnes and Jeremy Dacks for the Applicants.

Alan Merskey for the Special Committee of the Board of Directors of Canwest.

David Byers and Maria Konyukhova for the Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Benjamin Zarnett for the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders.

Peter J. Osborne for Proposed Management Directors of National Post.

Andrew Kent and Hilary Clarke for Bank of Nova Scotia, Agent for Senior Secured Lenders to LP Entities.

Steve Weisz for CIT Business Credit Canada Inc.

Amanda Darroch for Communication Workers of America.

Alena Thouin for Superintendent of Financial Services.

REASONS FOR DECISION

S.E. PEPALL J.:--

Relief Requested

1 The CMI Entities move for an order approving the Transition and Reorganization Agreement by and among Canwest Global Communications Corporation ("Canwest Global"), Canwest Limited Partnership/Canwest Societe en Commandite (the "Limited Partnership"), Canwest Media Inc. ("CMI"), Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc. ("CPI"), Canwest Television Limited Partnership ("CTLTP") and The National Post Company/La Publication National Post (the "National Post Company") dated as of October 26, 2009, and which includes the New Shared Services Agreement and the National Post Transition Agreement.

2 In addition they ask for a vesting order with respect to certain assets of the National Post Company and a stay extension order.

3 At the conclusion of oral argument, I granted the order requested with reasons to follow.

Background Facts

(a) Parties

4 The CMI Entities including Canwest Global, CMI, CTLTP, the National Post Company, and certain subsidiaries were granted *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") protection on Oct 6, 2009. Certain others including the Limited Partnership and CPI did not seek such protection. The term Canwest will be used to refer to the entire enterprise.

5 The National Post Company is a general partnership with units held by CMI and National Post Holdings Ltd. (a wholly owned subsidiary of CMI). The National Post Company carries on business publishing the National Post newspaper and operating related on line publications.

(b) History

6 To provide some context, it is helpful to briefly review the history of Canwest. In general terms, the Canwest enterprise has two business lines: newspaper and digital media on the one hand and television on the other. Prior to 2005, all of the businesses that were wholly owned by Canwest Global were operated directly or indirectly by CMI using its former name, Canwest Mediaworks Inc. As one unified business, support services were shared. This included such things as executive services, information technology, human resources and accounting and finance.

7 In October, 2005, as part of a planned income trust spin-off, the Limited Partnership was formed to acquire Canwest Global's newspaper publishing and digital media entities as well as certain of the shared services operations. The National Post Company was excluded from this acquisition due to its lack of profitability and unsuitability for inclusion in an income trust. The Limited Partnership entered into a credit agreement with a syndicate of lenders and the Bank of Nova Scotia as administrative agent. The facility was guaranteed by the Limited Partner's general partner, Canwest (Canada) Inc. ("CCI"), and its subsidiaries, CPI and Canwest Books Inc. (CBI") (collectively with the Limited Partnership, the "LP Entities"). The Limited Partnership and its subsidiaries then operated for a couple of years as an income trust.

8 In spite of the income trust spin off, there was still a need for the different entities to continue to share services. CMI and the Limited Partnership entered into various agreements to govern the provision and cost allocation of certain services between them. The following features characterized these arrangements:

- the service provider, be it CMI or the Limited Partnership, would be entitled to reimbursement for all costs and expenses incurred in the provision of services;
- shared expenses would be allocated on a commercially reasonable basis consistent with past practice; and
- neither the reimbursement of costs and expenses nor the payment of fees was intended to result in any material financial gain or loss to the service provider.

9 The multitude of operations that were provided by the LP Entities for the benefit of the National Post Company rendered the latter dependent on both the shared services arrangements and on the operational synergies that developed between the National Post Company and the newspaper and digital operations of the LP Entities.

10 In 2007, following the Federal Government's announcement on the future of income fund distributions, the Limited Partnership effected a going-private transaction of the income trust. Since July, 2007, the Limited Partnership has been a 100% wholly owned indirect subsidiary of Canwest Global. Although repatriated with the rest of the Canwest enterprise in 2007, the LP Entities have separate credit facilities from CMI and continue to participate in the shared services arrangements. In spite of this mutually beneficial interdependence between the LP Entities and the CMI Entities, given the history, there are misalignments of personnel and services.

