


COURT FILE NO. 1601-06131

COURT COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA

JUDICIAL CENTRE CALGARY



APPLICANT **IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES'
CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

**AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF
COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF
CONNACHER OIL AND GAS LIMITED**

DOCUMENT **BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE APPLICANT**

ADDRESS FOR SERVICE
AND CONTACT
INFORMATION OF PARTY
FILING THIS DOCUMENT

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Book of Authorities In Support of June 20, 2019 Application

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3.	<i>Lutheran Church – Canada, Re</i> , 2016 ABQB 419.
4.	<i>Securities Act of 1933</i> , 15 U.S.C. 2A, s. 3(a)(10)
5.	In the Matter of a Plan of Opti Canada Inc. and Opti Technology Inc., Order (Sanction Hearing and Stay Extension) of the Honourable Chief Justice N.C. Wittmann, dated September 7, 2011, Court File No. 1101-09476 (Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta), at paragraph 8 (c)
6.	In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Banro Corporation, Banro group (Barbados) Limited, Banro Congo (Barbados) Limited, Namoya (Barbados) Limited, Lugushwa (Barbados) Limited, Twangiza (Barbados) Limited and Kamituga (Barbados) Limited, Order (Plan Sanction) of the Honourable Mr. Justice Hainey dated March 27, 2018, Court file No. CV-17-589016-00CL.
7.	<i>Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc. Re</i> , 2010 ONSC 222.
8.	<i>Re AbitibiBowater Inc.</i> , 2010 QCCS 4450.
9.	<i>Re Canwest Global Communications Corp.</i> , 2010 ONSC 4209.
10.	<i>Re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.</i> , 2008 ONCA 587.
11.	<i>Re Kitchener Frame Ltd.</i> , 2012 ONSC 234.
12.	<i>Re Skylink Aviation</i> , 2013 ONSC 2519.
13.	<i>Re Canada North Group</i> , 2017 ABQB 508.

Tab 1

[Canada Federal Statutes](#)

[Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[Part I — Compromises and Arrangements \(ss. 4-8\)](#)

Most Recently Cited in: [Walter Energy Canada Holdings, Inc. \(Re\)](#), 2018 BCSC 1135, 2018 CarswellBC 1818, 61 C.B.R. (6th) 251, 294 A.C.W.S. (3d) 692 | (B.C. S.C., Jul 9, 2018)

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 4

s 4. Compromise with unsecured creditors

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4. Compromise with unsecured creditors

Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company, of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

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[Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[Part I — Compromises and Arrangements \(ss. 4-8\)](#)

Most Recently Cited in: [Pascan Aviation inc., Re](#), 2016 QCCS 1444, 2016 CarswellQue 2682, 36 C.B.R. (6th) 159, EYB 2016-264074, 265 A.C.W.S. (3d) 567 | (C.S. Qué., Feb 12, 2016)

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 5

s 5. Compromise with secured creditors

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5. Compromise with secured creditors

Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

Currency

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Most Recently Cited in: [Nortel Networks Corporation \(Re\)](#), 2018 ONSC 6257, 2018 CarswellOnt 18952, 298 A.C.W.S. (3d) 238, 64 C.B.R. (6th) 278 | (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List], Oct 17, 2018)

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 5.1

s 5.1

[Currency](#)

5.1

5.1(1) Claims against directors — compromise

A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.

5.1(2) Exception

A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that

- (a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or
- (b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.

5.1(3) Powers of court

The court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

5.1(4) Resignation or removal of directors

Where all of the directors have resigned or have been removed by the shareholders without replacement, any person who manages or supervises the management of the business and affairs of the debtor company shall be deemed to be a director for the purposes of this section.

Amendment History

1997, c. 12, s. 122

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[Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[Part I — Compromises and Arrangements \(ss. 4-8\)](#)

Most Recently Cited in: [Elefant v. Genwood Industries Ltd.](#), 2018 QCCS 4590, 2018 CarswellQue 9571, EYB 2018-303523 | (C.S. Qué., Oct 22, 2018)

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 6

s 6.

[Currency](#)

6.

6(1)Compromises to be sanctioned by court

If a majority in number representing two thirds in value of the creditors, or the class of creditors, as the case may be — other than, unless the court orders otherwise, a class of creditors having equity claims, — present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings of creditors respectively held under sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court and, if so sanctioned, is binding

(a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for that class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and

(b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or is in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

6(2)Court may order amendment

If a court sanctions a compromise or arrangement, it may order that the debtor's constating instrument be amended in accordance with the compromise or arrangement to reflect any change that may lawfully be made under federal or provincial law.

6(3)Restriction — certain Crown claims

Unless Her Majesty agrees otherwise, the court may sanction a compromise or arrangement only if the compromise or arrangement provides for the payment in full to Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province, within six months after court sanction of the compromise or arrangement, of all amounts that were outstanding at the time of the application for an order under section 11 or 11.02 and that are of a kind that could be subject to a demand under

(a) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*;

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the

Employment Insurance Act, or a premium under Part VII.1 of that Act, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts; or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection.

6(4)Restriction — default of remittance to Crown

If an order contains a provision authorized by section 11.09, no compromise or arrangement is to be sanctioned by the court if, at the time the court hears the application for sanction, Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province satisfies the court that the company is in default on any remittance of an amount referred to in subsection (3) that became due after the time of the application for an order under section 11.02.

6(5)Restriction — employees, etc.

The court may sanction a compromise or an arrangement only if

(a) the compromise or arrangement provides for payment to the employees and former employees of the company, immediately after the court's sanction, of

(i) amounts at least equal to the amounts that they would have been qualified to receive under paragraph 136(1)(d) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* if the company had become bankrupt on the day on which proceedings commenced under this Act, and

(ii) wages, salaries, commissions or compensation for services rendered after proceedings commence under this Act and before the court sanctions the compromise or arrangement, together with, in the case of travelling salespersons, disbursements properly incurred by them in and about the company's business during the same period; and

(b) the court is satisfied that the company can and will make the payments as required under paragraph (a).

6(6)Restriction — pension plan

If the company participates in a prescribed pension plan for the benefit of its employees, the court may sanction a compromise or an arrangement in respect of the company only if

(a) the compromise or arrangement provides for payment of the following amounts that are unpaid to the fund established for the purpose of the pension plan:

(i) an amount equal to the sum of all amounts that were deducted from the employees' remuneration for payment to the fund,

(ii) if the prescribed pension plan is regulated by an Act of Parliament,

(A) an amount equal to the normal cost, within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the *Pension Benefits Standards Regulations, 1985*, that was required to be paid by the employer to the fund, and

(B) an amount equal to the sum of all amounts that were required to be paid by the employer to the fund under a defined contribution provision, within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the *Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985*,

(C) an amount equal to the sum of all amounts that were required to be paid by the employer to the administrator of a pooled registered pension plan, as defined in subsection 2(1) of the *Pooled Registered Pension Plans Act*, and

(iii) in the case of any other prescribed pension plan,

(A) an amount equal to the amount that would be the normal cost, within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the *Pension Benefits Standards Regulations, 1985*, that the employer would be required to pay to the fund if the prescribed plan were regulated by an Act of Parliament, and

(B) an amount equal to the sum of all amounts that would have been required to be paid by the employer to the fund under a defined contribution provision, within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the *Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985*, if the prescribed plan were regulated by an Act of Parliament;

(C) an amount equal to the sum of all amounts that would have been required to be paid by the employer in respect of a prescribed plan, if it were regulated by the *Pooled Registered Pension Plans Act*; and

(b) the court is satisfied that the company can and will make the payments as required under paragraph (a).

6(7)Non-application of subsection (6)

Despite subsection (6), the court may sanction a compromise or arrangement that does not allow for the payment of the amounts referred to in that subsection if it is satisfied that the relevant parties have entered into an agreement, approved by the relevant pension regulator, respecting the payment of those amounts.

6(8)Payment — equity claims

No compromise or arrangement that provides for the payment of an equity claim is to be sanctioned by the court unless it provides that all claims that are not equity claims are to be paid in full before the equity claim is to be paid.

Amendment History

1992, c. 27, s. 90(1)(f); 1996, c. 6, s. 167(1)(d); 1997, c. 12, s. 123; 2004, c. 25, s. 194; 2005, c. 47, s. 126 [Amended 2007, c. 36, s. 106.]; 2009, c. 33, s. 27; 2012, c. 16, s. 82

Currency

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[Canada Federal Statutes](#)
[Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)
[Part II — Jurisdiction of Courts \(ss. 9-18.6\)](#)

Most Recently Cited in: [In The Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, As Amended and In The Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement](#), 2019 ONSC 2222, 2019 CarswellOnt 6071 | (Ont. S.C.J., Apr 23, 2019)

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.02

S 11.02

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11.02

11.02(1) Stays, etc. — initial application

A court may, on an initial application in respect of a debtor company, make an order on any terms that it may impose, effective for the period that the court considers necessary, which period may not be more than 30 days,

- (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*;
- (b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
- (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

11.02(2) Stays, etc. — other than initial application

A court may, on an application in respect of a debtor company other than an initial application, make an order, on any terms that it may impose,

- (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for any period that the court considers necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in paragraph (1)(a);
- (b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
- (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

11.02(3) Burden of proof on application

The court shall not make the order unless

- (a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and

(b) in the case of an order under subsection (2), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

11.02(4)Restriction

Orders doing anything referred to in subsection (1) or (2) may only be made under this section.

Amendment History

2005, c. 47, s. 128

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Tab 2



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2000 ABQB 442
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re

2000 CarswellAlta 662, 2000 ABQB 442, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, [2000] A.W.L.D. 654, [2000] A.J.
No. 771, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 265 A.R. 201, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 98 A.C.W.S. (3d) 334, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41

**In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended**

In the Matter of the Business Corporations Act (Alberta) S.A. 1981, c. B-15, as Amended, Section 185

In the Matter of Canadian Airlines Corporation and Canadian Airlines International Ltd.

Paperny J.

Heard: June 5-19, 2000

Judgment: June 27, 2000^{*}

Docket: Calgary 0001-05071

Counsel: *A.L. Friend, Q.C., H.M. Kay, Q.C., R.B. Low, Q.C., and L. Goldbach*, for Petitioners.
S.F. Dunphy, P. O'Kelly, and E. Kolers, for Air Canada and 853350 Alberta Ltd.
D.R. Haigh, Q.C., D.N. Nishimura, A.Z.A. Campbell and D. Tay, for Resurgence Asset Management LLC.
L.R. Duncan, Q.C., and G. McCue, for Neil Baker, Michael Salter, Hal Metheral, and Roger Midiaty.
F.R. Foran, Q.C., and P.T. McCarthy, Q.C., for Monitor, PwC.
G.B. Morawetz, R.J. Chadwick and A. McConnell, for Senior Secured Noteholders and the Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co.
C.J. Shaw, Q.C., for Unionized Employees.
T. Mallett and C. Feasby, for Amex Bank of Canada.
E.W. Halt, for J. Stephens Allan, Claims Officer.
M. Hollins, for Pacific Coastal Airlines.
P. Pastewka, for JHHD Aircraft Leasing No. 1 and No. 2.
J. Thom, for Royal Bank of Canada.
J. Medhurst-Tivadar, for Canada Customs and Revenue Agency.
R. Wilkins, Q.C., for Calgary and Edmonton Airport Authority.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX](#) Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

[XIX.3](#) Arrangements

[XIX.3.b](#) Approval by court

[XIX.3.b.i](#) "Fair and reasonable"

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX](#) Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

[XIX.3](#) Arrangements

[XIX.3.b](#) Approval by court

[XIX.3.b.iv](#) Miscellaneous

Civil practice and procedure

[XXIII](#) Practice on appeal[XXIII.10](#) Leave to appeal[XXIII.10.c](#) Appeal from refusal or granting of leave**Headnote**

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

Airline brought application for approval of plan of arrangement under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Investment corporation brought counter-application for declaration that plan constituted merger or transfer of airline's assets to AC Corp., that plan would not affect investment corporation, and directing repurchase of notes pursuant to trust indenture, and that actions of airline and AC Corp. in formulating plan were oppressive and unfairly prejudicial to them — Application granted; counter-application dismissed — All statutory conditions were fulfilled and plan was fair and reasonable — Fairness did not require equal treatment of all creditors — Aim of plan was to allow airline to sustain operations and permanently adjust debt structure to reflect current market for asset values and carrying costs, in return for AC Corp. providing guarantee of restructured obligations — Plan was not oppressive to minority shareholders who, in alternative bankruptcy scenario, would receive less than under plan — Reorganization of share capital did not cancel minority shareholders' shares, and did not violate s. 167 of Business Corporations Act of Alberta — Act contemplated reorganizations in which insolvent corporation would eliminate interests of common shareholders, without requiring shareholder approval — Proposed transaction was not "sale, lease or exchange" of airline's property which required shareholder approval — Requirements for "related party transaction" under Policy 9.1 of Ontario Securities Commission were waived, since plan was fair and reasonable — Plan resulted in no substantial injustice to minority creditors, and represented reasonable balancing of all interests — Evidence did not support investment corporation's position that alternative existed which would render better return for minority shareholders — In insolvency situation, oppression of minority shareholder interests must be assessed against altered financial and legal landscape, which may result in shareholders' no longer having true interest to be protected — Financial support and corporate integration provided by other airline was not assumption of benefit by other airline to detriment of airline, but benefited airline and its stakeholders — Investment corporation was not oppressed — Corporate reorganization provisions in plan could not be severed from debt restructuring — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 5.1(2) — Business Corporations Act, S.A. 1981, c. B-15, s. 167.

Table of Authorities**Cases considered by *Paperny J.*:**

Alabama, New Orleans, Texas & Pacific Junction Railway, Re (1890), [1891] 1 Ch. 213, 60 L.J. Ch. 221, [1886-90] All E.R. Rep. Ext. 1143, 64 L.T. 127, 7 T.L.R. 171, 2 Meg. 377 (Eng. C.A.) — referred to

Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank (1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank (April 16, 1992), Doc. Toronto B62/91-A (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Bruce Agra Foods Inc. v. Everfresh Beverages Inc. (Receiver of) (1996), 45 C.B.R. (3d) 169, 22 O.T.C. 247 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re (February 6, 1995), Doc. B348/94 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re (March 7, 1995), Doc. B28/95 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Campeau Corp., Re (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 104 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Crabtree (Succession de) c. Barrette, [47 C.C.E.L. 1](#), [10 B.L.R. \(2d\) 1](#), (sub nom. *Barrette v. Crabtree (Succession de)*) [53 Q.A.C. 279](#), (sub nom. *Barrette v. Crabtree (Succession de)*) [150 N.R. 272](#), (sub nom. *Barrette v. Crabtree Estate*) [101 D.L.R. \(4th\) 66](#), (sub nom. *Barrette v. Crabtree Estate*) [[1993\] 1 S.C.R. 1027](#) (S.C.C.) — referred to

Diligenti v. RWMD Operations Kelowna Ltd. ([1976](#)), [1 B.C.L.R. 36](#) (B.C. S.C.) — referred to
First Edmonton Place Ltd. v. 315888 Alberta Ltd. ([1988](#)), [60 Alta. L.R. \(2d\) 122](#), [40 B.L.R. 28](#) (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Hochberger v. Rittenberg ([1916](#)), [54 S.C.R. 480](#), [36 D.L.R. 450](#) (S.C.C.) — referred to
Keddy Motor Inns Ltd., Re ([1992](#)), [90 D.L.R. \(4th\) 175](#), [13 C.B.R. \(3d\) 245](#), [6 B.L.R. \(2d\) 116](#), (sub nom. *Keddy Motor Inns Ltd., Re (No. 4)*) [110 N.S.R. \(2d\) 246](#), (sub nom. *Keddy Motor Inns Ltd., Re (No. 4)*) [299 A.P.R. 246](#) (N.S. C.A.) — referred to

Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleum Ltd. ([1988](#)), [64 Alta. L.R. \(2d\) 139](#), [[1989\] 2 W.W.R. 566](#), [72 C.B.R. \(N.S.\) 20](#), [72 C.R. \(N.S.\) 20](#) (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Northland Properties Ltd., Re ([1988](#)), [73 C.B.R. \(N.S.\) 175](#) (B.C. S.C.) — considered
Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada, [34 B.C.L.R. \(2d\) 122](#), [73 C.B.R. \(N.S.\) 195](#), [[1989\] 3 W.W.R. 363](#) (B.C. C.A.) — considered

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. ([1993](#)), [17 C.B.R. \(3d\) 1](#), (sub nom. *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re*) [12 O.R. \(3d\) 500](#) (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Pente Investment Management Ltd. v. Schneider Corp. ([1998](#)), [113 O.A.C. 253](#), (sub nom. *Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corp.*) [42 O.R. \(3d\) 177](#), [44 B.L.R. \(2d\) 115](#) (Ont. C.A.) — referred to
Quintette Coal Ltd., Re ([1992](#)), [13 C.B.R. \(3d\) 146](#), [68 B.C.L.R. \(2d\) 219](#) (B.C. S.C.) — referred to
Repap British Columbia Inc., Re ([1998](#)), [1 C.B.R. \(4th\) 49](#), [50 B.C.L.R. \(3d\) 133](#) (B.C. S.C.) — considered

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SkyDome Corp., Re ([March 21, 1999](#)), [Doc. 98-CL-3179](#) (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

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Wandlyn Inns Ltd., Re ([1992](#)), [15 C.B.R. \(3d\) 316](#) (N.B. Q.B.) — referred to

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Air Canada Public Participation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 35 (4th Supp.)

Generally — referred to

Business Corporations Act, S.A. 1981, c. B-15

Generally — referred to

s. 167 [am. 1996, c. 32, s. 1(4)] — considered

s. 167(1) [am. 1996, c. 32, s. 1(4)] — considered

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s. 167(1)(f) — considered

s. 167(1)(g.1) [en. 1996, c. 32, s. 1(4)] — considered

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s. 185(7) — considered

s. 234 — considered

Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10

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s. 47 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — considered

s. 2 "debtor company" — referred to

s. 5.1 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — considered

s. 5.1(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — referred to

s. 5.1(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — referred to

s. 6 [am. 1992, c. 27, s. 90(1)(f); am. 1996, c. 6, s. 167(1)(d)] — considered

s. 12 — referred to

Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34

Generally — referred to

APPLICATION by airline for approval of plan of arrangement; COUNTER-APPLICATION by investment corporation for declaration that plan constituted merger or transfer of airline's assets to AC Corp., that plan would not affect investment corporation, and directing repurchase of notes pursuant to trust indenture, and that actions of airline and AC Corp. in formulating plan were oppressive and unfairly prejudicial; COUNTER-APPLICATION by minority shareholders.

Paperny J.:

I. Introduction

1 After a decade of searching for a permanent solution to its ongoing, significant financial problems, Canadian Airlines Corporation ("CAC") and Canadian Airlines International Ltd. ("CAIL") seek the court's sanction to a plan of arrangement filed under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") and sponsored by its historic rival, Air Canada Corporation ("Air Canada"). To Canadian, this represents its last choice and its only chance for survival. To Air Canada, it is an opportunity to lead the restructuring of the Canadian airline industry, an exercise many suggest is long overdue. To over 16,000 employees of Canadian, it means continued employment. Canadian Airlines will operate as a separate entity and continue to provide domestic and international air service to Canadians. Tickets of the flying public will be honoured and their frequent flyer points maintained. Long term business relationships with trade creditors and suppliers will continue.

2 The proposed restructuring comes at a cost. Secured and unsecured creditors are being asked to accept significant compromises and shareholders of CAC are being asked to accept that their shares have no value.

Certain unsecured creditors oppose the plan, alleging it is oppressive and unfair. They assert that Air Canada has appropriated the key assets of Canadian to itself. Minority shareholders of CAC, on the other hand, argue that Air Canada's financial support to Canadian, before and during this restructuring process, has increased the value of Canadian and in turn their shares. These two positions are irreconcilable, but do reflect the perception by some that this plan asks them to sacrifice too much.

3 Canadian has asked this court to sanction its plan under s. 6 of the CCAA. The court's role on a sanction hearing is to consider whether the plan fairly balances the interests of all the stakeholders. Faced with an insolvent organization, its role is to look forward and ask: does this plan represent a fair and reasonable compromise that will permit a viable commercial entity to emerge? It is also an exercise in assessing current reality by comparing available commercial alternatives to what is offered in the proposed plan.

II. Background

Canadian Airlines and its Subsidiaries

4 CAC and CAIL are corporations incorporated or continued under the *Business Corporations Act* of Alberta, S.A. 1981, c. B-15 ("ABCA"). 82% of CAC's shares are held by 853350 Alberta Ltd. ("853350") and the remaining 18% are held publicly. CAC, directly or indirectly, owns the majority of voting shares in and controls the other Petitioner, CAIL and these shares represent CAC's principal asset. CAIL owns or has an interest in a number of other corporations directly engaged in the airline industry or other businesses related to the airline industry, including Canadian Regional Airlines Limited ("CRAL"). Where the context requires, I will refer to CAC and CAIL jointly as "Canadian" in these reasons.

5 In the past fifteen years, CAIL has grown from a regional carrier operating under the name Pacific Western Airlines ("PWA") to one of Canada's two major airlines. By mid-1986, Canadian Pacific Air Lines Limited ("CP Air"), had acquired the regional carriers Nordair Inc. ("Nordair") and Eastern Provincial Airways ("Eastern"). In February, 1987, PWA completed its purchase of CP Air from Canadian Pacific Limited. PWA then merged the four predecessor carriers (CP Air, Eastern, Nordair, and PWA) to form one airline, "Canadian Airlines International Ltd.", which was launched in April, 1987.

6 By April, 1989, CAIL had acquired substantially all of the common shares of Wardair Inc. and completed the integration of CAIL and Wardair Inc. in 1990.

7 CAIL and its subsidiaries provide international and domestic scheduled and charter air transportation for passengers and cargo. CAIL provides scheduled services to approximately 30 destinations in 11 countries. Its subsidiary, Canadian Regional Airlines (1998) Ltd. ("CRAL 98") provides scheduled services to approximately 35 destinations in Canada and the United States. Through code share agreements and marketing alliances with leading carriers, CAIL and its subsidiaries provide service to approximately 225 destinations worldwide. CAIL is also engaged in charter and cargo services and the provision of services to third parties, including aircraft overhaul and maintenance, passenger and cargo handling, flight simulator and equipment rentals, employee training programs and the sale of Canadian Plus frequent flyer points. As at December 31, 1999, CAIL operated approximately 79 aircraft.

8 CAIL directly and indirectly employs over 16,000 persons, substantially all of whom are located in Canada. The balance of the employees are located in the United States, Europe, Asia, Australia, South America and Mexico. Approximately 88% of the active employees of CAIL are subject to collective bargaining agreements.

Events Leading up to the CCAA Proceedings

9 Canadian's financial difficulties significantly predate these proceedings.

10 In the early 1990s, Canadian experienced significant losses from operations and deteriorating liquidity. It completed a financial restructuring in 1994 (the "1994 Restructuring") which involved employees contributing \$200,000,000 in new equity in return for receipt of entitlements to common shares. In addition, Aurora Airline Investments, Inc. ("Aurora"), a subsidiary of AMR Corporation ("AMR"), subscribed for \$246,000,000 in preferred shares of CAIL. Other AMR subsidiaries entered into comprehensive services and marketing arrangements with CAIL. The governments of Canada, British Columbia and Alberta provided an aggregate of \$120,000,000 in loan guarantees. Senior creditors, junior creditors and shareholders of CAC and CAIL and its subsidiaries converted approximately \$712,000,000 of obligations into common shares of CAC or convertible notes issued jointly by CAC and CAIL and/or received warrants entitling the holder to purchase common shares.

11 In the latter half of 1994, Canadian built on the improved balance sheet provided by the 1994 Restructuring, focussing on strict cost controls, capacity management and aircraft utilization. The initial results were encouraging. However, a number of factors including higher than expected fuel costs, rising interest rates, decline of the Canadian dollar, a strike by pilots of Time Air and the temporary grounding of Inter-Canadien's ATR-42 fleet undermined this improved operational performance. In 1995, in response to additional capacity added by emerging charter carriers and Air Canada on key transcontinental routes, CAIL added additional aircraft to its fleet in an effort to regain market share. However, the addition of capacity coincided with the slow-down in the Canadian economy leading to traffic levels that were significantly below expectations. Additionally, key international routes of CAIL failed to produce anticipated results. The cumulative losses of CAIL from 1994 to 1999 totalled \$771 million and from January 31, 1995 to August 12, 1999, the day prior to the issuance by the Government of Canada of an Order under Section 47 of the *Canada Transportation Act* (relaxing certain rules under the *Competition Act* to facilitate a restructuring of the airline industry and described further below), the trading price of Canadian's common shares declined from \$7.90 to \$1.55.

12 Canadian's losses incurred since the 1994 Restructuring severely eroded its liquidity position. In 1996, Canadian faced an environment where the domestic air travel market saw increased capacity and aggressive price competition by two new discount carriers based in western Canada. While Canadian's traffic and load factor increased indicating a positive response to Canadian's post-restructuring business plan, yields declined. Attempts by Canadian to reduce domestic capacity were offset by additional capacity being introduced by the new discount carriers and Air Canada.

13 The continued lack of sufficient funds from operations made it evident by late fall of 1996 that Canadian needed to take action to avoid a cash shortfall in the spring of 1997. In November 1996, Canadian announced an operational restructuring plan (the "1996 Restructuring") aimed at returning Canadian to profitability and subsequently implemented a payment deferral plan which involved a temporary moratorium on payments to certain lenders and aircraft operating lessors to provide a cash bridge until the benefits of the operational restructuring were fully implemented. Canadian was able successfully to obtain the support of its lenders and operating lessors such that the moratorium and payment deferral plan was able to proceed on a consensual basis without the requirement for any court proceedings.

14 The objective of the 1996 Restructuring was to transform Canadian into a sustainable entity by focussing on controllable factors which targeted earnings improvements over four years. Three major initiatives were adopted: network enhancements, wage concessions as supplemented by fuel tax reductions/rebates, and overhead cost reductions.

15 The benefits of the 1996 Restructuring were reflected in Canadian's 1997 financial results when Canadian and its subsidiaries reported a consolidated net income of \$5.4 million, the best results in 9 years.

16 In early 1998, building on its 1997 results, Canadian took advantage of a strong market for U.S. public debt financing in the first half of 1998 by issuing U.S. \$175,000,000 of senior secured notes in April, 1998 ("Senior Secured Notes") and U.S. \$100,000,000 of unsecured notes in August, 1998 ("Unsecured Notes").

17 The benefits of the 1996 Restructuring continued in 1998 but were not sufficient to offset a number of new factors which had a significant negative impact on financial performance, particularly in the fourth quarter. Canadian's eroded capital base gave it limited capacity to withstand negative effects on traffic and revenue. These factors included lower than expected operating revenues resulting from a continued weakness of the Asian economies, vigorous competition in Canadian's key western Canada and the western U.S. transborder markets, significant price discounting in most domestic markets following a labour disruption at Air Canada and CAIL's temporary loss of the ability to code-share with American Airlines on certain transborder flights due to a pilot dispute at American Airlines. Canadian also had increased operating expenses primarily due to the deterioration of the value of the Canadian dollar and additional airport and navigational fees imposed by NAV Canada which were not recoverable by Canadian through fare increases because of competitive pressures. This resulted in Canadian and its subsidiaries reporting a consolidated loss of \$137.6 million for 1998.

18 As a result of these continuing weak financial results, Canadian undertook a number of additional strategic initiatives including entering the *oneworld*TM Alliance, the introduction of its new "Proud Wings" corporate image, a restructuring of CAIL's Vancouver hub, the sale and leaseback of certain aircraft, expanded code sharing arrangements and the implementation of a service charge in an effort to recover a portion of the costs relating to NAV Canada fees.

19 Beginning in late 1998 and continuing into 1999, Canadian tried to access equity markets to strengthen its balance sheet. In January, 1999, the Board of Directors of CAC determined that while Canadian needed to obtain additional equity capital, an equity infusion alone would not address the fundamental structural problems in the domestic air transportation market.

20 Canadian believes that its financial performance was and is reflective of structural problems in the Canadian airline industry, most significantly, over capacity in the domestic air transportation market. It is the view of Canadian and Air Canada that Canada's relatively small population and the geographic distribution of that population is unable to support the overlapping networks of two full service national carriers. As described further below, the Government of Canada has recognized this fundamental problem and has been instrumental in attempts to develop a solution.

Initial Discussions with Air Canada

21 Accordingly, in January, 1999, CAC's Board of Directors directed management to explore all strategic alternatives available to Canadian, including discussions regarding a possible merger or other transaction involving Air Canada.

22 Canadian had discussions with Air Canada in early 1999. AMR also participated in those discussions. While several alternative merger transactions were considered in the course of these discussions, Canadian, AMR and Air Canada were unable to reach agreement.

23 Following the termination of merger discussions between Canadian and Air Canada, senior management of Canadian, at the direction of the Board and with the support of AMR, renewed its efforts to secure financial partners with the objective of obtaining either an equity investment and support for an eventual merger with Air Canada or immediate financial support for a merger with Air Canada.

Offer by Onex

24 In early May, the discussions with Air Canada having failed, Canadian focussed its efforts on discussions with Onex Corporation ("Onex") and AMR concerning the basis upon which a merger of Canadian and Air Canada could be accomplished.

