


COURT FILE NO. 1601-06131
COURT COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA
JUDICIAL CENTRE CALGARY



APPLICANT **IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES'
CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

**AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF
COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF
CONNACHER OIL AND GAS LIMITED**

DOCUMENT **BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE APPLICANT**

ADDRESS FOR SERVICE **Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP**
AND CONTACT Suite 1250, Millennium Tower
INFORMATION OF PARTY 440 - 2nd Avenue SW
FILING THIS DOCUMENT Calgary, Alberta T2P 5E9

Attn: Shayne Kukulowicz/Ryan Jacobs/Jeffrey Oliver
Tel: 403-351-2920
Fax: 403-648-1151
skukulowicz@casselsbrock.com
rjacobs@casselsbrock.com
joliver@casselsbrock.com

**Book of Authorities In Support of August 24, 2016
Application for a Claims Procedure Order**

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4.	<i>Re Quicksilver Resources Canada Inc. et al</i> , Claims Procedure Order dated May 26, 2016, Court File No. 1601-03113 (ABQB)
5.	<i>Re Lone Pine Resources Canada Ltd., et al</i> , Claims Procedure Order dated October 9, 2013, Court File No. 1301-11352 (ABQB)

TAB 1



CANADA

CONSOLIDATION

CODIFICATION

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies

R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36

L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-36

Current to June 21, 2016

À jour au 21 juin 2016

Last amended on February 26, 2015

Dernière modification le 26 février 2015

if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

R.S., c. C-25, s. 5.

Claims against directors — compromise

5.1 (1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.

Exception

(2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that

(a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or

(b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.

Powers of court

(3) The court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

Resignation or removal of directors

(4) Where all of the directors have resigned or have been removed by the shareholders without replacement, any person who manages or supervises the management of the business and affairs of the debtor company shall be deemed to be a director for the purposes of this section.

1997, c. 12, s. 122.

Compromises to be sanctioned by court

6 (1) If a majority in number representing two thirds in value of the creditors, or the class of creditors, as the case may be — other than, unless the court orders otherwise, a class of creditors having equity claims, — present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings of creditors respectively held under sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court and, if so sanctioned, is binding

manière qu'il prescrit, une assemblée de ces créanciers ou catégorie de créanciers, et, si le tribunal en décide ainsi, des actionnaires de la compagnie.

S.R., ch. C-25, art. 5.

Transaction — réclamations contre les administrateurs

5.1 (1) La transaction ou l'arrangement visant une compagnie débitrice peut comporter, au profit de ses créanciers, des dispositions relativement à une transaction sur les réclamations contre ses administrateurs qui sont antérieures aux procédures intentées sous le régime de la présente loi et visent des obligations de celle-ci dont ils peuvent être, ès qualités, responsables en droit.

Restriction

(2) La transaction ne peut toutefois viser des réclamations portant sur des droits contractuels d'un ou de plusieurs créanciers ou fondées sur la fausse représentation ou la conduite injustifiée ou abusive des administrateurs.

Pouvoir du tribunal

(3) Le tribunal peut déclarer qu'une réclamation contre les administrateurs ne peut faire l'objet d'une transaction s'il est convaincu qu'elle ne serait ni juste ni équitable dans les circonstances.

Démission ou destitution des administrateurs

(4) Si tous les administrateurs démissionnent ou sont destitués par les actionnaires sans être remplacés, quiconque dirige ou supervise les activités commerciales et les affaires internes de la compagnie débitrice est réputé un administrateur pour l'application du présent article.

1997, ch. 12, art. 122.

Homologation par le tribunal

6 (1) Si une majorité en nombre représentant les deux tiers en valeur des créanciers ou d'une catégorie de créanciers, selon le cas, — mise à part, sauf ordonnance contraire du tribunal, toute catégorie de créanciers ayant des réclamations relatives à des capitaux propres — présents et votant soit en personne, soit par fondé de pouvoir à l'assemblée ou aux assemblées de créanciers respectivement tenues au titre des articles 4 et 5, acceptent une transaction ou un arrangement, proposé ou modifié à cette ou ces assemblées, la transaction ou l'arrangement peut être homologué par le tribunal et, le cas échéant, lie :

damage occurred before or after the date on which proceedings under this Act were commenced.

1997, c. 12, s. 124; 2007, c. 36, s. 67.

Fixing deadlines

12 The court may fix deadlines for the purposes of voting and for the purposes of distributions under a compromise or arrangement.

R.S., 1985, c. C-36, s. 12; 1992, c. 27, s. 90; 1996, c. 6, s. 167; 2004, c. 25, s. 195; 2005, c. 47, s. 130; 2007, c. 36, s. 68.

Leave to appeal

13 Except in Yukon, any person dissatisfied with an order or a decision made under this Act may appeal from the order or decision on obtaining leave of the judge appealed from or of the court or a judge of the court to which the appeal lies and on such terms as to security and in other respects as the judge or court directs.

R.S., 1985, c. C-36, s. 13; 2002, c. 7, s. 134.

Court of appeal

14 (1) An appeal under section 13 lies to the highest court of final resort in or for the province in which the proceeding originated.

Practice

(2) All appeals under section 13 shall be regulated as far as possible according to the practice in other cases of the court appealed to, but no appeal shall be entertained unless, within twenty-one days after the rendering of the order or decision being appealed, or within such further time as the court appealed from, or, in Yukon, a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, allows, the appellant has taken proceedings therein to perfect his or her appeal, and within that time he or she has made a deposit or given sufficient security according to the practice of the court appealed to that he or she will duly prosecute the appeal and pay such costs as may be awarded to the respondent and comply with any terms as to security or otherwise imposed by the judge giving leave to appeal.

R.S., 1985, c. C-36, s. 14; 2002, c. 7, s. 135.

Appeals

15 (1) An appeal lies to the Supreme Court of Canada on leave therefor being granted by that Court from the highest court of final resort in or for the province or territory in which the proceeding originated.

postérieure à celle où des procédures sont intentées au titre de la présente loi.

1997, ch. 12, art. 124; 2007, ch. 36, art. 67.

Échéances

12 Le tribunal peut fixer des échéances aux fins de votation et aux fins de distribution aux termes d'une transaction ou d'un arrangement.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-36, art. 12; 1992, ch. 27, art. 90; 1996, ch. 6, art. 167; 2004, ch. 25, art. 195; 2005, ch. 47, art. 130; 2007, ch. 36, art. 68.

Permission d'en appeler

13 Sauf au Yukon, toute personne mécontente d'une ordonnance ou décision rendue en application de la présente loi peut en appeler après avoir obtenu la permission du juge dont la décision fait l'objet d'un appel ou après avoir obtenu la permission du tribunal ou d'un juge du tribunal auquel l'appel est porté et aux conditions que prescrit ce juge ou tribunal concernant le cautionnement et à d'autres égards.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-36, art. 13; 2002, ch. 7, art. 134.

Cour d'appel

14 (1) Cet appel doit être porté au tribunal de dernier ressort de la province où la procédure a pris naissance.

Pratique

(2) Tous ces appels sont régis autant que possible par la pratique suivie dans d'autres causes devant le tribunal saisi de l'appel; toutefois, aucun appel n'est recevable à moins que, dans le délai de vingt et un jours après qu'a été rendue l'ordonnance ou la décision faisant l'objet de l'appel, ou dans le délai additionnel que peut accorder le tribunal dont il est interjeté appel ou, au Yukon, un juge de la Cour suprême du Canada, l'appelant n'y ait pris des procédures pour parfaire son appel, et à moins que, dans ce délai, il n'ait fait un dépôt ou fourni un cautionnement suffisant selon la pratique du tribunal saisi de l'appel pour garantir qu'il poursuivra dûment l'appel et payera les frais qui peuvent être adjugés à l'intimé et se conformera aux conditions relatives au cautionnement ou autres qu'impose le juge donnant la permission d'en appeler.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-36, art. 14; 2002, ch. 7, art. 135.

Appels

15 (1) Un appel peut être interjeté à la Cour suprême du Canada sur autorisation à cet effet accordée par ce tribunal, du plus haut tribunal de dernier ressort de la province ou du territoire où la procédure a pris naissance.

18.4 [Repealed, 2005, c. 47, s. 131]

18.5 [Repealed, 2005, c. 47, s. 131]

18.6 [Repealed, 2005, c. 47, s. 131]

PART III

General

Claims

Claims that may be dealt with by a compromise or arrangement

19 (1) Subject to subsection (2), the only claims that may be dealt with by a compromise or arrangement in respect of a debtor company are

(a) claims that relate to debts or liabilities, present or future, to which the company is subject on the earlier of

(i) the day on which proceedings commenced under this Act, and

(ii) if the company filed a notice of intention under section 50.4 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or commenced proceedings under this Act with the consent of inspectors referred to in section 116 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, the date of the initial bankruptcy event within the meaning of section 2 of that Act; and

(b) claims that relate to debts or liabilities, present or future, to which the company may become subject before the compromise or arrangement is sanctioned by reason of any obligation incurred by the company before the earlier of the days referred to in subparagraphs (a)(i) and (ii).

Exception

(2) A compromise or arrangement in respect of a debtor company may not deal with any claim that relates to any of the following debts or liabilities unless the compromise or arrangement explicitly provides for the claim's compromise and the creditor in relation to that debt has voted for the acceptance of the compromise or arrangement:

(a) any fine, penalty, restitution order or other order similar in nature to a fine, penalty or restitution order, imposed by a court in respect of an offence;

18.4 [Abrogé, 2005, ch. 47, art. 131]

18.5 [Abrogé, 2005, ch. 47, art. 131]

18.6 [Abrogé, 2005, ch. 47, art. 131]

PARTIE III

Dispositions générales

Réclamations

Réclamations considérées dans le cadre des transactions ou arrangements

19 (1) Les seules réclamations qui peuvent être considérées dans le cadre d'une transaction ou d'un arrangement visant une compagnie débitrice sont :

a) celles se rapportant aux dettes et obligations, présentes ou futures, auxquelles la compagnie est assujettie à celle des dates ci-après qui est antérieure à l'autre :

(i) la date à laquelle une procédure a été intentée sous le régime de la présente loi à l'égard de la compagnie,

(ii) la date d'ouverture de la faillite, au sens de l'article 2 de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*, si elle a déposé un avis d'intention sous le régime de l'article 50.4 de cette loi ou qu'elle a intenté une procédure sous le régime de la présente loi avec le consentement des inspecteurs visés à l'article 116 de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*;

b) celles se rapportant aux dettes et obligations, présentes ou futures, auxquelles elle peut devenir assujettie avant l'acceptation de la transaction ou de l'arrangement, en raison d'une obligation contractée antérieurement à celle des dates mentionnées aux sous-alinéas a)(i) et (ii) qui est antérieure à l'autre.

Exception

(2) La réclamation se rapportant à l'une ou l'autre des dettes ou obligations ci-après ne peut toutefois être ainsi considérée, à moins que la transaction ou l'arrangement ne prévoie expressément la possibilité de transiger sur cette réclamation et que le créancier intéressé n'ait voté en faveur de la transaction ou de l'arrangement proposé :

a) toute ordonnance d'un tribunal imposant une amende, une pénalité, la restitution ou une autre peine semblable;

(b) any award of damages by a court in civil proceedings in respect of

(i) bodily harm intentionally inflicted, or sexual assault, or

(ii) wrongful death resulting from an act referred to in subparagraph (i);

(c) any debt or liability arising out of fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity or, in Quebec, as a trustee or an administrator of the property of others;

(d) any debt or liability resulting from obtaining property or services by false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation, other than a debt or liability of the company that arises from an equity claim; or

(e) any debt for interest owed in relation to an amount referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (d).

R.S., 1985, c. C-36, s. 19; 1996, c. 6, s. 167; 2005, c. 47, s. 131; 2007, c. 36, s. 69.