(c) Restructuring

11 Both the CMI Entities and the LP Entities are pursuing independent but coordinated restructuring and reorganization plans. The former have proceeded with their CCAA filing and pre-packaged recapitalization transaction and the latter have entered into a forbearance agreement with certain of their senior lenders. Both the recapitalization transaction and the forbearance agreement contemplate a disentanglement and/or a realignment of the shared services arrangements. In addition, the term sheet relating to the CMI recapitalization transaction requires a transfer of the assets and business of the National Post Company to the Limited Partnership.

12 The CMI Entities and the LP Entities have now entered into the Transition and Reorganization Agreement which addresses a restructuring of these inter-entity arrangements. By agreement, it is subject to court approval. The terms were negotiated amongst the CMI Entities, the LP Entities, their financial and legal advisors, their respective chief restructuring advisors, the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders, certain of the Limited Partnership's senior lenders and their respective financial and legal advisors.

13 Schedule A to that agreement is the New Shared Services Agreement. It anticipates a cessation or renegotiation of the provision of certain services and the elimination of certain redundancies. It also addresses a realignment of certain employees who are misaligned and, subject to approval of the relevant regulator, a transfer of certain misaligned pension plan participants to pension plans

that are sponsored by the appropriate party. The LP Entities, the CMI Chief Restructuring Advisor and the Monitor have consented to the entering into of the New Shared Services Agreement.

14 Schedule B to the Transition and Reorganization Agreement is the National Post Transition Agreement.

15 The National Post Company has not generated a profit since its inception in 1998 and continues to suffer operating losses. It is projected to suffer a net loss of \$9.3 million in fiscal year ending August 31, 2009 and a net loss of \$0.9 million in September, 2009. For the past seven years these losses have been funded by CMI and as a result, the National Post Company owes CMI approximately \$139.1 million. The members of the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders had agreed to the continued funding by CMI of the National Post Company's short-term liquidity needs but advised that they were no longer prepared to do so after October 30, 2009. Absent funding, the National Post, a national newspaper, would shut down and employment would be lost for its 277 non-unionized employees. Three of its employees provide services to the LP Entities and ten of the LP Entities' employees provide services to the National Post Company. The National Post Company maintains a defined benefit pension plan registered under the Ontario Pension Benefits Act. It has a solvency deficiency as of December 31, 2006 of \$1.5 million and a wind up deficiency of \$1.6 million.

16 The National Post Company is also a guarantor of certain of CMI's and Canwest Global's secured and unsecured indebtedness as follows:

Irish Holdco Secured Note -- \$187.3 million

CIT Secured Facility -- \$10.7 million

CMI Senior Unsecured Subordinated Notes -- US\$393.2 million

Irish Holdco Unsecured Note -- \$430.6 million

17 Under the National Post Transition Agreement, the assets and business of the National Post Company will be transferred as a going concern to a new wholly-owned subsidiary of CPI (the "Transferee"). Assets excluded from the transfer include the benefit of all insurance policies, corporate charters, minute books and related materials, and amounts owing to the National Post Company by any of the CMI Entities.

18 The Transferee will assume the following liabilities: accounts payable to the extent they have not been due for more than 90 days; accrued expenses to the extent they have not been due for more than 90 days; deferred revenue; and any amounts due to employees. The Transferee will assume all liabilities and/or obligations (including any unfunded liability) under the National Post pension plan and benefit plans and the obligations of the National Post Company under contracts, licences and permits relating to the business of the National Post Company. Liabilities that are not expressly assumed are excluded from the transfer including the debt of approximately \$139.1 million owed to CMI, all liabilities of the National Post Company in respect of borrowed money including any related party or third party debt (but not including approximately \$1,148,365 owed to the LP Entities) and contingent liabilities relating to existing litigation claims.

19 CPI will cause the Transferee to offer employment to all of the National Post Company's employees on terms and conditions substantially similar to those pursuant to which the employees are currently employed.