25 On August 23, 1999, Canadian entered into an Arrangement Agreement with Onex, AMR and Airline Industry Revitalization Co. Inc. ("AirCo") (a company owned jointly by Onex and AMR and controlled by Onex). The Arrangement Agreement set out the terms of a Plan of Arrangement providing for the purchase by AirCo of all of the outstanding common and non-voting shares of CAC. The Arrangement Agreement was conditional upon, among other things, the successful completion of a simultaneous offer by AirCo for all of the voting and non-voting shares of Air Canada. On August 24, 1999, AirCo announced its offers to purchase the shares of both CAC and Air Canada and to subsequently merge the operations of the two airlines to create one international carrier in Canada.

26 On or about September 20, 1999 the Board of Directors of Air Canada recommended against the AirCo offer. On or about October 19, 1999, Air Canada announced its own proposal to its shareholders to repurchase shares of Air Canada. Air Canada's announcement also indicated Air Canada's intention to make a bid for CAC and to proceed to complete a merger with Canadian subject to a restructuring of Canadian's debt.

27 There were several rounds of offers and counter-offers between AirCo and Air Canada. On November 5, 1999, the Quebec Superior Court ruled that the AirCo offer for Air Canada violated the provisions of the *Air Canada Public Participation Act*. AirCo immediately withdrew its offers. At that time, Air Canada indicated its intention to proceed with its offer for CAC.

28 Following the withdrawal of the AirCo offer to purchase CAC, and notwithstanding Air Canada's stated intention to proceed with its offer, there was a renewed uncertainty about Canadian's future which adversely affected operations. As described further below, Canadian lost significant forward bookings which further reduced the company's remaining liquidity.

Offer by 853350

29 On November 11, 1999, 853350 (a corporation financed by Air Canada and owned as to 10% by Air Canada) made a formal offer for all of the common and non-voting shares of CAC. Air Canada indicated that the involvement of 853350 in the take-over bid was necessary in order to protect Air Canada from the potential adverse effects of a restructuring of Canadian's debt and that Air Canada would only complete a merger with Canadian after the completion of a debt restructuring transaction. The offer by 853350 was conditional upon, among other things, a satisfactory resolution of AMR's claims in respect of Canadian and a satisfactory resolution of certain regulatory issues arising from the announcement made on October 26, 1999 by the Government of Canada regarding its intentions to alter the regime governing the airline industry.

30 As noted above, AMR and its subsidiaries and affiliates had certain agreements with Canadian arising from AMR's investment (through its wholly owned subsidiary, Aurora Airline Investments, Inc.) in CAIL during the 1994 Restructuring. In particular, the Services Agreement by which AMR and its subsidiaries and affiliates provided certain reservations, scheduling and other airline related services to Canadian provided for a termination fee of approximately \$500 million (as at December 31, 1999) while the terms governing the preferred shares issued to Aurora provided for exchange rights which were only retractable by Canadian upon payment of a redemption fee in excess of \$500 million (as at December 31, 1999). Unless such provisions were amended or waived, it was practically impossible for Canadian to

complete a merger with Air Canada since the cost of proceeding without AMR's consent was simply too high.

31 Canadian had continued its efforts to seek out all possible solutions to its structural problems following the withdrawal of the AirCo offer on November 5, 1999. While AMR indicated its willingness to provide a measure of support by allowing a deferral of some of the fees payable to AMR under the Services Agreement, Canadian was unable to find any investor willing to provide the liquidity necessary to keep Canadian operating while alternative solutions were sought.

32 After 853350 made its offer, 853350 and Air Canada entered into discussions with AMR regarding the purchase by 853350 of AMR's shareholding in CAIL as well as other matters regarding code sharing agreements and various services provided to Canadian by AMR and its subsidiaries and affiliates. The parties reached an agreement on November 22, 1999 pursuant to which AMR agreed to reduce its potential damages claim for termination of the Services Agreement by approximately 88%.

33 On December 4, 1999, CAC's Board recommended acceptance of 853350's offer to its shareholders and on December 21, 1999, two days before the offer closed, 853350 received approval for the offer from the Competition Bureau as well as clarification from the Government of Canada on the proposed regulatory framework for the Canadian airline industry.

34 As noted above, Canadian's financial condition deteriorated further after the collapse of the AirCo Arrangement transaction. In particular:

- a) the doubts which were publicly raised as to Canadian's ability to survive made Canadian's efforts to secure additional financing through various sale-leaseback transactions more difficult;
- b) sales for future air travel were down by approximately 10% compared to 1998;
- c) CAIL's liquidity position, which stood at approximately \$84 million (consolidated cash and available credit) as at September 30, 1999, reached a critical point in late December, 1999 when it was about to go negative.

35 In late December, 1999, Air Canada agreed to enter into certain transactions designed to ensure that Canadian would have enough liquidity to continue operating until the scheduled completion of the 853350 take-over bid on January 4, 2000. Air Canada agreed to purchase rights to the Toronto-Tokyo route for \$25 million and to a sale-leaseback arrangement involving certain unencumbered aircraft and a flight simulator for total proceeds of approximately \$20 million. These transactions gave Canadian sufficient liquidity to continue operations through the holiday period.

36 If Air Canada had not provided the approximate \$45 million injection in December 1999, Canadian would likely have had to file for bankruptcy and cease all operations before the end of the holiday travel season.

37 On January 4, 2000, with all conditions of its offer having been satisfied or waived, 853350 purchased approximately 82% of the outstanding shares of CAC. On January 5, 1999, 853350 completed the purchase of the preferred shares of CAIL owned by Aurora. In connection with that acquisition, Canadian agreed to certain amendments to the Services Agreement reducing the amounts payable to AMR in the event of a termination of such agreement and, in addition, the unanimous shareholders agreement which gave AMR the right to require Canadian to purchase the CAIL preferred shares under certain circumstances was terminated. These arrangements had the effect of substantially reducing the obstacles to a restructuring of Canadian's debt and lease obligations and also significantly reduced the claims that AMR would be entitled to advance in such a restructuring.

38 Despite the \$45 million provided by Air Canada, Canadian's liquidity position remained poor. With January being a traditionally slow month in the airline industry, further bridge financing was required in order to ensure that Canadian would be able to operate while a debt restructuring transaction was being negotiated with creditors. Air Canada negotiated an arrangement with the Royal Bank of Canada ("Royal Bank") to purchase a participation interest in the operating credit facility made available to Canadian. As a result of this agreement, Royal Bank agreed to extend Canadian's operating credit facility from \$70 million to \$120 million in January, 2000 and then to \$145 million in March, 2000. Canadian agreed to supplement the assignment of accounts receivable security originally securing Royal's \$70 million facility with a further Security Agreement securing certain unencumbered assets of Canadian in consideration for this increased credit availability. Without the support of Air Canada or another financially sound entity, this increase in credit would not have been possible.

39 Air Canada has stated publicly that it ultimately wishes to merge the operations of Canadian and Air Canada, subject to Canadian completing a financial restructuring so as to permit Air Canada to complete the acquisition on a financially sound basis. This pre-condition has been emphasized by Air Canada since the fall of 1999.

40 Prior to the acquisition of majority control of CAC by 853350, Canadian's management, Board of Directors and financial advisors had considered every possible alternative for restoring Canadian to a sound financial footing. Based upon Canadian's extensive efforts over the past year in particular, but also the efforts since 1992 described above, Canadian came to the conclusion that it must complete a debt restructuring to permit the completion of a full merger between Canadian and Air Canada.

41 On February 1, 2000, Canadian announced a moratorium on payments to lessors and lenders. As a result of this moratorium Canadian defaulted on the payments due under its various credit facilities and aircraft leases. Absent the assistance provided by this moratorium, in addition to Air Canada's support, Canadian would not have had sufficient liquidity to continue operating until the completion of a debt restructuring.

42 Following implementation of the moratorium, Canadian with Air Canada embarked on efforts to restructure significant obligations by consent. The further damage to public confidence which a CCAA filing could produce required Canadian to secure a substantial measure of creditor support in advance of any public filing for court protection.

43 Before the Petitioners started these CCAA proceedings, Air Canada, CAIL and lessors of 59 aircraft in its fleet had reached agreement in principle on the restructuring plan.

44 Canadian and Air Canada have also been able to reach agreement with the remaining affected secured creditors, being the holders of the U.S. \$175 million Senior Secured Notes, due 2005, (the "Senior Secured Noteholders") and with several major unsecured creditors in addition to AMR, such as Loyalty Management Group Canada Inc.

45 On March 24, 2000, faced with threatened proceedings by secured creditors, Canadian petitioned under the CCAA and obtained a stay of proceedings and related interim relief by Order of the Honourable Chief Justice Moore on that same date. Pursuant to that Order, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Inc. was appointed as the Monitor, and companion proceedings in the United States were authorized to be commenced.

46 Since that time, due to the assistance of Air Canada, Canadian has been able to complete the restructuring of the remaining financial obligations governing all aircraft to be retained by Canadian for future operations. These arrangements were approved by this Honourable Court in its Orders dated April 14, 2000 and May 10, 2000, as described in further detail below under the heading "The Restructuring Plan".

47 On April 7, 2000, this court granted an Order giving directions with respect to the filing of the plan, the calling and holding of meetings of affected creditors and related matters.

48 On April 25, 2000 in accordance with the said Order, Canadian filed and served the plan (in its original form) and the related notices and materials.

49 The plan was amended, in accordance with its terms, on several occasions, the form of Plan voted upon at the Creditors' Meetings on May 26, 2000 having been filed and served on May 25, 2000 (the "Plan").

The Restructuring Plan

50 The Plan has three principal aims described by Canadian:

- (a) provide near term liquidity so that Canadian can sustain operations;
- (b) allow for the return of aircraft not required by Canadian; and
- (c) permanently adjust Canadian's debt structure and lease facilities to reflect the current market for asset values and carrying costs in return for Air Canada providing a guarantee of the restructured obligations.

51 The proposed treatment of stakeholders is as follows:

1. Unaffected Secured Creditors- Royal Bank, CAIL's operating lender, is an unaffected creditor with respect to its operating credit facility. Royal Bank holds security over CAIL's accounts receivable and most of CAIL's operating assets not specifically secured by aircraft financiers or the Senior Secured Noteholders. As noted above, arrangements entered into between Air Canada and Royal Bank have provided CAIL with liquidity necessary for it to continue operations since January 2000.

Also unaffected by the Plan are those aircraft lessors, conditional vendors and secured creditors holding security over CAIL's aircraft who have entered into agreements with CAIL and/or Air Canada with respect to the restructuring of CAIL's obligations. A number of such agreements, which were initially contained in the form of letters of intent ("LOIs"), were entered into prior to the commencement of the CCAA proceedings, while a total of 17 LOIs were completed after that date. In its Second and Fourth Reports the Monitor reported to the court on these agreements. The LOIs entered into after the proceedings commenced were reviewed and approved by the court on April 14, 2000 and May 10, 2000.

The basis of the LOIs with aircraft lessors was that the operating lease rates were reduced to fair market lease rates or less, and the obligations of CAIL under the leases were either assumed or guaranteed by Air Canada. Where the aircraft was subject to conditional sale agreements or other secured indebtedness, the value of the secured debt was reduced to the fair market value of the aircraft, and the interest rate payable was reduced to current market rates reflecting Air Canada's credit. CAIL's obligations under those agreements have also been assumed or guaranteed by Air Canada. The claims of these creditors for reduced principal and interest amounts, or reduced lease payments, are Affected Unsecured Claims under the Plan. In a number of cases these claims have been assigned to Air Canada and Air Canada disclosed that it would vote those claims in favour of the Plan.

2. Affected Secured Creditors- The Affected Secured Creditors under the Plan are the Senior Secured Noteholders with a claim in the amount of US\$175,000,000. The Senior Secured

Noteholders are secured by a diverse package of Canadian's assets, including its inventory of aircraft spare parts, ground equipment, spare engines, flight simulators, leasehold interests at Toronto, Vancouver and Calgary airports, the shares in CRAL 98 and a \$53 million note payable by CRAL to CAIL.

The Plan offers the Senior Secured Noteholders payment of 97 cents on the dollar. The deficiency is included in the Affected Unsecured Creditor class and the Senior Secured Noteholders advised the court they would be voting the deficiency in favour of the Plan.

3. Unaffected Unsecured Creditors-In the circular accompanying the November 11, 1999 853350 offer it was stated that:

The Offeror intends to conduct the Debt Restructuring in such a manner as to seek to ensure that the unionized employees of Canadian, the suppliers of new credit (including trade credit) and the members of the flying public are left unaffected.

The Offeror is of the view that the pursuit of these three principles is essential in order to ensure that the long term value of Canadian is preserved.

Canadian's employees, customers and suppliers of goods and services are unaffected by the CCAA Order and Plan.

Also unaffected are parties to those contracts or agreements with Canadian which are not being terminated by Canadian pursuant to the terms of the March 24, 2000 Order.

4. Affected Unsecured Creditors- CAIL has identified unsecured creditors who do not fall into the above three groups and listed these as Affected Unsecured Creditors under the Plan. They are offered 14 cents on the dollar on their claims. Air Canada would fund this payment.

The Affected Unsecured Creditors fall into the following categories:

- a. Claims of holders of or related to the Unsecured Notes (the "Unsecured Noteholders");
- b. Claims in respect of certain outstanding or threatened litigation involving Canadian;
- c. Claims arising from the termination, breach or repudiation of certain contracts, leases or agreements to which Canadian is a party other than aircraft financing or lease arrangements;
- d. Claims in respect of deficiencies arising from the termination or re-negotiation of aircraft financing or lease arrangements;
- e. Claims of tax authorities against Canadian; and
- f. Claims in respect of the under-secured or unsecured portion of amounts due to the Senior Secured Noteholders.

52 There are over \$700 million of proven unsecured claims. Some unsecured creditors have disputed the amounts of their claims for distribution purposes. These are in the process of determination by the court-appointed Claims Officer and subject to further appeal to the court. If the Claims Officer were to allow all of the disputed claims in full and this were confirmed by the court, the aggregate of unsecured claims would be approximately \$1.059 million.

53 The Monitor has concluded that if the Plan is not approved and implemented, Canadian will not be able to continue as a going concern and in that event, the only foreseeable alternative would be a liquidation

of Canadian's assets by a receiver and/or a trustee in bankruptcy. Under the Plan, Canadian's obligations to parties essential to ongoing operations, including employees, customers, travel agents, fuel, maintenance and equipment suppliers, and airport authorities are in most cases to be treated as unaffected and paid in full. In the event of a liquidation, those parties would not, in most cases, be paid in full and, except for specific lien rights and statutory priorities, would rank as ordinary unsecured creditors. The Monitor estimates that the additional unsecured claims which would arise if Canadian were to cease operations as a going concern and be forced into liquidation would be in excess of \$1.1 billion.

54 In connection with its assessment of the Plan, the Monitor performed a liquidation analysis of CAIL as at March 31, 2000 in order to estimate the amounts that might be recovered by CAIL's creditors and shareholders in the event of disposition of CAIL's assets by a receiver or trustee. The Monitor concluded that a liquidation would result in a shortfall to certain secured creditors, including the Senior Secured Noteholders, a recovery by ordinary unsecured creditors of between one cent and three cents on the dollar, and no recovery by shareholders.

55 There are two vociferous opponents of the Plan, Resurgence Asset Management LLC ("Resurgence") who acts on behalf of its and/or its affiliate client accounts and four shareholders of CAC. Resurgence is incorporated pursuant to the laws of New York, U.S.A. and has its head office in White Plains, New York. It conducts an investment business specializing in high yield distressed debt. Through a series of purchases of the Unsecured Notes commencing in April 1999, Resurgence clients hold \$58,200,000 of the face value of or 58.2% of the notes issued. Resurgence purchased 7.9 million units in April 1999. From November 3, 1999 to December 9, 1999 it purchased an additional 20,850,000 units. From January 4, 2000 to February 3, 2000 Resurgence purchased an additional 29,450,000 units.

56 Resurgence seeks declarations that: the actions of Canadian, Air Canada and 853350 constitute an amalgamation, consolidation or merger with or into Air Canada or a conveyance or transfer of all or substantially all of Canadian's assets to Air Canada; that any plan of arrangement involving Canadian will not affect Resurgence and directing the repurchase of their notes pursuant to the provisions of their trust indenture and that the actions of Canadian, Air Canada and 853350 are oppressive and unfairly prejudicial to it pursuant to section 234 of the Business Corporations Act.

57 Four shareholders of CAC also oppose the plan. Neil Baker, a Toronto resident, acquired 132,500 common shares at a cost of \$83,475.00 on or about May 5, 2000. Mr. Baker sought to commence proceedings to "remedy an injustice to the minority holders of the common shares". Roger Midiaty, Michael Salter and Hal Metheral are individual shareholders who were added as parties at their request during the proceedings. Mr. Midiaty resides in Calgary, Alberta and holds 827 CAC shares which he has held since 1994. Mr. Metheral is also a Calgary resident and holds approximately 14,900 CAC shares in his RRSP and has held them since approximately 1994 or 1995. Mr. Salter is a resident of Scottsdale, Arizona and is the beneficial owner of 250 shares of CAC and is a joint beneficial owner of 250 shares with his wife. These shareholders will be referred in the Decision throughout as the "Minority Shareholders".

58 The Minority Shareholders oppose the portion of the Plan that relates to the reorganization of CAIL, pursuant to section 185 of the *Alberta Business Corporations Act* ("ABCA"). They characterize the transaction as a cancellation of issued shares unauthorized by section 167 of the ABCA or alternatively is a violation of section 183 of the ABCA. They submit the application for the order of reorganization should be denied as being unlawful, unfair and not supported by the evidence.

III. Analysis

59 Section 6 of the CCAA provides that:

6. Where a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding

(a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and

(b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or is in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

60 Prior to sanctioning a plan under the CCAA, the court must be satisfied in regard to each of the following criteria:

(1) there must be compliance with all statutory requirements;

(2) all material filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to be done which is not authorized by the CCAA; and

(3) the plan must be fair and reasonable.

61 A leading articulation of this three-part test appears in *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C. S.C.) at 182-3, aff'd (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C. C.A.) and has been regularly followed, see for example *Re Sammi Atlas Inc.* (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at 172 and *Re T. Eaton Co.* (1999), 15 C.B.R. (4th) 311 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paragraph 7. Each of these criteria are reviewed in turn below.

1. Statutory Requirements

62 Some of the matters that may be considered by the court on an application for approval of a plan of compromise and arrangement include:

(a) the applicant comes within the definition of "debtor company" in section 2 of the CCAA;

(b) the applicant or affiliated debtor companies have total claims within the meaning of section 12 of the CCAA in excess of \$5,000,000;

(c) the notice calling the meeting was sent in accordance with the order of the court;

(d) the creditors were properly classified;

(e) the meetings of creditors were properly constituted;

(f) the voting was properly carried out; and

(g) the plan was approved by the requisite double majority or majorities.

63 I find that the Petitioners have complied with all applicable statutory requirements. Specifically:

(a) CAC and CAIL are insolvent and thus each is a "debtor company" within the meaning of section 2 of the CCAA. This was established in the affidavit evidence of Douglas Carty, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Canadian, and so declared in the March 24, 2000 Order in these proceedings and confirmed in the testimony given by Mr. Carty at this hearing.

(b) CAC and CAIL have total claims that would be claims provable in bankruptcy within the meaning of section 12 of the CCAA in excess of \$5,000,000.

(c) In accordance with the April 7, 2000 Order of this court, a Notice of Meeting and a disclosure statement (which included copies of the Plan and the March 24th and April 7th Orders of this court) were sent to the Affected Creditors, the directors and officers of the Petitioners, the Monitor and persons who had served a Notice of Appearance, on April 25, 2000.

(d) As confirmed by the May 12, 2000 ruling of this court (leave to appeal denied May 29, 2000), the creditors have been properly classified.

(e) Further, as detailed in the Monitor's Fifth Report to the Court and confirmed by the June 14, 2000 decision of this court in respect of a challenge by Resurgence Asset Management LLC ("Resurgence"), the meetings of creditors were properly constituted, the voting was properly carried out and the Plan was approved by the requisite double majorities in each class. The composition of the majority of the unsecured creditor class is addressed below under the heading "Fair and Reasonable".

2. *Matters Unauthorized*

64 This criterion has not been widely discussed in the reported cases. As recognized by Blair J. in *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.) and Farley J. in *Re Cadillac Fairview Inc.* (February 6, 1995), Doc. B348/94 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), within the CCAA process the court must rely on the reports of the Monitor as well as the parties in ensuring nothing contrary to the CCAA has occurred or is contemplated by the plan.

65 In this proceeding, the dissenting groups have raised two matters which in their view are unauthorized by the CCAA: firstly, the Minority Shareholders of CAC suggested the proposed share capital reorganization of CAIL is illegal under the ABCA and Ontario Securities Commission Policy 9.1, and as such cannot be authorized under the CCAA and secondly, certain unsecured creditors suggested that the form of release contained in the Plan goes beyond the scope of release permitted under the CCAA.

a. Legality of proposed share capital reorganization

66 Subsection 185(2) of the ABCA provides:

(2) If a corporation is subject to an order for reorganization, its articles may be amended by the order to effect any change that might lawfully be made by an amendment under section 167.

67 Sections 6.1(2)(d) and (e) and Schedule "D" of the Plan contemplate that:

a. All CAIL common shares held by CAC will be converted into a single retractable share, which will then be retracted by CAIL for \$1.00; and

b. All CAIL preferred shares held by 853350 will be converted into CAIL common shares.

68 The Articles of Reorganization in Schedule "D" to the Plan provide for the following amendments to CAIL's Articles of Incorporation to effect the proposed reorganization:

- (a) consolidating all of the issued and outstanding common shares into one common share;
- (b) redesignating the existing common shares as "Retractable Shares" and changing the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attaching to the Retractable Shares so that the Retractable Shares shall have attached thereto the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions as set out in the Schedule of Share Capital;
- (c) cancelling the Non-Voting Shares in the capital of the corporation, none of which are currently issued and outstanding, so that the corporation is no longer authorized to issue Non-Voting Shares;
- (d) changing all of the issued and outstanding Class B Preferred Shares of the corporation into Class A Preferred Shares, on the basis of one (1) Class A Preferred Share for each one (1) Class B Preferred Share presently issued and outstanding;
- (e) redesignating the existing Class A Preferred Shares as "Common Shares" and changing the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attaching to the Common Shares so that the Common Shares shall have attached thereto the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions as set out in the Schedule of Share Capital; and
- (f) cancelling the Class B Preferred Shares in the capital of the corporation, none of which are issued and outstanding after the change in paragraph (d) above, so that the corporation is no longer authorized to issue Class B Preferred Shares;

Section 167 of the ABCA

69 Reorganizations under section 185 of the ABCA are subject to two preconditions:

- a. The corporation must be "subject to an order for re-organization"; and
- b. The proposed amendments must otherwise be permitted under section 167 of the ABCA.

70 The parties agreed that an order of this court sanctioning the Plan would satisfy the first condition.

71 The relevant portions of section 167 provide as follows:

167(1) Subject to sections 170 and 171, the articles of a corporation may by special resolution be amended to

- (e) change the designation of all or any of its shares, and add, change or remove any rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions, including rights to accrued dividends, in respect of all or any of its shares, whether issued or unissued,
- (f) change the shares of any class or series, whether issued or unissued, into a different number of shares of the same class or series into the same or a different number of shares of other classes or series,
- (g.1) cancel a class or series of shares where there are no issued or outstanding shares of that class or series,

72 Each change in the proposed CAIL Articles of Reorganization corresponds to changes permitted under s. 167(1) of the ABCA, as follows:

Proposed Amendment in Schedule "D"

- (a) — consolidation of Common Shares
- (b) — change of designation and rights
- (c) — cancellation
- (d) — change in shares
- (e) — change of designation and rights
- (f) — cancellation

Subsection 167(1), ABCA

- 167(1)(f)
- 167(1)(e)
- 167(1)(g.1)
- 167(1)(f)
- 167(1)(e)
- 167(1)(g.1)

73 The Minority Shareholders suggested that the proposed reorganization effectively cancels their shares in CAC. As the above review of the proposed reorganization demonstrates, that is not the case. Rather, the shares of CAIL are being consolidated, altered and then retracted, as permitted under section 167 of the ABCA. I find the proposed reorganization of CAIL's share capital under the Plan does not violate section 167.

74 In R. Dickerson et al, *Proposals for a New Business Corporation Law for Canada*, Vol.1: Commentary (the "Dickerson Report") regarding the then proposed Canada Business Corporations Act, the identical section to section 185 is described as having been inserted with the object of enabling the "court to effect any necessary amendment of the articles of the corporation in order to achieve the objective of the reorganization without having to comply with the formalities of the Draft Act, particularly shareholder approval of the proposed amendment".

75 The architects of the business corporation act model which the ABCA follows, expressly contemplated reorganizations in which the insolvent corporation would eliminate the interest of common shareholders. The example given in the Dickerson Report of a reorganization is very similar to that proposed in the Plan:

For example, the reorganization of an insolvent corporation may require the following steps: first, reduction or even elimination of the interest of the common shareholders; second, relegation of the preferred shareholders to the status of common shareholders; and third, relegation of the secured debenture holders to the status of either unsecured Noteholders or preferred shareholders.

76 The rationale for allowing such a reorganization appears plain; the corporation is insolvent, which means that on liquidation the shareholders would get nothing. In those circumstances, as described further below under the heading "Fair and Reasonable", there is nothing unfair or unreasonable in the court effecting changes in such situations without shareholder approval. Indeed, it would be unfair to the creditors and other stakeholders to permit the shareholders (whose interest has the lowest priority) to have any ability to block a reorganization.

77 The Petitioners were unable to provide any case law addressing the use of section 185 as proposed under the Plan. They relied upon the decisions of *Re Royal Oak Mines Inc.* (1999), 14 C.B.R. (4th) 279 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) and *T. Eaton Co.*, *supra* in which Farley J. of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice emphasized that shareholders are at the bottom of the hierarchy of interests in liquidation or liquidation related scenarios.

78 Section 185 provides for amendment to articles by court order. I see no requirement in that section for a meeting or vote of shareholders of CAIL, quite apart from shareholders of CAC. Further, dissent and appraisal rights are expressly removed in subsection (7). To require a meeting and vote of shareholders and

to grant dissent and appraisal rights in circumstances of insolvency would frustrate the object of section 185 as described in the Dickerson Report.

79 In the circumstances of this case, where the majority shareholder holds 82% of the shares, the requirement of a special resolution is meaningless. To require a vote suggests the shares have value. They do not. The formalities of the ABCA serve no useful purpose other than to frustrate the reorganization to the detriment of all stakeholders, contrary to the CCAA.

Section 183 of the ABCA

80 The Minority Shareholders argued in the alternative that if the proposed share reorganization of CAIL were not a cancellation of their shares in CAC and therefore allowed under section 167 of the ABCA, it constituted a "sale, lease, or exchange of substantially all the property" of CAC and thus required the approval of CAC shareholders pursuant to section 183 of the ABCA. The Minority Shareholders suggested that the common shares in CAIL were substantially all of the assets of CAC and that all of those shares were being "exchanged" for \$1.00.

81 I disagree with this creative characterization. The proposed transaction is a reorganization as contemplated by section 185 of the ABCA. As recognized in *Savage v. Amoco Acquisition Co.* (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 154 (Alta. C.A.) aff'd (1988), 70 C.B.R. (N.S.) xxxii (S.C.C.), the fact that the same end might be achieved under another section does not exclude the section to be relied on. A statute may well offer several alternatives to achieve a similar end.

Ontario Securities Commission Policy 9.1

82 The Minority Shareholders also submitted the proposed reorganization constitutes a "related party transaction" under Policy 9.1 of the Ontario Securities Commission. Under the Policy, transactions are subject to disclosure, minority approval and formal valuation requirements which have not been followed here. The Minority Shareholders suggested that the Petitioners were therefore in breach of the Policy unless and until such time as the court is advised of the relevant requirements of the Policy and grants its approval as provided by the Policy.

83 These shareholders asserted that in the absence of evidence of the going concern value of CAIL so as to determine whether that value exceeds the rights of the Preferred Shares of CAIL, the Court should not waive compliance with the Policy.

84 To the extent that this reorganization can be considered a "related party transaction", I have found, for the reasons discussed below under the heading "Fair and Reasonable", that the Plan, including the proposed reorganization, is fair and reasonable and accordingly I would waive the requirements of Policy 9.1.

b. Release

85 Resurgence argued that the release of directors and other third parties contained in the Plan does not comply with the provisions of the CCAA.

86 The release is contained in section 6.2(2)(ii) of the Plan and states as follows:

As of the Effective Date, each of the Affected Creditors will be deemed to forever release, waive and discharge all claims, obligations, suits, judgments, damages, demands, debts, rights, causes of action and liabilities...that are based in whole or in part on any act, omission, transaction, event or other occurrence taking place on or prior to the Effective Date in any way relating to the Applicants and Subsidiaries, the CCAA Proceedings, or the Plan against:(i) The Applicants and Subsidiaries; (ii) The Directors, Officers and employees of the Applicants or Subsidiaries in each case as of the date

of filing (and in addition, those who became Officers and/or Directors thereafter but prior to the Effective Date); (iii) The former Directors, Officers and employees of the Applicants or Subsidiaries, or (iv) the respective current and former professionals of the entities in subclauses (1) to (3) of this s.6.2(2) (including, for greater certainty, the Monitor, its counsel and its current Officers and Directors, and current and former Officers, Directors, employees, shareholders and professionals of the released parties) acting in such capacity.