Determination of amount of claims

20 (1) For the purposes of this Act, the amount represented by a claim of any secured or unsecured creditor is to be determined as follows:

(a) the amount of an unsecured claim is the amount

(i) in the case of a company in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, proof of which has been made in accordance with that Act,

(ii) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, proof of which has been made in accordance with that Act, or

(iii) in the case of any other company, proof of which might be made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, but if the amount so provable is not admitted by the company, the amount is to be determined by the court on summary application by the company or by the creditor; and

(b) the amount of a secured claim is the amount, proof of which might be made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* if the claim were unsecured, but the amount if not admitted by the company is, in the case of a company subject to pending proceedings

b) toute indemnité accordée en justice dans une affaire civile :

(i) pour des lésions corporelles causées intentionnellement ou pour agression sexuelle,

(ii) pour décès découlant d'un acte visé au sous-alinéa (i);

c) toute dette ou obligation résultant de la fraude, du détournement, de la concussion ou de l'abus de confiance alors que la compagnie agissait, au Québec, à titre de fiduciaire ou d'administrateur du bien d'autrui ou, dans les autres provinces, à titre de fiduciaire;

d) toute dette ou obligation résultant de l'obtention de biens ou de services par des faux-semblants ou la présentation erronée et frauduleuse des faits, autre qu'une dette ou obligation de la compagnie qui découle d'une réclamation relative à des capitaux propres;

e) toute dette relative aux intérêts dus à l'égard d'une somme visée à l'un des alinéas a) à d).

L.R. (1985), ch. C-36, art. 19; 1996, ch. 6, art. 167; 2005, ch. 47, art. 131; 2007, ch. 36, art. 69.

Détermination du montant de la réclamation

20 (1) Pour l'application de la présente loi, le montant de la réclamation d'un créancier garanti ou chirographaire est déterminé de la façon suivante :

a) le montant d'une réclamation non garantie est celui :

(i) dans le cas d'une compagnie en voie de liquidation sous le régime de la *Loi sur les liquidations et les restructurations*, dont la preuve a été établie en conformité avec cette loi,

(ii) dans le cas d'une compagnie qui a fait une cession autorisée ou à l'encontre de laquelle une ordonnance de faillite a été rendue sous le régime de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*, dont la preuve a été établie en conformité avec cette loi,

(iii) dans le cas de toute autre compagnie, dont la preuve peut être établie sous le régime de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*, mais si le montant ainsi prouvable n'est pas admis par la compagnie, il est déterminé par le tribunal sur demande sommaire de celle-ci ou du créancier;

b) le montant d'une réclamation garantie est celui dont la preuve pourrait être établie sous le régime de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* si la réclamation n'était pas garantie, mais ce montant, s'il n'est pas

TAB 2

2009 NSSC 136
Nova Scotia Supreme Court

ScoZinc Ltd., Re

2009 CarswellNS 229, 2009 NSSC 136, 177 A.C.W.S. (3d)
293, 277 N.S.R. (2d) 251, 53 C.B.R. (5th) 96, 882 A.P.R. 251

**In the Matter of The Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36, as amended**

And In the Matter of A Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of ScoZinc Ltd. (Applicant)

D.R. Beveridge J.

Heard: April 3, 2009

Judgment: April 3, 2009

Written reasons: April 28, 2009

Docket: Hfx. 305549

Counsel: John G. Stringer, Q.C., Mr. Ben R. Durnford for Applicant
Robert MacKeigan, Q.C. for Grant Thornton

Subject: Insolvency

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency — Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous issues

Company was granted protection pursuant to s. 11 of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") — Monitor was appointed pursuant to s. 11.7 of CCAA — Determination of creditors' claims was set by claims procedure order ("order") — Three creditors submitted proofs of claim by claims bar date set out in order and then submitted revised proofs of claim after claims bar date, but before date set for monitor to complete assessment of claims — Monitor determined errors in proofs of claims were due to inadvertence and issued notice of revision or disallowance, allowing claims as revised if it was determined monitor had power to do so — Monitor brought motion for directions on whether it had authority to allow revision of claim by increasing it after claim's bar date but before date set for monitor to complete assessment of claims — Monitor had necessary authority — Court creates claims process by court order — Determination that claims had to initially be identified and assessed by monitor, and heard first by claims officer, was valid exercise of court's inherent jurisdiction — Logical and practical that monitor, as officer of court, be directed to fulfil analogous role to that of trustee under Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and order accomplished this — Provision in order mandated monitor to review all proofs of claim filed on or before claims bar date and accept, revise or disallow them — While normally monitor's revision would be to reduce proof of claim, nothing in order so restricted monitor's authority — It did not matter that revised claims were submitted after claims bar date — In essence, monitor simply acted to revise proofs of claim already submitted to conform with evidence elicited by monitor or submitted to it.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by D.R. Beveridge J.:

Air Canada, Re (2004), 2 C.B.R. (5th) 23, 2004 CarswellOnt 3320 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Blue Range Resource Corp., Re (2000), 2000 CarswellAlta 30, (sub nom. *Blue Range Resources Corp., Re*) 250 A.R. 239, (sub nom. *Blue Range Resources Corp., Re*) 213 W.A.C. 239, 15 C.B.R. (4th) 192, 2000 ABCA 16 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Blue Range Resource Corp., Re (2000), 2000 ABCA 285, 2000 CarswellAlta 1145, [2001] 2 W.W.R. 477, (sub nom. *Enron Canada Corp. v. National-Oilwell Canada Ltd.*) 193 D.L.R. (4th) 314, 271 A.R. 138, 234 W.A.C. 138, 87 Alta. L.R. (3d) 352 (Alta. C.A.) — followed

Carlen Transport Inc. v. Juniper Lumber Co. (Monitor of) (2001), 21 C.B.R. (4th) 222, (sub nom. *Juniper Lumber Co., Re*) 233 N.B.R. (2d) 111, (sub nom. *Juniper Lumber Co., Re*) 601 A.P.R. 111, 2001 CarswellNB 21 (N.B. Q.B.) — referred to

Federal Gypsum Co., Re (2007), 2007 NSSC 384, 2007 CarswellNS 630, 261 N.S.R. (2d) 314, 835 A.P.R. 314, 40 C.B.R. (5th) 39 (N.S. S.C.) — referred to

Freeman, Re (1922), 55 N.S.R. 545, [1923] 1 D.L.R. 378, 1922 CarswellNS 57 (N.S. C.A.) — considered

Laidlaw Inc., Re (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 790, 34 C.B.R. (4th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re (2006), 25 C.B.R. (5th) 231, 2006 CarswellOnt 6230 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re*) 12 O.R. (3d) 500, 1993 CarswellOnt 182 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Pine Valley Mining Corp., Re (2008), 2008 CarswellBC 579, 2008 BCSC 356, 41 C.B.R. (5th) 43 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Siscoe & Savoie v. Royal Bank (1994), 1994 CarswellNB 14, 29 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 157 N.B.R. (2d) 42, 404 A.P.R. 42 (N.B. C.A.) — considered

Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re (2003), 2003 CarswellBC 1399, 2003 BCCA 344, 184 B.C.A.C. 54, 302 W.A.C. 54, 43 C.B.R. (4th) 187, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236 (B.C. C.A.) — considered

Stelco Inc., Re (2005), 253 D.L.R. (4th) 109, 75 O.R. (3d) 5, 2 B.L.R. (4th) 238, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135, 2005 CarswellOnt 1188, 196 O.A.C. 142 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Triton Tubular Components Corp., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 4439, 14 C.B.R. (5th) 264 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 135(2) — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 4 — considered

s. 5 — considered

s. 6 — considered

s. 11 — pursuant to

s. 11.7 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.7(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.7(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.7(3) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.7(3)(d) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 12 — considered

s. 12(1) "claim" — considered

s. 12(2) — considered

Probate Act, R.S.N.S. 1900, c. 158

Generally — referred to

MOTION by monitor appointed under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* for directions on whether it had authority to allow revision of claim after claim's bar date but before date set for monitor to complete its assessment of claims.

D.R. Beveridge J. (orally):

1 On December 22, 2008 ScoZinc Ltd. was granted protection by way of a stay of proceedings of all claims against it pursuant to s.11 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36. The stay has been extended from time to time. Grant Thornton was appointed as the Monitor of the business and financial affairs of ScoZinc pursuant to s.11.7 of the *CCAA*.

2 The determination of creditors' claims was set by a Claims Procedure Order. This order set dates for the submission of claims to the Monitor, and for the Monitor to assess the claims. The Monitor brought a motion seeking directions from the court on whether it has the necessary authority to allow a revision of a claim after the claim's bar date but before the date set for the Monitor to complete its assessment of claims.

3 The motion was heard on April 3, 2009. At the conclusion of the hearing of the motion I concluded that the Monitor did have the necessary authority. I granted the requested order with reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

Background

4 The procedure for the identification and quantification of claims was established pursuant to my order of February 18, 2009. Any persons asserting a claim was to deliver to the Monitor a Proof of Claim by 5:00 p.m. on March 16, 2009, including a statement of account setting out the full details of the claim. Any claimant that did not deliver a Proof of Claim by the claims bar date, subject to the Monitor's agreement or as the court may otherwise order, would have its claim forever extinguished and barred from making any claim against ScoZinc.

5 The Monitor was directed to review all Proofs of Claim filed on or before March 16, 2009 and to accept, revise or disallow the claims. Any revision or disallowance was to be communicated by Notice of Revision or Disallowance, no later than March 27, 2009. If a creditor disagreed with the assessment of the Monitor, it could dispute the assessment before a Claims Officer and ultimately to a judge of the Supreme Court.

6 The three claims that have triggered the Monitor's motion for directions were submitted by Acadian Mining Corporation, Royal Roads Corp., and Komatsu International (Canada) Inc.

7 ScoZinc is 100% owned by Acadian Mining Corp. These two corporations share office space, managerial staff, and have common officers and directors. Acadian Mining is a substantial shareholder in Royal Roads and also have some common officers and directors.

8 Originally Royal Roads asserted a claim as a secured creditor on the basis of a first charge security held by it on ScoZinc's assets for a loan in the amount of approximately \$2.3 million. Acadian Mining also claimed to be a secured creditor due to a second charge on ScoZinc's assets securing approximately \$23.5 million of debt. Both Royal Roads and Acadian Mining have released their security. Each company submitted Proofs of Claim dated March 4, 2009 as unsecured creditors.

9 Royal Roads claim was for \$579,964.62. The claim by Acadian Mining was for \$23,761,270.20. John Rawding, Financial Officer for Acadian Mining and ScoZinc, prepared the Proofs of Claim for both Royal Roads and Acadian Mining. It appears from the affidavit and materials submitted, and the Monitor's fifth report dated March 31, 2009 that there were errors in each of the Proofs of Claim.

10 Mr. Rawding incorrectly attributed \$1,720,035.38 as debt by Acadian Mining to Royal Roads when it should have been debt owed by ScoZinc to Royal Roads. In addition, during year end audit procedures for Royal Roads, Acadian Mining and ScoZinc, other erroneous entries were discovered. The total claim that should have been advanced by Royal Roads was \$2,772,734.19.

11 The appropriate claim that should have been submitted by Acadian Mining was \$22,041,234.82, a reduction of \$1,720,035.38. Both Royal Roads and Acadian Mining submitted revised Proofs of Claim on March 25, 2009 with supporting documentation.

12 The third claim is by Komatsu. Its initial Proof of Claim was dated March 16, 2009 for both secured and unsecured claims of \$4,245,663.78. The initial claim did not include a secured claim for the equipment that had been returned to Komatsu, nor include a claim for equipment that was still being used by ScoZinc. A revised Proof of Claim was filed by Komatsu on March 26, 2009.

13 The Monitor, sets out in its fifth report dated March 31, 2009, that after reviewing the relevant books and records, the errors in the Proofs of Claim by Royal Roads, Acadian Mining and Komatsu were due to inadvertence. For all of these claims it issued a Notice of Revision or Disallowance on March 27, 2009, allowing the claims as revised "if it is determined by the court that the Monitor has the power to do so".

14 The request for directions and the circumstances pose the following issue:

Issue

15 Does the Monitor have the authority to allow the revision of a claim by increasing it based on evidence submitted by a claimant within the time period set for the monitor to carry out its assessment of claims?

Analysis

16 The jurisdiction of the Monitor stems from the jurisdiction of the court granted to it by the *CCAA*. Whenever an order is made under s.11 of the *CCAA* the court is required to appoint a monitor. Section 11.7 of the *CCAA* provides:

11.7(1) When an order is made in respect of a company by the court under section 11, the court shall at the same time appoint a person, in this section and in section 11.8 referred to as "the monitor", to monitor the business and financial affairs of the company while the order remains in effect.

(2) Except as may be otherwise directed by the court, the auditor of the company may be appointed as the monitor.