20 The Transferee is to pay a portion of the price or cost in cash: (i) \$2 million and 50% of the National Post Company's negative cash flow during the month of October, 2009 (to a maximum of \$1 million), less (ii) a reduction equal to the amount, if any, by which the assumed liabilities estimate as defined in the National Post Transition Agreement exceeds \$6.3 million.

21 The CMI Entities were of the view that an agreement relating to the transfer of the National Post could only occur if it was associated with an agreement relating to shared services. In addition, the CMI Entities state that the transfer of the assets and business of the National Post Company to the Transferee is necessary for the survival of the National Post as a going concern. Furthermore, there are synergies between the National Post Company and the LP Entities and there is also the operational benefit of reintegrating the National Post newspaper with the other newspapers. It cannot operate independently of the services it receives from the Limited Partnership. Similarly, the LP Entities estimate that closure of the National Post would increase the LP Entities' cost burden by approximately \$14 million in the fiscal year ending August 31, 2010.

22 In its Fifth Report to the Court, the Monitor reviewed alternatives to transitioning the business of the National Post Company to the LP Entities. RBC Dominion Securities Inc. who was engaged in December, 2008 to assist in considering and evaluating recapitalization alternatives, received no expressions of interest from parties seeking to acquire the National Post Company. Similarly, the Monitor has not been contacted by anyone interested in acquiring the business even though the need to transfer the business of the National Post Company has been in the public domain since October 6, 2009, the date of the Initial Order. The Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders will only support the short term liquidity needs until October 30, 2009 and the National Post Company is precluded from borrowing without the Ad Hoc Committee's consent which the latter will not provide. The LP Entities will not advance funds until the transaction closes. Accordingly, failure to transition would likely result in the forced cessation of operations and the commencement of liquidation proceedings. The estimated net recovery from a liquidation range from a negative amount to an amount not materially higher than the transfer price before costs of liquidation. The senior secured creditors of the National Post Company, namely the CIT Facility lenders and Irish Holdco, support the transaction as do the members of the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders.

23 The Monitor has concluded that the transaction has the following advantages over a liquidation:

- it facilitates the reorganization and orderly transition and subsequent termination of the shared services arrangements between the CMI Entities and the LP Entities;
- it preserves approximately 277 jobs in an already highly distressed newspaper publishing industry;

- it will help maintain and promote competition in the national daily newspaper market for the benefit of Canadian consumers; and
- the Transferee will assume substantially all of the National Post Company's trade payables (including those owed to various suppliers) and various employment costs associated with the transferred employees.

Issues

24 The issues to consider are whether:

- (a) the transfer of the assets and business of the National Post is subject to the requirements of section 36 of the *CCAA*;
- (b) the Transition and Reorganization Agreement should be approved by the Court; and
- (c) the stay should be extended to January 22, 2010.

Discussion

(a) Section 36 of the *CCAA*

25 Section 36 of the *CCAA* was added as a result of the amendments which came into force on September 18, 2009. Counsel for the CMI Entities and the Monitor outlined their positions on the impact of the recent amendments to the *CCAA* on the motion before me. As no one challenged the order requested, no opposing arguments were made.

26 Court approval is required under section 36 if:

- (a) a debtor company under *CCAA* protection
- (b) proposes to sell or dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business.

27 Court approval under this section of the Act¹ is only required if those threshold requirements are met. If they are met, the court is provided with a list of non-exclusive factors to consider in determining whether to approve the sale or disposition. Additionally, certain mandatory criteria must be met for court approval of a sale or disposition of assets to a related party. Notice is to be given to secured creditors likely to be affected by the proposed sale or disposition. The court may only grant authorization if satisfied that the company can and will make certain pension and employee related payments.

28 Specifically, section 36 states:

- (1) Restriction on disposition of business assets -- A debtor company in respect of which an order has been made under this Act may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.

- (2) Notice to creditors -- A company that applies to the court for an authorization is to give notice of the application to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the proposed sale or disposition.
- (3) Factors to be considered -- In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other things,
 - (a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
 - (b) whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
 - (c) whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
 - (d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
 - (e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
 - (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.
- (4) Additional factors -- related persons -- If the proposed sale or disposition is to a person who is related to the company, the court may, after considering the factors referred to in subsection (3), grant the authorization only if it is satisfied that
 - (a) good faith efforts were made to sell or otherwise dispose of the assets to persons who are not related to the company; and
 - (b) the consideration to be received is superior to the consideration that would be received under any other offer made in accordance with the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition.
- (5) Related persons -- For the purpose of subsection (4), a person who is related to the company includes
 - (a) a director or officer of the company;
 - (b) a person who has or has had, directly or indirectly, control in fact of the company; and
 - (c) a person who is related to a person described in paragraph (a) or (b).