87 Prior to 1997, the CCAA did not provide for compromises of claims against anyone other than the petitioning company. In 1997, section 5.1 was added to the CCAA. Section 5.1 states:

5.1 (1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.

(2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that:

(a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or

(b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.

(3) The Court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

88 Resurgence argued that the form of release does not comply with section 5.1 of the CCAA insofar as it applies to individuals beyond directors and to a broad spectrum of claims beyond obligations of the Petitioners for which their directors are "by law liable". Resurgence submitted that the addition of section 5.1 to the CCAA constituted an exception to a long standing principle and urged the court to therefore interpret s. 5.1 cautiously, if not narrowly. Resurgence relied on *Crabtree (Succession de) c. Barrette*, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1027 (S.C.C.) at 1044 and *Bruce Agra Foods Inc. v. Everfresh Beverages Inc. (Receiver of)* (1996), 45 C.B.R. (3d) 169 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 5 in this regard.

89 With respect to Resurgence's complaint regarding the breadth of the claims covered by the release, the Petitioners asserted that the release is not intended to override section 5.1(2). Canadian suggested this can be expressly incorporated into the form of release by adding the words "*excluding the claims excepted by s. 5.1(2) of the CCAA*" immediately prior to subsection (iii) and clarifying the language in Section 5.1 of the Plan. Canadian also acknowledged, in response to a concern raised by Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, that in accordance with s. 5.1(1) of the CCAA, directors of CAC and CAIL could only be released from liability arising before March 24, 2000, the date these proceedings commenced. Canadian suggested this was also addressed in the proposed amendment. Canadian did not address the propriety of including individuals in addition to directors in the form of release.

90 In my view it is appropriate to amend the proposed release to expressly comply with section 5.1(2) of the CCAA and to clarify Section 5.1 of the Plan as Canadian suggested in its brief. The additional language suggested by Canadian to achieve this result shall be included in the form of order. Canada Customs and Revenue Agency is apparently satisfied with the Petitioners' acknowledgement that claims against directors can only be released to the date of commencement of proceedings under the CCAA, having appeared at this hearing to strongly support the sanctioning of the Plan, so I will not address this concern further.

91 Resurgence argued that its claims fell within the categories of excepted claims in section 5.1(2) of the CCAA and accordingly, its concern in this regard is removed by this amendment. Unsecured creditors

JHHD Aircraft Leasing No. 1 and No. 2 suggested there may be possible wrongdoing in the acts of the directors during the restructuring process which should not be immune from scrutiny and in my view this complaint would also be caught by the exception captured in the amendment.

92 While it is true that section 5.2 of the CCAA does not authorize a release of claims against third parties other than directors, it does not prohibit such releases either. The amended terms of the release will not prevent claims from which the CCAA expressly prohibits release. Aside from the complaints of Resurgence, which by their own submissions are addressed in the amendment I have directed, and the complaints of JHHD Aircraft Leasing No. 1 and No. 2, which would also be addressed in the amendment, the terms of the release have been accepted by the requisite majority of creditors and I am loathe to further disturb the terms of the Plan, with one exception.

93 Amex Bank of Canada submitted that the form of release appeared overly broad and might compromise unaffected claims of affected creditors. For further clarification, Amex Bank of Canada's potential claim for defamation is unaffected by the Plan and I am prepared to order Section 6.2(2)(ii) be amended to reflect this specific exception.

3. Fair and Reasonable

94 In determining whether to sanction a plan of arrangement under the CCAA, the court is guided by two fundamental concepts: "fairness" and "reasonableness". While these concepts are always at the heart of the court's exercise of its discretion, their meanings are necessarily shaped by the unique circumstances of each case, within the context of the Act and accordingly can be difficult to distill and challenging to apply. Blair J. described these concepts in *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.*, *supra*, at page 9:

"Fairness" and "reasonableness" are, in my opinion, the two keynote concepts underscoring the philosophy and workings of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. Fairness is the quintessential expression of the court's equitable jurisdiction — although the jurisdiction is statutory, the broad discretionary powers given to the judiciary by the legislation which make its exercise an exercise in equity — and "reasonableness" is what lends objectivity to the process.

95 The legislation, while conferring broad discretion on the court, offers little guidance. However, the court is assisted in the exercise of its discretion by the purpose of the CCAA: to facilitate the reorganization of a debtor company for the benefit of the company, its creditors, shareholders, employees and, in many instances, a much broader constituency of affected persons. Parliament has recognized that reorganization, if commercially feasible, is in most cases preferable, economically and socially, to liquidation: *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), [1989] 2 W.W.R. 566 (Alta. Q.B.) at 574; *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363 (B.C. C.A.) at 368.

96 The sanction of the court of a creditor-approved plan is not to be considered as a rubber stamp process. Although the majority vote that brings the plan to a sanction hearing plays a significant role in the court's assessment, the court will consider other matters as are appropriate in light of its discretion. In the unique circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to consider a number of additional matters:

- a. The composition of the unsecured vote;
- b. What creditors would receive on liquidation or bankruptcy as compared to the Plan;
- c. Alternatives available to the Plan and bankruptcy;
- d. Oppression;
- e. Unfairness to Shareholders of CAC; and

f. The public interest.

a. *Composition of the unsecured vote*

97 As noted above, an important measure of whether a plan is fair and reasonable is the parties' approval and the degree to which it has been given. Creditor support creates an inference that the plan is fair and reasonable because the assenting creditors believe that their interests are treated equitably under the plan. Moreover, it creates an inference that the arrangement is economically feasible and therefore reasonable because the creditors are in a better position than the courts to gauge business risk. As stated by Blair J. at page 11 of *Olympia & York Developments Ltd.*, *supra*:

As other courts have done, I observe that it is not my function to second guess the business people with respect to the "business" aspect of the Plan or descending into the negotiating arena or substituting my own view of what is a fair and reasonable compromise or arrangement for that of the business judgment of the participants. The parties themselves know best what is in their interests in those areas.

98 However, given the manner of voting under the CCAA, the court must be cognizant of the treatment of minorities within a class: see for example *Re Quintette Coal Ltd.* (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 146 (B.C. S.C.) and *Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas & Pacific Junction Railway* (1890), 60 L.J. Ch. 221 (Eng. C.A.). The court can address this by ensuring creditors' claims are properly classified. As well, it is sometimes appropriate to tabulate the vote of a particular class so the results can be assessed from a fairness perspective. In this case, the classification was challenged by Resurgence and I dismissed that application. The vote was also tabulated in this case and the results demonstrate that the votes of Air Canada and the Senior Secured Noteholders, who voted their deficiency in the unsecured class, were decisive.

99 The results of the unsecured vote, as reported by the Monitor, are:

1. For the resolution to approve the Plan: 73 votes (65% in number) representing \$494,762,304 in claims (76% in value);
2. Against the resolution: 39 votes (35% in number) representing \$156,360,363 in claims (24% in value); and
3. Abstentions: 15 representing \$968,036 in value.

100 The voting results as reported by the Monitor were challenged by Resurgence. That application was dismissed.

101 The members of each class that vote in favour of a plan must do so in good faith and the majority within a class must act without coercion in their conduct toward the minority. When asked to assess fairness of an approved plan, the court will not countenance secret agreements to vote in favour of a plan secured by advantages to the creditor: see for example, *Hochberger v. Rittenberg* (1916), 36 D.L.R. 450 (S.C.C.)

102 In *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C. S.C.) at 192-3 aff'd (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C. C.A.), dissenting priority mortgagees argued the plan violated the principle of equality due to an agreement between the debtor company and another priority mortgagee which essentially amounted to a preference in exchange for voting in favour of the plan. Trainor J. found that the agreement was freely disclosed and commercially reasonable and went on to approve the plan, using the three part test. The British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld this result and in commenting on the minority complaint McEachern J.A. stated at page 206:

In my view, the obvious benefits of settling rights and keeping the enterprise together as a going concern far outweigh the deprivation of the appellants' wholly illusory rights. In this connection, the learned chambers judge said at p.29:

I turn to the question of the right to hold the property after an order absolute and whether or not this is a denial of something of that significance that it should affect these proceedings. There is in the material before me some evidence of values. There are the principles to which I have referred, as well as to the rights of majorities and the rights of minorities.

Certainly, those minority rights are there, but it would seem to me that in view of the overall plan, in view of the speculative nature of holding property in the light of appraisals which have been given as to value, that this right is something which should be subsumed to the benefit of the majority.

103 Resurgence submitted that Air Canada manipulated the indebtedness of CAIL to assure itself of an affirmative vote. I disagree. I previously ruled on the validity of the deficiency when approving the LOIs and found the deficiency to be valid. I found there was consideration for the assignment of the deficiency claims of the various aircraft financiers to Air Canada, namely the provision of an Air Canada guarantee which would otherwise not have been available until plan sanction. The Monitor reviewed the calculations of the deficiencies and determined they were calculated in a reasonable manner. As such, the court approved those transactions. If the deficiency had instead remained with the aircraft financiers, it is reasonable to assume those claims would have been voted in favour of the plan. Further, it would have been entirely appropriate under the circumstances for the aircraft financiers to have retained the deficiency and agreed to vote in favour of the Plan, with the same result to Resurgence. That the financiers did not choose this method was explained by the testimony of Mr. Carty and Robert Peterson, Chief Financial Officer for Air Canada; quite simply it amounted to a desire on behalf of these creditors to shift the "deal risk" associated with the Plan to Air Canada. The agreement reached with the Senior Secured Noteholders was also disclosed and the challenge by Resurgence regarding their vote in the unsecured class was dismissed. There is nothing inappropriate in the voting of the deficiency claims of Air Canada or the Senior Secured Noteholders in the unsecured class. There is no evidence of secret vote buying such as discussed in *Re Northland Properties Ltd.*

104 If the Plan is approved, Air Canada stands to profit in its operation. I do not accept that the deficiency claims were devised to dominate the vote of the unsecured creditor class, however, Air Canada, as funder of the Plan is more motivated than Resurgence to support it. This divergence of views on its own does not amount to bad faith on the part of Air Canada. Resurgence submitted that only the Unsecured Noteholders received 14 cents on the dollar. That is not accurate, as demonstrated by the list of affected unsecured creditors included earlier in these Reasons. The Senior Secured Noteholders did receive other consideration under the Plan, but to suggest they were differently motivated suggests that those creditors did not ascribe any value to their unsecured claims. There is no evidence to support this submission.

105 The good faith of Resurgence in its vote must also be considered. Resurgence acquired a substantial amount of its claim after the failure of the Onex bid, when it was aware that Canadian's financial condition was rapidly deteriorating. Thereafter, Resurgence continued to purchase a substantial amount of this highly distressed debt. While Mr. Symington maintained that he bought because he thought the bonds were a good investment, he also acknowledged that one basis for purchasing was the hope of obtaining a blocking position sufficient to veto a plan in the proposed debt restructuring. This was an obvious ploy for leverage with the Plan proponents.

106 The authorities which address minority creditors' complaints speak of "substantial injustice" (*Re Keddy Motor Inns Ltd.* (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 245 (N.S. C.A.), "confiscation" of rights (*Re Campeau Corp.*

(1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 104 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Re SkyDome Corp.* (March 21, 1999), Doc. 98-CL-3179 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) and majorities "feasting upon" the rights of the minority (*Re Quintette Coal Ltd.* (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 146 (B.C. S.C.)). Although it cannot be disputed that the group of Unsecured Noteholders represented by Resurgence are being asked to accept a significant reduction of their claims, as are all of the affected unsecured creditors, I do not see a "substantial injustice", nor view their rights as having been "confiscated" or "feasted upon" by being required to succumb to the wishes of the majority in their class. No bad faith has been demonstrated in this case. Rather, the treatment of Resurgence, along with all other affected unsecured creditors, represents a reasonable balancing of interests. While the court is directed to consider whether there is an injustice being worked within a class, it must also determine whether there is an injustice with respect the stakeholders as a whole. Even if a plan might at first blush appear to have that effect, when viewed in relation to all other parties, it may nonetheless be considered appropriate and be approved: *Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank* (1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.) and *Re Northland Properties Ltd.*, *supra* at 9.

107 Further, to the extent that greater or discrete motivation to support a Plan may be seen as a conflict, the Court should take this same approach and look at the creditors as a whole and to the objecting creditors specifically and determine if their rights are compromised in an attempt to balance interests and have the pain of compromise borne equally.

108 Resurgence represents 58.2% of the Unsecured Noteholders or \$96 million in claims. The total claim of the Unsecured Noteholders ranges from \$146 million to \$161 million. The affected unsecured class, excluding aircraft financing, tax claims, the noteholders and claims under \$50,000, ranges from \$116.3 million to \$449.7 million depending on the resolutions of certain claims by the Claims Officer. Resurgence represents between 15.7% - 35% of that portion of the class.

109 The total affected unsecured claims, excluding tax claims, but including aircraft financing and noteholder claims including the unsecured portion of the Senior Secured Notes, ranges from \$673 million to \$1,007 million. Resurgence represents between 9.5% - 14.3% of the total affected unsecured creditor pool. These percentages indicate that at its very highest in a class excluding Air Canada's assigned claims and Senior Secured's deficiency, Resurgence would only represent a maximum of 35% of the class. In the larger class of affected unsecured it is significantly less. Viewed in relation to the class as a whole, there is no injustice being worked against Resurgence.

110 The thrust of the Resurgence submissions suggests a mistaken belief that they will get more than 14 cents on liquidation. This is not borne out by the evidence and is not reasonable in the context of the overall Plan.

b. Receipts on liquidation or bankruptcy

111 As noted above, the Monitor prepared and circulated a report on the Plan which contained a summary of a liquidation analysis outlining the Monitor's projected realizations upon a liquidation of CAIL ("Liquidation Analysis").

112 The Liquidation Analysis was based on: (1) the draft unaudited financial statements of Canadian at March 31, 2000; (2) the distress values reported in independent appraisals of aircraft and aircraft related assets obtained by CAIL in January, 2000; (3) a review of CAIL's aircraft leasing and financing documents; and (4) discussions with CAIL Management.

113 Prior to and during the application for sanction, the Monitor responded to various requests for information by parties involved. In particular, the Monitor provided a copy of the Liquidation Analysis to those who requested it. Certain of the parties involved requested the opportunity to question the Monitor

further, particularly in respect to the Liquidation Analysis and this court directed a process for the posing of those questions.

114 While there were numerous questions to which the Monitor was asked to respond, there were several areas in which Resurgence and the Minority Shareholders took particular issue: pension plan surplus, CRAL, international routes and tax pools. The dissenting groups asserted that these assets represented overlooked value to the company on a liquidation basis or on a going concern basis.

Pension Plan Surplus

115 The Monitor did not attribute any value to pension plan surplus when it prepared the Liquidation Analysis, for the following reasons:

- 1) The summaries of the solvency surplus/deficit positions indicated a cumulative net deficit position for the seven registered plans, after consideration of contingent liabilities;
- 2) The possibility, based on the previous splitting out of the seven plans from a single plan in 1988, that the plans could be held to be consolidated for financial purposes, which would remove any potential solvency surplus since the total estimated contingent liabilities exceeded the total estimated solvency surplus;
- 3) The actual calculations were prepared by CAIL's actuaries and actuaries representing the unions could conclude liabilities were greater; and
- 4) CAIL did not have a legal opinion confirming that surpluses belonged to CAIL.

116 The Monitor concluded that the entitlement question would most probably have to be settled by negotiation and/or litigation by the parties. For those reasons, the Monitor took a conservative view and did not attribute an asset value to pension plans in the Liquidation Analysis. The Monitor also did not include in the Liquidation Analysis any amount in respect of the claim that could be made by members of the plan where there is an apparent deficit after deducting contingent liabilities.

117 The issues in connection with possible pension surplus are: (1) the true amount of any of the available surplus; and (2) the entitlement of Canadian to any such amount.

118 It is acknowledged that surplus prior to termination can be accessed through employer contribution holidays, which Canadian has taken to the full extent permitted. However, there is no basis that has been established for any surplus being available to be withdrawn from an ongoing pension plan. On a pension plan termination, the amount available as a solvency surplus would first have to be further reduced by various amounts to determine whether there was in fact any true surplus available for distribution. Such reductions include contingent benefits payable in accordance with the provisions of each respective pension plan, any extraordinary plan wind up cost, the amounts of any contribution holidays taken which have not been reflected, and any litigation costs.

119 Counsel for all of Canadian's unionized employees confirmed on the record that the respective union representatives can be expected to dispute all of these calculations as well as to dispute entitlement.

120 There is a suggestion that there might be a total of \$40 million of surplus remaining from all pension plans after such reductions are taken into account. Apart from the issue of entitlement, this assumes that the plans can be treated separately, that a surplus could in fact be realized on liquidation and that the Towers Perrin calculations are not challenged. With total pension plan assets of over \$2 billion, a surplus of \$40 million could quickly disappear with relatively minor changes in the market value of the securities held or calculation of liabilities. In the circumstances, given all the variables, I find that the existence of any

surplus is doubtful at best and I am satisfied that the Monitor's Liquidation Analysis ascribing it zero value is reasonable in this circumstances.

CRAL

121 The Monitor's liquidation analysis as at March 31, 2000 of CRAL determined that in a distress situation, after payments were made to its creditors, there would be a deficiency of approximately \$30 million to pay Canadian Regional's unsecured creditors, which include a claim of approximately \$56.5 million due to Canadian. In arriving at this conclusion, the Monitor reviewed internally prepared unaudited financial statements of CRAL as of March 31, 2000, the Houlihan Lokey Howard and Zukin, distress valuation dated January 21, 2000 and the Simat Helliesen and Eichner valuation of selected CAIL assets dated January 31, 2000 for certain aircraft related materials and engines, rotables and spares. The Avitas Inc., and Avmark Inc. reports were used for the distress values on CRAL's aircraft and the CRAL aircraft lease documentation. The Monitor also performed its own analysis of CRAL's liquidation value, which involved analysis of the reports provided and details of its analysis were outlined in the Liquidation Analysis.

122 For the purpose of the Liquidation Analysis, the Monitor did not consider other airlines as comparable for evaluation purposes, as the Monitor's valuation was performed on a distressed sale basis. The Monitor further assumed that without CAIL's national and international network to feed traffic into and a source of standby financing, and considering the inevitable negative publicity which a failure of CAIL would produce, CRAL would immediately stop operations as well.

123 Mr. Peterson testified that CRAL was worth \$260 million to Air Canada, based on Air Canada being a special buyer who could integrate CRAL, on a going concern basis, into its network. The Liquidation Analysis assumed the windup of each of CRAL and CAIL, a completely different scenario.

124 There is no evidence that there was a potential purchaser for CRAL who would be prepared to acquire CRAL or the operations of CRAL 98 for any significant sum or at all. CRAL has value to CAIL, and in turn, could provide value to Air Canada, but this value is attributable to its ability to feed traffic to and take traffic from the national and international service operated by CAIL. In my view, the Monitor was aware of these features and properly considered these factors in assessing the value of CRAL on a liquidation of CAIL.

125 If CAIL were to cease operations, the evidence is clear that CRAL would be obliged to do so as well immediately. The travelling public, shippers, trade suppliers, and others would make no distinction between CAIL and CRAL and there would be no going concern for Air Canada to acquire.

International Routes

126 The Monitor ascribed no value to Canadian's international routes in the Liquidation Analysis. In discussions with CAIL management and experts available in its aviation group, the Monitor was advised that international routes are unassignable licenses and not property rights. They do not appear as assets in CAIL's financials. Mr. Carty and Mr. Peterson explained that routes and slots are *not* treated as assets by airlines, but rather as rights in the control of the Government of Canada. In the event of bankruptcy/receivership of CAIL, CAIL's trustee/receiver could not sell them and accordingly they are of no value to CAIL.

127 Evidence was led that on June 23, 1999 Air Canada made an offer to purchase CAIL's international routes for \$400 million cash plus \$125 million for aircraft spares and inventory, along with the assumption of certain debt and lease obligations for the aircraft required for the international routes. CAIL evaluated the Air Canada offer and concluded that the proposed purchase price was insufficient to permit it to continue

carrying on business in the absence of its international routes. Mr. Carty testified that something in the range of \$2 billion would be required.

128 CAIL was in desperate need of cash in mid December, 1999. CAIL agreed to sell its Toronto — Tokyo route for \$25 million. The evidence, however, indicated that the price for the Toronto — Tokyo route was not derived from a valuation, but rather was what CAIL asked for, based on its then-current cash flow requirements. Air Canada and CAIL obtained Government approval for the transfer on December 21, 2000.

129 Resurgence complained that despite this evidence of offers for purchase and actual sales of international routes and other evidence of sales of slots, the Monitor did not include Canadian's international routes in the Liquidation Analysis and only attributed a total of \$66 million for all intangibles of Canadian. There is some evidence that slots at some foreign airports may be bought or sold in some fashion. However, there is insufficient evidence to attribute any value to other slots which CAIL has at foreign airports. It would appear given the regulation of the airline industry, in particular, the *Aeronautics Act* and the *Canada Transportation Act*, that international routes for a Canadian air carrier only have full value to the extent of federal government support for the transfer or sale, and its preparedness to allow the then-current license holder to sell rather than act unilaterally to change the designation. The federal government was prepared to allow CAIL to sell its Toronto — Tokyo route to Air Canada in light of CAIL's severe financial difficulty and the certainty of cessation of operations during the Christmas holiday season in the absence of such a sale.

130 Further, statements made by CAIL in mid-1999 as to the value of its international routes and operations in response to an offer by Air Canada, reflected the amount CAIL needed to sustain liquidity without its international routes and was not a representation of market value of what could realistically be obtained from an arms length purchaser. The Monitor concluded on its investigation that CAIL's Narita and Heathrow slots had a realizable value of \$66 million, which it included in the Liquidation Analysis. I find that this conclusion is supportable and that the Monitor properly concluded that there were no other rights which ought to have been assigned value.

Tax Pools

131 There are four tax pools identified by Resurgence and the Minority Shareholders that are material: capital losses at the CAC level, undepreciated capital cost pools, operating losses incurred by Canadian and potential for losses to be reinstated upon repayment of fuel tax rebates by CAIL.

Capital Loss Pools

132 The capital loss pools at CAC will not be available to Air Canada since CAC is to be left out of the corporate reorganization and will be severed from CAIL. Those capital losses can essentially only be used to absorb a portion of the debt forgiveness liability associated with the restructuring. CAC, who has virtually all of its senior debt compromised in the plan, receives compensation for this small advantage, which cost them nothing.

Undepreciated capital cost ("UCC")

133 There is no benefit to Air Canada in the pools of UCC unless it were established that the UCC pools are in excess of the fair market value of the relevant assets, since Air Canada could create the same pools by simply buying the assets on a liquidation at fair market value. Mr. Peterson understood this pool of UCC to be approximately \$700 million. There is no evidence that the UCC pool, however, could be considered to be a source of benefit. There is no evidence that this amount is any greater than fair market value.

Operating Losses

134 The third tax pool complained of is the operating losses. The debt forgiven as a result of the Plan will erase any operating losses from prior years to the extent of such forgiven debt.

Fuel tax rebates

135 The fourth tax pool relates to the fuel tax rebates system taken advantage of by CAIL in past years. The evidence is that on a consolidated basis the total potential amount of this pool is \$297 million. According to Mr. Carty's testimony, CAIL has not been taxable in his ten years as Chief Financial Officer. The losses which it has generated for tax purposes have been sold on a 10 - 1 basis to the government in order to receive rebates of excise tax paid for fuel. The losses can be restored retroactively if the rebates are repaid, but the losses can only be carried forward for a maximum of seven years. The evidence of Mr. Peterson indicates that Air Canada has no plan to use those alleged losses and in order for them to be useful to Air Canada, Air Canada would have to complete a legal merger with CAIL, which is not provided for in the plan and is not contemplated by Air Canada until some uncertain future date. In my view, the Monitor's conclusion that there was no value to any tax pools in the Liquidation Analysis is sound.

136 Those opposed to the Plan have raised the spectre that there may be value unaccounted for in this liquidation analysis or otherwise. Given the findings above, this is merely speculation and is unsupported by any concrete evidence.

c. Alternatives to the Plan

137 When presented with a plan, affected stakeholders must weigh their options in the light of commercial reality. Those options are typically liquidation measured against the plan proposed. If not put forward, a hope for a different or more favourable plan is not an option and no basis upon which to assess fairness. On a purposive approach to the CCAA, what is fair and reasonable must be assessed against the effect of the Plan on the creditors and their various claims, in the context of their response to the plan. Stakeholders are expected to decide their fate based on realistic, commercially viable alternatives (generally seen as the prime motivating factor in any business decision) and not on speculative desires or hope for the future. As Farley J. stated in *T. Eaton Co.* (1999), 15 C.B.R. (4th) 311 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paragraph 6:

One has to be cognizant of the function of a balancing of their prejudices. Positions must be realistically assessed and weighed, all in the light of what an alternative to a successful plan would be. Wishes are not a firm foundation on which to build a plan; nor are ransom demands.

138 The evidence is overwhelming that all other options have been exhausted and have resulted in failure. The concern of those opposed suggests that there is a better plan that Air Canada can put forward. I note that significant enhancements were made to the plan during the process. In any case, this is the Plan that has been voted on. The evidence makes it clear that there is not another plan forthcoming. As noted by Farley J. in *T. Eaton Co.*, *supra*, "no one presented an alternative plan for the interested parties to vote on" (para. 8).

d. Oppression

Oppression and the CCAA

139 Resurgence and the Minority Shareholders originally claimed that the Plan proponents, CAC and CAIL and the Plan supporters 853350 and Air Canada had oppressed, unfairly disregarded or unfairly prejudiced their interests, under Section 234 of the ABCA. The Minority Shareholders (for reasons that will appear obvious) have abandoned that position.

140 Section 234 gives the court wide discretion to remedy corporate conduct that is unfair. As remedial legislation, it attempts to balance the interests of shareholders, creditors and management to ensure adequate investor protection and maximum management flexibility. The Act requires the court to judge the conduct of the company and the majority in the context of equity and fairness: *First Edmonton Place Ltd. v. 315888 Alberta Ltd.* (1988), 40 B.L.R. 28 (Alta. Q.B.). Equity and fairness are measured against or considered in the context of the rights, interests or reasonable expectations of the complainants: *Diligenti v. RWMD Operations Kelowna Ltd.* (1976), 1 B.C.L.R. 36 (B.C. S.C.).

141 The starting point in any determination of oppression requires an understanding as to what the rights, interests, and reasonable expectations are and what the damaging or detrimental effect is on them. MacDonald J. stated in *First Edmonton Place*, *supra* at 57:

In deciding what is unfair, the history and nature of the corporation, the essential nature of the relationship between the corporation and the creditor, the type of rights affected in general commercial practice should all be material. More concretely, the test of unfair prejudice or unfair disregard should encompass the following considerations: The protection of the underlying expectation of a creditor in the arrangement with the corporation, the extent to which the acts complained of were unforeseeable where the creditor could not reasonably have protected itself from such acts and the detriment to the interests of the creditor.

142 While expectations vary considerably with the size, structure, and value of the corporation, all expectations must be reasonably and objectively assessed: *Pente Investment Management Ltd. v. Schneider Corp.* (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 177 (Ont. C.A.).

143 Where a company is insolvent, only the creditors maintain a meaningful stake in its assets. Through the mechanism of liquidation or insolvency legislation, the interests of shareholders are pushed to the bottom rung of the priority ladder. The expectations of creditors and shareholders must be viewed and measured against an altered financial and legal landscape. Shareholders cannot reasonably expect to maintain a financial interest in an insolvent company where creditors' claims are not being paid in full. It is through the lens of insolvency that the court must consider whether the acts of the company are in fact oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarded. CCAA proceedings have recognized that shareholders may not have "a true interest to be protected" because there is no reasonable prospect of economic value to be realized by the shareholders given the existing financial misfortunes of the company: *Royal Oak Mines Ltd.*, *supra*, para. 4., *Re Cadillac Fairview Inc.* (March 7, 1995), Doc. B28/95 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), and *T. Eaton Company*, *supra*.

144 To avail itself of the protection of the CCAA, a company must be insolvent. The CCAA considers the hierarchy of interests and assesses fairness and reasonableness in that context. The court's mandate not to sanction a plan in the absence of fairness necessitates the determination as to whether the complaints of dissenting creditors and shareholders are legitimate, bearing in mind the company's financial state. The articulated purpose of the Act and the jurisprudence interpreting it, "widens the lens" to balance a broader range of interests that includes creditors and shareholders and beyond to the company, the employees and the public, and tests the fairness of the plan with reference to its impact on all of the constituents.

145 It is through the lens of insolvency legislation that the rights and interests of both shareholders and creditors must be considered. The reduction or elimination of rights of both groups is a function of the insolvency and not of oppressive conduct in the operation of the CCAA. The antithesis of oppression is fairness, the guiding test for judicial sanction. If a plan unfairly disregards or is unfairly prejudicial it will not be approved. However, the court retains the power to compromise or prejudice rights to effect a broader purpose, the restructuring of an insolvent company, provided that the plan does so in a fair manner.

Oppression allegations by Resurgence

146 Resurgence alleges that it has been oppressed or had its rights disregarded because the Petitioners and Air Canada disregarded the specific provisions of their trust indenture, that Air Canada and 853350 dealt with other creditors outside of the CCAA, refusing to negotiate with Resurgence and that they are generally being treated inequitably under the Plan.