(3) The monitor shall

(a) for the purposes of monitoring the company's business and financial affairs, have access to and examine the company's property, including the premises, books, records, data, including data in electronic form, and other financial documents of the company to the extent necessary to adequately assess the company's business and financial affairs;

(b) file a report with the court on the state of the company's business and financial affairs, containing prescribed information,

(i) forthwith after ascertaining any material adverse change in the company's projected cash-flow or financial circumstances,

(ii) at least seven days before any meeting of creditors under section 4 or 5, or

(iii) at such other times as the court may order;

(c) advise the creditors of the filing of the report referred to in paragraph (b) in any notice of a meeting of creditors referred to in section 4 or 5; and

(d) carry out such other functions in relation to the company as the court may direct.

...

17 It appears that the purpose of the *CCAA* is to grant to an insolvent company protection from its creditors in order to permit it a reasonable opportunity to restructure its affairs in order to reach a compromise or arrangement between the company and its creditors. The court has the power to order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors for them to consider a compromise or arrangement proposed by the debtor company (s. 4, 5). Where a majority of the creditors representing two thirds value of the creditors or class of creditors agree to a compromise or arrangement, the court may sanction it and thereafter such compromise or arrangement is binding on all creditors, or class of creditors (s. 6).

18 Section 12 of the *Act* defines a claim to mean "any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind that, if unsecured, would be a debt provable in bankruptcy within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*." However, as noted by McElcheran in *Commercial Insolvency in Canada* (LexisNexis Canada Inc., Markham, Ontario, 2005 at p. 279-80) the *CCAA* does not set out a process for identification or determination of claims; instead, the Court creates a claims process by court order.

19 The only guidance provided by the *CCAA* is that in the event of a disagreement the amount of a claim shall be determined by the court on summary application by the company or by the creditor. Section 12(2) of the *Act* provides:

Determination of amount of claim

(2) For the purposes of this Act, the amount represented by a claim of any secured or unsecured creditor shall be determined as follows:

(a) the amount of an unsecured claim shall be the amount

(i) in the case of a company in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act, proof of which has been made in accordance with that Act,

(ii) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has been made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, proof of which has been made in accordance with that Act, or

(iii) in the case of any other company, proof of which might be made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, but if the amount so provable is not admitted by the company, the amount shall be determined by the court on summary application by the company or by the creditor; and

(b) the amount of a secured claim shall be the amount, proof of which might be made in respect thereof under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act if the claim were unsecured, but the amount if not admitted by the company shall, in the case of a company subject to pending proceedings under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act or the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, be established by proof in the same manner as an unsecured claim under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act or the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, as the case may be, and in the case of any other company the amount shall be determined by the court on summary application by the company or the creditor.

20 The only parties who appeared on this motion were the Monitor, ScoZinc and Komatsu. No specific submissions were requested nor made by the parties with respect to the nature of the court's jurisdiction to determine the mechanism and time lines to classify and quantify claims against the debtor company.

21 Under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* the Trustee is the designated gatekeeper who first determines whether a Proof of Claim submitted by a creditor is valid. The trustee may admit the claim or disallow it in whole or in part (s.135(2) *BIA*). A creditor who is dissatisfied with a decision by the trustee may appeal to a judge of the Bankruptcy Court.

22 In contrast, the *CCAA* does not set out the procedure beyond the language in s.12. The language only accomplishes two things. The first is that the debtor company can agree on the amount of a secured or unsecured claim; and secondly, if there is a disagreement, then on application of either the company or the creditor, the amount shall be determined by the court on "summary application".

23 The practice has arisen for the court to create by order a claims process that is both flexible and expeditious. The Monitor identifies, by review of the debtor's records, all potential claimants and sends to them a claim package. To ensure that all creditors come forward and participate on a timely basis, there is a provision in the claims process order requiring creditors to file their claims by a fixed date. If they do not, subject to further relief provided by the claims process order, or by the court, the creditor's claim is barred.

24 If the Monitor disagrees with the claim, and the disagreement cannot be resolved, then a claimant can present its case to a claims officer who is usually given the power to adjudicate disputed claims, with the right of appeal to a judge of the court overseeing the *CCAA* proceedings.

25 The establishment of a claims process utilizing the monitor and or a claims officer by court order appears to be a well accepted practice (See for example *Federal Gypsum Co., Re*, 2007 NSSC 384 (N.S. S.C.); *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Air Canada, Re* (2004), 2 C.B.R. (5th) 23 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Triton Tubular Components Corp., Re*, [2005] O.J. No. 3926 (Ont. S.C.J.); *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re*, [2006] O.J. No. 4087 (Ont. S.C.J.); *Pine Valley Mining Corp., Re*, 2008 BCSC 356

(B.C. S.C.); *Blue Range Resource Corp., Re*, 2000 ABCA 285 (Alta. C.A.); *Carlen Transport Inc. v. Juniper Lumber Co. (Monitor of)* (2001), 21 C.B.R. (4th) 222 (N.B. Q.B.).

26 I could find no reported case that doubt the authority of the court to create a claims process. Kenneth Kraft in his article "The CCAA and the Claims Bar Process", (2000), 13 *Commercial Insolvency Reporter* 6, endorsed the utilization of a claims process on the basis of reliance on the court's inherent jurisdiction, provided the process adhered to the specific mandates of the CCAA. In unrelated contexts, caution has been expressed with respect to reliance on the inherent jurisdiction of the superior court as the basis for dealing with the myriad issues that can arise under the CCAA (See: *Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re* (2003), 43 C.B.R. (4th) 187 (B.C. C.A.)) and *Stelco Inc., Re*, [2005] O.J. No. 1171 (Ont. C.A.)).

27 Sir J.H. Jacob, Q.C. in his seminal article "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court", (1970) *Current Legal Problems* 23, concluded that it has been clear law from the earliest times that superior courts of justice, as part of their inherent jurisdiction, have the power to control their own proceedings and process. He wrote:

Under its inherent jurisdiction, the court has power to control and regulate its process and proceedings, and it exercises this power in a great variety of circumstances and by many different methods. Some of the instances of the exercise of this power have been of far-reaching importance, others have dealt with matters of detail or have been of transient value. Some have involved the exercise of administrative powers, others of judicial powers. Some have been turned into rules of law, others by long usage or custom may have acquired the force of law, and still others remain mere rules of practice. The exercise of this power has been pervasive throughout the whole legal machinery and has been extended to all stages of proceedings, pre-trial, trial and post-trial. Indeed, it is difficult to set the limits upon the powers of the court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to control and regulate its process, for these limits are coincident with the needs of the court to fulfil its judicial functions in the administration of justice.

p. 32-33

28 The CCAA gives no specific guidance to the court on how to determine the existence, nature, validity or extent of a claim against a debtor company. As noted earlier, the only reference is in s. 12 of the Act that if there is a dispute as to the amount of a claim, then the amount shall be determined by the court "on summary application". In *Freeman, Re*, [1922] N.S.J. No. 15, [1923] 1 D.L.R. 378 (N.S. C.A.) (en banc) the court considered the words "on summary application" as they appeared in the *Probate Act* R.S.N.S. 1900 c.158. Harris C.J. wrote:

[17] The words "summary application" do not mean without notice, but simply imply that the proceedings before the Court are not to be conducted in the ordinary way, but in a concise way.

[18] The Oxford Dictionary p. 140 gives as one of the meanings of "summary" dispensing with needless details or formalities — done with despatch.

[19] In the case of the *Western & Co. v. Atlanta* (1901), 113 Ga. 537, the meaning of the words "summary proceeding" is discussed at some length and the Court held at pp. 543-544: —

"In a summary manner does not at all mean that they may be abated without notice or hearing, but simply that it may be done without a trial in the ordinary forms prescribed by law for a regular judicial procedure."

[20] I cite this not because it is a binding authority, but because its reasoning commends itself to my judgment and I adopt it.

29 In my opinion, whatever process may be appropriate and necessary to adjudicate disputed claims that ultimately end up before a judge of the superior court, the determination by the court that claims must initially be identified and assessed by the Monitor, and heard first by a Claims Officer, is a valid exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction.

30 The CCAA gives to the court the express and implied jurisdiction to do a variety of things. They need not all be enumerated. The court is required to appoint a monitor (s.11.7). Once appointed, the monitor is required to monitor the

company's business and financial affairs. The *Act* mandates that the monitor have access to and examine the company's property including all records. The monitor must file a report with the court on the state of the company's business and financial affairs and contain prescribed information. In addition, the monitor shall carry out such other functions in relation to the company as the court may direct (s.11.7(3)(d)).

31 In these circumstances, it is not only logical, but eminently practical that the monitor, as an officer of the court, be directed by court order to fulfil the analogous role to that of the trustee under the *BIA*. The Claims Procedure Order of February 18, 2009 accomplishes this.

Power of the Monitor

32 The Monitor was required by the Order to publish a notice to claimants in the newspaper regarding the claims procedure. It was also required to send a claims package to known potential claimants identified by the Monitor through its review of the books and records of ScoZinc. The claims bar date was set as March 16, 2009, or such later date as may be ordered by the court.

33 The duties of the Monitor, once a claim was received by it, were set out in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Claims Procedure Order. They provide as follows:

9. Upon receipt of a Proof of Claim:

a. The Monitor is hereby authorized and directed to use reasonable discretion as to the adequacy of compliance as to the manner in which Proofs of Claim are completed and executed and may, where it is satisfied that a Claim has been adequately proven, waive strict compliance with the requirements of this Order as to the completion and the execution of a Proof of Claim. A Claim which is accepted by the Monitor shall constitute a Proven Claim;

b. the Monitor and ScoZinc may attempt to consensually resolve the classification and amount of any Claim with the claimant prior to accepting, revising or disallowing such Claim; and

...

10. The Monitor shall review all Proofs of Claim filed on or before the Claims Bar Date. The Monitor shall accept, revise or disallow such Proofs of Claim as contemplated herein. The Monitor shall send a Notice of Revision or Disallowance and the form of Notice of Dispute to the Claimant as soon as the Claim has been revised or disallowed but in any event no later than 11:59 p.m. (Halifax time) on March 27, 2009 or such later date as the Court may order. Where the Monitor does not send a Notice of Revision or Disallowance by the aforementioned date to a Claimant who has submitted a Proof of Claim, the Monitor shall be deemed to have accepted such Claim.

34 Any person who wished to dispute a Notice of Revision or Disallowance was required to file a notice to the monitor and to the Claims Officer no later than April 6, 2009. The Claims Officer was designated to be Richard Cregan, Q.C., serving in his personal capacity and not as Registrar in Bankruptcy. Subject to the direction of the court, the Claims Officer was given the power to determine how evidence would be brought before him and any other procedural matters that may arise with respect to the claim. A claimant or the Monitor may appeal the Claims Officer's decision to the court.

35 The Monitor suggests that the power given to it under paragraph 9(a) and 10 is sufficient to permit it to accept the revised Proofs of Claim filed after the claim's bar date of March 16, 2009, but before its assessment date of March 27, 2009.

36 Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal in *Blue Range Resource Corp., Re*, 2000 ABCA 285 (Alta. C.A.). As noted by the Monitor, the decision in *Blue Range* did not directly deal with the issue on which the Monitor here seeks directions. In *Blue Range*, the claims procedure established by the court set the claims bar date

of June 15, 1999. Claims of creditors not proven in accordance with the procedures set out were deemed to be forever barred. Some creditors filed their Notice of Claim after the claims bar date. The monitor disallowed their claims. There were a second group of creditors who filed their Notice of Claim prior to the applicable claims bar date, but then sought to amend their claims after the claims bar date had passed. The monitor also disallowed these claims as late. What is not clear from the reported decisions is whether this second group of creditors requested amendments of their claims during the time period granted to the Monitor to carry out its assessment.

37 The chambers judge allowed the late and amended claims to be filed. Enron Capital Corp. and the creditor's committee sought leave to appeal that decision. Leave to appeal was granted on January 14, 2000 with respect to the following question:

What criteria in the circumstances of these cases should the Court use to exercise its discretion in deciding whether to allow late claimants to file claims which, if proven, may be recognized, notwithstanding a previous claims bar order containing a claims bar date which would otherwise bar the claim of the late claimants, and applying the criteria to each case, what is the result?

Blue Range Resource Corp., Re, 2000 ABCA 16 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers])

38 Wittmann J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. He noted that all counsel conceded that the court had the authority to allow the late filing of claims and that the appeal was really a matter of what criteria the court should use in exercising that power. Accordingly, a Claims Procedure Order that contains a claims bar date should not purport to forever bar a claim without a saving provision. Wittmann J.A. set out the test for determining when a late claim may be included to be as follows:

[26] Therefore, the appropriate criteria to apply to the late claimants is as follows:

1. Was the delay caused by inadvertence and if so, did the claimant act in good faith?
2. What is the effect of permitting the claim in terms of the existence and impact of any relevant prejudice caused by the delay?
3. If relevant prejudice is found can it be alleviated by attaching appropriate conditions to an order permitting late filing?
4. If relevant prejudice is found which cannot be alleviated, are there any other considerations which may nonetheless warrant an order permitting late filing?