- (6) Assets may be disposed of free and clear -- The court may authorize a sale or disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it shall also order that other assets of the company or the proceeds of the sale or disposition be subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by the order.
- (7) Restriction -- employers -- The court may grant the authorization only if the court is satisfied that the company can and will make the payments that would have been required under paragraphs 6(4)(a) and (5)(a) if the court had sanctioned the compromise or arrangement.²

29 While counsel for the CMI Entities states that the provisions of section 36 have been satisfied, he submits that section 36 is inapplicable to the circumstances of the transfer of the assets and business of the National Post Company because the threshold requirements are not met. As such, the approval requirements are not triggered. The Monitor supports this position.

30 In support, counsel for the CMI Entities and for the Monitor firstly submit that section 36(1) makes it clear that the section only applies to a debtor company. The terms "debtor company" and "company" are defined in section 2(1) of the *CCAA* and do not expressly include a partnership. The National Post Company is a general partnership and therefore does not fall within the definition of debtor company. While I acknowledge these facts, I do not accept this argument in the circumstances of this case. Relying on case law and exercising my inherent jurisdiction, I extended the scope of the Initial Order to encompass the National Post Company and the other partnerships such that they were granted a stay and other relief. In my view, it would be inconsistent and artificial to now exclude the business and assets of those partnerships from the ambit of the protections contained in the statute.

31 The CMI Entities' and the Monitor's second argument is that the Transition and Reorganization Agreement represents an internal corporate reorganization that is not subject to the requirements of section 36. Section 36 provides for court approval where a debtor under *CCAA* protection proposes to sell or otherwise dispose of assets "outside the ordinary course of business". This implies, so the argument goes, that a transaction that is in the ordinary course of business is not captured by section 36. The Transition and Reorganization Agreement is an internal corporate reorganization which is in the ordinary course of business and therefore section 36 is not triggered state counsel for the CMI Entities and for the Monitor. Counsel for the Monitor goes on to submit that the subject transaction is but one aspect of a larger transaction. Given the commitments and agreements entered into with the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders and the Bank of Nova Scotia as agent for the senior secured lenders to the LP Entities, the transfer cannot be treated as an independent sale divorced from its rightful context. In these circumstances, it is submitted that section 36 is not engaged.

32 The *CCAA* is remedial legislation designed to enable insolvent companies to restructure. As mentioned by me before in this case, the amendments do not detract from this objective. In discussing section 36, the Industry Canada Briefing Book³ on the amendments states that "The reform is intended to provide the debtor company with greater flexibility in dealing with its property while limiting the possibility of abuse."

33 The term "ordinary course of business" is not defined in the *CCAA* or in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*⁸. As noted by Cullity J. in *Millgate Financial Corp. v. BCED Holdings Ltd.*⁹, authorities that have considered the use of the term in various statutes have not provided an exhaustive definition. As one author observed in a different context, namely the *Bulk Sales Act*¹⁰, courts have typically taken a common sense approach to the term "ordinary course of business" and have considered the normal business dealings of each particular seller⁸. In *Pacific Mobile Corp.*⁹, the Supreme Court of Canada stated:

It is not wise to attempt to give a comprehensive definition of the term "ordinary course of business" for all transactions. Rather, it is best to consider the circumstances of each case and to take into account the type of business carried on by the debtor and creditor.

We approve of the following passage from Monet J.A.'s reasons, [1982] C.A. 501, discussing the phrase "ordinary course of business" ...

'It is apparent from these authorities, it seems to me, that the concept we are concerned with is an abstract one and that it is the function of the courts to consider the circumstances of each case in order to determine how to characterize a given transaction. This in effect reflects the constant interplay between law and fact.'