147 The trust indenture under which the Unsecured Notes were issued required that upon a "change of control", 101% of the principal owing thereunder, plus interest would be immediately due and payable. Resurgence alleges that Air Canada, through 853350, caused CAC and CAIL to purposely fail to honour this term. Canadian acknowledges that the trust indenture was breached. On February 1, 2000, Canadian announced a moratorium on payments to lessors and lenders, including the Unsecured Noteholders. As a result of this moratorium, Canadian defaulted on the payments due under its various credit facilities and aircraft leases.

148 The moratorium was not directed solely at the Unsecured Noteholders. It had the same impact on other creditors, secured and unsecured. Canadian, as a result of the moratorium, breached other contractual relationships with various creditors. The breach of contract is not sufficient to found a claim for oppression in this case. Given Canadian's insolvency, which Resurgence recognized, it cannot be said that there was a reasonable expectation that it would be paid in full under the terms of the trust indenture, particularly when Canadian had ceased making payments to other creditors as well.

149 It is asserted that because the Plan proponents engaged in a restructuring of Canadian's debt before the filing under the CCAA, that its use of the Act for only a small group of creditors, which includes Resurgence is somehow oppressive.

150 At the outset, it cannot be overlooked that the CCAA does not require that a compromise be proposed to *all* creditors of an insolvent company. The CCAA is a flexible, remedial statute which recognizes the unique circumstances that lead to and away from insolvency.

151 Next, Air Canada made it clear beginning in the fall of 1999 that Canadian would have to complete a financial restructuring so as to permit Air Canada to acquire CAIL on a financially sound basis and as a wholly owned subsidiary. Following the implementation of the moratorium, absent which Canadian could not have continued to operate, Canadian and Air Canada commenced efforts to restructure significant obligations by consent. They perceived that further damage to public confidence that a CCAA filing could produce, required Canadian to secure a substantial measure of creditor support in advance of any public filing for court protection. Before the Petitioners started the CCAA proceedings on March 24, 2000, Air Canada, CAIL and lessors of 59 aircraft in its fleet had reached agreement in principle on the restructuring plan.

152 The purpose of the CCAA is to create an environment for negotiations and compromise. Often it is the stay of proceedings that creates the necessary stability for that process to unfold. Negotiations with certain key creditors in advance of the CCAA filing, rather than being oppressive or conspiratorial, are to be encouraged as a matter of principle if their impact is to provide a firm foundation for a restructuring. Certainly in this case, they were of critical importance, staving off liquidation, preserving cash flow and allowing the Plan to proceed. Rather than being detrimental or prejudicial to the interests of the other stakeholders, including Resurgence, it was beneficial to Canadian and all of its stakeholders.

153 Resurgence complained that certain transfers of assets to Air Canada and its actions in consolidating the operations of the two entities prior to the initiation of the CCAA proceedings were unfairly prejudicial to it.

154 The evidence demonstrates that the sales of the Toronto — Tokyo route, the Dash 8s and the simulators were at the suggestion of Canadian, who was in desperate need of operating cash. Air Canada paid what Canadian asked, based on its cash flow requirements. The evidence established that absent the injection of cash at that critical juncture, Canadian would have ceased operations. It is for that reason that the Government of Canada willingly provided the approval for the transfer on December 21, 2000.

155 Similarly, the renegotiation of CAIL's aircraft leases to reflect market rates supported by Air Canada covenant or guarantee has been previously dealt with by this court and found to have been in the best interest of Canadian, not to its detriment. The evidence establishes that the financial support and corporate integration that has been provided by Air Canada was not only in Canadian's best interest, but its only option for survival. The suggestion that the renegotiations of these leases, various sales and the operational realignment represents an assumption of a benefit by Air Canada to the detriment of Canadian is not supported by the evidence.

156 I find the transactions predating the CCAA proceedings, were in fact Canadian's life blood in ensuring some degree of liquidity and stability within which to conduct an orderly restructuring of its debt. There was no detriment to Canadian or to its creditors, including its unsecured creditors. That Air Canada and Canadian were so successful in negotiating agreements with their major creditors, including aircraft financiers, without resorting to a stay under the CCAA underscores the serious distress Canadian was in and its lenders recognition of the viability of the proposed Plan.

157 Resurgence complained that other significant groups held negotiations with Canadian. The evidence indicates that a meeting was held with Mr. Symington, Managing Director of Resurgence, in Toronto in March 2000. It was made clear to Resurgence that the pool of unsecured creditors would be somewhere between \$500 and \$700 million and that Resurgence would be included within that class. To the extent that the versions of this meeting differ, I prefer and accept the evidence of Mr. Carty. Resurgence wished to play a significant role in the debt restructuring and indicated it was prepared to utilize the litigation process to achieve a satisfactory result for itself. It is therefore understandable that no further negotiations took place. Nevertheless, the original offer to affected unsecured creditors has been enhanced since the filing of the plan on April 25, 2000. The enhancements to unsecured claims involved the removal of the cap on the unsecured pool and an increase from 12 to 14 cents on the dollar.

158 The findings of the Commissioner of Competition establishes beyond doubt that absent the financial support provided by Air Canada, Canadian would have failed in December 1999. I am unable to find on the evidence that Resurgence has been oppressed. The complaint that Air Canada has plundered Canadian and robbed it of its assets is not supported but contradicted by the evidence. As described above, the alternative is liquidation and in that event the Unsecured Noteholders would receive between one and three cents on the dollar. The Monitor's conclusions in this regard are supportable and I accept them.

e. Unfairness to Shareholders

159 The Minority Shareholders essentially complained that they were being unfairly stripped of their only asset in CAC — the shares of CAIL. They suggested they were being squeezed out by the new CAC majority shareholder 853350, without any compensation or any vote. When the reorganization is completed as contemplated by the Plan, their shares will remain in CAC but CAC will be a bare shell.

160 They further submitted that Air Canada's cash infusion, the covenants and guarantees it has offered to aircraft financiers, and the operational changes (including integration of schedules, "quick win" strategies, and code sharing) have all added significant value to CAIL to the benefit of its stakeholders, including the Minority Shareholders. They argued that they should be entitled to continue to participate into the future

and that such an expectation is legitimate and consistent with the statements and actions of Air Canada in regard to integration. By acting to realign the airlines before a corporate reorganization, the Minority Shareholders asserted that Air Canada has created the expectation that it is prepared to consolidate the airlines with the participation of a minority. The Minority Shareholders take no position with respect to the debt restructuring under the CCAA, but ask the court to sever the corporate reorganization provisions contained in the Plan.

161 Finally, they asserted that CAIL has increased in value due to Air Canada's financial contributions and operational changes and that accordingly, before authorizing the transfer of the CAIL shares to 853350, the current holders of the CAIL Preferred Shares, the court must have evidence before it to justify a transfer of 100% of the equity of CAIL to the Preferred Shares.

162 That CAC will have its shareholding in CAIL extinguished and emerge a bare shell is acknowledged. However, the evidence makes it abundantly clear that those shares, CAC's "only asset", have no value. That the Minority Shareholders are content to have the debt restructuring proceed suggests by implication that they do not dispute the insolvency of both Petitioners, CAC and CAIL.

163 The Minority Shareholders base their expectation to remain as shareholders on the actions of Air Canada in acquiring only 82% of the CAC shares before integrating certain of the airlines' operations. Mr. Baker (who purchased *after* the Plan was filed with the Court and almost six months after the take over bid by Air Canada) suggested that the contents of the bid circular misrepresented Air Canada's future intentions to its shareholders. The two dollar price offered and paid per share in the bid must be viewed somewhat skeptically and in the context in which the bid arose. It does not support the speculative view that some shareholders hold, that somehow, despite insolvency, their shares have some value on a going concern basis. In any event, any claim for misrepresentation that Minority Shareholders might have arising from the take over bid circular against Air Canada or 853350, if any, is unaffected by the Plan and may be pursued after the stay is lifted.

164 In considering Resurgence's claim of oppression I have already found that the financial support of Air Canada during this restructuring period has benefited Canadian and its stakeholders. Air Canada's financial support and the integration of the two airlines has been critical to keeping Canadian afloat. The evidence makes it abundantly clear that without this support Canadian would have ceased operations. However it has not transformed CAIL or CAC into solvent companies.

165 The Minority Shareholders raise concerns about assets that are ascribed limited or no value in the Monitor's report as does Resurgence (although to support an opposite proposition). Considerable argument was directed to the future operational savings and profitability forecasted for Air Canada, its subsidiaries and CAIL and its subsidiaries. Mr. Peterson estimated it to be in the order of \$650 to \$800 million on an annual basis, commencing in 2001. The Minority Shareholders point to the tax pools of a restructured company that they submit will be of great value once CAIL becomes profitable as anticipated. They point to a pension surplus that at the very least has value by virtue of the contribution holidays that it affords. They also look to the value of the compromised claims of the restructuring itself which they submit are in the order of \$449 million. They submit these cumulative benefits add value, currently or at least realizable in the future. In sharp contrast to the Resurgence position that these acts constitute oppressive behaviour, the Minority Shareholders view them as enhancing the value of their shares. They go so far as to suggest that there may well be a current going concern value of the CAC shares that has been conveniently ignored or unquantified and that the Petitioners must put evidence before the court as to what that value is.

166 These arguments overlook several important facts, the most significant being that CAC and CAIL are insolvent and will remain insolvent until the debt restructuring is fully implemented. These companies are not just technically or temporarily insolvent, they are massively insolvent. Air Canada will have invested

upward of \$3 billion to complete the restructuring, while the Minority Shareholders have contributed nothing. Further, it was a fundamental condition of Air Canada's support of this Plan that it become the sole owner of CAIL. It has been suggested by some that Air Canada's share purchase at two dollars per share in December 1999 was unfairly prejudicial to CAC and CAIL's creditors. Objectively, any expectation by Minority Shareholders that they should be able to participate in a restructured CAIL is not reasonable.

167 The Minority Shareholders asserted the plan is unfair because the effect of the reorganization is to extinguish the common shares of CAIL held by CAC and to convert the voting and non-voting Preferred Shares of CAIL into common shares of CAIL. They submit there is no expert valuation or other evidence to justify the transfer of CAIL's equity to the Preferred Shares. There is no equity in the CAIL shares to transfer. The year end financials show CAIL's shareholder equity at a deficit of \$790 million. The Preferred Shares have a liquidation preference of \$347 million. There is no evidence to suggest that Air Canada's interim support has rendered either of these companies solvent, it has simply permitted operations to continue. In fact, the unaudited consolidated financial statements of CAC for the quarter ended March 31, 2000 show total shareholders equity went from a deficit of \$790 million to a deficit of \$1.214 million, an erosion of \$424 million.

168 The Minority Shareholders' submission attempts to compare and contrast the rights and expectations of the CAIL preferred shares as against the CAC common shares. This is not a meaningful exercise; the Petitioners are not submitting that the Preferred Shares have value and the evidence demonstrates unequivocally that they do not. The Preferred Shares are merely being utilized as a corporate vehicle to allow CAIL to become a wholly owned subsidiary of Air Canada. For example, the same result could have been achieved by issuing new shares rather than changing the designation of 853350's Preferred Shares in CAIL.

169 The Minority Shareholders have asked the court to sever the reorganization from the debt restructuring, to permit them to participate in whatever future benefit might be derived from the restructured CAIL. However, a fundamental condition of this Plan and the expressed intention of Air Canada on numerous occasions is that CAIL become a wholly owned subsidiary. To suggest the court ought to sever this reorganization from the debt restructuring fails to account for the fact that it is not two plans but an integral part of a single plan. To accede to this request would create an injustice to creditors whose claims are being seriously compromised, and doom the entire Plan to failure. Quite simply, the Plan's funder will not support a severed plan.

170 Finally, the future profits to be derived by Air Canada are not a relevant consideration. While the object of any plan under the CCAA is to create a viable emerging entity, the germane issue is what a prospective purchaser is prepared to pay in the circumstances. Here, we have the one and only offer on the table, Canadian's last and only chance. The evidence demonstrates this offer is preferable to those who have a remaining interest to a liquidation. Where secured creditors have compromised their claims and unsecured creditors are accepting 14 cents on the dollar in a potential pool of unsecured claims totalling possibly in excess of \$1 billion, it is not unfair that shareholders receive nothing.

e. The Public Interest

171 In this case, the court cannot limit its assessment of fairness to how the Plan affects the direct participants. The business of the Petitioners as a national and international airline employing over 16,000 people must be taken into account.

172 In his often cited article, *Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (1947), 25 Can.Bar R.ev. 587 at 593 Stanley Edwards stated:

Another reason which is usually operative in favour of reorganization is the interest of the public in the continuation of the enterprise, particularly if the company supplies commodities or services that are necessary or desirable to large numbers of consumers, or if it employs large numbers of workers who would be thrown out of employment by its liquidation. This public interest may be reflected in the decisions of the creditors and shareholders of the company and is undoubtedly a factor which a court would wish to consider in deciding whether to sanction an arrangement under the C.C.A.A.

173 In *Re Repap British Columbia Inc.* (1998), 1 C.B.R. (4th) 49 (B.C. S.C.) the court noted that the fairness of the plan must be measured against the overall economic and business environment and against the interests of the citizens of British Columbia who are affected as "shareholders" of the company, and creditors, of suppliers, employees and competitors of the company. The court approved the plan even though it was unable to conclude that it was necessarily fair and reasonable. In *Re Quintette Coal Ltd.*, *supra*, Thackray J. acknowledged the significance of the coal mine to the British Columbia economy, its importance to the people who lived and worked in the region and to the employees of the company and their families. Other cases in which the court considered the public interest in determining whether to sanction a plan under the CCAA include *Re Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) and *Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank* (April 16, 1992), Doc. Toronto B62/91-A (Ont. Gen. Div.)

174 The economic and social impacts of a plan are important and legitimate considerations. Even in insolvency, companies are more than just assets and liabilities. The fate of a company is inextricably tied to those who depend on it in various ways. It is difficult to imagine a case where the economic and social impacts of a liquidation could be more catastrophic. It would undoubtedly be felt by Canadian air travellers across the country. The effect would not be a mere ripple, but more akin to a tidal wave from coast to coast that would result in chaos to the Canadian transportation system.

175 More than sixteen thousand unionized employees of CAIL and CRAL appeared through counsel. The unions and their membership strongly support the Plan. The unions represented included the Airline Pilots Association International, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Transportation District 104, Canadian Union of Public Employees, and the Canadian Auto Workers Union. They represent pilots, ground workers and cabin personnel. The unions submit that it is essential that the employee protections arising from the current restructuring of Canadian not be jeopardized by a bankruptcy, receivership or other liquidation. Liquidation would be devastating to the employees and also to the local and national economies. The unions emphasize that the Plan safeguards the employment and job dignity protection negotiated by the unions for their members. Further, the court was reminded that the unions and their members have played a key role over the last fifteen years or more in working with Canadian and responsible governments to ensure that Canadian survived and jobs were maintained.

176 The Calgary and Edmonton Airport authorities, which are not for profit corporations, also supported the Plan. CAIL's obligations to the airport authorities are not being compromised under the Plan. However, in a liquidation scenario, the airport authorities submitted that a liquidation would have severe financial consequences to them and have potential for severe disruption in the operation of the airports.

177 The representations of the Government of Canada are also compelling. Approximately one year ago, CAIL approached the Transport Department to inquire as to what solution could be found to salvage their ailing company. The Government saw fit to issue an order in council, pursuant to section 47 of the *Transportation Act*, which allowed an opportunity for CAIL to approach other entities to see if a permanent solution could be found. A standing committee in the House of Commons reviewed a framework for the restructuring of the airline industry, recommendations were made and undertakings were given by Air Canada. The Government was driven by a mandate to protect consumers and promote competition. It

submitted that the Plan is a major component of the industry restructuring. Bill C-26, which addresses the restructuring of the industry, has passed through the House of Commons and is presently before the Senate. The Competition Bureau has accepted that Air Canada has the only offer on the table and has worked very closely with the parties to ensure that the interests of consumers, employees, small carriers, and smaller communities will be protected.

178 In summary, in assessing whether a plan is fair and reasonable, courts have emphasized that perfection is not required: see for example *Re Wandlyn Inns Ltd.* (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 316 (N.B. Q.B.), *Quintette Coal*, *supra* and *Repap*, *supra*. Rather, various rights and remedies must be sacrificed to varying degrees to result in a reasonable, viable compromise for all concerned. The court is required to view the "big picture" of the plan and assess its impact as a whole. I return to *Algoma Steel v. Royal Bank*, *supra* at 9 in which Farley J. endorsed this approach:

What might appear on the surface to be unfair to one party when viewed in relation to all other parties may be considered to be quite appropriate.

179 Fairness and reasonableness are not abstract notions, but must be measured against the available commercial alternatives. The triggering of the statute, namely insolvency, recognizes a fundamental flaw within the company. In these imperfect circumstances there can never be a perfect plan, but rather only one that is supportable. As stated in *Re Sammi Atlas Inc.* (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at 173:

A plan under the CCAA is a compromise; it cannot be expected to be perfect. It should be approved if it is fair, reasonable and equitable. Equitable treatment is not necessarily equal treatment. Equal treatment may be contrary to equitable treatment.

180 I find that in all the circumstances, the Plan is fair and reasonable.

IV. Conclusion

181 The Plan has obtained the support of many affected creditors, including virtually all aircraft financiers, holders of executory contracts, AMR, Loyalty Group and the Senior Secured Noteholders.

182 Use of these proceedings has avoided triggering more than \$1.2 billion of incremental claims. These include claims of passengers with pre-paid tickets, employees, landlords and other parties with ongoing executory contracts, trade creditors and suppliers.

183 This Plan represents a solid chance for the continued existence of Canadian. It preserves CAIL as a business entity. It maintains over 16,000 jobs. Suppliers and trade creditors are kept whole. It protects consumers and preserves the integrity of our national transportation system while we move towards a new regulatory framework. The extensive efforts by Canadian and Air Canada, the compromises made by stakeholders both within and without the proceedings and the commitment of the Government of Canada inspire confidence in a positive result.

184 I agree with the opposing parties that the Plan is not perfect, but it is neither illegal nor oppressive. Beyond its fair and reasonable balancing of interests, the Plan is a result of bona fide efforts by all concerned and indeed is the only alternative to bankruptcy as ten years of struggle and creative attempts at restructuring by Canadian clearly demonstrate. This Plan is one step toward a new era of airline profitability that hopefully will protect consumers by promoting affordable and accessible air travel to all Canadians.

185 The Plan deserves the sanction of this court and it is hereby granted. The application pursuant to section 185 of the ABCA is granted. The application for declarations sought by Resurgence are dismissed. The application of the Minority Shareholders is dismissed.

Application granted; counter-applications dismissed.

Footnotes

- * Leave to appeal refused [84 Alta. L.R. \(3d\) 52, 9 B.L.R. \(3d\) 86, \[2000\] 10 W.W.R. 314, 2000 ABCA 238, 20 C.B.R. \(4th\) 46 \(Alta. C.A. \[In Chambers\]\)](#).

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Tab 3



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2016 ABQB 419

Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Lutheran Church - Canada, Re

2016 CarswellAlta 1484, 2016 ABQB 419, [2016] A.W.L.D. 3664,
[2016] A.W.L.D. 3694, 269 A.C.W.S. (3d) 218, 38 C.B.R. (6th) 36

**In the Matter of The Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended**

In the Matter of Lutheran Church - Canada, the Alberta - British Columbia District,
Encharis Community Housing and Services, Encharis Management and Support Services,
and Lutheran Church - Canada, The Alberta - British Columbia District Investments Ltd.

B.E. Romaine J.

Heard: July 15, 2016

Judgment: August 2, 2016

Docket: Calgary 1501-00955

Counsel: Francis N.J. Taman, Ksena J. Court for District Group
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Christa Nicholson for Francis Taman, Bishop and McKenzie LLP

Subject: Churches and Religious Institutions; Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial;
Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX](#) Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

[XIX.2](#) Initial application

[XIX.2.g](#) Monitor

Debtors and creditors

[VII](#) Receivers

[VII.3](#) Appointment

[VII.3.d](#) Monitors and consultants

Headnote

Debtors and creditors --- Receivers — Appointment — Monitors and consultants

Creditors asserted monitor in proceedings under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") was acting as advocate of debtor without sufficient degree of neutrality — Creditors asserted that monitor had conflict of interest because in pre-filing report monitor disclosed that it provided consulting services to District between specified date and date of initial order; Monitor advised that it recently determined that related professional accounting firm DTL acted as auditor for District; and Monitor advised that DTL

completed DIL audit for years — Requisite double majority, after significant disclosure and opportunities to review and question plans, voted in favour of plans — Creditors' Committees of DIL and District, who had duty to act in best interests of body of creditors, supported plans — Creditors asserted monitor breached its fiduciary duty by failing to disclose municipal planning documents — Creditors applied to replace monitor when last two plans of arrangement and compromise were approved by requisite double majority of creditors — Application dismissed — There was no reason arising from conflict or breach of duty to do so — Previous services did not on their face disqualify monitor from acting as monitor — It was not unusual for proposed monitor to be involved with debtor companies for period of time prior to CCAA filing — There was no realistic conflict arising from allegations — Monitor made full disclosure — Monitor went to great lengths to inform great number of creditors of ongoing proceedings, and to give its well-reasoned and measured opinion on myriad of issues in this complex proceeding — In retrospect, it may have been prudent for monitor to reference master-site development plan and approved area structure plan earlier, in substantially way it was later referenced in Monitor's QFA on development, but that was hindsight observation and unlikely to resolve other than one of complaints — Timing of application was strategic — Proposed plans were within court's jurisdiction to sanction, were fair and reasonable, and were to be sanctioned — Monitor supported plans, and there was no reason to give monitor's opinion less than usual deference and weight — Plans provided greater benefit to creditors than forced liquidation in depressed real estate market — Balance of interests favoured approval of plans.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Monitor

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *B.E. Romaine J.*:

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ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 5432, 2008 CarswellOnt 5433, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 390 N.R. 393 (note), (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 257 O.A.C. 400 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 2000 ABQB 442, 2000 CarswellAlta 662, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

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Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 2001 ABCA 9, 2000 CarswellAlta 1556, 277 A.R. 179, 242 W.A.C. 179, 88 Alta. L.R. (3d) 8, [2001] 4 W.W.R. 1 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

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Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2010), 2010 ONSC 4209, 2010 CarswellOnt 5510, 70 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Central Guaranty Trustco Ltd., Re (1993), 21 C.B.R. (3d) 139, 1993 CarswellOnt 228 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Contech Enterprises Inc., Re (2015), 2015 BCSC 129, 2015 CarswellBC 170, 21 C.B.R. (6th) 107, 3 P.P.S.A.C. (4th) 180 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Gold Texas Resources Ltd., Re (1989), 1989 CarswellBC 1397 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — considered
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Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re (2007), 2007 CarswellOnt 1029, 30 C.B.R. (5th) 59 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Nelson Financial Group Ltd., Re (2011), 2011 ONSC 2750, 2011 CarswellOnt 3100, 79 C.B.R. (5th) 307 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. *Olympia & York Developments Ltd.*, Re) 12 O.R. (3d) 500, 1993 CarswellOnt 182 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Sammi Atlas Inc., Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 1145, 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171, 59 O.T.C. 153 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — followed

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Statutes considered:

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s. 38 — considered

Class Proceedings Act, S.A. 2003, c. C-16.5

Generally — referred to

Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50

Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 5.1(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — considered

s. 6(1) — considered

s. 11.7(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 23(1) — considered

Financial Institutions Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 141

Generally — referred to

Securities Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-4

Generally — referred to

APPLICATION by creditors to replace monitor when last two plans of arrangement and compromise were approved by requisite double majority of creditors.

B.E. Romaine J.:

I. Introduction

1 This CCAA proceeding has been complicated by some unusual features. There are approximately 2,592 creditors of the Church extension fund with proven claims of approximately \$95.7 million, plus 12 trade creditors with claims of approximately \$957,000. There are 896 investors in the Church investment corporation with outstanding claims of \$22.4 million. Many of these creditors and investors invested their funds at least in part because of their connection to the Lutheran Church. Many of them are elderly. Some of them are angry that what they thought were safe vehicles for investment, given the involvement of their

Church, have proven not to be immune to insolvency. Some of them invested their life savings at a time of life when such funds are their only security during retirement. Inevitably, there is bitterness, a lack of trust and a variety of different opinions about the outcome of this insolvency restructuring.

2 A group of creditors have applied to replace the Monitor at a time when the last two plans of arrangement and compromise in these proceedings had been approved by the requisite double majority of creditors. I dismiss the application to replace the Monitor on the basis that there is no reason arising from conflict or breach of duty to do so. I find that the proposed plans are within my jurisdiction to sanction are fair and reasonable in the circumstances and should be sanctioned. These are my reasons.

II. Factual Overview

A. Background

3 On January 23, 2015, the Lutheran Church — Canada, the Alberta — British Columbia District (the "District"), Encharis Community Housing and Services ("ECHS"), Encharis Management and Support Services ("EMSS") and Lutheran Church — Canada, the Alberta — British Columbia District Investment Ltd. ("DIL", collectively the "District Group") obtained an initial order under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended. Deloitte Restructuring Inc. was appointed as Monitor and a CRO was appointed for the District and DIL.

4 The District is a registered charity that includes the Church Extension Fund ("CEF"), which was created to allow District members to lend money to what are characterized as faith-based developments. Through the CEF, the District borrowed approximately \$96 million from corporation, churches and individuals. These funds were invested by the District in a variety of ways, including loans and mortgages available to congregations to build or renovate churches and schools, real estate investments, and a mortgage on a real estate development known as the Prince of Peace Development.

5 CEF was managed by the District's Department of Stewardship and Financial Ministries and was not created as a separate legal entity. As such, District members who loaned funds to CEF are creditors of the District (the "District Depositors").

6 ECHS owned land and buildings within the Prince of Peace Development, including the Manor and the Harbour, senior care facilities managed by EMSS. EMSS operated the Manor and Harbour for the purpose of providing integrated supportive living services at the Manor and the Harbour to seniors.

7 The Prince of Peace Development also included a church, a school, condominiums, lands known as the Chestermere lands and other development lands.

8 DIL is a not-for-profit company that acted as a trust agent and investment manager of registered retirement savings plans, registered retirement income plans and tax-free savings accounts for annuitants. Concentra Trust acted as the trustee with respect to these investments. Depositors to DIL are referred to as the "DIL Investors". The District Depositors and the DIL Investors will collectively be referred to as the "Depositors".

9 Soon after the initial order, the District and the Monitor received feedback that the District Depositors and the DIL Investors wanted to have a voice in the *CCAA* process. Thus, on February 13, 2015, Jones, J granted an order creating creditors' committees for the District (the "District Creditors' Committee") and DIL (the "DIL Creditors' Committee"), tasked with representing the interests of the District Depositors and DIL Investors. The members of the committees were elected from among the Depositors. By the order that created them, they must act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to their respective groups of creditors.

The committees were authorized to engage legal counsel, who have represented them throughout the *CCAA* process, and the committees and their counsel have been active participants in the process.

10 ECHS and EMSS prepared plans of compromise and arrangement that were approved by creditors and sanctioned by the Court in January 2016. Pursuant to those plans, ECHS' interest in the condominiums was transferred to a new corporation that is to be incorporated under the District Plan ("NewCo"). The Chestermere lands were sold. The remainder of the lands and buildings (the "Prince of Peace properties") are dealt with in the District Plan.

11 On 22nd and 23rd of February, 2016, a Depositor and an agent of a Depositor commenced proceedings against Lutheran Church — Canada, Lutheran Church — Canada Financial Ministries, Francis Taman, Bishop & McKenzie LLP, John Williams, Roland Chowne, Prowse Chowne LLP, Concentra Trust, and Shepherd's Village Ministries Ltd., all defendants with involvement in the District Group's affairs, pursuant to the *Class Proceedings Act*, S.A. 2003, c. C-16.5 (Alberta). Two other Depositors issued a Notice of Civil Claim in the Supreme Court of British Columbia pursuant to the *Class Proceedings Act*, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.50 (British Columbia) against the same defendants (together with the Alberta proceeding, the "class action proceedings").

12 On March 3, 2016, DIL submitted a plan of arrangement that had been approved by creditors for sanction by the Court. I deferred the decision on whether to sanction the DIL plan until the District plan had been finalized, presented to District creditors, and, if approved, submitted for sanctioning. At the same time, I stayed the class action proceedings. The DIL and District plans contain similar provisions that are subject to controversy among some Depositors. There is considerable overlap among the DIL Investors and the District Depositors.

13 On July 15, 2016, the District applied for an order sanctioning the District plan. On the same day, the Depositors who commenced the class action proceedings applied for an order replacing the Monitor.

B. The District Plan

14 The District plan has one class of creditors. Pursuant to the claims process, there were 2,638 District Depositors. An emergency fund was implemented prior to the filing date and approved by the Court as part of the initial order, to ensure that District Depositors, many of whom are seniors, would have sufficient funds to cover their basic necessities. Taking into account those payments, District Depositors had proven claims of approximately \$96.2 million as at December 31, 2015.

15 Under the plan, each eligible affected creditor will be paid the lesser of \$5,000 or the total amount of their claim (the "Convenience Payment(s)") upon the date that the District plan takes effect. This will result in 1,640 District Depositors (approximately 62%) and 10 trades creditors (approximately 77%) being paid in full. The Convenience Payments are estimated to total \$6.3 million.