[27] In the context of the criteria, "inadvertent" includes carelessness, negligence, accident, and is unintentional. I will deal with the conduct of each of the respondents in turn below and then turn to a discussion of potential prejudice suffered by the appellants.

2000 ABCA 285 (Alta. C.A.)

39 The appellants claimed that they would be prejudiced if the late claims were allowed because if they had known the late claims would be allowed they would have voted differently. This assertion was rejected by the chambers judge. With respect to what is meant by prejudiced, Wittmann J.A. wrote:

40 In a CCAA context, as in a BIA context, the fact that Enron and the other Creditors will receive less money if late and late amended claims are allowed is not prejudice relevant to this criterion. Re-organization under the CCAA involves compromise. Allowing all legitimate creditors to share in the available proceeds is an integral part of the process. A reduction in that share can not be characterized as prejudice: *Re Cohen* (1956), 36 C.B.R. 21 (Alta. C.A.) at 30-31. Further, I am in agreement with the test for prejudice used by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in 312630 British Columbia Ltd. It is: did the creditor(s) by reason of the late filings lose a

realistic opportunity to do anything that they otherwise might have done? Enron and the other creditors were fully informed about the potential for late claims being permitted, and were specifically aware of the existence of the late claimants as creditors. I find, therefore, that Enron and the Creditors will not suffer any relevant prejudice should the late claims be permitted.

40 In considering how the Monitor should carry out its duties and responsibilities under the Claims Procedure Order it is important to note that the Monitor is an officer of the court and is obliged to ensure that the interests of the stakeholders are considered including all creditors, the company and its shareholders (See *Laidlaw Inc., Re* (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])).

41 In a different context Turnball J.A. in *Siscoe & Savoie v. Royal Bank* (1994), 29 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (N.B. C.A.) commented that the monitor is an agent of the court and as a result is responsible and accountable to the court, owing a fiduciary duty to all of the parties (para. 28).

42 In my opinion, para. 9(a) is not of assistance in determining the authority of the Monitor to revise upward a claim filed after the claim's bar date but before the assessment date. Paragraph 9(a) authorizes the Monitor to use reasonable discretion as to the adequacy of compliance as to *the manner* to which Proofs of Claim are completed and executed. If it satisfied that the claim has been adequately proven it may waive strict compliance with the requirements of the order as to *completion* and the *execution* of a Proof of Claim.

43 Paragraph 10 of the Claims Procedure Order mandates the Monitor shall review all Proofs of Claim filed on or before the claims bar date. It shall "accept, revise or disallow such Proofs of Claim as contemplated herein". While normally a monitor's revision would be to reduce a Proof of Claim, there is in fact nothing in the Claims Procedure Order that so restricts the Monitor's authority. It is obviously contemplated by para. 10 that the monitor is to carry out some assessment of the claims that are submitted.

44 In my view, the Proofs of Claim that are filed act both as a form of pleading and an opportunity for the claimant to provide supporting documents to evidence its claim. In the case before me, the creditors discovered that the claims they had submitted were inaccurate and further evidence was tendered to the Monitor to demonstrate. The Monitor, after reviewing the evidence, accepted the validity of the claims.

45 Courts in a general way are engaged in dispensing justice. They do so by setting up and applying procedural rules to ensure that litigants are afforded a fair hearing. The resolution of disputes through the litigation process, including the ultimate hearing, is fundamentally a truth-seeking process to determine the facts and to apply the law to those facts. Can it be any different where the process is not in the court but under its supervision pursuant to a claims process under the CCAA.?

46 To suggest that the monitor does not have the authority to receive evidence and submissions and to consider them is to say that it does not have any real authority to carry out its court appointed role to assess the claims that have been submitted. The notion that the monitor cannot look at documentary evidence on its own initiative or at the instance of a claimant, and even consider submissions, is to deny it any real power to consider and make a preliminary determination of the merits of a claim.

47 The Claims Procedure Order contains a number of provisions that anticipate the exchange of information between the Monitor, the company and a creditor. Paragraph 9(b) authorizes the Monitor and ScoZinc to attempt to consensually resolve the classification and the amount of any claim with a claimant prior to accepting, revising or disallowing such claim. Paragraph 17 of the Claims Procedure Order directs that the Monitor shall at all times be authorized to enter into negotiations with claimants and settle any claim on such terms as the Monitor may consider appropriate.

48 In my opinion, it does not matter that revised claims were submitted after the claims bar date. In essence, the Monitor simply acted to revise the Proofs of Claim already submitted to conform with the evidence elicited by the Monitor, or submitted to it. The Monitor had the necessary authority to revise the claims, either as to classification or amount.

49 If a claimant seeks to revise or amend its claim after the assessment date set out in the Claims Procedure Order, different considerations may come into play. The appropriate procedure will depend on the provisions of the Claims Procedure Order. In addition, the court, as the ultimate arbiter of disputed claims under s. 12 of the *CCAA*, should always be viewed as having the jurisdiction to permit appropriate revision of claims.

Order accordingly.

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TAB 3

2010 ABQB 507
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

BA Energy Inc., Re

2010 CarswellAlta 1598, 2010 ABQB 507, [2010] A.W.L.D. 4793, 192 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27, 70 C.B.R. (5th) 24

**In the Matter of Section 193 of the Alberta Business Corporations
Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. B-9, as amended; and in the matter
of the Judicature Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. J-2, as amended,**

And in the Matter of a Proposed Arrangement involving Value Creation Inc., BA Energy Inc.
and the holders of common shares of Value Creation Inc.; And in the Matter of the Companies'
Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended; and in the Matter of BA Energy Inc.

B.E. Romaine J.

Heard: June 1, 2010

Judgment: August 5, 2010 *

Docket: Calgary 0801-16292

Counsel: Chris D. Simard, Kelsey J. Drozdowski for Dresser-Rand Canada, Ltd.

David LeGeyt for Ernst & Young Inc.

Howard A. Gorman, Kyle D. Kashuba for BA Energy Inc.

Subject: Insolvency

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency — Proving claim — Practice and procedure — Amendment of claim

Debtor entered into agreement of sale with creditor for purchase of equipment — Total purchase price was US \$8,577,942.39 — Debtor paid US\$7,021,918 pursuant to purchase agreement before successfully applying for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Some equipment was still in creditor's possession at that time — Creditor filed proof of claim with monitor claiming US\$1,655,477.95 secured by undelivered equipment — Monitor advised creditor it was free to sell undelivered equipment in satisfaction of its claim — Equipment was custom made and difficult to sell — Creditor filed late amended proof of claim for unsecured claim of US \$1,474,161.63 and secured claim of US\$177,382 — Monitor disallowed amended claim on basis that it was late — Creditor brought application for order requiring monitor to accept late amended proof of claim — Application dismissed — Amended claim was really new claim so it was properly treated as late — It would not have been fair or equitable to accept late amended proof of claim — Late amended claim was not result of inadvertence — Creditor delayed in valuing undelivered equipment — Creditor changed nature of its claim at time when all creditors would have been aware that distribution to unsecured creditors was expected to be substantial — Allowing late amended claim would have been prejudicial to debtor and other creditors — Debtor structured plan of arrangement on basis that creditor would not be affected — There were no conditions that would have alleviated relevant prejudice — Debtor was required to pay reasonable conduct money for employee of creditor who was cross-examined on his affidavit.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by B.E. Romaine J.:

Blue Range Resource Corp., Re (2000), 2000 ABCA 285, 2000 CarswellAlta 1145, [2001] 2 W.W.R. 477, (sub nom. *Enron Canada Corp. v. National-Oilwell Canada Ltd.*) 193 D.L.R. (4th) 314, 271 A.R. 138, 234 W.A.C. 138, 87 Alta. L.R. (3d) 352 (Alta. C.A.) — followed

Lindsay v. Transtec Canada Ltd. (1994), 28 C.B.R. (3d) 110, 5 C.C.P.B. 219, [1995] 2 W.W.R. 404, 99 B.C.L.R. (2d) 73, 1994 CarswellBC 620 (B.C. S.C.) — distinguished

Look Communications Inc., Re (2005), [2006] G.S.T.C. 122, 2005 CarswellOnt 8591, 21 C.B.R. (5th) 265 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

APPLICATION by creditor for order requiring monitor to accept late amended proof of claim.

B.E. Romaine J.:

Introduction

1 Dresser-Rand Canada, Inc. ("Dresser-Rand") applies for acceptance of its late amended proof of claim so that it may participate in a distribution to unsecured creditors pursuant to the plan of arrangement and reorganization of BA Energy Inc. ("BA Energy") under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

2 The issue is whether Dresser-Rand, having initially filed a claim which it characterized as fully secured on the basis of holding assets that it described as having a value equal to its claim, is entitled to file a late amended claim that now alleges that a large portion of the claim is unsecured.

Facts

3 In 2006, BA Energy had entered into an agreement of sale with Dresser-Rand for the purchase of a wet-gas compressor and ancillary equipment for use at the proposed Heartland Upgrader, a heavy oil upgrader that BA Energy was in the process of constructing at a site near Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta. The total purchase price for this compressor was USD \$8,577,942.39.

4 On December 30, 2008, BA Energy was granted an initial order under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended (the "CCAA").

5 At the time of the filing under the CCAA, BA Energy had paid USD \$7,021,918 pursuant to the purchase agreement, leaving a balance owing of USD \$1,651,543.63. The compressor was still in the possession of Dresser-Rand at its premises in Edmonton, with the exception of some of the ancillary equipment which had been delivered to the proposed site of the Heartland Upgrader.

6 On March 9, 2009, counsel to Dresser-Rand enquired of counsel to BA Energy and counsel to the Monitor whether the balance of the purchase price would be paid, "failing which Dresser-Rand will be free to exercise its right of sale pursuant to the *Sale of Goods Act*." On May 15, 2009, Dresser-Rand sent a Proof of Claim to the Monitor, signed by

Dresser-Rand's General Manager in Canada, indicating that it had a secured claim for USD \$1,655,477.95 and that "in respect of the said debt, we hold assets of the CCAA Debtor valued at \$1,655,477.95 US as security". Under the Claims Procedure Order, claims were to be filed by June 15, 2009.

7 On August 26, 2009, BA Energy repudiated the purchase agreement and advised Dresser-Rand that it had a duty to mitigate its losses with respect to the terminated agreement.

8 In an email dated August 31, 2009, counsel to Dresser-Rand asked counsel to BA Energy to confirm that Dresser-Rand was free to deal with the compressor equipment in its possession and enquired whether BA Energy would return the parts in its possession. On the same day, counsel to BA Energy responded that Dresser-Rand could deal with the equipment subject to any requirement to act reasonably in performing its duty to mitigate and said that he would ask his client about the equipment in its possession.

9 On September 18, 2009, the Monitor advised counsel to Dresser-Rand that, in light of the repudiation, Dresser-Rand's previous claim may have been stayed and that Dresser-Rand may have the right to file "Subsequent Claim" as set out in the Claims Procedure Order. The Monitor also told Dresser-Rand that BA Energy believed that the ancillary equipment in its possession was worth about \$1 million. Counsel to Dresser-Rand responded that he did not believe his client would be interested in the equipment at that price.

10 On September 22, 2009, Dresser-Rand submitted a Subsequent Claim for USD \$1,651,543.63 (taking into account a further invoice paid by BA Energy). Again, Dresser-Rand in its claim form characterized the claim as secured and, again, the claim form states that Dresser-Rand held assets of the CCAA Debtor valued at USD \$1,651,543.63.

11 On December 16, 2009, the Monitor issued a Notice of Revision or Disallowance of the claim. This notice indicates that the Proof of Claim as submitted in the amount of USD \$1,651,543.53 was revised and accepted at nil. The Monitor noted as follows:

Retained Assets

[Dresser-Rand] retained possession of certain assets as a result of the termination of the Purchase Order. In the Termination Letter the Applicant directed [Dresser-Rand] to mitigate its losses in respect of the termination of the Purchase Order. The Applicant noted in its review of [Dresser-Rand]'s Claim that the retained assets have a value in excess of the amount of [Dresser-Rand]'s Claim. Accordingly, the Applicant has revised [Dresser-Rand]'s claim to \$0.00.