34 In arguing that section 36 does not apply to an internal corporate reorganization, the CMI Entities rely on the commentary of Industry Canada as being a useful indicator of legislative intent and descriptive of the abuse the section was designed to prevent. That commentary suggests that section 36(4), which deals with dispositions of assets to a related party, was intended to:

... prevent the possible abuse by "phoenix corporations". Prevalent in small business, particularly in the restaurant industry, phoenix corporations are the result of owners who engage in serial bankruptcies. A person incorporates a business and proceeds to cause it to become bankrupt. The person then purchases the assets of the business at a discount out of the estate and incorporates a "new" business using the assets of the previous business. The owner continues their original business basically unaffected while creditors are left unpaid.¹⁰

35 In my view, not every internal corporate reorganization escapes the purview of section 36. Indeed, a phoenix corporation to one may be an internal corporate reorganization to another. As suggested by the decision in *Pacific Mobile Corp.*⁹, a court should in each case examine the circumstances of the subject transaction within the context of the business carried on by the debtor.

36 In this case, the business of the National Post Company and the CP Entities are highly integrated and interdependent. The Canwest business structure predated the insolvency of the CMI Entities and reflects in part an anomaly that arose as a result of an income trust structure driven by tax considerations. The Transition and Reorganization Agreement is an internal reorganization transaction that is designed to realign shared services and assets within the Canwest corporate family so as to rationalize the business structure and to better reflect the appropriate business model. Furthermore, the realignment of the shared services and transfer of the assets and business of the National Post Company to the publishing side of the business are steps in the larger reorganization of the relationship between the CMI Entities and the LP Entities. There is no ability to proceed with either

the Shared Services Agreement or the National Post Transition Agreement alone. The Transition and Reorganization Agreement provides a framework for the CMI Entities and the LP Entities to properly restructure their inter-entity arrangements for the benefit of their respective stakeholders. It would be commercially unreasonable to require the CMI Entities to engage in the sort of third party sales process contemplated by section 36(4) and offer the National Post for sale to third parties before permitting them to realign the shared services arrangements. In these circumstances, I am prepared to accept that section 36 is inapplicable.

(b) Transition and Reorganization Agreement

37 As mentioned, the Transition and Reorganization Agreement is by its terms subject to court approval. The court has a broad jurisdiction to approve agreements that facilitate a restructuring: *Re Stelco Inc.*¹² Even though I have accepted that in this case section 36 is inapplicable, court approval should be sought in circumstances where the sale or disposition is to a related person and there is an apprehension that the sale may not be in the ordinary course of business. At that time, the court will confirm or reject the ordinary course of business characterization. If confirmed, at minimum, the court will determine whether the proposed transaction facilitates the restructuring and is fair. If rejected, the court will determine whether the proposed transaction meets the requirements of section 36. Even if the court confirms that the proposed transaction is in the ordinary course of business and therefore outside the ambit of section 36, the provisions of the section may be considered in assessing fairness.

38 I am satisfied that the proposed transaction does facilitate the restructuring and is fair and that the Transition and Reorganization Agreement should be approved. In this regard, amongst other things, I have considered the provisions of section 36. I note the following. The CMI recapitalization transaction which prompted the Transition and Reorganization Agreement is designed to facilitate the restructuring of CMI into a viable and competitive industry participant and to allow a substantial number of the businesses operated by the CMI Entities to continue as going concerns. This preserves value for stakeholders and maintains employment for as many employees of the CMI Entities as possible. The Transition and Reorganization Agreement was entered into after extensive negotiation and consultation between the CMI Entities, the LP Entities, their respective financial and legal advisers and restructuring advisers, the Ad Hoc Committee and the LP senior secured lenders and their respective financial and legal advisers. As such, while not every stakeholder was included, significant interests have been represented and in many instances, given the nature of their interest, have served as proxies for unrepresented stakeholders. As noted in the materials filed by the CMI Entities, the National Post Transition Agreement provides for the transfer of assets and certain liabilities to the publishing side of the Canwest business and the assumption of substantially all of the operating liabilities by the Transferee. Although there is no guarantee that the Transferee will ultimately be able to meet its liabilities as they come due, the liabilities are not stranded in an entity that will have materially fewer assets to satisfy them.