16 The District plan contemplates the liquidation of certain non-core assets. Each time the quantum of funds held in trust from the liquidation of these assets, net of the "Restructuring Holdback" and the "Representative Action Holdback" referred to later in this decision, reaches \$3 million, funds will be distributed on a pro-rata basis to creditors.

17 If the District plan is approved, a private Alberta corporation ("NewCo") will be formed following the effective date of the plan. NewCo will purchase the Prince of Peace properties from ECHS in exchange for the NewCo shares. The value of the NewCo shares would be based on the following:

- a) the forced sale value of the Harbour and Manor seniors' care facilities based on an independent appraisal dated November 30, 2015;

b) the forced sale value of the remaining Peace of Peace properties, based on an independent appraisal dated October 15, 2015;

c) the estimated value of the assets held by ECHS that would be transferred to NewCo pursuant to the ECHS plan; and

d) the estimated value of the assets held by EMSS that would be transferred to NewCo pursuant to the EMSS plan.

18 ECHS will then transfer the NewCo shares to the District in partial satisfaction of the District — ECHS mortgage. The NewCo shares will be distributed to eligible affected creditors of the District on a pro-rata basis. The Monitor currently estimates that creditors remaining unpaid after the Convenience Payment will receive NewCo shares valued at between 53% and 60% of their remaining proven claims. The cash payments arising from liquidation of non-core assets and the distribution of shares are anticipated by the Monitor to provide creditors who are not paid in full by the Convenience Payments with distributions valued at between 68% and 80% of their remaining proven claims, after deducting the Convenience Payments. Non-resident creditors (8 in total) will receive only cash.

19 Distributions to creditors will be subject to two holdbacks:

a) the "Restructuring Holdback", to satisfy reasonable fees and expenses of the Monitor, the Monitor's legal counsel, the CRO, the District Group's legal counsel and legal counsel for the District Creditors' Committee, the amount of which will be determined prior to the date of each distribution based on the estimated professional fees required to complete the administration of the *CCAA* proceedings; and

b) the "Representative Holdback", an amount sufficient to fund the out-of-pocket costs associated with the "Representative Action" process described later in this decision, and to indemnify any District Depositor who may be appointed as a representative plaintiff in the Representative Action for any costs award against him or her. The Representative Action Holdback will be determined prior to any distribution based on guidance from a Subcommittee appointed to pursue the Representative Action and retain representative counsel.

20 The District will continue to operate but the District's bylaws and handbook will be amended such that the District would no longer be able to raise or administer funds through any type of investment vehicle. NewCo will continue to operate the Harbour and Manor seniors' care facilities.

21 NewCo's bylaws will include a clause requiring that 50% of the board of directors must be comprised of District Depositors or their nominees. Although NewCo is being created with the object of placing the NewCo assets in the hands of a professional management team with appropriate business and real estate expertise, the District Creditors' Committee wanted to ensure that affected Creditors will have representation equal to that of the professional management team on the NewCo board. The members of the NewCo board may change prior to NewCo being formed, subject to District Creditors' Committee approval. Subsequent changes to the NewCo board would be voted on at future shareholder meetings.

22 The articles of incorporation for NewCo will be created to include the following provisions, which are intended to provide additional protection for affected creditors:

a) NewCo assets may only be pledged as collateral for up to 10% of their fair market value, subject to an amendment by a special resolution of the shareholders of NewCo;

b) a redemption of a portion of the NewCo shares would be allowed upon the sale of any portion of the NewCo assets that generates net sale proceeds of over \$5 million;

- c) NewCo would establish a mechanism to join those NewCo shareholders who wished to purchase NewCo shares with those NewCo shareholders who wished to sell them;
- d) a general meeting of the NewCo shareholders will be called no later than six months following the effective date of the plan for the purpose of having NewCo shareholders vote on a proposed mandate for NewCo, which may include the expansion of the Harbour and Manor seniors' care facilities, the subdivision and orderly liquidation or all or a portion of the NewCo assets or a joint venture to further develop the NewCo assets; and
- e) to provide dissent rights to minority NewCo shareholders.

The Representative Action

23 The District plan establishes a Representative Action process whereby a future legal action or actions, which may be undertaken as a class proceeding, can be undertaken for the benefit of those District Depositors who elect or are deemed to elect to participate. The Representative Action would include only claims by District Depositors who are not fully paid under the District plan and specifically includes the following:

- a) claims related to a contractual right of one or more of the District Depositors;
- b) claims bases on allegations of misrepresentation or wrongful or oppressive conduct;
- c) claims for breach of any legal, equitable, contractual or other duty;
- d) claims pursuant to which the District has coverage under directors' and officers' liability insurance; and
- e) claims to be pursued in the District's name, including any derivative action or any claims that could be assigned to a creditor pursuant to Section 38 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, if such legislation were applicable.

24 District Depositors may opt-out of the Representative Action process, in which case they would be barred from further participation. Evidently, some Depositors are precluded by their religious beliefs from participating in this type of litigation.

25 The District Depositors who elect to participate in the Representative Action process will have a portion of their cash distributions from the sale of assets withheld to fund the Representative Action Holdback. It will only be possible to estimate the value of the Representative Action Holdback once representative counsel has been retained. At that point, the Monitor will send correspondence to the participating Depositors with additional information, including the name of the legal counsel chosen, the estimated amount of the Representative Action Holdback, the commencement date of the representative action, the deadline for opting out of the Representative Action and instructions on how to opt out of the Representative Action should they choose to do so.

26 A Subcommittee will be established to choose legal counsel to represent the participating District Depositors. The Subcommittee will include between three and five individuals and all members of the Subcommittee will be appointed by the District Creditors' Committee. The Subcommittee is not anticipated to include a member of the District Committee.

27 The duties and responsibilities of the Subcommittee will include the following:

- a) reviewing the qualifications of at least three lawyers and selecting one lawyer to act as counsel;
- b) with the assistance of counsel, identifying a party(ies) willing to act as the Representative Plaintiff;
- c) remaining in place throughout the Representative Action with its mandate to include:
 - (i) assisting in maximizing the amount available for distribution;
 - (ii) consulting with and instructing counsel including communicating with the participating District Depositors at reasonable intervals and settling all or a portion of the Representative Action;
 - (iii) replacing counsel;
 - (iv) serving in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of the participating District Depositors;
 - (v) establishing the amount of Representative Action Holdback and directing that payments be made to counsel from the Representative Action Holdback; and
 - (vi) bringing any matter before the Court by way of an application for advice and direction.

28 The Representative Action process will be the sole recourse available to District Depositors with respect to the Representative Action claims.

29 The District plan releases:

- a) the Monitor, the Monitor's legal counsel, the District Group's legal counsel, the CRO, the legal counsel for the District Committee and the District Committee members, except to the extent that any liability arises out of any fraud, gross negligence or willful misconduct on the part of the released representatives, to the extent that any actions or omissions of the released representatives are directly or indirectly related to the *CCAA* proceedings or their commencement; and
- b) the District, the other *CCAA* applicants, the present and former directors, officers and employees of the District, parties covered under the D&O Insurance and any independent contractors of the District who were employed three days or more on a regular basis, from claims that are largely limited to statutory filing obligations.

30 The following claims are specifically excluded from being released by the District plan:

- a) claims against directors that relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors or are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors as set out in Section 5.1(2) of the *CCAA*;
- b) claims prosecuted by the Alberta Securities Commission or the British Columbia Securities Commission arising from compliance requirements of the *Securities Act* of Alberta and the *Financial Institutions Act* of British Columbia;
- c) claims made by the Superintendent of Financial Institutions arising from the compliance requirements of the *Loan and Trust Corporations Acts* of Alberta and British Columbia; and
- d) any Representative Action claims, whether or not they are insured under the District's directors and officers liability insurance, that are advanced solely as part of the Representative Action.

C. The District Meeting

31 On March 21, 2016, I granted an order authorizing the District to file the District plan of compromise and arrangement and present it to the creditors. A draft version of the Monitor's Report to District Creditors was provided to both the Court and counsel for the class action plaintiffs ahead of the District meeting order being granted. Neither class action counsel voiced specific concerns with the disclosure provided therein.

32 The first meeting of District creditors was held on May 14, 2016. Counsel for the BC and Alberta class action plaintiffs were in attendance and able to make submissions to the meeting and to question the Monitor. A number of attendees made submissions and asked questions. Certain documents that had been referenced in a Monitor's FAQ report on the issue of future potential development of the Prince of Peace properties (described later in this decision) were discussed in detail and questions with respect to these documents were answered by the Monitor. The meeting lasted approximately six hours. It was adjourned at the request of the representative of a Depositor who wanted more time to consider the Prince of Peace development disclosure and obtain further instructions from his congregation.

33 After making inquiries and being satisfied that congregations who wished further consultation had time to do so, the Monitor posted a notice on its website on May 20, 2016 that the reconvened meeting was to be held on June 10, 2016. The notice was sent by email to those creditors who are congregations on May 20, 2016 and sent by regular mail to all creditors on May 24, 2016. The notice advised creditors that they had additional time to change their vote on the District plan, should they choose to do so. Four congregations asked the Monitor for further information before the reconvened meeting.

34 The Monitor received a total of 1,294 votes on the District plan from eligible affected creditors with claims totalling approximately \$85.1 million. Of these votes, 1,239 were received by way of election letters and 55 were received by way of written ballots submitted in person or by proxy at the District meeting. In total, 50% of eligible affected creditors voted and the claims of those creditors who voted represented 88% of the total proven claims of eligible affected creditors.

35 Of the creditors who voted, 1,076 or approximately 83% voted in favour of the District plan and 218 or approximately 17% voted against the District plan. Those creditors who voted in favour of the plan held claims totalling approximately \$65 million, or approximately 76% in value of the voting claims, and those creditors who voted against the plan held claims totalling approximately \$20.1 million or approximately 24% in value of the voting claims. Therefore, the District plan was approved by the required majority, being two-thirds in dollar value and a majority in number of voting eligible affected creditors.

D. The DIL Plan

36 The DIL plan includes only one class of affected creditors consisting of DIL Investors. The DIL Investors reside in eight provinces and territories in Canada and in three U.S. states. Most of the accounts held by DIL Investors are RRSP and RRIF accounts.

37 Following the release of the original DIL package of meeting materials, based on discussions with DIL Investors, the Monitor prepared two documents entitled "Answers to frequently asked questions" (the "FAQs"), one of which was dated December 24, 2015 and the other dated January 18, and amended January 20, 2015.

38 The DIL plan contains provisions for the orderly transition of the registered accounts from Concentra to a replacement trustee and administrator. As part of this transition, the cash and short-term investments held by DIL will be transferred, net of holdbacks outlined in the DIL plan, to the replacement fund manager.

The mortgages held by Concentra and administered by DIL will be converted to cash over time and paid to the fund manager.

39 Pursuant to previous order, DIL was authorized to distribute up to \$15 million to the DIL Investors. For those DIL Investors who held registered retirement savings plan, tax free savings accounts or locked-in retirement accounts with DIL, their pro-rate share of the first DIL Distribution was transferred into accounts that had been established with the replacement fund manager. For those DIL Investors who held RRIFs or LIFs, their pro-rate share of the first DIL distribution was transferred upon their request, to an alternate registered account of their choosing. A second distribution of up to \$7.5 million was made in April, 2016.

40 In addition to this these interim distribution, statutory annual minimum payment to RRIF holders were made for 2015. Selected DIL Investors also received payments pursuant to the emergency fund. Taking into account these payments, pre-filing distributions to DIL Investors totalled approximately \$15.6 million, 41% of their original investment without taking into account any estimated write-downs on the value of the assets held by DIL.

41 The DIL plan contains substantially the same provisions with respect to limited releases and a Representative Action process as the District plan.

42 The Monitor estimates that, prior to any recovery under the Representation Action, DIL Investors will recover between 77% and 83% of their original investment as of the filing date.

E. The DIL Meeting

43 The DIL meeting of creditors was held on January 23, 2016.

44 There were 87 attendees at the DIL meeting. The Monitor received a total of 472 votes from DIL Investors with claims totalling approximately \$14.5 million. In total, 53% of DIL Investors voted and the claims of those DIL Investors who voted represented 65% of the total proven claims of DIL Investors.

45 Of the 472 DIL Investors who voted, 434, or approximately 92%, voted in favour of the DIL plan and 38 DIL Investors, or approximately 8%, voted against the DIL plan. Those DIL Investors who voted in favour of the DIL plan had claims totalling approximately \$12.7 million, or approximately 87% of the claims, and those DIL Investors who voted against the DIL plan had claims totalling approximately \$1.8 million, or approximately 13% of the claims and a majority in number of voting DIL Investors. Therefore, the DIL plan was approved by the required double majority.

III. The Applications

A. Application to Remove the Monitor

46 The Depositors who commenced the British Columbia class action proceedings, Elvira Kroeger and Randall Kellen, apply:

- a) to remove the Monitor and replace it with Ernst & Young LLP; or alternatively
- b) to appoint Ernst & Young as a "Limited Purpose Monitor" to review the Representative Action provisions of the District plan and render its opinion to the Court with respect to whether the plan is fair and reasonable to the District Depositors;
- c) to authorize Ernst & Young to retain legal counsel to assist it in rendering its opinion to the Court if it considers it reasonable and necessary to do so; and

d) to secure Ernst & Young's fees and those of its counsel to a maximum amount of \$150,000.00 plus applicable taxes under the current Administration Charge or under a second Administration Charge to rank *pari passu* with the current Administration Charge.

47 They are supported in their application by the Alberta class action plaintiffs, collectively the "opposing Depositors". The opposing Depositors submit that the Monitor is unable by reason of conflict of interest to provide the Court with a neutral and objective opinion with respect to the Representative Action provisions of the District plan. They also submit that the Monitor has breached its fiduciary duty to the Court and to the District creditors by failing to disclose certain municipal planning documents relating to the Prince of Peace Development.

1. Overview

48 It is trite law that the Monitor in *CCAA* proceedings is an officer of the Court and that its duty is to act in the best interests of all stakeholders. Monitors are required to act honestly and fairly and to provide independent observation and oversight of the debtor company.

49 The Monitor is expected and required to report regularly to the Court, creditors and other stakeholders, and has a statutory obligation to advise the Court on the reasonableness and fairness of any plan of arrangement proposed between the debtor and its creditors: section 23(1) of the *CCAA*. Courts accord a high level of deference to decisions and opinions of the Monitor.

50 The opposing Depositors submit that the Monitor is acting as an advocate of the debtor, without a sufficient degree of neutrality. They submit, by implication, that I should give the Monitor's recommendations on the plans little or no deference for that reason.

51 An attack on the Monitor is an attack on the integrity of the *CCAA* process, and must be taken seriously.

2. Conflict of Interest

52 The opposing Depositors allege that the Monitor has a conflict of interest on the following bases:

a) In its Pre-Filing Report to the Court, the Monitor disclosed that it had provided consulting services to the District between February 6, 2014 and the date of the initial order, including:

(i) on February 6, 2014; to provide an independent evaluation of the potential options relating to the Prince of Peace Development and to create a plan for executing the option that was ultimately chosen;

(ii) on June 30, 2014; to provide an evaluation of the debt structure of the CEF as it related to the District, the members of the District, ECHS, EMSS and the Prince of Peace Development; and

(iii) on July 25, 2014; to act as a consultant regarding the informal or formal restructuring of the District Group.

b) In its Fourth Report dated June 24, 2015, the Monitor advised that it had recently determined that a related professional accounting firm, Deloitte & Touche (now Deloitte LLP) had acted as auditor for the District from 1990 to 1998 or 1999. While the Monitor had performed a conflicts check prior to agreeing to act as Monitor, this check failed to flag the previous audit engagement. The Monitor further stated that, while its former role as auditor to District did not preclude it from acting as Monitor in these proceedings, it might be precluded from conducting a preliminary review of the District's

expenditures in relation to the Prince of Peace development for the period during which it had acted as auditor. However, as the District had been unable to produce supporting documentation with respect to funds expended on the Prince of Peace development prior to 2006, and Deloitte did not act as auditor subsequent to 1999, the Monitor took the position that "it was not conflicted from completing the Review to the extent that they can for the period for which documentation is available".

c) On March 8, 2016, the Monitor advised the Court and the parties that Deloitte & Touche had completed the DIL audit for the years ended January 31, 1998 and January 31, 1999, the first two years during which DIL operated the registered fund. Again, the reason for the late disclosure appears to be that the engagements were recorded under different names those now used by the District.

53 These previous services do not, on their face, disqualify the Monitor from acting as Monitor. With respect to the audit services, it is not a conflict of interest for the auditor of a debtor company to act as Monitor in *CCAA* proceedings. In this case, the sister company of the Monitor has not been the auditor of either the District or DIL for over 16 years, The Monitor does not suffer from any of the restrictions placed on who may be a Monitor by Section 11.7(2) of the *Act*. While the late disclosure of the historical audits was unfortunate, audits performed more than 16 years ago by a sister corporation raise no reasonable apprehension of bias, either real or perceived.

54 It is also not a conflict of interest, nor is it unusual, for a proposed Monitor to be involved with the debtor companies for a period of time prior to a *CCAA* filing. The Monitor made full disclosure of that involvement prior to being appointed, more than a year before this application was brought.

55 This is not a case where a Monitor was involved in or required to give advice to the Court on the essential issue before it, such as a pre-filing sales process. The issues with respect to the plans before the Court arise from details of the plans that have been the subject of negotiation and consultation among the District Group, the Creditors' Committees and the Monitor post-filing.

56 The opposing Depositors, however, point to certain representations that were made by the District in letters to some of Depositors in the months prior to the *CCAA* filing, which they say were untrue and misleading. They submit that the Monitor must have known about these letters, and thus condoned, if not participated in, misrepresentations made to the Depositors.

57 The Monitor responds that it did not act in a management capacity with respect to the District nor did it prepare or issue communications pre-filing. It did not control the District Group.

58 There is no realistic indication of conflict arising from these allegations. The attempt to taint the Monitor with knowledge of letters sent by the District to the Depositors is speculation unsupported by any evidence.

59 The opposing Depositors also submit that the prior audit engagements create a potential conflict for the Monitor in the event that the Subcommittees of the Creditors' Committees decide to bring a claim against Deloitte & Touche as former auditor of the District or DIL. In that respect, Ms. Kroeger and Mr. Kellen have by letter dated March 4, 2016 demanded that the District commence legal proceedings against the District's auditors, including Deloitte & Touche. Given the stay, the District took no action, and the opposing Depositors concede that they did not expect the District to act during the *CCAA* proceedings.

60 It is not appropriate for this Court to determine or to speculate on whether the Depositors have a realistic cause of action against an auditor sixteen years after the final audit engagement, but assuming that the Representative Action provisions of the plans could result in an action against a sister corporation of the Monitor, the proposed ongoing role of the Monitor in those proceedings should be examined to determine whether such role could give rise to a real or perceived conflict of interest.

61 As the Monitor points out, its role with respect to the Representative Action is limited to assisting in the formation of the Subcommittees (although it has no role in deciding who will serve on the Subcommittees), facilitating the review of qualifications of legal counsel who wish to act in the Representative Action (although the Monitor will not participate in the selection of the representative counsel), and communicating with Depositors based on instructions given by the Subcommittees with respect to the names of the members of the Subcommittees, the name of the representative counsel, the estimated amount of the Representative Action Holdback, the commencement date of the Representative Action, the deadline for opting out of the Representative Action, and instructions on how to opt-out of the Representative Action should Depositors choose to do so. The Monitor's involvement will be directed by the Subcommittees and is anticipated to be limited to these tasks. The Monitor notes that, should it or the Subcommittees determine that the Monitor has a conflict of interest in respect of completing any of these tasks, the Monitor would recuse itself. It submits however, that it is appropriate that it be involved in order to ensure that the Subcommittees are able to undertake these duties in a manner that complies with the requirements of the plans and does not prejudice the rights of Depositors under the plans.

62 The Monitor will aid in making distributions under the plans, including with respect to the release of any unused portion of the Representative Action Holdback, which it anticipates will be determined on a global basis and communicated by the Subcommittees to the Monitor on a global basis. The Monitor will have no knowledge of the considerations or calculations that go into establishing the Representative Action Holdback. Further, the Monitor does not need to be, and will not under any circumstances be, privy to any information regarding the strategy that the representative counsel chooses to communicate to Depositors, including the parties to be named in the Representative Action.

63 In the circumstances, the Monitor is the most appropriate party to be involved in communication with Depositors in the early stages of the Representative Action process, as it has the information and experience necessary to ensure that such communication is done quickly, effectively, and at the lowest possible expense.

64 The mere possibility of a decision to proceed against the Monitor's sister corporation does not justify the expense and disruption of bringing in a new Monitor to perform these administrative tasks. If the Subcommittees determine that an action can be commenced against the historical auditors that is not barred by limitations considerations, the issue of a real, rather than a speculative conflict, can be raised before the Court for advice and direction in accordance with the plans. The possibility that the Subcommittees may decide not to proceed against the historical auditors does not imply undue influence from the Monitor. The members of the Subcommittees will be fiduciaries, bound to act in the best interests of the remaining creditors.

65 There is no persuasive argument nor any evidence that they would act other than in those best interests.

66 The opposing Depositors' submission that the Monitor cannot with any degree of neutrality or objectivity advise the Court on the reasonableness and fairness of the Representative Action provisions of the plans ignores the fact that the Monitor is not released from liability for any damages arising from its pre-CCAA conduct as auditor to the District by the plans.

67 The opposing Depositors submit that there are "substantive and procedural benefits" from its continuing position that the Monitor may take advantage of. On closer examination, those alleged advantages are insignificant.

68 In summary, I find that there is no actual or perceived conflict of interest that would warrant the replacement of the Monitor, particularly at this late state of the CCAA proceedings. The Monitor made full disclosure of the historical audit relationship of its sister corporation to the District and DIL and its own

pre-filing relationship to the District Group. Neither the Monitor nor Deloitte & Touche benefit from any releases as part of the plans. The Monitors' continuing involvement in the Representative Action process is limited, administrative in nature, and would take place pre-litigation.

3. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

69 A more serious charge against the Monitor than conflict of interest is the opposing Depositors' allegation that the Monitor breached its fiduciary duty to the Court and to District Depositors by failing to disclose certain municipal planning documents.

70 The documents at issue are:

a) a master-site development plan (the "MSDP") that was prepared for the District by an architectural firm in December, 2012 and was subsequently approved by the Municipal District of Rocky View County. This plan includes site information, layout and analysis of activities, facilities, maintenance and operations and a context for land use and the associated population density; and

b) an approved area structure plan for the Hamlet of Conrich (the "Conrich ASP"), which was put forward by the MD of Rocky View and which includes reference to the Prince of Peace properties.

71 The MSDP identifies several prerequisites to development of the Prince of Peace properties, including a connection to the municipal water supply, the upgrading of the sanitary sewer lift station and work on a storm water management infrastructure. The Monitor notes the MSDP was prepared specifically for the development contemplated by EHSS in 2012, being medium density residential and additional assisted living capacity, ground floor retail and a parkade structure. As such, it is likely outdated and may not align with future development. A more recent appraisal of the properties in 2015 assumed low density development. The 2015 appraisal of the properties takes into account the work that would need to be undertaken by any third party who wished to further develop the Prince of Peace properties.

72 The opposing Depositors submit that the infrastructure projects identified by the MSDP would be costly and would likely pose barriers to development. They presented hearsay evidence of a conversation Mr. Kellen had with a Rocky View official that is of limited relevance apart from its hearsay nature, because future development would likely be different from what was contemplated in 2012.

73 The Conrich ASP stipulates that no development may occur within the Hamlet of Conrich until the kinds of infrastructure requirements identified in the MSDP are met. The ASP is being appealed by the City of Chestermere.

74 The Monitor became aware of these documents during its pre-filing services to the District Group. When a Depositor raised a question about these reports on April 28, 2016 at an information meeting, the Monitor prepared a QFA document dated April 29, 2016 regarding the future subdivision and development of the Prince of Peace properties and referencing the documents. This QFA was posted on the Monitor's website on April 29, 2016 and mailed to all affected creditors with claims over \$5,000 on May 3, 2016, more than a month before the meeting at which the District plan was approved.

75 The issue is whether the Monitor breached its duty to the Court and creditors by failing to disclose these reports earlier. The answer to this question must take into account the context of the District plan and the nature of the Monitor's recommendations.

76 The District plan does not contemplate that any further development of the Prince of Peace properties would occur pursuant to the CCAA proceedings. The possibility that NewCo shareholders would pursue further development is one of the options available to NewCo or to a third party purchaser of the Prince

of Peace properties if NewCo shareholders decide to sell the properties, as recognized in the plan materials. The plan gives NewCo shareholders the opportunity to consider their options.

77 As the Monitor notes, a vote on the District plan is not a vote in favour of any particular mandate for NewCo. The District plan contemplates that a NewCo shareholders' meeting will be held within six months of the District plan taking effect, at which time the NewCo shareholders will vote on a proposed mandate for NewCo, which may include the expansion of the Harbour and Manor seniors' care facilities, the subdivision and orderly liquidation of all or a portion of the assets held by NewCo, a joint venture to further develop the Prince of Peace properties or other options. These options will need to be investigated and reported on by NewCo's management team ahead of the NewCo shareholders' meeting.

78 It was in this context that the Monitor considered the content of its reports to Depositors on the District plan and did not disclose the two plans, which in any event may be dated and of little relevance to a future development. I do not accept the opposing Depositors' allegation that the Monitor "concealed" this information.

79 In that regard, I note that, although Mr. Kellen in a sworn affidavit deposed that he became aware of the MSDP and Conrich ASP on or about April, 2016, he appears to have posted a link to the Conrich ASP in the CEF Forum website on February 24, 2015. It also appears that the MSDP document was discussed in the CEF Forum in January, 2016, with a link posted for participants in the forum. Mr. Kellen filed a supplementary affidavit after the Monitor noted these facts in its Twenty-First Report. He says that he now recalls reviewing the Conrich ASP, which references the MSDP, in February, 2015, but does not recall reading it in any great detail, that he did not appreciate the significance of the documents and simply forgot about them. This is hard to reconcile with Mr. Kellen's present insistence that the documents are highly relevant.

80 A further issue is whether the Monitor's recommendation of the District plan gave rise to a duty to disclose these documents. The opposing Depositors submit that the Monitor endorsed the plan on the basis of potential upside opportunities available through development. This submission appears to refer to a sentence in the Monitor's March 28, 2016 report to creditors, as follows:

The issuance of NewCo Shares pursuant to the District Plan allows District Depositors to benefit from the ability to liquidate the Prince of Peace Properties at a time when market conditions are more favourable or the ability to benefit from potential upside opportunities that may be available such as through the further expansion of the Harbour and Manor seniors' care facilities, through a joint venture to further develop the Prince of Peace Properties or through other options

(emphasis added).

81 Clearly, the Monitor in its report referenced further development as only one of the options available to NewCo shareholders at the time of their first shareholders' meeting. It is incorrect to say that the Monitor's endorsement of the District plan was based solely on the option of development by NewCo acting alone. The Monitor did not recommend any particular mandate for NewCo in its various reports.

82 The Monitor decided that disclosure of the two documents at issue was not necessary in the context of a plan that put decisions with respect to the various options available to the new corporate owner of the property in the hands of the shareholders at a future date.

83 The opposing Depositors submit, however, that the District Depositors had the right to this information relating the pros and cons of development before deciding whether to become NewCo shareholders in the first place.

84 As it happened, they did have such access through the Monitor's April 29, 2016 QFA document, and also, it appears, through information posted on the CEF Forum and from information communicated during the information meetings for Depositors. There is no evidence that any Depositor failed to receive the Monitor's QFA document prior to the June 10, 2016 District meeting date.

85 The opposing Depositors are critical of the Monitor's QFA disclosure. The problem appears to be that the Monitor does not agree that the issues disclosed in the MSDP and the Conrich ASP are as dire as the opposing Depositors describe.

86 The opposing Depositors also fault the Monitor for not referencing a website where the documents could be found, but I note that the QFA provides a telephone numbers and email address for any inquiries.

87 They fault the Monitor for not discussing in the QFA the requirement to upgrade the sanitary sewer lift station and to provide for the disposal of storm water. As noted by the Monitor, those issues are typical of what would be encountered by any developer in considering a new development. The QFA refers to the development risks as follows:

All development activities have risk associated with them, however, the Monitor is not aware of any known issues related to the PoP Development which would suggest that the future subdivision or development of Prince of Peace Properties would not be feasible other than the risks that are typically associated with real estate development generally.

88 A difference of opinion between the opposing Depositors and the Monitor with respect to the significance of these development requirements does not constitute concealment, bad faith or breach of duty by the Monitor.

89 The opposing Depositors also fault the Monitor for failing to provide Depositors with new election letters and forms of proxy in its May 20, 2016 notice of adjournment of the District meeting. The notice clearly sets out the procedure to be followed if a Depositor wishes to change his or her vote or proxy. It invites Depositors to contact the Monitor by telephone or email if they have any additional questions. The Monitor notes that it sent out three election forms with its initial mail-out to Depositors, and received no requests for a new election form. It received at least one change of vote after sending out this notice.

90 One of the Alberta class action plaintiffs alleges that the Monitor impeded them from distributing material at the information meetings. The Monitor reports that the Alberta plaintiffs were present at the Sherwood Park meeting, handing out material and requesting contact information from other attendees. Some of the attendees expressed confusion as to who had authored the material being handed out by the two Alberta plaintiffs and who was requesting their contact information. The Monitor requested that the Alberta plaintiffs hand-out material at a reasonable distance from the meeting room entrance and communicate clearly to attendees that the material they were handing out was not authored, endorsed or being circulated by the Monitor and that they were not requesting contact information on behalf of the Monitor.