12 On December 18, 2009, counsel to Dresser-Rand asked to meet with counsel to BA Energy and the Monitor to discuss the reasoning behind the Notice of Revision, commenting that "(p)reviously you did not dispute our priority to the extent of what we could realize from the equipment we have in our possession." The email also notes that the compressor is custom-made equipment and that its sale may take some time.

13 On December 20, 2009, counsel to Dresser-Rand delivered a Notice of Dispute to the Monitor, with a covering letter that noted as follows:

With respect to the enclosed Notice of Dispute, in reviewing the documentation you forwarded to Dresser-Rand Canada, Inc. in this regard, this simply may be a situation where there is misunderstanding of terminology between us. Looking at your statement about the "retained assets", you do not appear to be disputing Dresser-Rand Canada, Inc.'s right to retain the assets in question (being compressor equipment) and deal with it as it wishes. To this stage, we have always valued the retained assets as being worth as much or more than the debt that is owed by BA Energy Inc. to Dresser-Rand Canada, Inc. We do not believe that you should have put \$0.00 beside the secured aspect of this claim in the Notice of Revision or Disallowance dated December 16, 2009.

14 The Notice of Dispute lists \$1,651,543.63 under the designation "Reviewed Claim or Subsequent Claim as Disputed" and characterizes this amount as "Secured". It makes no claim on an unsecured basis. The Notice stipulates that "(t)his claim is fully secured. The Notice of Revision or Disallowance did not reflect this fact."

15 A without-prejudice conference call was held on January 6, 2010 among counsel to BA Energy, the Monitor and counsel to Dresser-Rand.

16 In an email dated January 11, 2010, the Monitor asked Dresser-Rand's counsel whether he had been able to determine the appropriate person for the Monitor to speak to with respect to the equipment in the possession of BA Energy. Counsel to Dresser-Rand responded that he had not and that he was "awaiting the letter [counsel to BA Energy] indicated last week you would be sending on the other point that deals more generally with the claim, etc."

17 On January 14, 2010, the Monitor sent counsel to Dresser Rand an email that attached a letter that he was asked to review, commenting: ... "let me know if it meets your needs before I finalize it."

18 The letter, marked "draft", reads as follows:

As Court Appointed Monitor of BA Energy Inc. I am sending this letter to you as a follow-up to our teleconference of January 5, 2010 and to provide more clarity with respect to the Notice of Revision and Notice of Dispute between BA Energy Inc. ("BA Energy") and Dresser Rand Canada, Inc. ("DRC").

As agreed on our teleconference, BA Energy does not dispute DRC's rights to retain the assets in question and deal with them as it wishes. This right means DRC shall have no claim against BA Energy given that the value of the assets are at least as much or more than the claim amount. Furthermore, I must note that DRC will accept all potential risks and rewards of its actions in dealing with the assets. For further clarity, should DRC sell the assets for an amount greater than the amount of the claim filed against BA Energy, then this excess amount benefits DRC. Should DRC sell the assets for an amount less than DRC's claim against BA Energy, DRC will not be able to claim the difference against BA Energy.

I trust this clarifies any misunderstanding between the parties.

(emphasis added)

19 Counsel to Dresser-Rand responded saying that the letter would be reviewed internally and by his client and that he would get back to the Monitor. Numerous emails ensued between counsel to Dresser-Rand and the Monitor. On January 25, 2010, counsel to Dresser-Rand advised the Monitor that "I am told that I should hear from someone in the US part of the organization tomorrow. Unfortunately, many people have become involved within my client and has made it more complex for me to get instructions."

20 In an email dated January 27, 2010, counsel to Dresser Rand advised the Monitor that:

...my people as of yesterday were still assessing their position, including what can be done with the part of the compressor they have and those parts which BA has in its position. Unfortunately, these machines are very custom made for a particular customer and are not readily saleable or useable for anyone else. They [sic] inquiries out to see what they can do and hope to get back to me this week.

21 On February 19, 2010 counsel to Dresser-Rand left a voice mail for the Monitor. The recording was not preserved. Counsel to Dresser-Rand in an email to his client said that in the voice mail, he enquired if BA Energy was interested in making an offer to Dresser-Rand for the compressor "with the concept being that if an acceptable cash offer was made to [Dresser-Rand] for that equipment, [Dresser Rand] would forego any further claim against [BA Energy] for the balance owing." The Monitor in an email to BA Energy said that in the voice mail, counsel to Dresser-Rand was enquiring

whether BA Energy would like to acquire the compressor for an unnamed price and that "if [BA Energy] acquired this equipment then Dresser-Rand would withdraw their claim".

22 On February 23, 2010, BA Energy advised the Monitor that it did not wish to purchase the compressor. On the same day, the Monitor filed its Ninth Report with the Court and served it on the parties on the service list. The report states that BA Energy anticipated filing a plan of arrangement which would result in a recovery that would be better than a liquidation, and that it was expected that the plan would be brought to the Court for approval in mid to late March, 2010. During this time period, the Monitor and BA Energy were finalizing the sale of a key asset necessary to fund the plan and were in the course of structuring the plan.

23 On March 15, 2010, BA Energy filed and served its Notice of Motion for approval to circulate a plan of arrangement and hold a meeting of creditors. Dresser-Rand was not listed either as an affected or unaffected creditor nor was it mentioned on the list of disputed claims.

24 Apparently, counsel to Dresser-Rand had not yet been added to the service list at this time and did not receive a copy of the Ninth Report until it was posted on the Monitor's web-site on March 16, 2010. Counsel to Dresser-Rand received a copy of the plan motion materials on March 17, 2010 and requested to be put on the service list on that date. The Monitor also informed counsel to Dresser-Rand on March 17, 2010 that BA Energy was not interested in purchasing the compressor from Dresser-Rand and that it took the position that the Dresser-Rand claim had been satisfied.

25 On March 18, 2010, the Court approved the circulation of the plan of arrangement to creditors.

26 On March 26, 2010, Dresser-Rand submitted a late amended proof of claim in which it stated it had an unsecured claim of USD \$1,474,161.63 and a secured claim of USD \$177,382.

27 On April 5, 2010, the Monitor issued a Notice of Revision or Disallowance relating to Dresser-Rand's amended proof of claim, with a revised claim amount of zero. The Monitor set out the following as reasons for disallowance:

Dresser-Rand's Late Amended proof of claim dated March 26, 2010, claiming an unsecured claim in the amount of \$1,474,161.63 USD and a secured claim in the amount of \$177,382.00 USD (the "Late Amended Claim") is barred and extinguished pursuant to the claims procedure order dated April 29, 2009 (the "Claims Procedure Order"). The Late Amended Claim is in essence the same as the Initial Claim (as defined below) submitted by Dresser-Rand, which claim has been resolved as described below.

Dresser-Rand was aware of and participated in the claims process established under the Claims Procedure Order. Dresser-Rand's initial proof of claim was received by the Monitor on or about May 15, 2009, as amended to a Subsequent Claim (as defined in the Claims Procedure Order) on September 22, 2009 (the "Initial Claim") following BA Energy's repudiation of the purchase order. The Initial Claim by Dresser-Rand was for \$0.00 unsecured and Dresser-Rand acknowledged it held equipment or collateral of a value equal to its claim.

On December 16, 2009, the Monitor issued a notice of revision or disallowance thereby disallowing the total claim amount listed by Dresser-Rand in its Initial Claim (the "NOR"). The reason for the disallowance in the NOR was that Dresser-Rand acknowledged that it retained possession of the collateral equipment that it held in full satisfaction of the Initial Claim amounts (the "POC Satisfaction"), therefore, Dresser-Rand had no claim against BA Energy. Dresser-Rand did respond by issuing a notice of dispute on December 21, 2009 (the "NOD"); however, the NOD served to only address a "misunderstanding of terminology" on the part of Dresser-Rand regarding the classification of the claim amounts and not a dispute as to or the rejection of the POC Satisfaction. After further discussions between the parties, the Monitor sent draft correspondence to Dresser-Rand's solicitors dated January 13, 2010 affirming the POC Satisfaction, that Dresser-Rand was retaining the equipment in full satisfaction of its claim and that it had the risk and benefit of any potential recovery. Throughout the process leading up to the Late Amended Claim, Dresser-Rand valued the collateral equipment as being worth as much or more than the debt owed by the Applicant.

BA Energy and the Monitor relied upon the proofs of claim as filed in the claims process, including the Initial Claim, in calculating the dividend in the BA Energy Plan of Arrangement filed March 10, 2010 (the "Plan"). The inclusion of the Late Amended Claim would have significantly affected BA Energy's/the Monitor's calculations and provisions contained in the Plan, and the subsequent BA Energy creditor review, consideration and implementation of the Plan.

The Dresser-Rand filing of the Late Amended Claim occurred only after distribution of the Plan proposing a 55% dividend. Allowance of the Amended Proof of Claim would: (i) circumvent the *Companies' Creditor Arrangement Act* (Canada) process, the Claims Procedure Order and provide Dresser-Rand an unjustified and improper advantage, and (ii) prejudice BA Energy and/or BA Energy's creditors generally in the pro rata or total distribution under the Plan.

28 Dresser-Rand filed a Notice of Dispute on April 8, 2010, submitting that there was no resolution of its claim as asserted by the Monitor, that it was "prudent and reasonable" for it to amend its claim on March 26, 2010 and that not accepting the claim would be prejudicial to Dresser-Rand and not prejudicial to BA Energy or its creditors. Dresser-Rand filed a Notice of Motion with respect to its claim on April 12, 2010 and served the service list.

29 The meeting of creditors was held on April 15, 2010. Only one creditor appeared in person: the rest voted by proxy. No-one voted against the plan. Counsel to Dresser-Rand read a prepared statement indicating that it had filed an amended proof of claim that may impact the other creditors if ultimately validated.

Analysis

30 Dresser-Rand submits that the amended proof of claim it filed on March 26, 2010 is not a "late claim", but merely an amendment to the September, 2009 proof of claim which was filed in a timely manner in compliance with the Claims Procedure Order. I cannot agree with this submission. The amended proof of claim purports to assert an unsecured claim for the first time, a claim that would qualify as an affected claim under the plan as opposed to the fully-secured claim previously asserted. It changes the nature of the original claim to such a degree that it must be considered a new claim and not a mere amendment.

31 Dresser-Rand initially filed its claim on the basis that it was in possession of assets of such a value as to satisfy its claim and that it was secured by its possession of such assets. It maintained that position for approximately eight months, leading the debtor and the Monitor to believe, not unreasonably, that Dresser-Rand would not be an affected creditor in a plan of arrangement. BA Energy structured its plan on that assumption. Dresser-Rand changed its approach and amended its claim to file in large part as an affected unsecured creditor at a time when it would have been clear to creditors that the distribution to unsecured creditors under a plan would be substantial, albeit prior to a formal vote by unsecured creditors on the plan.

32 While this application involves a determination of whether Dresser-Rand's late amended claim should be accepted, it is neither a clear case of a creditor "lying in the weeds" nor is it clearly the kind of late claim reviewed by Wittmann, J. A. (as he then was) in *Blue Range Resource Corp., Re*, 2000 ABCA 285 (Alta. C.A.), the leading authority on the assessment of late claims. However, the principles set out in *Blue Range* are relevant to the application.

33 Wittmann, J. A. set out the following as appropriate criteria for a court to apply to the assessment of late claims:

1. Was the delay caused by inadvertence and if so, did the claimant act in good faith?
2. What is the effect of permitting the claim in terms of the existence and impact of any relevant prejudice caused by the delay?
3. If relevant prejudice is found, can it be alleviated by attaching appropriate conditions to an order permitting late filing?

4. If relevant prejudice is found which cannot be alleviated, are there any other considerations which may nonetheless warrant an order permitting late filing?

34 In identifying these criteria and applying them to specific late claims, Wittmann, J. A. favoured a "blended approach", taking into consideration both the standards set out under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*. and the U.S. Bankruptcy Rules, and informed by concepts drawn from the approaches taken in a variety of areas of law when dealing with late notice or delays in process. It is clear from the nature of the criteria that the question of whether a late claim should be accepted is an equitable consideration, taking into account the specific circumstances of each case.

A. Inadvertence and Good Faith

35 Wittmann, J.A. noted that "inadvertence" in the context of the first criterion includes carelessness, negligence or accident and is unintentional.

36 BA Energy submits that Dresser-Rand's conduct in this case cannot be described as careless, negligent or accidental, but arose from a deliberate intent to reframe its claim as an unsecured claim when it became apparent that there would be a distribution to unsecured creditors of approximately \$0.55 per dollar of claim.