39 There is no prejudice to the major creditors of the CMI Entities. Indeed, the senior secured lender, Irish Holdco., supports the Transition and Reorganization Agreement as does the Ad Hoc Committee and the senior secured lenders of the LP Entities. The Monitor supports the Transition and Reorganization Agreement and has concluded that it is in the best interests of a broad range of stakeholders of the CMI Entities, the National Post Company, including its employees, suppliers and customers, and the LP Entities. Notice of this motion has been given to secured creditors likely to be affected by the order.

40 In the absence of the Transition and Reorganization Agreement, it is likely that the National Post Company would be required to shut down resulting in the consequent loss of employment for most or all the National Post Company's employees. Under the National Post Transition Agreement, all of the National Post Company employees will be offered employment and as noted in the affidavit of the moving parties, the National Post Company's obligations and liabilities under the pension plan will be assumed, subject to necessary approvals.

41 No third party has expressed any interest in acquiring the National Post Company. Indeed, at no time did RBC Dominion Securities Inc. who was assisting in evaluating recapitalization alternatives ever receive any expression of interest from parties seeking to acquire it. Similarly, while the need to transfer the National Post has been in the public domain since at least October 6, 2009, the Monitor has not been contacted by any interested party with respect to acquiring the business of the National Post Company. The Monitor has approved the process leading to the sale and also has conducted a liquidation analysis that caused it to conclude that the proposed disposition is the most beneficial outcome. There has been full consultation with creditors and as noted by the Monitor, the Ad Hoc Committee serves as a good proxy for the unsecured creditor group as a whole. I am satisfied that the consideration is reasonable and fair given the evidence on estimated liquidation value and the fact that there is no other going concern option available.

42 The remaining section 36 factor to consider is section 36(7) which provides that the court should be satisfied that the company can and will make certain pension and employee related payments that would have been required if the court had sanctioned the compromise or arrangement. In oral submissions, counsel for the CMI Entities confirmed that they had met the requirements of section 36. It is agreed that the pension and employee liabilities will be assumed by the Transferee. Although present, the representative of the Superintendent of Financial Services was unopposed to the order requested. If and when a compromise and arrangement is proposed, the Monitor is asked to make the necessary inquiries and report to the court on the status of those payments.

Stay Extension

43 The CMI Entities are continuing to work with their various stakeholders on the preparation and filing of a proposed plan of arrangement and additional time is required. An extension of the stay of proceedings is necessary to provide stability during that time. The cash flow forecast suggests that the CMI Entities have sufficient available cash resources during the requested extension period. The Monitor supports the extension and nobody was opposed. I accept the statements of the CMI Entities and the Monitor that the CMI Entities have acted, and are continuing to act, in good faith and with due diligence. In my view it is appropriate to extend the stay to January 22, 2010 as requested.

S.E. PEPALL J.

cp/e/qlrxg/qljxr/qlced/qlaxw

¹ Court approval may nonetheless be required by virtue of the terms of the Initial or other court order or at the request of a stakeholder.

2 The reference to paragraph 6(4)a should presumably be 6(6)a.

3 Industry Canada "Bill C-55: Clause by Clause Analysis-Bill Clause No. 131-CCAA Section 36".

4 Ibid.

5 *R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended.*

6 (2003), 47 C.B.R. (4th) 278 at para. 52.

7 R.S.O. 1990, c. B.14, as amended.

8 D.J. Miller "Remedies under the Bulk Sales Act: (Necessary, or a Nuisance?)", Ontario Bar Association, October, 2007.

9 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 290.

10 *Supra*, note 3.

11 *Supra*, note 9.

12 (2005), 15 C.B.R. (5th) 288 (Ont. C.A.).

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985,
c. C-36, AS AMENDED

Court File No: CV-13-10274-00CL

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT
OF 8440522 CANADA INC., DATA & AUDIO-VISUAL ENTERPRISES WIRELESS INC., AND
DATA & AUDIO-VISUAL ENTERPRISES HOLDINGS INC.

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST**

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

**BOOK OF AUTHORITIES
(Plan Filing and Meeting Order and Stay Extension
Motion)
(Returnable April 23, 2014)**

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