91 The Monitor wrote to class action counsel as follows:

The Monitor recognizes that your clients have expressed views thus far which are in opposition to the District's plan. Of course it is up to each depositor, including your clients, to decide how to vote. We also recognize that any party, including your clients, are entitled to voice their support or opposition to the District's plan. However, in the interest of ensuring an efficient meeting that respects the *CCAA* process and the interests of other depositors in attendance, the Monitor is implementing the below referenced rules and procedures. These rules and procedures are intended to provide your clients with

the ability to convey their opinions in a fashion which does not impede the meeting and respects the rights of other parties in attendance.

92 The Monitor had a table established for the use of the class action representatives within reasonable proximity to the entrance to the room in which the meetings were held. The class action representatives were entitled to circulate written information to attendees within the reasonable vicinity of that table, but not permitted to disseminate any written material within the room or in the doorway entering the room in which the meetings were held.

93 The rules provided that any written communication circulated by the class action representatives was to include a prominently displayed disclaimer that such materials were not authored, endorsed or being circulated by the Monitor. A sign identifying the class action representatives was to be prepared by them and displayed at the table established for their use.

94 These are reasonable rules, designed to avoid confusion, and they did not impede the class action plaintiffs from voicing their views.

95 The opposing Depositors submit that the Monitor instructed attendees at information meetings to cast their votes immediately, without waiting for the District meeting. The Monitor denies encouraging creditors one way or the other with respect to when to vote. It communicated to attendees the options available to creditors for voting on the District plan and the deadlines associated with each option. It also communicated at meetings that creditors who wished to do so could provide the Monitor with any paperwork they had brought with them. It is a stretch to impute any kind of bad faith to the Monitor in conveying this information.

96 The class action plaintiffs and their counsel had the ability to attend all of the information meetings. They were in attendance and actively participated in the information meeting in Langley, BC, at the Sherwood Park Meeting, the Red Deer Meeting and the District Meeting. Both counsel were in attendance and participated in the District Meeting. The Monitor notes that it is aware of at least two emails that were widely circulated by a relative of one of the class action plaintiffs outlining the views of the class action plaintiffs on the District Plan. I am satisfied that the opposing Depositors had a more than adequate opportunity to communicate their views to other Depositors and to attempt to garner support for their opposition, and that they were not impeded by the Monitor.

97 I must address one more disturbing allegation. Two opposing Depositors submit that the Monitor's non-disclosure of the MSDP and the Conrich ASP in the context of what they allege is the Depositor's false and misleading communications with CEF Depositors might lead a reasonable and informed person to believe that "the Monitor is prepared to condone and facilitate the District's dishonest conduct". This is a disingenuous attack on the Monitor's professional reputation, made without evidence or any reasonable foundation. There is no air of reality to this allegation. There is no evidence that the Monitor was aware of misleading statements, if any, made by the District or its employees or agents before or during the *CCAA* proceedings.

98 The Monitor has prepared 22 regular reports during the approximately 18 months of these proceedings, plus five confidential supplements and three special reports providing creditors with specific information relating to their respective plans of compromise and arrangement. The Monitor also prepared hand-outs tailored to provided information to specific groups of creditors, and five QFAs with information on multiple topics, including NewCo, the potential outcomes of the *CCAA* proceedings, estates, trust accounts, the assignment of NewCo shares by creditors and the potential future subdivision of the Prince of Peace properties.

99 The Monitor attended five regional information meetings in Alberta and British Columbia between April 19 and April 28, 2016 to review the contents of the District plan and respond to any inquiries by District Depositors related to the plan. The Information Meetings were each between approximately two and a half and four hours long. It is clear that the information provided to creditors during these CCAA proceedings was far more extensive than that which would normally be provided.

100 Monitors, being under a duty to the Court as the Court officer and to the parties involved in a CCAA proceeding under statute, must sometimes make recommendations that are unpopular with some creditors. The Court expects a Monitor's honest and candid advice, and relies on it. The Monitor in this case went to great lengths to inform the great number of Depositors of ongoing proceedings, and to give its well-reasoned and measured opinion on the myriad of issues in this complex proceeding. In retrospect, it may have been prudent for the Monitor to reference the MSDP and Conrich ASP earlier, in substantially the way it was later referenced in the Monitor's QFA on development, but that is a hindsight observation, and unlikely to resolve other than one of the opposing Depositors' many complaints in support of their application.

4. Cost and Delay

101 The Monitor and the District Group submit that the timing of this application to remove the Monitor is suspect: that the alleged conflicts complained of have been disclosed for months. The opposing Depositors say that they were awaiting the outcome of the District vote, and that it was not until the May 14, 2016 District meeting that they knew that the Monitor knew about and had failed to disclose the MSDP and the Cornich ASP.

102 It is clear that the timing of the application is strategic: a clear majority of the DIL and District creditors have voted in favour of the plans despite the efforts of the relatively few opposing Depositors to convince others to join in their opposition. They must now rely on other grounds to frustrate, delay or defeat the Court's sanction of the plans. That is their prerogative as creditors who oppose the plan, and the Court must, and does, consider their objections seriously, whatever the underlying motivation. However, relief on a motion of this kind should only be granted where the evidence indicates "a genuine concern with respect to the merits of the alleged conflict": *Moffat v. Wetstein*, [1996] O.J. No. 1966 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para 131.

103 While the timing of this application to replace the Monitor does not preclude the opposing Depositors from bringing the application, the Court must balance the potential risk to creditors and the District Group arising from the alleged potential conflict of interest against the prejudice to creditors and the District Group arising from the inevitable delay, duplication of effort and high costs involved with replacing the Monitor at this very late stage of the proceedings.

104 I have found that the Monitor does not have any legitimate conflict of interest, real or perceived, and that it has not breached any fiduciary duty. Even if I am wrong in this determination, the damage caused by such conflict or breach of duty has been mitigated by full disclosure of potential conflicts and disclosure of the information that the opposing Depositors submit should have been disclosed prior to the vote on the District Plan.

105 Compared to this, appointing a replacement Monitor would involve costs in excess of \$150,000, taking into account that the replacement Monitor would need to retain counsel. The process would cause substantial delay in already lengthy proceedings while the replacement Monitor reviews the events of the last eighteen months.

106 I also take into account that the key issue that the opposing Depositors want a replacement Monitor to review is whether the Representative Action provisions of the plans are within the jurisdiction of a CCAA court to sanction. This is a question of law, on which a replacement Monitor would have to rely on counsel.

107 At this point in the proceedings, in addition to being reviewed by the Monitor's legal counsel, the provisions of the plans related to the Representative Action have been reviewed by the creditors' committees for the District and DIL, who act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to the creditors of those respective entities and by each committee's independent legal counsel. The jurisdictional issue related to the Representative Action provisions is a legal matter rather than a business issue. As such, this Court is qualified to opine on it independently, without the assistance of a new Monitor.

108 I note that the creditors' committees who represent the majority of Depositors are strongly opposed to a replacement Monitor. They pointed out that the plans have been approved by the requisite majorities, and delay and additional cost does not serve the interests of the general body of creditors, particularly without what they consider to be any justifiable reason.

109 The assistance of a further limited purpose Monitor would likely be of little to no further assistance to the Court and would result in increased professional costs to the detriment of creditors as a whole. This is the tail-end of a lengthy process. The introduction of another Monitor without any clear, ascertainable benefit to the body of creditors, leading to uncertainty, costs and delay, is unwarranted.

5. Conclusion

110 The anger and frustration expressed in these proceedings by a small minority of Depositors, while perhaps understandable given their losses and the trust they placed in their Church, is misplaced when it is directed against the Monitor.

111 There is no reason arising from conflict of interest or breach of fiduciary duty to replace the Monitor.

112 I therefore dismiss the application.

B. Sanctioning of the DIL and District Plans

1. Overview

113 As provided in section 6(1) of the *CCAA*, the Court has the discretion to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement where, as here, the requisite double majority of creditors has approved the plan. The effect of the Court's approval is to bind the debtor company and its creditors.

114 The general requirements for court approval of a *CCAA* plan are well established:

- (a) there must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements;
- (b) all materials filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to have been done that is not authorized by the *CCAA*; and
- (c) the plan must be fair and reasonable.

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para 17; *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, 2000 ABQB 442 (Alta. Q.B.) at para 60, leave to appeal refused 2000 ABCA 238 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), affirmed 2001 ABCA 9 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 60 (S.C.C.); *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, 2010 ONSC 4209 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para 14.

115 It is clear that there has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements with respect to both the DIL and the District plans, assuming jurisdiction as a different issue. The opposing Depositors attack the plans on the basis of the second and third requirements.

116 They submit:

- (a) the plans contain provisions that are not within the scheme and purpose of the *CCAA*;
- (b) the plans compromise third party claims;
- (c) the plans provide no benefit to Depositors within the purpose of the *CCAA*;
- (d) the plans contravene section 5.1(2) of the *CCAA*;
- (e) the plans have not been advanced in good faith, with due diligence and full disclosure; and
- (f) the plans are not fair and reasonable.

1. Do the plans contain provisions that are not within the scheme and purpose of the CCAA?

117 The opposing Depositors submit that the Representative Action provisions of the plans do not advance the District Group's restructuring goals.

118 The District and the Creditors' Committees respond that the Representative Action provisions follow the "one proceeding" model that underpins the *CCAA* and will prevent maneuvering among Depositors for better positions in subsequent litigation, which, they say, has already commenced with the stayed class action proceedings. They submit that the provisions provide certainty to Depositors and allow the District to continue its core function without the distraction of a myriad of claims, consuming its limited resources and having the potential to compromise its insurance coverage.

119 The opposing Depositors submit that procedural rules can be used to limit proceedings in the absence of the Representative Action provisions, and that if more than one class proceeding is brought within a jurisdiction, carriage motions can be brought to determine which action can proceed to certification. Thus, they argue, there is little likelihood that the District will be overwhelmed by litigation in the event that the plans are not approved. Rather, there will be one class proceeding in each of British Columbia and Alberta, and potentially a number of independent claims advanced by those who choose to opt out of those actions or whose claims are of an individual nature not suited to determination in a class proceeding. It is open to the District to apply to have those individual claims consolidated if it is appropriate to do so.

120 This argument contains its own contradictions. It anticipates multiple actions that may have to be resolved through court application and carriage motions, the very multiplicity of actions that the Representative Action provisions are proposed to alleviate.

121 The opposing Depositors cite *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 240 O.A.C. 245, 2008 ONCA 587 (Ont. C.A.) (CanLii); leave dismissed [2008] SCC No. 32765 [2008 CarswellOnt 5432] (S.C.C.) for the proposition that the Court does not have the jurisdiction to approve a plan that contains terms that fall outside the purpose, objects and scheme of the *CCAA*. The *Metcalfe* decision dealt with a unique situation involving the Court's jurisdiction to approve a plan that involved wide-ranging releases. In the result, the Court approved the plan including the releases. The DIL and District plans do not involve third-party releases except in a limited sense that is not at issue. It is true that Blair, J.A. noted in the *Metcalfe* decision that there must be a reasonable connection between the third party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of a third party release. However, he also noted at para 51 that, since its enactment:

Courts have recognized that the [CCAA] has a broader dimension than simply the direct relations between the debtor company and creditors and that this broader public dimension must be weighed in the balance together with the interests of those most directly affected.

122 The opposing creditors in [Metcalfe](#) raised many of the same arguments that the opposing Depositors raise in this case, and the Court noted that they "reflect a view of the purpose and objects of the CCAA that is too narrow": para 55.

123 The opposing Depositors also argue that any provision of a plan that may benefit the District is improper. They submit that the District's arguments "anticipate that it will be the beneficiary of [the Subcommittee's] goodwill", and that this betrays the District's improper motive. There is nothing improper or contrary to the scheme and purpose of the CCAA for a debtor company to attempt to be able to continue its business more efficiently and effectively post-CCAA. That is the very core and purpose of the *Act*. This argument assumes that the Subcommittees would betray their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the creditors they will represent by favouring DIL or the District. There is no evidence that this would happen; on the contrary, the Creditors' Committees have ably represented the interests of creditors as a whole in this restructuring, and there is no reason that the Subcommittees would do otherwise.

124 Finally, the opposing Depositors submit, referencing the results of a survey conducted by the Lutheran Church — Canada, that there is little likelihood of the District remaining in operation in the future without being subsumed into a single administrative structure. At this point, this is only a possibility that would not be implemented for more than a year, if it is implemented at all.

125 There is a nexus between the Representative Action provisions of the plans and the restructuring in that these provisions are designed to allow the District to continue in the operation of its core function without the distraction of multiple litigation, while preserving the rights of Depositors to assert actions against third parties involved in the events that led to this insolvency. This Court does not lack jurisdiction to sanction the plans for this reason.

2. Do the Representative Action provisions of the plans compromise third party claims?

126 The basis for this submission is that the Subcommittees will have absolute discretion to commence and compromise third party claims (including derivative claims), to instruct counsel, and to determine the litigation budget to be shouldered by the Depositors. Under the terms of the plans, a Depositor whose third-party claim is denied by the Subcommittee has no right to proceed independently.

127 The plans impose fiduciary duties on the Subcommittee members to act in the best interest of Depositors who do not opt-out. No claims are *prima facie* released, other than the partial releases that are unopposed. Thus, it must be assumed that a claim against a third party will not be advanced by a Subcommittee only if not doing so is consistent with its fiduciary duties for whatever reason (for example, advice from representative counsel that a claim has no basis for success).

128 The opposing Depositors put forward a hypothetical situation in which an individual may have a meritorious claim that he or she wishes to pursue, but the Subcommittee doesn't wish to proceed due to lack of funding. The District and the Monitor point out, and I accept, that the definition of Representative Action permits more than one action. There is no provision of the plans that prevents this hypothetical individual from funding the Subcommittee to pursue such an action on his or her behalf as a Representative Plaintiff. The individual would become part of the Subcommittee and the action would be advanced by the Subcommittee using representative counsel. The hypothetical action would be treated like any other representative action claim under the plans. The Subcommittee would have carriage and control of such litigation, subject to its fiduciary obligations.

129 If any issues arose from such a hypothetical situation, the advice and direction of the Court is available.

130 It is important to note that the Representative Action provisions of the plans do not deprive any Depositors of the right to pursue claims as described against third-parties. They merely funnel the process through independent Subcommittees of creditors chosen from among the Depositors who have claims remaining after the Convenience Payments and who will have the fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the body of such creditors to maximize recovery of their investments.

131 While third-party claims could be pursued in another fashion, through uncoordinated action by individual Depositors, that does not mean that the Representative Action provisions constitute a compromise of such claims. There is no jurisdictional impediment to sanction arising from this inaccurate characterization of the plan provisions.

3. Do the Representative Action provisions provide any benefit to Depositors within the purpose of the CCAA?

132 The Monitor identified the benefits of the Representative Action provisions in its reports to Depositors as follows:

- (a) they provide a streamlined process for the establishment of the Representative Action class and the funding of the Representative Action;
- (b) they prevent a situation where Depositors are being contacted by multiple groups seeking to represent them in a class action or otherwise;
- (c) they may result in increased recoveries through settlement of the Representative Action claims on a group basis; and
- (d) as certain Depositors have indicated that they view any involvement in litigation as inconsistent with their personal religious beliefs, the Representative Action process allows them to opt-out before litigation is even commenced, should that be their preference.

133 The opposing Depositors suggest that none of these benefits fall within the "express purposes" of the *CCAA*. As noted by the Supreme Court in *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, [2010 SCC 60](#) (S.C.C.) [hereinafter *Century Services*], the *CCAA* has a broad remedial purpose, and permits a company to continue its business through various methods, with a view to becoming viable once again, including compromises or arrangements between an insolvent company and its creditors, and a going-forward strategy.

134 The *Act* is aimed at avoiding, where possible, the devastating social and economic consequences of the cessation of business operations, and at allowing the debtor to carry on business in a manner that causes the least possible harm to employees and the communities in which it operates. I accept that this is what the District Group is attempting to do with the plans, including the Representative Action provisions. While these provisions are of benefit to the District in allowing it to deal with claims affecting its officers, directors and employees from a single source, they also have a rationale and reasonable purpose in protecting the community of mostly older Depositors that the District will continue to serve in a religious capacity, and in attempting to maximize recovery through the possibility of focused negotiations with a limited number of parties. This does not mean that these types of provisions will always be an appropriate way to deal with third party claims, but, in the circumstances of this rather unique restructuring, the benefits are reasonable, rationale and connected with the overall restructuring.

135 The DIL and District plans are part of a four component conceptual plan of arrangement and compromise that is designed to permit the District to continue to carry out its core operations as a church

entity without the CEF and DIL functions that it has previously carried out and without the senior's care ministry component it had carried out through ECHS and EMSS. The opposing Depositors take an overly narrow view of the *CCAA*'s purpose, and ignore the real benefits identified by the Monitor to the large group of Depositors who are interested in recovering as much of their investment as possible. This Court does not lack jurisdiction to sanction the plans on this ground.

4. Do the plans contravene section 5.1(2) of the CCAA?

136 Claims that may be included in the Representative Action provisions include claims that cannot be compromised pursuant to section 5.1(2) of the *CCAA* as they are claims against directors that relate to a contractual right of one or more creditors or are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or wrongful or oppressive conduct by a director.

137 As noted previously, the plans do not release or compromise any claims that can be pursued in the Representative Action. Accordingly, the plans permit the directors to be pursued in a Representative Action in accordance with s. 5.1(2) of the *CCAA*.

5. Have the plans been advanced in good faith, with diligence and full disclosure?

138 As noted with respect to the application to replace the Monitor, it was not necessary for the District to disclose the MSDP and the Conrich ASP in the context of the District plan. However, these documents were disclosed to Depositors before the reconvened District meeting, and Depositors had the ability to change their vote on the District plan with this information in hand. The District was not guilty of bad faith arising from these circumstances.

139 The opposing Depositors also submit that counsel for the District Group, by acting as counsel and advancing the plans, has "intentionally sought to misuse the *CCAA* proceedings to shield himself and his law firm from liability". First, neither counsel nor his firm is released by the plans from any liability, other than the limited release provisions that are not contentious. The opposing creditors have made a number of allegations against counsel and his firm; none of these allegations have been tested or established and undoubtedly the Subcommittees will have to consider whether to bring proceedings against these parties for advice that may have been provided to the District Group prior to the *CCAA* filing. This situation does not give rise to bad faith by the District Group.

140 The opposing Depositors also allege that counsel for the District Group has been unjustly enriched as a result of the legal fees they have been paid while acting as counsel in these proceedings. Counsel has not been able to respond to this allegation of dubious merit. Again, this is irrelevant to the issue of the District Group's good faith.

141 Similar allegations have been made about the Monitor, which have been addressed in the decision relating to the replacement of Monitor.

6. Are the Plans Fair and Reasonable?

a. Overview

142 Farley, J. in *Sammi Atlas Inc., Re*, [1998] O.J. No. 1089 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para 4 provided a useful description of the Court's duty in determining whether a proposed plan is fair and reasonable:

... is the Plan fair and reasonable? A Plan under the *CCAA* is a compromise; it cannot be expected to be perfect. It should be approved if it is fair, reasonable and equitable. Equitable treatment is not necessarily equal treatment. Equal treatment may be contrary to equitable treatment. One must look

at the creditors as a whole (i.e. generally) and to the objecting creditors (specifically) and see if rights are compromised in an attempt to balance interests (and have the pain of the compromise equitably shared) as opposed to a confiscation of rights. It is recognized that the *CCAA* contemplates that a minority of creditors is bound by the Plan which a majority have approved — subject only to the court determining that the Plan is fair and reasonable: see *Northland Properties Ltd.* at p.201; *Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* at p.509.

In an earlier case, he commented:

In the give and take of a *CCAA* plan negotiation, it is clear that equitable treatment need not necessarily involve equal treatment. There is some give and some get in trying to come up with an overall plan which Blair J. in *Olympia & York* likened to a sharing of the pain. Simply put, any *CCAA* arrangement will involve pain — if for nothing else than the realization that one has made a bad investment/loan: [Re: Central Guarantee Trust Ltd., \[1993\] O.J. No. 1479](#).

143 The objection of the opposing Depositors to these plans focus mainly on whether the different treatment of some creditors results in inequitable treatment, whether the plans are flawed in any respect and how much weight I should accord to the approval of the majority.

b. Deference to the Majority

144 Dealing with the important factor of the approval of the plans by the requisite double majority of creditors, the Court in *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re*, [\[2007\] O.J. No. 695](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para 18 commented:

It has been held that in determining whether to sanction a plan, the court must exercise its equitable jurisdiction and consider the prejudice to the various parties that would flow from granting or refusing to grant approval of the plan and must consider alternatives available to the Applicants if the plan is not approved. An important factor to be considered by the court in determining whether the plan is fair and reasonable is the degree of approval given to the plan by the creditors. It has also been held that, in determining whether to approve the plan, a court should not second-guess the business aspects of the plan or substitute its views for that of the stakeholders who have approved the plan.

145 The opposing Depositors, however, invite me to do just that. They refer to a remark by McLachlen, J. (as she then was), in *Gold Texas Resources Ltd., Re*, [\[1989\] B.C.J. No. 167](#) (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) at page 4, to the effect that the court should determine whether "there is not within an apparent majority some undisclosed or unwarranted coercion of the minority.... (i)t must be satisfied that the majority is acting *bona fide* and in good faith".

146 The opposing Depositors submit that, in considering the voting results, I should keep in mind that the many of the Depositors "are not businessmen" and that 60% of them are senior citizens over 60 years of age. I note that some of the opposing creditors are also "not businessmen" and are over 60, but the Court is not asked to discount their opposing votes for that reason.

147 I have read the considerable disclosure about the plans prepared and distributed by the Monitor, and note the extraordinary efforts of the Monitor and the District Group to ensure that Depositors had the opportunity to ask questions at the information meetings. The Depositors have had months to inform themselves of the plans. Even if the disputed development disclosure had been necessary, there were roughly 1 1/2 months from the Monitor's disclosure of the documents to the vote on the District Plan. It would be patronizing for the Court to assume anything other than the Depositors were capable of

reading the materials, asking relevant questions and exercising judgment in their own best interest. Business sophistication is not a necessity in making an informed choice.

148 The opposing Depositors also submit that there is evidence of efforts by Church officials to influence the outcome of the vote in favour of the plans. This evidence consists of affidavits from the opposing Depositors or their supporters that accuse various Church pastors of efforts to intimidate or silence those who oppose the plans. These allegations have been made against individuals who are not direct parties in these proceedings, at such a time and in such circumstances that it was not possible for them to respond.

149 As seen from the allegations against the Monitor, to which the Monitor had an opportunity to respond, there may be very different perceptions about what actually occurred during the incidents described in the allegations. I appreciate that it must be uncomfortable to be at odds with your religious community on an important issue. However, these allegations would bear greater weight if the terms of the plans were prejudicial to the Depositors as a whole, or the allegations were supported by the Creditor's Committees but they are not. It is not unreasonable or irrational for Depositors to have voted in favour of the plans.

150 I am unable to accept on the evidence before me that the Depositors who voted in favour of the plans did so because they were coerced by church officials. This does a disservice to those who exercised their right to vote and to have an opinion on the plans, no matter what their level of sophistication, their age or their religious persuasion.

c. The Convenience Payments

151 The opposing Depositors also submit that the votes in favour of the District plan were unfairly skewed by the fact that creditors with claims of less than \$5,000 are to be paid in full (the "Convenience Creditors"). The Monitor reports that, of the 1,616 Convenience Creditors, 500 or 31% in number holding 54% in value of total claims under \$5,000 voted on the District plan.

152 Of the 500 Convenience Creditors who voted on the District plan, 450 or 90% voted in favour of the District plan and 50 or 10% voted against the District plan. The Convenience Creditors who voted in favour of the District plan had claims of approximately \$641,300 (91% of the total claims of voting Convenience Creditors), and the Convenience Creditors who voted against the District plan had claims of approximately \$66,500 (9% of the total claims of voting Convenience Creditors).

153 Approximately 1,294 Eligible Affected Creditors with total claims of approximately \$85.1 million voted on the District plan. The Convenience Creditors therefore represented approximately 39% in number and approximately 1% in dollar value of the total eligible affected creditors. In order for the District plan to be approved, both a majority in number and two-thirds in dollar value of voting creditors must have voted in favour of the plan. As such, while the Convenience Payments increased the likelihood that a majority in number of Creditors would vote in favour of the plan, they had little impact on the likelihood that two-thirds in dollar value of voting creditors would vote in favour of the plan.

154 Excluding the Convenience Creditors, a total of 794 creditors voted on the District plan, of which 626, or approximately 79% voted in favour and 168 voted against. Therefore the plan still would have passed by a majority in number of voting creditors had the Convenience Creditors not voted.

155 The District Group and the Monitor note that the Convenience Creditor payments have the effect of limiting the number of NewCo shareholders to about 1,000, rather than 2,600, thus creating a more manageable corporate governance structure for NewCo and ensuring that only Depositors with a significant financial interest in NewCo will be shareholders. This is a reasonable and persuasive rationale for paying out the Convenience Creditors. While each case must be reviewed in its unique circumstances, this type of payout of creditors with smaller claims is not uncommon in CCAA restructurings: *Contech Enterprises Inc.*,

Re, [2015 BCSC 129](#) (B.C. S.C.); *Target Canada Co.*, Re, [2016 CarswellOnt 8815](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Nelson Financial Group Ltd.*, Re, [2011 ONSC 2750](#) (Ont. S.C.J.).

156 As noted previously, equitable treatment is not necessary equal treatment, and the elimination of potential shareholders with little financial interest from NewCo is a benefit to remaining Depositors in the context of the District plan. They may not have had any significant financial influence in the corporation, but their interests would have had to be taken into account in deciding on the future of NewCo.

d. The NewCo provisions

157 The opposing Depositors submit that, as the future of the Prince of Peace properties cannot be known until after the first meeting of NewCo shareholders six months after the effective date of the plan, the plan deprives the Court of the ability to ensure the plan is fair and reasonable and therefore appropriate to impose on the minority.

158 This is incorrect. What is relevant to the Court in reviewing the plan is the value of the shares of NewCo that are part of the consideration that will be distributed to some of the District Depositors. As noted in [Century Services](#) at para 77:

Because the alternative to reorganization is often bankruptcy, participants will measure the impact of a reorganization against the position they would enjoy in liquidation.

159 The Monitor notes that the value of the NewCo shares is intended to be based principally on the independent appraisals, which reflect a range of forced sale values. The Monitor has consulted with the Deloitte' Valuations Group, which has indicated that in valuing shares such as those of NewCo, it would be more common to value assets such as the Prince of Peace properties based on appraised market values as opposed to forced sale values. The Monitor reports that it has attempted to balance this consideration against other practical considerations, such as that fact that, depending on the mandate that is chosen for NewCo, the Prince of Peace properties may still be liquidated in the near-term, and that therefore, there is the need to accurately reflect the shortfall to some of the Depositors, which will represent the amount they would ultimately be able to pursue in the Representative Action. I accept the Monitor's opinion that it is unlikely that the values attributed to the Prince of Peace properties in calculating the value of the NewCo shares will reflect the lowest forced sale values reflected in the appraisals.

160 The District Plan contemplates a debt-to equity conversion, which is common in *CCAA* proceedings. The Court does not have to make a determination of the value of the equity offered, as long as it is satisfied, as I am, that the value of the package to be distributed to the Depositors will likely exceed a current forced-sale liquidation recovery in this depressed real estate market, which is the alternative proposed by the opposing Depositors. The plan provides the NewCo shareholders with flexibility to optimize recovery at the time of the first shareholder's meeting, with the advantage of recommendations from an experienced management team. While there is no guarantee that the market will improve, it is a realistic possibility. At any rate, the sale of the Prince of Peace properties will not be the only option available to NewCo shareholders. Again, I must take into account that this appears to be the view of the Depositors who voted in favour of the plan.

161 The opposing Depositors submit that the NewCo shares are not a suitable investment for District Depositors over the age of 70. It is unrealistic to believe that any *CCAA* plan of compromise and arrangement would be supported by all of a debtor company's creditors or that the compromise effected would be ideally suited to every creditor's personal situation. The NewCo articles attempt to address the concerns of those who don't want to hold shares by building in provisions that would allow the possibility that shareholders are able to sell to other shareholders or have their shares redeemed.

162 This is not a perfect solution, but plans do not have to be perfect to be found to be fair and reasonable. I find that the NewCo provisions of the District plan, in the context of the plan, as a whole, are fair and reasonable.

e. The Representative Action provisions

163 In addition to submissions previously discussed with respect to these provisions, the opposing Depositors submit that "(n)o honest and intelligent District Depositors acting in their own best interests would give up these fundamental rights of [full and unfettered access to the courts] where the law already provides perfectly satisfactory processes for advancing legal claims against third parties on a class basis. These provisions are neither fair nor reasonable, and accordingly must not receive the sanction of this Court".

164 The short answer to this is that a majority of the honest and intelligent Depositors have voted in favour of the plans, including the Representative Action provisions. It is not the place of this Court to second guess their decision without good and persuasive reasons: [Central Guaranty Trustco Ltd., Re](#) [1993 CarswellOnt 228 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List])] at paras 3&4; [Muscletech](#) at para 18.