37 It is clear that Dresser-Rand was aware of BA Energy's process under the CCAA from shortly after the initial order and had retained counsel active on its behalf as early as March, 2009. It filed its initial proof of claim in a timely manner in May, 2009. It was aware from August, 2009 that BA Energy had repudiated the agreement but it was also clear that from March, 2009, Dresser-Rand took the position that it was free to exercise a right of sale of the equipment in its possession. I agree that it cannot be said that Dresser-Rand's amended proof of claim arose from inadvertence.

38 BA Energy alleges that Dresser-Rand has acted in bad faith in putting forth its recharacterized and amended claim only when it became apparent that it may do better as an unsecured creditor, given the level of distribution to unsecured creditors anticipated by the successful monetization of assets.

39 While there is insufficient evidence to reach the conclusion that Dresser-Rand acted in bad faith, it is true that it would have been clear to creditors in the relevant time period that a successful plan with an acceptable distribution to unsecured creditors was a strong possibility. At the least, Dresser-Rand delayed approximately eight months before taking any substantial or meaningful steps to value the assets in its possession in order to come to a valuation of its security. While Scott Kaffka, an employee of a U.S. affiliate of Dresser-Rand, suggests in his affidavits that Dresser-Rand was investigating the possibility of remarketing the equipment before January, 2010, it is also clear from the affidavits and cross-examination on them that relatively little was done in that regard until Mr. Kaffka became involved and contacted an equipment dealer to obtain an estimate of value for the compressor on January 28, 2010, some eleven months after counsel for Dresser-Rand first stated that it took the position that it was entitled to sell the equipment. It is noteworthy that on January 27, 2010, counsel to Dresser-Rand advised the Monitor that Dresser-Rand was still assessing its position, and that the opinion as to of value that Dresser-Rand relies upon was not formally prepared until March 19, 2010.

40 The consequences of the delay in adequately investigating the value of the assets it held as security for its claim, which accounts for most of the delay in filing the amended claim, must be borne by Dresser-Rand. The question of the resale value of the compressor was a question within the reasonable control of Dresser-Rand to determine.

41 The objective of a claims procedure order is to attempt to ensure that all legitimate creditors come forward on a timely basis. A claims procedure order provides the debtor and the Monitor with the information necessary to fashion a plan that may prove acceptable to the requisite majority of creditors given the financial circumstances of the debtor and that may be sanctioned by the court. The fact that accurate information relating to the amount and nature of claims is essential for the formulation of a successful plan requires that the specifics of a claims procedure order should generally be observed and enforced, and that the acceptance of a late claim should not be an automatic outcome. The applicant

for such an order must provide some explanation for the late filing and the reviewing court must consider any prejudice caused by the delay.

42 The claims procedure process was developed to give creditors a level playing field with respect to their claims and to discourage tactics that would give some creditors an unjustified advantage. Situations that give rise to concerns of improper manipulation of the process by a creditor must be carefully considered.

43 Dresser-Rand was offered an opportunity to amend its claim after the purchase agreement with BA Energy was formally repudiated, and did so on September 22, 2010, confirming its initial claim with only a slight variation in amount claimed. As late as December 21, 2009, Dresser-Rand characterized its claim as a fully-secured claim its Notice of Dispute and concedes that it believed at least to this point in time that the compressor was worth at least as much as its claim. Dresser-Rand submits that there was delay by the Monitor in responding to the amended claim, but a three-month delay in the circumstances of a large restructuring with many claims is not unusual. Dresser-Rand also submits that the Monitor should have reacted more quickly to its February 19, 2010 suggestion that it was open to accepting an unspecified cash offer from BA Energy to settle its claim. While the Monitor did not respond for roughly a month, it is clear that the Monitor was involved in preparing and filing a key report on the restructuring with the Court and also involved in a major monetization of BA Energy's assets that would subsequently fund the plan.

B. Prejudice Caused by the Delay

44 BA Energy, in consultation with the Monitor, prepared its plan in the early months of 2010 without making any provision for an unsecured deficiency claim from Dresser-Rand. Given what had been communicated among the parties with respect to Dresser-Rand's claim at this point of time, this was not unreasonable.

45 It is difficult to determine what the effect Dresser-Rand's late amended claim may have had on the decisions of creditors with respect to whether to approve the plan. All but one creditor voted on the plan by proxy, and some of those proxies were authorized before Dresser-Rand served other creditors with a Notice of Motion with respect to its revised claim on April 12, 2010. Dresser-Rand states in its brief that 16 out of 30 proxies were submitted after April 7, 2010. Therefore, roughly half of the creditors in number had already voted on the plan several days prior to receiving notice of Dresser-Rand's late claim.

46 With respect to the materiality of the claim, it would if accepted comprise approximately 5.4% of the total pool of affected creditors and, if paid from plan proceeds, would reduce the amount available to unsecured creditors from 55 cents per dollar of a claim to 53 cents per dollar of claim. The Dresser-Rand claim therefore is not as insignificant as the late claims accepted by the Court in *Blue Range*.

47 As noted in *Blue Range* at paragraph 40, the fact that creditors may receive less money if a late claim is accepted is not prejudice relative to the second criterion. The test is whether creditors by reason of the late claim lost a realistic opportunity to do anything that they otherwise might have done. In this case, it is not possible to determine if any of the proxy votes cast in favour of the plan would have been affected by knowledge of the late claim. It is only apparent that a significant number of creditors were not aware of the claim when they decided how to vote.

48 During the sanction hearing of April 16, 2010, BA Energy indicated that, instead of reducing the distribution to other creditors if Dresser-Rand's late claim was accepted by the Court, BA Energy would find another way to pay the required distribution to Dresser-Rand.

49 Consideration of prejudice is not restricted to prejudice to other creditors. The second criterion also requires consideration of prejudice to the debtor company or other interested parties: *Blue Range* at paras. 14 and 18. The timing of the late claim with respect to the stage of proceedings is a key consideration in determining whether there has been prejudice: *Blue Range* at para. 36.

50 The parties prejudiced by this late amended claim are BA Energy and its parent Value Creation, BA Energy's largest secured creditor. Value Creation refrained from requiring BA Energy to pay all of the proceeds of the assets it had monetized on Value Creation's secured claim and allowed BA Energy to use a portion of those proceeds to distribute to other creditors under the plan. While there is no doubt that Value Creation benefits from BA Energy's restructuring under the CCAA as a continuing entity with surviving assets, the postponement of a portion of Value Creation's secured claim was arrived at in consideration of the status of creditor claims as they had been filed, without Dresser-Rand's late amended claim.

51 It is not surprising that BA Energy did not attempt to alter its plan after having received notice of Dresser-Rand's amended proof of claim. Given the negotiations that necessarily proceed a vote on the plan, the status of proxy voting and the limited time to the creditors' meeting, BA Energy did not have a realistic opportunity to amend its plan to include Dresser-Rand without the risk of losing support from other creditors and jeopardizing the plan.

52 In *Lindsay v. Transtec Canada Ltd.* (1994), 28 C.B.R. (3d) 110 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 74, Huddart, J. held, in a case where there would have been no effect on other creditors if a late claim was accepted as it would be paid from post-arrangement revenue, that it was fair to refuse to grant leave to the late creditor to commence an action against the debtor company for a number of reasons, noting that "(a) CCAA proceeding is not a stage for an individual creditor to try to ensure the best possible position for himself ... As in bankruptcy proceedings, it is not unfair that a creditor who attempts to gain an advantage for himself should find himself disentitled to recover anything."

53 While the facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts before the Court in *Lindsay*, Dresser-Rand filed a very late revised claim after months of relative lack of diligence with respect to the value of its security, at a time when it had become apparent that the distribution to unsecured creditors under a proposed plan would be substantial. Dresser-Rand's recovery would be improved considerably by its very late recharacterization of claim if Dresser-Rand's new submissions with respect to the resale value of the compressor is accepted.

54 Dresser-Rand submits that, from its perspective, the Monitor's draft letter of January 14, 2010 was a "proposed resolution" of the claim, and that thus BA Energy and the Monitor should have been aware from early 2010 that the Dresser-Rand claim was unresolved and that Dresser-Rand would be claiming a deficiency in value as an unsecured claim. While the letter is marked "draft" and the Monitor requested a response before it was finalized, it refers to an agreement reached in the teleconference and the clarification of a misunderstanding arising from the Notice of Revision. While the Monitor was advised that this letter was being reviewed by Dresser-Rand, and Dresser-Rand invited a proposal for settlement on February 19, 2010, it was not until March 26, 2010, ten months after the expiry of the initial claims bar date that Dresser-Rand made its revised position clear to the debtor and the Monitor.

55 Mr. Kaffka states in his affidavits that Dresser-Rand received a verbal estimate of value from an equipment dealer on January 28, 2010. It may well be that Dresser-Rand did not wish to disclose the low resale value it was now alleging for the compressor at a point in time when it was hoping that BA Energy would make an offer to purchase the compressor, but this was a strategic decision by Dresser-Rand, and, again, the risk of further delay in clearly communicating its revised estimate of value because of this strategic decision must be borne by Dresser-Rand.

56 Dresser-Rand also submits that it would have filed its amended claim sooner had the Monitor advised it sooner that BA Energy was not interested in purchasing the compressor. It is true that Dresser-Rand may have been able to file its amended claim at the end of February, 2010 instead of at the end of March, 2010 had the Monitor responded earlier to Dresser-Rand's suggestion that BA Energy may wish to make an offer on the equipment, but it should be noted that Dresser-Rand's "proposal" was merely an invitation to BA Energy to make a settlement offer, and not a proposal specifying an acceptable price for the compressor that may have alerted the Monitor to its importance. The Monitor in the Thirteenth Report to the Court dated April 30, 2010 explained that it did not place a high priority on its response to the voice-mail enquiry as it thought that it was one of several enquiries that Dresser-Rand was making to potential purchasers to of the compressor.

57 Dresser-Rand submits that BA Energy knew as early as January 14, 2010 (the date of the Monitor's draft letter) that Dresser-Rand may have been in the position of recovering less than it was owed if it sold the equipment. While this was anticipated as a possibility in the January 14, 2010 letter, the responsibility for valuing the equipment Dresser-Rand claimed as its security cannot be transferred to the debtor or the Monitor. Dresser-Rand is in the business of manufacturing and marketing the equipment, and had as late as September 22, 2009 made the formal representation in its revised proof of claim that the equipment was worth the amount of its claim. It appears that in January 2010, an officer of BA Energy enquired of the Monitor whether BA Energy could recover any surplus proceeds from Dresser-Rand's sale of the compressor, further indicating that there is no evidence that either the debtor or the Monitor anticipated Dresser-Rand's late change of position on value.

C. Other Considerations

58 Dresser-Rand submits that equity favours its application, as it is a wronged party with a legitimate claim that has been compromised by the CCAA proceedings. While if Dresser-Rand's current position with respect to value is accepted, it may suffer a deficiency in its claim of roughly \$1.6 million still owing on the purchase price of roughly \$8 million for the compressor, Dresser-Rand has possession of the compressor and current estimates of a deficiency are still speculative. There is no overwhelming equitable consideration that would counter-balance relevant prejudice to BA Energy of the late claim.

59 Dresser-Rand submits that the situation is similar to that described in *Look Communications Inc., Re* (2005), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 265 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). However, this is not a situation where BA Energy was aware at all times of the applicant's claim and did not object, nor is it a case where, had court approval of the claim been sought prior to plan approval, it would be clear that such approval would be granted as a matter of course. No assumptions can be made about the outcome if this amended claim had been brought in a timely way and disputed.

D. Conclusion on a Late Claim

60 It would not be fair or equitable to accept this late amended claim. Given the facts of this case, there are no conditions that would alleviate relevant prejudice.

61 If I am wrong in my assessment of whether the late revised claim should be accepted, I would agree with BA Energy that the claim should not in any event be accepted as set out in the Amended Proof of Claim, but should be remitted to the Monitor to allow a proper consideration of value. BA Energy and the Monitor have not been given an opportunity to test the allegations made as to the resale value of the compressor as would occur in the normal course of a claim, given the timing of the late claim in relation to the plan and its sanctioning. While the parties may not have discussed this in advance of the application, it is clear that this was not a normal claims dispute, but was restricted to the issue of whether the claim should be accepted.