165 The opposing Depositors also submit that the Representative Action provisions of the plans are flawed in that they do not provide for information about causes of action the Subcommittee intends to advance, and against whom prior to the opt-out deadline.

166 However, Depositors are able to opt-out at any time prior to the last business day preceeding the date of commencement of the Representative Action. It is not unreasonable to anticipate that Depositors will have further information with respect to the proposed Representative Actions prior to their commencement.

167 It is also true that participating Depositors will not know their own proportionate share of the Representative Action Holdback until after the opt-out deadline has passed and the size of the Representative Action class is known. However, the Monitor has committed to provide a range of what individual shares may be.

168 The opposing Depositors submit that in the absence of reliable information about the extent of their financial commitment to the Representative Action, it can reasonably be expected that many District Depositors will be content to receive their distribution under the plan and forgo the balance of their claims by electing to opt out the Representative Action. This is not a reasonable assumption. Representative counsel will likely be retained on a contingency fee basis, and therefore Depositors will be unlikely to be at risk for a substantial retainer to advance the Representative Action.

169 Finally, on this issue, the opposing Depositors submit there is an irreconcilable conflict of interest between the Subcommittee and a Representative Plaintiff that can be expected to mar the Representative Action. Unlike the Subcommittee tasked with instructing counsel, the Representative Plaintiff bears the sole financial responsibility for paying an adverse costs award. The opposing Depositors submit that it is reasonable to expect that there may be a divergence of views between the Subcommittee and the Representative Plaintiff as to the conduct of the Representative Action.

170 As would be the case in class action proceedings when the interests of representative plaintiffs come into conflicts with the interests of the class, advice and direction can be sought from the Court in the event that this situation materializes.

171 The opposing Depositors submit that the Representative Action provisions interfere with a citizen's constitutional right of access to the courts. These provisions do not deprive the Depositors from their right to

take action against third parties; they are able to do so through a Subcommittee chosen from their members with fiduciary duties to the whole. This issue was considered in the context of third-party releases, which do eliminate the right to pursue an action against third parties, in [Metcalf](#), and Blair, J.A. commented at para 104 as follows:

The power to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement that contains third-party releases of the type opposed by the appellants is embedded in the wording of the *CCAA*. The fact that this may interfere with a claimant's right to pursue a civil action — normally a matter of provincial concern — or trump Quebec rules of public order is constitutionally immaterial. The *CCAA* is a valid exercise of federal power. Provided the matter in question falls within the legislation directly or as necessarily incidental to the exercise of that power, the *CCAA* governs. To the extent that its provisions are inconsistent with provincial legislation, the federal legislation is paramount.

7. Conclusion

172 As noted at para 18 of [Metcalf](#):

Effective insolvency restructurings would not be possible without a statutory mechanism to bind an unwilling minority of creditors. Unanimity is frequently impossible in such situations. But the minority must be protected too. Parliament's solution to this quandary was to permit a wide range of proposals to be negotiated and put forward (the compromise or arrangement) and to bind all creditors by class to the terms of the plan, but to do so only where the proposal can gain the support of the requisite "double majority" of votes and obtain the sanction of the court on the basis that it is fair and reasonable. In this way, the scheme of the *CCAA* supports the intention of Parliament to encourage a wide variety of solutions to corporate insolvencies without unjustifiably overriding the rights of dissenting creditors.

173 In this case, the requisite double majority, after significant disclosure and opportunities to review and question the plans, have voted in favour of the plans. The Creditors' Committees of DIL and the District, who have the duty to act in the best interests of the body of creditors, support the plans.

174 The Monitor supports the plans, and there is no reason in this case to give the Monitor's opinion less than the usual deference and weight.

175 Measuring the plans against available commercial alternatives leads me to the conclusion that they provide greater benefits to Depositors and other creditors than a forced liquidation in a depressed real estate market.

176 The plans preserve the District's core operations. I accept that the Representative Action provisions are appropriate and reasonable in the circumstances of this restructuring, that, in addition to the benefits identified by the Monitor of stream-lined proceedings, the avoidance of multiple communications and the potential of increased recovery, Depositors will benefit from the oversight of the Subcommittees and the Representative Action process will be able to incorporate cause of action, such as derivative actions, that are normally outside the scope of class actions.

177 The insolvency of the District Group has caused heartbreak and hardship for many people, as is the case in any insolvency. In the end, the majority of affected creditors have accepted plans that resolve their collective problems to the extent possible in difficult circumstances. As noted in [Metcalf](#) "in insolvency restructuring proceedings almost everyone loses something": para 117. That is certainly the case here, and the best that can be done is to try to ensure that the plans are a reasonable "balancing of prejudices". It is not possible to please all stakeholders.

178 The balance of interests clearly favours approval. I am satisfied that the DIL and District plans are fair and reasonable and should be sanctioned.

Application dismissed.

End of Document

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Tab 4



KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment

Proposed Legislation

[United States Code Annotated](#)
[Title 15. Commerce and Trade](#)
[Chapter 2A. Securities and Trust Indentures \(Refs & Annos\)](#)
[Subchapter I. Domestic Securities \(Refs & Annos\)](#)

15 U.S.C.A. § 77c

§ 77c. Classes of securities under this subchapter

Effective: July 9, 2012

[Currentness](#)

(a) Exempted securities

Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any of the following classes of securities:

(1) Reserved.

(2) Any security issued or guaranteed by the United States or any territory thereof, or by the District of Columbia, or by any State of the United States, or by any political subdivision of a State or territory, or by any public instrumentality of one or more States or territories, or by any person controlled or supervised by and acting as an instrumentality of the Government of the United States pursuant to authority granted by the Congress of the United States; or any certificate of deposit for any of the foregoing; or any security issued or guaranteed by any bank; or any security issued by or representing an interest in or a direct obligation of a Federal Reserve bank; or any interest or participation in any common trust fund or similar fund that is excluded from the definition of the term “investment company” under section 3(c)(3) of the Investment Company Act of 1940; or any security which is an industrial development bond (as defined in [section 103\(c\)\(2\) of Title 26](#)) the interest on which is excludable from gross income under [section 103\(a\)\(1\) of Title 26](#) if, by reason of the application of [paragraph \(4\)](#) or [\(6\) of section 103\(c\) of Title 26](#) (determined as if paragraphs (4)(A), (5), and (7) were not included in such section 103(c)), paragraph (1) of such section 103(c) does not apply to such security; or any interest or participation in a single trust fund, or in a collective trust fund maintained by a bank, or any security arising out of a contract issued by an insurance company, which interest, participation, or security is issued in connection with (A) a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan which meets the requirements for qualification under [section 401 of Title 26](#), (B) an annuity plan which meets the requirements for the deduction of the employer's contributions under [section 404\(a\)\(2\) of Title 26](#), (C) a governmental plan as defined in [section 414\(d\) of Title 26](#) which has been established by an employer for the exclusive benefit of its employees or their beneficiaries for the purpose of distributing to such employees or their beneficiaries the corpus and income of the funds accumulated under such plan, if under such plan it is impossible, prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities with respect to such employees and their beneficiaries, for any part of the corpus or income to be used for, or diverted to, purposes other than the exclusive benefit of such employees or their beneficiaries, or (D) a church plan, company, or account that is excluded from the definition of an investment company under section 3(c)(14) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, other than any

plan described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of this paragraph (i) the contributions under which are held in a single trust fund or in a separate account maintained by an insurance company for a single employer and under which an amount in excess of the employer's contribution is allocated to the purchase of securities (other than interests or participations in the trust or separate account itself) issued by the employer or any company directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the employer, (ii) which covers employees some or all of whom are employees within the meaning of [section 401\(c\)\(1\) of Title 26](#) (other than a person participating in a church plan who is described in [section 414\(e\)\(3\)\(B\) of Title 26](#)), or (iii) which is a plan funded by an annuity contract described in [section 403\(b\) of Title 26](#) (other than a retirement income account described in [section 403\(b\)\(9\) of Title 26](#), to the extent that the interest or participation in such single trust fund or collective trust fund is issued to a church, a convention or association of churches, or an organization described in [section 414\(e\)\(3\)\(A\) of Title 26](#) establishing or maintaining the retirement income account or to a trust established by any such entity in connection with the retirement income account). The Commission, by rules and regulations or order, shall exempt from the provisions of [section 77e](#) of this title any interest or participation issued in connection with a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plan which covers employees some or all of whom are employees within the meaning of [section 401\(c\)\(1\) of Title 26](#), if and to the extent that the Commission determines this to be necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of this subchapter. For purposes of this paragraph, a security issued or guaranteed by a bank shall not include any interest or participation in any collective trust fund maintained by a bank; and the term "bank" means any national bank, or banking institution organized under the laws of any State, territory, or the District of Columbia, the business of which is substantially confined to banking and is supervised by the State or territorial banking commission or similar official; except that in the case of a common trust fund or similar fund, or a collective trust fund, the term "bank" has the same meaning as in the Investment Company Act of 1940;

(3) Any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which arises out of a current transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for current transactions, and which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited;

(4) Any security issued by a person organized and operated exclusively for religious, educational, benevolent, fraternal, charitable, or reformatory purposes and not for pecuniary profit, and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any person, private stockholder, or individual, or any security of a fund that is excluded from the definition of an investment company under section 3(c)(10) (B) of the Investment Company Act of 1940;

(5) Any security issued (A) by a savings and loan association, building and loan association, cooperative bank, homestead association, or similar institution, which is supervised and examined by State or Federal authority having supervision over any such institution; or (B) by (i) a farmer's cooperative organization exempt from tax under [section 521 of Title 26](#), (ii) a corporation described in [section 501\(c\)\(16\) of Title 26](#) and exempt from tax under [section 501\(a\) of Title 26](#), or (iii) a corporation described in [section 501\(c\)\(2\) of Title 26](#) which is exempt from tax under [section 501\(a\) of Title 26](#) and is organized for the exclusive purpose of holding title to property, collecting income therefrom, and turning over the entire amount thereof, less expenses, to an organization or corporation described in clause (i) or (ii);

(6) Any interest in a railroad equipment trust. For purposes of this paragraph “interest in a railroad equipment trust” means any interest in an equipment trust, lease, conditional sales contract, or other similar arrangement entered into, issued, assumed, guaranteed by, or for the benefit of, a common carrier to finance the acquisition of rolling stock, including motive power;

(7) Certificates issued by a receiver or by a trustee or debtor in possession in a case under Title 11, with the approval of the court;

(8) Any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity contract, issued by a corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner, bank commissioner, or any agency or officer performing like functions, of any State or Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia;

(9) Except with respect to a security exchanged in a case under Title 11, any security exchanged by the issuer with its existing security holders exclusively where no commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting such exchange;

(10) Except with respect to a security exchanged in a case under Title 11, any security which is issued in exchange for one or more bona fide outstanding securities, claims or property interests, or partly in such exchange and partly for cash, where the terms and conditions of such issuance and exchange are approved, after a hearing upon the fairness of such terms and conditions at which all persons to whom it is proposed to issue securities in such exchange shall have the right to appear, by any court, or by any official or agency of the United States, or by any State or Territorial banking or insurance commission or other governmental authority expressly authorized by law to grant such approval;

(11) Any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a person resident and doing business within or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing business within, such State or Territory.

(12) Any equity security issued in connection with the acquisition by a holding company of a bank under [section 1842\(a\) of Title 12](#) or a savings association under [section 1467a\(e\) of Title 12](#), if--

(A) the acquisition occurs solely as part of a reorganization in which security holders exchange their shares of a bank or savings association for shares of a newly formed holding company with no significant assets other than securities of the bank or savings association and the existing subsidiaries of the bank or savings association;

(B) the security holders receive, after that reorganization, substantially the same proportional share interests in the holding company as they held in the bank or savings association, except for nominal changes in shareholders' interests resulting from lawful elimination of fractional interests and the exercise of dissenting shareholders' rights under State or Federal law;

(C) the rights and interests of security holders in the holding company are substantially the same as those in the bank or savings association prior to the transaction, other than as may be required by law; and

(D) the holding company has substantially the same assets and liabilities, on a consolidated basis, as the bank or savings association had prior to the transaction.

For purposes of this paragraph, the term “savings association” means a savings association (as defined in [section 1813\(b\) of Title 12](#)) the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

(13) Any security issued by or any interest or participation in any church plan, company or account that is excluded from the definition of an investment company under section 3(c)(14) of the Investment Company Act of 1940.

(14) Any security futures product that is--

(A) cleared by a clearing agency registered under [section 78q-1](#) of this title or exempt from registration under subsection (b)(7) of such [section 78q-1](#); and

(B) traded on a national securities exchange or a national securities association registered pursuant to [section 78o-3\(a\)](#) of this title.

(b)Additional exemptions

(1)Small issues exemptive authority

The Commission may from time to time by its rules and regulations, and subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed therein, add any class of securities to the securities exempted as provided in this section, if it finds that the enforcement of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering; but no issue of securities shall be exempted under this subsection where the aggregate amount at which such issue is offered to the public exceeds \$5,000,000.

(2)Additional issues

The Commission shall by rule or regulation add a class of securities to the securities exempted pursuant to this section in accordance with the following terms and conditions:

(A) The aggregate offering amount of all securities offered and sold within the prior 12-month period in reliance on the exemption added in accordance with this paragraph shall not exceed \$50,000,000.

(B) The securities may be offered and sold publicly.

(C) The securities shall not be restricted securities within the meaning of the Federal securities laws and the regulations promulgated thereunder.

(D) The civil liability provision in [section 77l \(a\)\(2\)](#) of this title shall apply to any person offering or selling such securities.

(E) The issuer may solicit interest in the offering prior to filing any offering statement, on such terms and conditions as the Commission may prescribe in the public interest or for the protection of investors.

(F) The Commission shall require the issuer to file audited financial statements with the Commission annually.

(G) Such other terms, conditions, or requirements as the Commission may determine necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors, which may include--

(i) a requirement that the issuer prepare and electronically file with the Commission and distribute to prospective investors an offering statement, and any related documents, in such form and with such content as prescribed by the Commission, including audited financial statements, a description of the issuer's business operations, its financial condition, its corporate governance principles, its use of investor funds, and other appropriate matters; and

(ii) disqualification provisions under which the exemption shall not be available to the issuer or its predecessors, affiliates, officers, directors, underwriters, or other related persons, which shall be substantially similar to the disqualification provisions contained in the regulations adopted in accordance with section 926 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ([15 U.S.C. 77d](#) note).

(3)Limitation

Only the following types of securities may be exempted under a rule or regulation adopted pursuant to paragraph (2): equity securities, debt securities, and debt securities convertible or exchangeable to equity interests, including any guarantees of such securities.

(4)Periodic disclosures

Upon such terms and conditions as the Commission determines necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors, the Commission by rule or regulation may require an issuer of a class of securities exempted under paragraph (2) to make available to investors and file with the Commission periodic disclosures regarding the issuer, its business operations, its financial condition, its corporate

governance principles, its use of investor funds, and other appropriate matters, and also may provide for the suspension and termination of such a requirement with respect to that issuer.

(5)Adjustment

Not later than 2 years after April 5, 2012, and every 2 years thereafter, the Commission shall review the offering amount limitation described in paragraph (2)(A) and shall increase such amount as the Commission determines appropriate. If the Commission determines not to increase such amount, it shall report to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate on its reasons for not increasing the amount.

(c)Securities issued by small investment company

The Commission may from time to time by its rules and regulations and subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed therein, add to the securities exempted as provided in this section any class of securities issued by a small business investment company under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 if it finds, having regard to the purposes of that Act, that the enforcement of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors.

CREDIT(S)

(May 27, 1933, c. 38, Title I, § 3, 48 Stat. 75; June 6, 1934, c. 404, Title II, § 202, 48 Stat. 906; Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, Title II, § 214, as added Aug. 9, 1935, c. 498, 49 Stat. 557; amended June 29, 1938, c. 811, § 15, 52 Stat. 1240; May 15, 1945, c. 122, 59 Stat. 167; Aug. 10, 1954, c. 667, Title I, § 5, 68 Stat. 684; [Pub.L. 85-699, Title III, § 307\(a\)](#), Aug. 21, 1958, 72 Stat. 694; [Pub.L. 91-373, Title IV, § 401\(a\)](#), Aug. 10, 1970, 84 Stat. 718; [Pub.L. 91-547](#), § 27(b), (c), Dec. 14, 1970, 84 Stat. 1434; [Pub.L. 91-565](#), Dec. 19, 1970, 84 Stat. 1480; [Pub.L. 91-567](#), § 6(a), Dec. 22, 1970, 84 Stat. 1498; [Pub.L. 94-210, Title III, § 308\(a\)\(1\), \(3\)](#), Feb. 5, 1976, 90 Stat. 56, 57; [Pub.L. 95-283](#), § 18, May 21, 1978, 92 Stat. 275; [Pub.L. 95-425](#), § 2, Oct. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 962; [Pub.L. 95-598, Title III, § 306](#), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2674; [Pub.L. 96-477, Title III, § 301, Title VII, § 701](#), Oct. 21, 1980, 94 Stat. 2291, 2294; [Pub.L. 97-261](#), § 19(d), Sept. 20, 1982, 96 Stat. 1121; [Pub.L. 99-514](#), § 2, Oct. 22, 1986, 100 Stat. 2095; [Pub.L. 100-181, Title II, §§ 203, 204](#), Dec. 4, 1987, 101 Stat. 1252; [Pub.L. 103-325, Title III, § 320](#), Sept. 23, 1994, 108 Stat. 2225; [Pub.L. 104-62](#), § 3, Dec. 8, 1995, 109 Stat. 684; [Pub.L. 104-290, Title V, § 508\(b\)](#), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3447; [Pub.L. 106-102, Title II, § 221\(a\)](#), Nov. 12, 1999, 113 Stat. 1401; [Pub.L. 106-554](#), § 1(a)(5) [Title II, § 208(a)(2)], Dec. 21, 2000, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-435; [Pub.L. 108-359](#), § 1(b), Oct. 25, 2004, 118 Stat. 1666; [Pub.L. 111-203, Title IX, § 985\(a\)\(1\)](#), July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 1933; [Pub.L. 112-106, Title IV, § 401\(a\)](#), Apr. 5, 2012, 126 Stat. 323; [Pub.L. 112-142](#), § 2, July 9, 2012, 126 Stat. 989.)

Notes of Decisions (119)

15 U.S.C.A. § 77c, 15 USCA § 77c

Current through P.L. 116-20.

Tab 5

COURT FILE NUMBER 1101-09476
COURT COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA
JUDICIAL CENTRE CALGARY
APPLICANTS

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES'
CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c.
C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE CANADA
BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c.
C-44, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF OPTI CANADA INC.
and OPTI TECHNOLOGY INC.

DOCUMENT

ORDER
(Sanction Hearing and Stay Extension)

ADDRESS FOR SERVICE
AND
CONTACT INFORMATION
OF
PARTY FILING THIS
DOCUMENT

MacLeod Dixon LLP
3700 Canterra Tower
400 Third Avenue SW
Calgary, Alberta T2P 4H2
Phone: 403-267-8222
Fax: 403-264-5973

Attention: Howard A. Gorman/Craig Hoskins


File No. 269517

DATE ON WHICH ORDER
WAS PRONOUNCED

September 7, 2011

NAME OF JUSTICE WHO
MADE THIS ORDER

Chief Justice N.C. Wittmann



I hereby certify this to be a true copy of
the original Order
Dated this 8 day of Sept, 2011
for Clerk of the Court

UPON the application of OPTI Technology Inc., ("Technology") and OPTI Canada Inc. ("Canada") (Technology and Canada hereinafter being referred to collectively as "OPTI"), **AND** **UPON** having read the pleadings, proceedings and evidence filed herein, including the Affidavit of Joseph Bradford sworn September 7, 2011 (the "September 7 Bradford Affidavit"), filed, **AND** **UPON** reviewing the Third Report of the Monitor dated September 7, 2011 and the Initial Order

(the "Initial Order") granted in the within proceedings on July 13, 2011; **AND UPON** it appearing that circumstances exist that make this Order and an extension of the stay of proceedings appropriate, and that OPTI has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence; **AND UPON** hearing counsel for OPTI and other interested parties and stakeholders;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECLARED THAT:

Interpretation, Service and Meeting

1. For the purposes of this Order, capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined shall have the same meaning as those terms have been given in the August 4, 2011 Noteholder Meeting Order (the "Noteholder Meeting Order") in the within Action or the Master Plan defined therein.
2. With respect to service of notice of this application and all accompanying materials, the dissemination of the Meeting Materials (including the Plan), the service of notice of the Meeting and all other matters of technical compliance under the CCAA, the CBCA, and previous Orders of the Court:
 - (a) Service of notice of this application and all supporting materials is hereby abridged to the extent required and is hereby deemed to be good and sufficient such that this application is properly returnable today, and any further requirement for service of the Application and supporting materials is dispensed with;
 - (b) The distribution of the Meeting Materials (including the Plan) and all accompanying materials has been duly effected in accordance with the requirements of the Noteholder Meeting Order and the August 22, 2011 Order in this Action;
 - (c) Proper notice of the Meeting was duly given to all Persons entitled to vote at such Meeting; and
 - (d) The Meeting was duly convened and held in accordance with the provisions of the CCAA and the CBCA.

Sanction of Plan

3. OPTI has complied in all material respects with the provisions of the CCAA, the CBCA, and the previous Orders of this Honourable Court in these proceedings.
4. The Plan has been agreed to and approved by the Required Majority of Beneficial Noteholders and Qualified Transferees in accordance with the requirements of the CCAA, the CBCA, and the Noteholder Meeting Order.

5. The Plan (including the Master Plan, the Acquisition Plan, and the Recapitalization Plan) is found to be substantively and procedurally fair and reasonable to the Second Lien Noteholders, the Existing Shareholders and any other Persons, in the best interests of OPTI and all affected parties, does not constitute oppressive conduct to the Second Lien Noteholders, the Existing Shareholders or any other Persons and is hereby finally and absolutely sanctioned and approved pursuant to the provisions of the CCAA and the CBCA.
6. The Applicable Plan shall be implemented in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Master Plan.

Plan Implementation

7. With respect to the Acquisition Plan only, it is hereby declared and directed that:
 - (a) as of the Plan Implementation Date, the Acquisition Plan and all associated steps, transactions, arrangements, assignments, releases and reorganizations effected thereby are approved, binding and effective as set out in the Acquisition Plan upon Canada, all Second Lien Noteholders, all Existing Shareholders and all other Persons and Parties affected by the Acquisition Plan;
 - (b) the steps to occur, be taken and be effected, and the releases to be effected, on the Plan Implementation Date are deemed to occur, be taken and effected, and be effective in the sequential order contemplated by Section 5.2 of the Acquisition Plan on the Plan Implementation Date, beginning at the Effective Time;
 - (c) effective upon the fulfillment, satisfaction or waiver (in accordance with Section 7.4 of the Acquisition Plan) of the conditions in Section 7.3 of the Acquisition Plan, and in the sequential order contemplated by Section 5.2 of the Acquisition Plan:
 - (i) the Recapitalization Plan shall be deemed to be terminated and be of no further force or effect;
 - (ii) any accrued and unpaid interest payable under the Second Lien Notes as at the Plan Implementation Date shall be capitalized by adding it to the principal outstanding under the Second Lien Notes;
 - (iii) the Second Lien Notes and Second Lien Claims shall be transferred and assigned from the Second Lien Noteholders to CNOOC BVI for a purchase price equal to the Note Purchase Price (less any amounts withheld, paid or payable pursuant to Section 4.10 of the Acquisition Plan), and extinguish any

rights of the Former Noteholders under their Second Lien Notes other than to receive their pro rata shares of the Note Purchase Price;

- (iv) the Rights and any Common Share Options shall be cancelled and extinguished and the Rights Plan shall be terminated;
- (v) the Common Shares shall be transferred and assigned from the Existing Shareholders to CNOOC Luxembourg for a purchase price equal to the Share Purchase Price, and any rights of the Existing Shareholders under the Common Shares shall be extinguished other than to receive their pro rata shares of the Share Purchase Price (less any amounts withheld, paid or payable pursuant to Section 4.10 of the Acquisition Plan);
- (vi) Technology shall be liquidated and shall distribute its property and assets to Canada and the Monitor shall be deemed to hold the amount of the Cash Flow Deficiency in trust for and on behalf of Canada;
- (vii) Canada shall be deemed to have assumed the obligations of Technology under the OPTI Technology Note and OPTI Technology GSA;
- (viii) the releases referred to in Section 6.1 of the Acquisition Plan shall become effective in accordance with the Acquisition Plan;
- (ix) the Second Lien Indenture Trustee and the Trust Company shall comply with the provisions set out in Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.10 of the Acquisition Plan, as applicable, regarding the payment of the Note Purchase Price and the Share Purchase Price;
- (x) the Charges shall be deemed to be terminated and discharged solely with respect to Canada and its present and future Property , except for the Administration Charge;
- (xi) the Initial Order shall be amended to provide that from and after the Plan Implementation Date, in respect of Canada, the Administration Charge shall apply only with respect to payments being made by the Monitor under the Acquisition Plan;
- (xii) all payments by the Trust Company to the Second Lien Note Indenture Trustee under the Acquisition Plan shall be for the account of CNOOC BVI and the fulfillment of its obligations to the Second Lien Noteholders under the Acquisition Plan;

- (xiii) all payments by the Trust Company or any Depository to the Existing Shareholders under the Acquisition Plan shall be for the account of CNOOC Luxembourg and the fulfillment of its obligations to the Existing Shareholders under the Acquisition Plan;
- (xiv) upon completion by the Monitor of its duties in respect of Canada pursuant to the CCAA and the Orders, including, without limitation, the Monitor's duties in respect of the payments made by the Monitor in accordance with the Acquisition Plan, the Monitor may file with the Court a certificate of termination with respect to the Acquisition Plan stating that all of its duties in respect of Canada pursuant to the CCAA and the Orders have been completed and thereupon, Ernst & Young Inc. shall be deemed to be discharged from its duties as Monitor of Canada and the Administration Charge shall be terminated and released; and
- (xv) Canada, the Monitor, the Purchasers and the Requisite Majority of the Noteholder Support Group shall be entitled to apply to the Court for advice and direction in respect of any matter arising from or under the Master Plan or the Acquisition Plan.

8. With respect to the Recapitalization Plan only, it is hereby declared and directed that:

- (a) as of the Plan Implementation Date, the Recapitalization Plan and all associated steps, transactions, arrangements, assignments, releases and reorganizations effected thereby are hereby approved, binding and effective as set out in the Recapitalization Plan upon Canada, all Second Lien Noteholders, all Existing Shareholders and all other Persons and Parties affected by the Recapitalization Plan;
- (b) the steps to occur, be taken and be effected, and the releases to be effected, on the Plan Implementation Date are deemed to occur, be taken and effected, and be effective in the sequential order contemplated by Section 5.3 of the Recapitalization Plan on the Plan Implementation Date, beginning at the Effective Time;
- (c) the terms and conditions of the issuance and exchange of the Exchange Shares, the rights (but not the obligations) to acquire New Investment Shares pursuant to the New Investment (as defined in the Recapitalization Plan) (the "New Investment Rights") and the New Shareholder Warrants to and with the Second Lien Noteholders and the Existing Shareholders, as applicable, in exchange for the Claims and the Existing Common Shares held by the Second Lien Noteholders and the Existing Shareholders, as applicable, as well as the terms and conditions of the issuance of the New Investment Shares, are hereby approved and are determined to

be substantively and procedurally "fair" to the Second Lien Noteholders, the Existing Shareholders, and all other Persons, and the Court hereby makes the following additional findings:

- (i) that prior to the hearing of this application, Canada has advised the Court that it would be relying on the Section 3(a)(10) exemption under the U.S. Securities Act in order to issue, without registration under the U.S. Securities Act, the Exchange Shares, the New Investment Rights and the New Shareholder Warrants to the Second Lien Noteholders and the Existing Shareholders, as applicable,
 - (ii) that the Court was, and is, authorized under the CCAA and the CBCA to conduct this application and to approve the fairness of the terms and conditions of such issuance and exchange, and
 - (iii) that this application has been open to all of the Second Lien Noteholders, the Existing Shareholders and all other Persons and, prior to this application, all of the Second Lien Noteholders, the Existing Shareholders and all other Persons were given adequate notice thereof and that there were no impediments to the Second Lien Noteholders, the Existing Shareholders and all other Persons appearing and being heard at said hearing;
- (d) effective upon the fulfillment, satisfaction or waiver (in accordance with Section 7.4 of the Recapitalization Plan) of the conditions in Section 7.3 of the Recapitalization Plan, and in the sequential order contemplated by Section 5.3 of the Recapitalization Plan:
- (i) unless previously terminated, the Acquisition Plan shall be deemed to be terminated and of no further force or effect;
 - (ii) all New Common Shares issued and outstanding shall be deemed to be issued and outstanding as fully-paid and non-assessable;
 - (iii) the Existing Equity shall be extinguished and cancelled without any repayment of capital thereof;
 - (iv) any rights of the Second Lien Noteholders under their Second Lien Notes shall be extinguished;
 - (v) the New Secured Debt Indentures shall be effective;
 - (vi) the New Credit Agreement shall be effective;

- (vii) the Rights shall be terminated and extinguished and the Rights Plan shall be terminated;
- (viii) a number of New Common Shares representing an amount to be determined by the New Board, such amount not to exceed 10% of the number of New Common Shares issued and outstanding immediately upon implementation of the Recapitalization Plan, shall be reserved for issuance by OPTI to directors, officers and employees of OPTI at the discretion of the New Board;
- (ix) the First Lien Note Indenture Trustee and the Trust Company shall be directed to comply with the provisions of the Recapitalization Plan;
- (x) the releases referred to in Section 6.1 of the Recapitalization Plan shall become effective;
- (xi) the Charges shall be terminated and discharged;
- (xii) upon completion by the Monitor of its duties in respect of Canada pursuant to the CCAA and the Orders, the Monitor may file with the Court a certificate of plan termination with respect to the Master Plan and the Recapitalization Plan stating that all of its duties in respect of OPTI pursuant to the CCAA and the Orders have been completed and thereupon Ernst & Young Inc. shall be deemed to be discharged from its duties as Monitor of Canada; and
- (xiii) Canada, the Monitor and the Requisite Majority of the Noteholder Support Group may apply to the Court for advice and direction in respect of any matter arising from or under the Master Plan or the Recapitalization Plan.