E. Conduct Money

62 In support of this application, Dresser-Rand filed and relied upon affidavits sworn by Mr. Kaffka, who resides in New York. Mr. Kaffka was cross-examined on these affidavits. Dresser-Rand submits that BA Energy should be required to pay conduct money for Mr. Kaffka's attendance at cross-examination.

63 BA Energy objects to paying conduct money for Mr. Kaffka's cross-examination because he is not an employee of Dresser-Rand Canada Inc., because he had no involvement with the issues prior to January, 2010 and because Dresser-Rand has employees in Alberta who could have provided an affidavit, including Bill Colpitts, its recently-retired General Manager who was involved with the matter and signed the first Proof of Claim.

64 Dresser-Rand submits that Mr. Kaffka was an appropriate affiant because he was primarily responsible for Dresser-Rand's mitigation efforts after January, 2010 and because he was the individual who determined the market value of the compressor.

65 While Mr. Kafka's evidence of pre-2010 efforts by Dresser-Rand to mitigate and to assess value was of necessity hearsay, he was involved in 2010 mitigation efforts. He was not so clearly an inappropriate witness that Dresser-Rand is disentitled to reasonable conduct money. I direct that BA Energy be required to pay reasonable conduct money for Mr. Kaffka's attendance.

F. Costs

66 This is not an appropriate case to depart from the usual practice with respect to costs in commercial insolvency applications, and therefore both Dresser-Rand and BA Energy will bear their own costs.

Application dismissed.

Footnotes


* A corrigendum issued by the court on August 13, 2010 has been incorporated herein.

TAB 4

I hereby certify this to be a true copy of
the original Order

Dated this 26 day of May 2016

COURT FILE NUMBER for Clerk of the Court 1601 - 03113



COURT COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA
JUDICIAL CENTRE CALGARY

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES'
CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985,
c. C-36, as amended

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPROMISE
OR ARRANGEMENT OF QUICKSILVER
RESOURCES CANADA INC., 0942065 B.C. LTD.
and 0942069 B.C. LTD.

DOCUMENT

CLAIMS PROCEDURE ORDER

ADDRESS FOR SERVICE AND
CONTACT INFORMATION OF
PARTY FILING THIS DOCUMENT

BENNETT JONES LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
4500, 855 - 2nd Street S.W.
Calgary, Alberta T2P 4K7

Attention: Chris Simard / Kevin Zych
Tel No.: 403-298-4485 / 416-777-5738
Fax No.: 403-265-7219 / 416-863-1716

DATE ON WHICH ORDER WAS PRONOUNCED: May 26, 2016

LOCATION WHERE ORDER WAS PRONOUNCED: Calgary

NAME OF JUSTICE WHO MADE THIS ORDER: Madam Justice K. M. Eidsvik

UPON the application of Quicksilver Resources Canada Inc. ("QRCI") and 0942065 B.C. Ltd. ("LNG Co") pursuant to the CCAA (as defined below) for an order approving a procedure for the determination and resolution of claims against the Applicants (as defined below) and authorizing and directing the Monitor (as defined below) in consultation with the Applicants to administer the said claims procedure in accordance with its terms;

AND UPON having read the Application, the Affidavit of Bob McGregor sworn May 18, 2016, and the Fourth Report of the Monitor dated May 20, 2016, all filed; AND UPON hearing

the submissions of counsel for the Applicants, counsel for the Monitor, and counsel for other interested parties;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

SERVICE OF APPLICATION

1. Service of this Application and supporting documents is hereby deemed to be good and sufficient, the time for notice is hereby abridged to the time provided, and no other person is required to have been served with notice of this Application.

DEFINITIONS

2. In this Order:
 - (a) "**Administration Charge**" means the Administration Charge as defined in the Initial Order;
 - (b) "**Applicants**" means QRCI, LNG Co, and 0942069 B.C. Ltd.;
 - (c) "**BIA**" means the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended;
 - (d) "**Business Day**" means a day, other than a Saturday, Sunday or a statutory holiday, on which banks are generally open for business in Calgary, in the Province of Alberta, Canada;
 - (e) "**Calendar Day**" means a day, including Saturday, Sunday and any statutory holidays in the Province of Alberta, Canada;
 - (f) "**CCAA**" means the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended;
 - (g) "**CCAA Proceedings**" means the proceedings commenced by the Applicants under the CCAA in the Court, under Action No. 1601-03113;

(h) **"Claim"** means:

- (i) any right or claim of any Person that may be asserted or made in whole or in part against the Applicants, or any of them, whether or not asserted or made, in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever, and any interest accrued thereon or costs payable in respect thereof, including without limitation, by reason of the commission of a tort (intentional or unintentional), by reason of any breach of contract or other agreement (oral or written), by reason of any breach of duty (including, without limitation, any legal, statutory, regulatory, equitable or fiduciary duty or obligation) or by reason of any right of ownership of or title to property or assets or right to a trust or deemed trust (statutory, express, implied, resulting, constructive or otherwise), and whether or not any indebtedness, liability or obligation is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, unsecured, present or future, known or unknown, by guarantee, surety or otherwise, and whether or not any right or claim is executory or anticipatory in nature including, without limitation, any right or ability of any Person to advance a claim for contribution or indemnity or otherwise with respect to any matter, action, cause or chose in action whether existing at present or commenced in the future, which indebtedness, liability or obligation, and any interest accrued thereon or costs payable in respect thereof (A) is based in whole or in part on facts prior to the Filing Date, (B) relates to a time period prior to the Filing Date, or (C) is a right or claim of any kind that would be a debt provable in bankruptcy within the meaning of the BIA had the Applicants become bankrupt on the Filing Date;
- (ii) a Restructuring Period Claim;
- (iii) a D&O Claim;
- (iv) a D&O Indemnity Claim; and

(v) a Secured Claim;

provided, however, that "Claim" shall not include an Excluded Claim;

- (i) "**Claimant**" means any Person asserting a Claim and includes without limitation the transferee or assignee of a Claim transfer and recognized as a Claimant in accordance with paragraph 31 hereof or a trustee, executor, liquidator, receiver, receiver and manager, or other Person acting on or behalf of or through such Person;
- (j) "**Claims Bar Date**" means 5:00 p.m. (Calgary time) on July 5, 2016, or any later date ordered by the Court;
- (k) "**Claims Package**" means the materials to be provided by the Monitor to Persons who may have a Claim, which materials shall include a blank Proof of Claim and a Proof of Claim Instruction Letter, and such other materials as the Applicants or the Monitor may consider appropriate or desirable.
- (l) "**Claims Procedure**" means the procedures outlined in this Order, including the Schedules;
- (m) "**Court**" means the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta in the Judicial Centre of Calgary;
- (n) "**Creditors' Meeting**" means any meeting of creditors called for the purpose of considering and voting in respect of the Plan, if one is filed, to be scheduled pursuant to further order of the Court;
- (o) "**D&O Claim**" means:
 - (i) any right or claim of any Person that may be asserted or made in whole or in part against one or more Directors or Officers that relates to a Claim for which such Directors or Officers are by law liable to pay in their capacity as Directors or Officers; or

- (ii) any right or claim of any Person that may be asserted or made in whole or in part against one or more Directors or Officers, in that capacity, whether or not asserted or made, in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever, and any interest accrued thereon or costs payable in respect thereof, including by reason of the commission of a tort (intentional or unintentional), by reason of any breach of contract or other agreement (oral or written), by reason of any breach of duty (including any legal, statutory, regulatory, equitable or fiduciary duty or obligation) or by reason of any right of ownership of or title to property or assets or right to a trust or deemed trust (statutory, express, implied, resulting, constructive or otherwise), and whether or not any indebtedness, liability or obligation, and any interest accrued thereon or costs payable in respect thereof, is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, unsecured, present or future, known or unknown, by guarantee, surety or otherwise, and whether or not any right or claim is executory or anticipatory in nature, including any right or ability of any Person to advance a claim for contribution or indemnity from any such Directors or Officers or otherwise with respect to any matter, action, cause or chose in action, whether existing at present or commenced in the future, which indebtedness, liability or obligation, and any interest accrued thereon or costs payable in respect thereof (A) is based in whole or in part on facts prior to the Filing Date, or (B) relates to a time period prior to the Filing Date;
- (p) **"D&O Indemnity Claim"** means any existing or future right of any Director or Officer against any of the Applicants which arose or arises as a result of any Person filing a Proof of Claim in respect of such Director or Officer for which such Director or Officer is entitled to be indemnified by any of the Applicants;
- (q) **"Director"** means anyone who is or was, or may be deemed to be or have been, whether by statute, operation of law or otherwise, a director or *de facto* director of any of the Applicants;

- (r) **"Directors' Charge"** means the Directors' Charge as defined in the Initial Order;
- (s) **"Distribution Claim"** means the amount of the Claim of a Claimant as finally determined for distribution purposes, in accordance with the provisions of this Order and the CCAA;
- (t) **"Employee Amounts"** means all outstanding wages, salaries and employee benefits (including employee medical, dental, disability, life insurance and similar benefit plans or arrangements, incentive plans, share compensation plans and employee assistance programs and employee or employer contributions in respect of pension or group savings plans, and other benefits), vacation pay, commissions, bonuses and other incentive payments, and employee expenses and reimbursements, in each case incurred in the ordinary course of business and consistent with existing compensation policies and arrangements, and all equivalent amounts related to individuals who perform employment-like services for the Applicants as contractors, and for greater certainty, shall not include any Claims arising from or in respect of any termination or cessation of employment of any employee of the Applicants, except to the extent covered by the KERP Charge;
- (u) **"Excluded Claim"** shall mean:
 - (i) any claim secured by the Administration Charge, the Directors' Charge, or the KERP Charge;
 - (ii) any other claim secured by a Court-ordered charge in the CCAA Proceedings arising after the date of this Order;
 - (iii) any claim in respect of Employee Amounts that become payable on or after the Filing Date;
 - (iv) any claim arising under a contract entered into by any Applicant after the Filing Date or with respect to goods or services provided to any of the Applicants on or after the Filing Date; and

- (v) any inter-company Claim existing among the Applicants which, for greater certainty, shall not include any Claim of any Person that is not an Applicant in these proceedings;
- (v) "**Filing Date**" means March 8, 2016;
- (w) "**Governmental Authority**" means a federal, provincial, state, territorial, municipal or other government or government department, agency or authority (including a court of law or any regulatory authority or body) having jurisdiction over the Applicants or their business;
- (x) "**Initial Order**" means the Initial Order in the CCAA Proceedings granted by the Honourable Mr. Justice D. B. Nixon granted on the Filing Date;
- (y) "**KERP Charge**" means the KERP Charge as defined in the Initial Order;
- (z) "**Known Claimant**" means:
 - (i) any Person who, based upon the books and records of the Applicants, was owed monies by any of the Applicants as of the Filing Date and which monies remain unpaid in whole or in part;
 - (ii) any Person who has commenced a legal proceeding in respect of a Claim or D&O Claim or given any of the Applicants written notice of an intention to commence a legal proceeding or a demand for payment in respect of a Claim or D&O Claim, provided that where a lawyer of record has been listed in connection with any such proceedings, the "Known Claimant" for the purposes of any notice required herein or to be given hereunder shall be, in addition to that Person, its lawyer of record;
 - (iii) any Person who was at or prior to the Filing Date party to a material lease, contract, or other agreement or obligation of any of the Applicants with respect to which such Person may assert a Claim; and
 - (iv) any Person who is a party to a lease, contract, or other agreement or obligation of any of the Applicants which was restructured, terminated,

repudiated or disclaimed by any of the Applicants between the Filing Date and the date of this Order;

- (aa) "**Monitor**" means FTI Consulting, Inc., in its capacity as Court-appointed monitor of the Applicants;
- (bb) "**Monitor's Website**" means <http://cfcanada.fticonsulting.com/QRCI>;
- (cc) "**Newspaper Notice to Claimants**" means the notice for publication pursuant to paragraph 16 of this Order, substantially in the form attached as Schedule "A";
- (dd) "**Notice of Dispute**" means the notice referred to in paragraphs 21 and 28 hereof, substantially in the form attached as Schedule "E" hereto, which may be delivered to the Monitor by a Claimant disputing a Notice of Revision or Disallowance, with reasons for its dispute;
- (ee) "**Notice of Revision or Disallowance**" means the notice referred to in paragraphs 20 and 27 hereof, substantially in the form of Schedule "D" hereto advising a Claimant that the Applicants have revised or rejected all or part of such Claimant's Claim set out in its Proof of Claim;
- (ff) "**Officer**" means anyone who is or was, or may be deemed to be or have been, whether by statute, operation of law or otherwise, an officer or *de facto* officer of any of the Applicants;
- (gg) "**Person**" is to be broadly interpreted and includes any individual, firm, corporation, limited or unlimited liability company, general or limited partnership, association, trust, unincorporated organization, joint venture, Government Authority or any agency, officer or instrumentality thereof or any other entity, wherever situate or domiciled, and whether or not having legal status;
- (hh) "**Plan**" means any proposed plan(s) of compromise or arrangement to be filed in respect of the Applicants, or any of them, pursuant to the CCAA as the same may be amended, supplemented or restated from time to time in accordance with the terms thereof;

- (ii) **"Proof of Claim"** means the Proof of Claim referred to herein, substantially in the form attached as Schedule "B" hereto;
- (jj) **"Proof of Claim Instruction Letter"** means the instruction letter to Claimants, substantially in the form attached as Schedule "C" hereto, regarding the completion of a Proof of Claim by a Claimant and the claims procedure described herein;
- (kk) **"QRI"** means Quicksilver Resources Inc.;
- (ll) **"Restructuring Period Claim"** means any right or claim of any Person against one or more of the Applicants in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever resulting from the restructuring, disclaimer, resiliation, termination or breach by one or more of the Applicants on or after the Filing Date of any contract, lease, or other agreement, whether written or oral and whether such restructuring, disclaimer, resiliation, termination or breach took place or takes place before or after the date of this Order;
- (mm) **"Restructuring Period Claims Bar Date"** means fifteen (15) Calendar Days after termination, repudiation or resiliation of the applicable agreement or other event giving rise to the applicable Restructuring Period Claim;
- (nn) **"Secured Claim"** means that portion of a Claim that is (i) secured by security validly charging or encumbering property or assets of the Applicants, or any of them, (including statutory and possessory liens that create security interests) up to the value of such collateral, and (ii) duly and properly perfected in accordance with the relevant legislation in the appropriate jurisdiction as of the Filing Date;
- (oo) **"Unknown Claimants"** are Claimants which are not Known Claimants or a Claimant with an Excluded Claim; and
- (pp) **"Voting Claim"** means the amount of the Claim of a Claimant as finally determined for voting at the Creditors' Meeting, in accordance with the provisions of this Order and the CCAA.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

3. All references as to time herein shall mean local time in Calgary, Alberta, Canada, and any reference to an event occurring on a Business Day shall mean prior to 5:00 p.m. on such Business Day unless otherwise indicated herein.
4. All references to the word "including" shall mean "including without limitation".
5. All references to the singular herein include the plural, the plural include the singular, and any gender includes the other gender.
6. All Claims shall be denominated in Canadian dollars. Any Claims denominated in a foreign currency shall be converted to Canadian dollars for purposes of any Plan at the Bank of Canada's noon exchange rate in effect on the Filing Date.
7. Interest and penalties that would otherwise accrue after the Filing Date shall not be included in any Claims.
8. Copies of all forms delivered hereunder, as applicable, and determinations of Claims by the Court shall be maintained by the Monitor and, subject to further order of the Court, the applicable Claimant will be entitled to have access thereto by appointment during normal business hours on written request to the Monitor.
9. Any Person with an Excluded Claim shall not file a Proof of Claim in this process in respect of such Excluded Claim, unless required to do so by further order of the Court, nor shall the Monitor send a Claims Package to Persons with Excluded Claims.

MONITOR'S ROLE

10. The Monitor, in addition to its prescribed rights, duties, responsibilities and obligations under the CCAA and under the Initial Order, shall have primary carriage of the administration of the claims procedure provided for herein, and is hereby directed and empowered to take such other actions and fulfill such other roles as are contemplated by this Order or incidental thereto. The Applicants are directed to provide such assistance to the Monitor in carrying out the terms of this claims procedure as the Monitor may reasonably request.

11. In carrying out the terms of this Order, the Monitor shall:
- (a) have all of the protections given to it by the CCAA, the Initial Order, and this Order, or as an officer of the Court, including the stay of proceedings in its favour;
 - (b) incur no liability or obligation as a result of the carrying out of the provisions of this Order, save and except for any gross negligence or willful misconduct on its part;
 - (c) be entitled to rely on the books and records of the Applicants and any information provided by the Applicants, all without independent investigation; and
 - (d) not be liable for any claims or damages resulting from any errors or omissions in such books, records or information, save and except for any gross negligence or willful misconduct on its part.
12. The Monitor is hereby authorized to use reasonable discretion as to the adequacy of compliance with respect to the manner in which forms delivered hereunder are completed and executed, and may, where they are satisfied that a Claim has been adequately proven, waive strict compliance with the requirements of this Order as to completion and execution of such forms and to request any further documentation from a Person that the Monitor may require in order to enable them to determine the validity of a Claim.

CLAIMS PROCEDURE FOR KNOWN CLAIMANTS

(i) **Disclaimers and Resiliations**

13. Any action taken by the Applicants to restructure, disclaim, resiliate, terminate or breach any contract, lease or other agreement, whether written or oral, pursuant to the terms of the Initial Order, must occur on or before the day that is fifteen (15) Calendar Days prior to the date of the Creditors' Meeting. Any notices of disclaimer or resiliation delivered to Claimants in connection with the foregoing shall be accompanied by a Claims Package.

14. Any Claimant that wishes to assert a Restructuring Period Claim must return a completed Proof of Claim to the Monitor such that it is received by the Monitor by no later than 5:00 p.m. on the Restructuring Period Claims Bar Date.
- (ii) **Notice of Claims to Known Claimants**
15. The Monitor shall send a Claims Package to each of the Known Claimants by prepaid ordinary mail before 11:59 p.m. on June 3, 2016.

CLAIMS PROCEDURE FOR UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS

(i) Notice of Claims

16. The Monitor will cause the Newspaper Notice to Claimants to be published on two separate dates prior to June 3, 2016 in each of the Calgary Herald and the Globe and Mail (National Edition). The Monitor will also post electronic copies of the Newspaper Notice to Claimants, the Proof of Claim, and this Order on the Monitor's Website as soon as practically possible after the date on which this Order is granted.
17. In addition, the Monitor shall send a Claims Package to any Unknown Claimant who requests these documents. Any such Unknown Claimant must return a completed Proof of Claim to the Monitor by no later than the Claims Bar Date.
18. To the extent that any D&O Claim is filed in accordance with this claims procedure, a corresponding D&O Indemnity Claim shall be deemed to have been filed in respect of such D&O Claim.

CLAIMS BAR DATE, ADJUDICATION AND RESOLUTION OF CLAIMS

(i) Barring of Claims

19. Any Claimant that does not return a Proof of Claim to the Monitor by the Claims Bar Date (or, for a Claimant asserting a Restructuring Period Claim, by the Restructuring Period Claims Bar Date), unless otherwise ordered by the Court, shall:
 - (a) not be entitled to vote at any Creditor's Meeting;

- (b) not be entitled to receive any distribution under any Plan;
- (c) not be entitled to any further notice in, and shall not be entitled to participate as a Claimant or creditor in, the CCAA Proceedings in respect of such Claim;
- (d) be forever barred from making or enforcing any such Claim against any of the Applicants, their Directors and their Officers, and all such Claims will be forever extinguished and barred without any further act or notification by the Applicants; and
- (e) be forever barred from making or enforcing any such Claim as against any other Person who could claim contribution or indemnity from the Applicants, their Directors and their Officers, or any of them and all such Claims will be forever extinguished and barred without any further act or notification by the Applicants.

(ii) **Determination of Claims**

20. The Applicants and the Monitor shall review all Proofs of Claim received by the Claims Bar Date and the Monitor shall accept, revise or disallow the amount of each Claim set out therein for voting and/or distribution purposes. The Monitor shall by no later than 11:59 p.m. on July 15, 2016, notify each Claimant who has delivered a Proof of Claim as to whether such Claimant's Claim as set out therein has been revised or rejected for voting purposes (and for distribution purposes, if the Applicants elect to do so), and the reasons therefor, by sending a Notice of Revision or Disallowance. Where the Applicants do not send by such date a Notice of Revision or Disallowance to a Claimant, the Applicants shall be deemed to have accepted such Claimant's Claim in the amount set out in that Claimant's Proof of Claim as a Voting Claim for voting purposes only, which shall be deemed to be that Claimant's Voting Claim.
21. Any Claimant who disputes the classification or amount of its Claim as set forth in a Notice of Revision or Disallowance sent pursuant to the immediately preceding paragraph shall deliver a Notice of Dispute to the Monitor (with a copy to the Applicants) by no later than 5:00 p.m. on the date that is fifteen (15) Calendar Days after receipt of the Notice of Revision or Disallowance.

(iii) **Resolution of Claims**

22. Where a Claimant that receives a Notice of Revision or Disallowance pursuant to paragraph 20 above does not file a Notice of Dispute by the time set out in paragraph 21 above, the value of such Claimant's Voting Claim or Distribution Claim (if the Notice of Revision or Disallowance dealt with the Distribution Claim) shall be deemed to be as set out in the Notice of Revision or Disallowance.
23. Upon receipt of a Notice of Dispute, the Applicants, with the assistance of the Monitor, may attempt to consensually resolve the classification and amount of the Claim with the Claimant.
24. If the Applicants and the Claimant consensually resolve the classification and amount of the Claim, the Monitor may accept a revised Claim, and such Claim will constitute a Voting Claim or a Distribution Claim (if the Notice of Revision or Disallowance dealt with the Distribution Claim).
25. In the event that the Monitor is unable to resolve a dispute regarding any Voting Claim with a Claimant, the Applicant or the Claimant shall so notify the Monitor, and the Claimant or the Applicant, as the case may be. The decision as to whether the Claimant's Voting Claim should be adjudicated by the Court shall be in the sole discretion of the Monitor (subject to consultation with the Applicant); provided, however that to the extent a Claim is referred under this paragraph to the Court, it shall be on the basis that the value of the Claim shall be resolved or adjudicated both for voting and distribution purposes (and that it shall remain open to the parties to agree that the Claimant's Voting Claim may be settled by the Claimant and the Applicant without prejudice to a future hearing by the Court to determine the Claimant's Distribution Claim). Thereafter, the Court shall resolve the dispute between the Applicant and such Claimant, and in any event, it is anticipated that the Court shall, by no later two (2) Calendar Days prior to the date of the Creditors' Meeting, notify the Applicant, such Claimant and the Monitor of the determination of the value of the Claimant's Voting Claim and Distribution Claim. Such determination of the value of the Voting Claim and Distribution Claim by the Court shall be deemed to be the Claimant's Voting Claim and Distribution Claim for voting and distribution purposes.

26. Where the value of a Claimant's Voting Claim has not been finally determined by the Court by the date of the Creditors' Meeting, the relevant Applicant shall either:
- (a) accept the Claimant's determination of the value of the Voting Claim as set out in the applicable Notice of Dispute only for the purposes of voting and conduct the vote of the creditors on that basis subject to a final determination of such Claimant's Voting Claim, and in such case the Monitor shall record separately the value of such Claimant's Voting Claim and whether such Claimant voted in favour of or against the Plan;
 - (b) adjourn the Creditors' Meeting until a final determination of the Voting Claim(s) is made; or
 - (c) deal with the matter as the Court may otherwise direct or as the relevant Applicant, the Monitor and the Claimant may otherwise agree.
27. The Monitor, with the assistance of the Applicants, shall review and consider all Proofs of Claim filed in accordance with this Claims Procedure Order, in order to determine the Distribution Claims. The Monitor shall notify each Claimant who filed a Proof of Claim and who did not receive a Notice of Revision or Disallowance for distribution purposes pursuant to paragraph 20 hereof as to whether such Claimant's Claim as set out in such Claimant's Proof of Claim has been revised or rejected for distribution purposes, and the reasons therefor, by delivery of a Notice of Revision or Disallowance. Where the Monitor does not send a Notice of Revision or Disallowance for distribution purposes to a Claimant, the relevant Applicants and the Monitor shall be deemed to have accepted the amount of such Claimant's Claim as set out in such Claimant's Proof of Claim as such Claimant's Distribution Claim.
28. Any Claimant who disputes a Notice of Revision or Disallowance for distribution purposes shall no later than fifteen (15) Calendar Days after receiving the notice referred to in paragraph 27, deliver a Notice of Dispute to the Monitor.
29. Where a Claimant that receives a Notice of Revision or Disallowance pursuant to paragraph 27 above does not return a Notice of Dispute for distribution purposes to the