9. With respect to both the Acquisition Plan and the Recapitalization Plan, it is hereby declared and directed that:

- (a) subject to the performance by Canada of its obligations under the Master Plan and the Applicable Plan, all obligations, agreements or leases to which Canada is a Party shall be and remain in full force and effect, unamended, as at Plan Implementation, and no Party to any such obligation or agreement shall on or following Plan Implementation accelerate, terminate, refuse to renew, rescind, refuse to perform or otherwise repudiate its obligations thereunder, or enforce or exercise (or purport to enforce or exercise) any right or remedy under or in respect of any such obligation, agreement or lease, by reason:

- (i) of any event which occurred prior to, and not continuing after, Plan Implementation or which is or continues to be suspended or waived under the Master Plan or the Applicable Plan, which would have entitled any other Party thereto to enforce those rights or remedies;
 - (ii) that Canada has sought or obtained relief or has taken steps as part of the Master Plan, the Applicable Plan or under the CCAA or CBCA;
 - (iii) of any default or event of default arising as a result of the financial condition or insolvency of Canada;
 - (iv) of the effect upon Canada of the completion of any of the transactions contemplated under the Master Plan or the Applicable Plan; or
 - (v) of any restructurings or reorganizations effected pursuant to the Master Plan or the Applicable Plan;
- (b) the commencing, taking, applying for or issuing or continuing any and all steps or proceedings, including, without limitation, administrative hearings and orders, declarations or assessments, commenced, taken or proceeded with or that may be commenced, taken or proceeded with against any Released Party in respect of all Claims and any other matter released pursuant to Section 6.1 of the Applicable Plan is hereby stayed; and
- (c) the Monitor is authorized to perform its functions and fulfill its obligations under the Applicable Plan to facilitate the implementation of the Applicable Plan.
10. From and after the Plan Implementation Date, all Persons shall be deemed to have waived any and all defaults then existing, previously committed, or caused by OPTI, any non-compliance with or breach of or default under any covenant, warranty, representation, term, provision, condition or obligation, express or implied, in any contract, instrument, credit document, guarantee, agreement for sale, lease or other agreement, written or oral, and any and all amendments or supplements thereto (each, an "Agreement") existing between such person and OPTI or any other Person, and which non-compliance, breach or default is applicable to OPTI or results from any circumstance or event applicable to OPTI or its obligations under any Agreement and any and all notices of default and demands for payment under any Agreement shall be deemed to be of no further force or effect.
11. From and after the Plan Implementation Date, each Creditor and any Person affected by the Master Plan will be deemed to have consented and agreed to all of the provisions of the Master Plan in its entirety. In particular, each Creditor shall be deemed on its own behalf

and on behalf of its heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, for all purposes:

- (a) to have executed and delivered to OPTI all consents, releases, assignments and waivers, statutory or otherwise, required to implement and carry out the Master Plan in its entirety;
 - (b) to have waived any default by OPTI in any provision, express or implied, in any Agreement or other arrangement existing between such Creditor and OPTI that occurred on or prior to the Plan Implementation Date;
 - (c) to have agreed that if there is any conflict between the provision, express or implied, of any Agreement or other arrangement existing between such Creditor and OPTI as at the Plan Implementation Date (other than those entered into by OPTI on, after, or with effect from, the Plan Implementation Date) and the provisions of the Master Plan, then the provision of the Master Plan take precedence and priority and the provisions of such Agreement or other arrangement are amended accordingly; and
 - (d) to have released and discharged absolutely all Claims against the Released Parties in accordance with the provisions of the Applicable Plan.
12. At any time on or after the Plan Implementation Date, OPTI is authorized to complete any steps, including but not limited to the preparation, execution, and filing of necessary documentation, required to effect the discharge of any registration made against OPTI by an Affected Creditor in respect of an Affected Claim and by any Creditor in respect of a Disputed Claim.
13. The Monitor is authorized to perform its functions and fulfill its obligations under the Master Plan to facilitate the implementation of the Master Plan.

Foreign Exchange Hedge

14. OPTI is hereby directed and authorized to pay the principal amount owing under the Swaps (as that term is defined in the Initial Order), plus any accrued but unpaid interest thereon, upon the implementation of the Applicable Plan.

Stay Extension

15. The Stay Period (as that term is defined in the Initial Order), as amended and extended by the August 4, 2011 First Stay Extension Order granted in the with action, is hereby further amended and extended to extend the Stay Period to and including November 4, 2011.

General

16. OPTI shall pay all employee claims under Section 6(5) of the CCAA.
17. There are no pension payments outstanding of the nature and kind referenced in Section 6(6) of the CCAA.
18. OPTI, the Monitor and all other parties are authorized and directed to take all steps and actions necessary or appropriate to implement the Applicable Plan, including the transactions contemplated by the Applicable Plan in accordance with the terms of the Plan.
19. Notwithstanding (a) the pendency of the CCAA Proceedings, the CBCA Proceedings, and the declarations of insolvency made therein; or (b) the provisions of any federal or provincial statute, none of the transactions, payments, steps, releases or compromises made during the CCAA Proceedings or the CBCA Proceedings or contemplated to be performed or effected pursuant to the Master Plan or the Applicable Plan shall constitute settlements, fraudulent preferences, fraudulent conveyances or other challengeable or reviewable transactions under any applicable law, federal, provincial or otherwise nor shall they constitute conduct meriting an oppression remedy.
20. Pursuant to the CCAA and the CBCA, this Order shall have full force and effect in all provinces of Canada. This Court requests the aid and recognition of: (i) any court or any judicial, regulatory or administrative body in any province or territory of Canada and the Federal Court of Canada; (ii) any judicial, regulatory or administrative tribunal or other court constituted pursuant to the Parliament of Canada or the legislature of any province; (iii) any court or any judicial, regulatory or administrative body of the United States; and (iv) the states or other subdivisions of the United States and of any other nation or state to act in aid of and to be complementary to this Court in carrying out the terms hereof.
21. Service of this Order shall only be required to be made upon those parties on the service list respecting this application and those additional parties in attendance at the hearing of the within application and shall be dispensed with as against all or any other parties.



C.J.C.Q.B.A.

Tab 6

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**



THE HONOURABLE MR.

JUSTICE HAINEY

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TUESDAY, THE 27th

DAY OF MARCH, 2018

**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

**AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF BANRO
CORPORATION, BANRO GROUP (BARBADOS) LIMITED, BANRO CONGO (BARBADOS)
LIMITED, NAMOYA (BARBADOS) LIMITED, LUGUSHWA (BARBADOS) LIMITED,
TWANGIZA (BARBADOS) LIMITED AND KAMITUGA (BARBADOS) LIMITED**

(the "**Applicants**")

**ORDER
(Plan Sanction)**

THIS MOTION made by the Applicants for an Order (the "**Sanction Order**") pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended ("**CCAA**") *inter alia* (a) approving and sanctioning the Amended Consolidated Plan of Compromise and Reorganization of the Applicants dated March 9, 2018 (the "**Plan**"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Schedule "A", and (b) approving the Third Report of FTI Consulting Canada Inc. in its capacity as Monitor (the "**Monitor**"), dated February 15, 2018 (the "**Third Report**") and the Fourth Report of the Monitor dated March 13, 2018 (the "**Fourth Report**"), was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the within Notice of Motion, the Affidavit of Rory James Taylor sworn March 13, 2018 including the exhibits thereto, the Confidential Affidavit of Rory James Taylor sworn March 13, 2018 (the "**Confidential Affidavit**"), the Third Report, the Fourth Report, the affidavit of Sophie Moher sworn March 26, 2018, and upon hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicants, the Monitor, Gramercy Funds Management LLC, Baiyin International

Investment Limited, Baiyin Nonferrous Group Company, Limited, VR Global Partners, L.P. and no one else appearing although duly served as appears from the affidavit of service of Sophie Moher sworn March 13, 2018, and upon being advised that this Order shall serve as the basis for reliance on the exemption provided by Section 3(a)(10) of the *United States Securities Act of 1933*, as amended, from the registration requirements otherwise imposed by that Act,

DEFINED TERMS

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that all capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall be as defined in the Plan or as in the Meeting Order made in this proceeding (the “**CCAA Proceedings**”) by Justice Hainey on February 1, 2018 (the “**Meeting Order**”), as applicable.

SERVICE, NOTICE AND MEETINGS

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Motion, the Motion Record, and the Fourth Report be and is hereby validated such that this Motion is properly returnable today and that service thereof upon any interested party other than the persons served with the Motion Record is hereby dispensed with.

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that there has been good and sufficient service, delivery and notice to all Affected Creditors of the Information Package and the Noteholder Information Package, and that the Creditors’ Meetings were duly, called, convened, held and conducted all in conformity with the CCAA and all other Orders of this Court in the CCAA Proceedings (collectively, the “**CCAA Orders**”).

SANCTION OF THE PLAN

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that:

- (a) Pursuant to the Meeting Order, the relevant classes of creditors of the Applicants for the purposes of voting to approve the Plan are the Affected Banro Unsecured Class and the Affected Secured Class;
- (b) the Plan has been approved by the Affected Banro Unsecured Required Majority and the Affected Secured Required Majority, all in conformity with the CCAA and the terms of the Meeting Order;

- (c) the Applicants have acted, and are acting, in good faith and with due diligence, and have complied with the provisions of the CCAA and the CCAA Orders in all respects;
- (d) the Court is satisfied that the Applicants have not done or purported to do anything that is not authorized by the CCAA; and
- (e) the Plan, all terms and conditions thereof, and the matters and the transactions contemplated thereby, are fair and reasonable including to all Persons who are entitled to receive equity in Newco in accordance with the Plan.

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Plan is hereby sanctioned and approved pursuant to section 6 of the CCAA and section 192 of the *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44.

PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Plan and all associated steps, compromises, transactions, arrangements, releases and reorganizations effected thereby (including, without limitation, the steps in Article 7 of the Plan) are hereby approved, shall be deemed to be implemented and shall be binding and effective as of the Effective Time in accordance with the terms of the Plan or at such other time, times or manner as may be set forth in the Plan in the sequence provided therein, and shall enure to the benefit of and be binding and effective upon the Applicants, the Directors, the Officers, the Consenting Parties, all Affected Creditors, the DIP Lender, the Released Parties and all other Persons and parties named or referred to in, affected by, or subject to the Plan as provided for in the Plan or this Order.

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Applicants, the Directors, the Officers, and the Monitor is authorized and directed to take all steps and actions and to do all things, necessary or appropriate, to implement the Plan in accordance with its terms and to enter into, execute, deliver, complete, implement and consummate all of the steps, transactions, distributions, disbursements, payments, deliveries, allocations, instruments and agreements contemplated by, and subject to the terms and conditions of, the Plan, and all such steps and actions are hereby authorized, ratified and approved. None of the Applicants, the Directors, the Officers or the Monitor shall incur any liability as a result of acting in accordance with the terms of the Plan and this Order, other than any liability arising out of or in connection with the gross negligence or wilful misconduct of such parties.

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that upon delivery of written notice from the Applicants and the Requisite Consenting Parties (or counsel on their behalf) to the Monitor that the conditions precedent as set out in the Plan have been satisfied or waived, as applicable, in accordance with the terms of the Plan, the Monitor shall as soon as reasonably practicable following receipt of such written notice, deliver to the Applicants a certificate signed by the Monitor substantially in the form attached hereto as Schedule "B" (the "**Monitor's Certificate**") certifying that all conditions precedent set out in the Plan have been satisfied or waived and that the Implementation Date has occurred and that the Plan and the provisions of this Sanction Order which come into effect on the Implementation Date are effective in accordance with their respective terms. Following the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate to the Applicants, the Monitor shall file the Monitor's Certificate with the Court, and shall post a copy of same, once filed, on the Monitor's website and provide a copy to the Service List. Upon delivery of the Monitor's Certificate to the Applicants, all applicable parties shall take such steps as are required to implement the steps set out in section 7.3 of the Plan.

COMPROMISE OF CLAIMS AND EFFECT OF PLAN

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, pursuant to and in accordance with the terms of the Plan, on the Implementation Date, all existing Claims of Affected Creditors against the Applicants shall be fully, finally, irrevocably and forever compromised, released, discharged, cancelled, extinguished and barred and all proceedings with respect to, in connection with or relating to such Affected Claims shall permanently be stayed against the Released Parties, subject only to the right of Affected Creditors to receive the distributions pursuant to the Plan and this Order in respect of their Claims, in the manner and to the extent provided for in the Plan.

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the determination of Proven Claims in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order and Plan shall be final and binding on the Applicants and all Affected Creditors.

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that an Affected Creditor holding a Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claim shall not be entitled to receive a distribution under the Plan in respect of any portion thereof unless and until such Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claim becomes a Proven Claim in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order and Plan.

12. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing in the Plan extends to or shall be interpreted as extending or amending the Claims Bar Date or gives or shall be interpreted as giving any rights to any Person in respect of Claims that have been barred or extinguished pursuant to the Claims Procedure Order. Any Affected Claim or Director/Officer Claim for which a Proof of Claim or Director/Officer Proof of Claim has not been filed in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order, including for greater certainty and without limitation all claims or causes of action based on the allegations contained in the Lepard Action as defined below, whether or not the holder of such Affected Claim or Director/Officer Claim has received personal notification of the claims process established by the Claims Procedure Order, have been, shall be and are hereby forever barred, extinguished and released with prejudice.

13. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that except to the extent expressly contemplated by the Plan or this Sanction Order, all obligations or agreements to which the Applicants are a party to immediately prior to the Effective Time, will be and shall remain in full force and effect as at the Implementation Date, unamended except as they may have been amended by agreement of the parties to such agreement, and no Person who is a party to any such obligation or agreement shall, following the Implementation Date, accelerate, terminate, rescind, refuse to perform or otherwise repudiate its obligations thereunder, or enforce or exercise any right (including any right of set-off, option, dilution or other remedy) or make any demand under or in respect of any such obligation or agreement, by reason of (i) any defaults or events of default arising as a result of the insolvency of the Applicants prior to the Implementation Date; (ii) any defaults, events of default or cross-defaults under or in respect of any Priority Lien Debt or Parity Lien Debt (as defined in the Amended and Restated Collateral Trust Agreement dated April 19, 2017), in each case arising prior to the Implementation Date; (iii) any change of control of the Applicants arising from the implementation of the Plan; (iv) the fact that the Applicants have sought or obtained relief under the CCAA or that the Plan has been implemented by the Applicants; (v) the effect on the Applicants of the completion of any of the transactions contemplated by the Plan; (vi) any compromises, arrangements, or reorganization effected pursuant to the Plan; or (vii) any other event(s) which occurred on or prior to the Implementation Date which would have entitled any Person to enforce rights and remedies subject to any express provisions to the contrary in any agreements entered into with the Applicants after the Filing Date.

14. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that from and after the Implementation Date, all Persons shall be deemed to have waived any and all defaults of the Applicants then existing or previously committed by the Applicants, or caused by the Applicants, directly or indirectly, or non-compliance with any covenant, warranty, representation, undertaking, positive or negative pledge, term, provision, condition or obligation, expressed or implied, in any contract, instrument, credit document, lease, guarantee, agreement for sale, deed, licence, permit or other agreement, written or oral, and any and all amendments or supplements thereto, existing between such Person and any of the Applicants arising directly or indirectly from the filing by the Applicants under the CCAA and the implementation of the Plan, and any and all notices of default and demands for payment or any step or proceeding taken or commenced in connection therewith under any such agreement shall be deemed to have been rescinded and of no further force or effect, provided that nothing herein shall be deemed to excuse the Applicants from performing their obligations under the Plan or be a waiver of defaults by the Applicants under the Plan and the related documents.

15. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that on the Implementation Date, in accordance with the Plan all Equity Interests in Banro Corporation ("**Banro**") shall be cancelled without any liability, payment or other compensation in respect thereof.

16. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that all claims or causes of action against Banro Corporation based on the allegations set out in the Class Action Complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by EMA GARP FUND L.P. and Lawrence Lepard, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated as plaintiffs (the "**Plaintiffs**") against Banro Corporation and John Clarke as defendants, bearing Case No. 18-cv-01986 (the "**Lepard Action**") constitute Affected Equity Claims.

17. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that on the Implementation Date, in accordance with section 4.4 of the Plan, all Affected Equity Claims shall be fully and finally, irrevocably and forever compromised, released, discharged, cancelled and barred and that no Person including the Plaintiffs in the Lepard Action shall be entitled to any consideration or distributions in respect of such Affected Equity Claims.

DISTRIBUTIONS

18. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that all distributions or payments by the Monitor, on behalf of the Applicants, to Affected Creditors with Proven Claims under the Plan are for the account of the Applicants and the fulfillment of the Applicants' obligations under the Plan.

19. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants are authorized to take any and all such actions as may be necessary or appropriate to comply with applicable withholding and reporting requirements. All amounts withheld on account of Taxes shall be treated for all purposes as having been paid to Affected Creditors in respect of which such withholding was made, provided such withheld amounts are remitted to the appropriate Taxing Authority.

20. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Applicants or the Monitor on behalf of the Applicants, as the case may be, shall be authorized, in connection with the making of any payment or distribution, and in connection with the taking of any step or transaction or performance of any function under or in connection with the Plan, to apply to any Governmental Entity for any consent, authorization, certificate or approval in connection therewith.

21. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, on the Implementation Date, Newco shall issue the New Equity in accordance with the Plan to be held by the Transfer Agent on behalf of each Proven Affected Secured Creditor until such time as each Proven Affected Secured Creditor has delivered its Newco Equityholder Information in accordance with the Plan. In the event that a Proven Affected Secured Creditor fails to deliver its Newco Equityholder Information in accordance with the Plan on or before the date that is six months following the Implementation Date, the New Equity otherwise issuable to such Proven Affected Secured Creditor pursuant to the Plan shall not be delivered to such Proven Affected Secured Creditor and Newco shall be entitled to cancel, and shall have no further obligation to issue or deliver, any New Equity to such Proven Affected Secured Creditors in respect of which Newco Equityholder Information was not received and such Proven Affected Secured Creditors shall cease to have a claim to, or interest of any kind or nature against or in, the Applicants, Newco or the New Equity.

CHARGES

22. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Administration Charge and the Directors' Charge shall continue in full force and effect and shall, from and after the Effective Time, attach solely against the Administrative Reserve.

23. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that as of the Effective Time, the DIP Lenders' Charge and the DIP Claims shall be released without the consent of the Requisite Consenting Parties.

RELEASES

24. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the compromises, arrangements, releases, discharges and injunctions contemplated in Article 8 of the Plan, including those granted by and for the benefit of the Released Parties are integral components thereof and that, effective on the Implementation Date, all such compromises, releases, discharges and injunctions contemplated in the Plan are effective, sanctioned, approved and given full force and effect.

25. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, to the extent not barred, released or otherwise affected by paragraph 12 above, and notwithstanding paragraph 24 above, any Person having, or claiming any entitlement or compensation relating to, a Director/Officer Claim (with the exception of any Director/Officer Claims judged by the express terms of a judgment rendered on a final determination on the merits to have resulted from criminal, fraudulent or other wilful misconduct on the part of the Director or Officer (an "**Excluded Director/Officer Claim**")) will be irrevocably limited to recovery in respect of such Director/Officer Claim solely from the proceeds of the applicable insurance policies held by the Applicants (the "**Insurance Policies**"), and Persons with any Director/Officer Claims will have no right to, and shall not, directly or indirectly, make any claim or seek any recoveries from the Applicants or any Released Party, other than enforcing such Person's rights to be paid by the applicable insurer(s) from the proceeds of the applicable Insurance Policies. Nothing in this Plan Sanction Order prejudices, compromises, releases or otherwise affects any right or defence of any insurer in respect of an Insurance Policy or any insured in respect of a Director/Officer Claim. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, from and after the Implementation Date, a Person may only commence or continue an action for an Excluded Director/Officer Claim against a Director or Officer if such Person has first obtained leave of the Court on notice to the applicable Directors and Officers, the Monitor and the Applicants.

26. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that from and after the Implementation Date any and all Persons shall be and are hereby forever barred, estopped, stayed and enjoined from commencing, taking, applying for or issuing or continuing any and all steps or proceedings, whether directly, derivatively or otherwise, and including without limitation, administrative hearings and orders, declarations or assessments, commenced, taken or proceeded with or that may be commenced,

taken or proceeded with against any Released Party in respect of all Claims and matters which are released pursuant to Article 8 of the Plan or discharged, compromised or terminated pursuant to the Plan, except as against the applicable insurer(s) to the extent that Persons with Director/Officer Claims seek to enforce rights to be paid from the proceeds of the Insurance Policies, and provided that any claimant in respect of a Director/Officer Claim that was duly filed with the Monitor by the Claims Bar Date shall be permitted to file a statement of claim in respect thereof to the extent necessary solely for the purpose of preserving such claimant's ability to pursue such Director/Officer Claim against an insurer in respect of an Insurance Policy. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, from and after the Implementation Date, a Person may only commence or continue an action against a Released Party in respect of a matter that is not released pursuant to Article 8.1(a)(iii) of the Plan if such Person has first obtained leave of the Court on notice to the applicable Released Party, the Applicants, Newco, the Monitor and the insurer(s) under any applicable Insurance Policy.

27. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, on the Implementation Date, each Affected Creditor, each holder of a Director/Officer Claim and any Person having a Released Claim shall be deemed to have consented and agreed to all of the provisions of the Plan, in its entirety, and, in particular, each Affected Creditor, each holder of a Director/Officer Claim and any Person having a Released Claim shall be deemed:

- (a) to have executed and delivered to the Monitor, the Applicants and the other Released Parties all consents, releases, assignments and waivers, statutory or otherwise, required to implement and carry out the Plan in its entirety; and
- (b) to have agreed that if there is any conflict between the provisions, express or implied, of any agreement or other arrangement, written or oral, existing between such Affected Creditor, holder of a Director/Officer Claim, and the Applicants as of the Implementation Date and the provisions of the Plan, the provisions of the Plan take precedence and priority, and the provisions of such agreement or other arrangements shall be deemed to be amended accordingly.

THE MONITOR

28. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that in addition to its prescribed rights and obligations under the CCAA and the CCAA Orders, the Monitor is granted the powers, duties and protections contemplated by and required under the Plan and that the Monitor be and is hereby authorized,

entitled and empowered to perform its duties and fulfil its obligations under the Plan to facilitate the implementation thereof and to apply to this Court for any orders necessary or advisable to carry out its powers and obligations under any other CCAA Order.

29. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, without limiting the provisions of the Initial Order or the provisions of any other CCAA Order, including this Order, the Applicants shall remain in possession and control of the Property (as defined in the Initial Order) and the Monitor shall not take possession or be deemed to be in possession and/or control of the Property.

30. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall be and are hereby directed to maintain the books and records of the Applicants for purposes of assisting the Monitor in the completion of the resolution of the Affected Banro Unsecured Claims;

31. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that in no circumstance will the Monitor have any liability for any of the Applicants' tax liabilities regardless of how or when such liabilities may have arisen.

32. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, effective upon the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate to the Applicants in accordance with paragraph 8 hereof:

(a) the Initial Order shall be amended to delete in their entirety subparagraphs 27(a), 27(c), 27(d), 27(e) and 27(f) and the Monitor shall thereafter have no obligation to perform any duty or exercise any power set out in such subparagraphs; and

(b) the Applicants shall not be subject to the restrictions, obligations, requirements or provisions of paragraphs 8-13 or 23 of the Initial Order.

EXTENSION OF STAY PERIOD

33. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Stay Period (as defined in paragraph 15 of the Initial Order) be and is hereby extended until and including the earlier of April 27, 2018 or the filing of the Monitor's Certificate.

APPROVAL OF MONITOR'S THIRD AND FOURTH REPORTS

34. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Third Report and Fourth Report and the conduct and activities of the Monitor described therein be and are hereby approved.

SEALING

35. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Confidential Affidavit be and is hereby sealed and treated as confidential.

GENERAL

36. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants, the Monitor and any other interested parties are hereby granted leave to apply to this Court for such further advice, directions or assistance as may be necessary to give effect to the terms of the Plan and any other matters that pertain to the completion of the administration of the CCAA Proceedings.

37. **THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court or any judicial, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada, the United States, or in any other foreign jurisdiction, to recognize and give effect to the Plan and this Order, to confirm the Plan and this Order as binding and effective in any appropriate foreign jurisdiction, and to assist the Applicants, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of the Plan and this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Applicants, and the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Applicants in any foreign proceeding, or to assist the Applicants and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Hainey", written over a horizontal line.

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT À TORONTO
ON / BOOK NO:
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO:

MAR 27 2018

PER / PAR: *RW*

SCHEDULE "A"
PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND REORGANIZATION

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST**

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS*
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF BANRO
CORPORATION, BANRO GROUP (BARBADOS) LIMITED, BANRO CONGO (BARBADOS)
LIMITED, NAMOYA (BARBADOS) LIMITED, LUGUSHWA (BARBADOS) LIMITED, TWANGIZA
(BARBADOS) LIMITED AND KAMITUGA (BARBADOS) LIMITED

APPLICANTS

**AMENDED CONSOLIDATED PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND REORGANIZATION
PURSUANT TO THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT* and the *CANADA*
*BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT***

concerning, affecting and involving

**BANRO CORPORATION, BANRO GROUP (BARBADOS) LIMITED, BANRO CONGO
(BARBADOS) LIMITED, NAMOYA (BARBADOS) LIMITED, LUGUSHWA (BARBADOS)
LIMITED, TWANGIZA (BARBADOS) LIMITED AND KAMITUGA (BARBADOS) LIMITED**

March 26, 2018

CONSOLIDATED PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND REORGANIZATION

- A. Banro Corporation ("**Banro**"), Banro Group (Barbados) Limited, Banro Congo (Barbados) Limited, Namoya (Barbados) Limited, Lugushwa (Barbados) Limited, Twangiza (Barbados) Limited and Kamituga (Barbados) Limited (collectively, the "**Banro Barbados Entities**") and together with Banro, the "**Applicants**") are debtor companies (as such term is defined in the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "**CCAA**")).
- B. On December 22, 2017, the Honourable Justice Hainey of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the "**Court**") granted an Initial Order in respect of the Applicants (as such Order may be amended, restated or varied from time to time, the "**Initial Order**") pursuant to the CCAA.
- C. The Applicants and the Non-Applicant Subsidiaries (as defined herein) (together, the "**Banro Parties**") entered into a Support Agreement dated December 22, 2017 (as it may be amended, restated and varied from time to time in accordance with the terms thereof, the "**Support Agreement**") with Baiyin International Investment Limited and affiliates thereof within the direct or indirect control of Baiyin Nonferrous Group Company, Limited (collectively, "**Baiyin**"), Gramercy Funds Management LLC, as agent for and on behalf of certain funds and accounts for which it acts as investment manager or advisor ("**Gramercy**") and any other party that executed a Consent Agreement (as defined herein) (collectively, the "**Consenting Parties**" and each a "**Consenting Party**") pursuant to which the Consenting Parties agreed to support this Plan.

NOW THEREFORE the Applicants hereby propose and present this consolidated plan of compromise and reorganization under the CCAA and the *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44.

ARTICLE 1 INTERPRETATION

1.1 Certain Rules of Interpretation

For the purposes of this Plan:

- (a) In this Plan and the Recitals, unless otherwise stated or the subject matter or context otherwise requires, all terms defined herein have their meanings ascribed thereto in Schedule "**A**".
- (b) Any reference in this Plan to a contract, instrument, release, indenture or other agreement or document being in a particular form or on particular terms and conditions means such document shall be substantially in such form or substantially on such terms and conditions;
- (c) Unless otherwise expressly provided herein, any reference in this Plan to an instrument, agreement or an Order or an existing document or exhibit filed or to be filed means such instrument, agreement, Order, document or exhibit as it may have been or may be amended, modified, or supplemented in accordance with its terms;

- (d) The division of this Plan into articles and sections is for convenience of reference only and does not affect the construction or interpretation of this Plan, nor are the descriptive headings of articles and sections intended as complete or accurate descriptions of the content thereof;
- (e) The use of words in the singular or plural, or with a particular gender, including a definition, shall not limit the scope or exclude the application of any provision of this Plan to such Person (or Persons) or circumstances as the context otherwise permits;
- (f) The words "includes" and "including" and similar terms of inclusion shall not, unless expressly modified by the words "only" or "solely", be construed as terms of limitation, but rather shall mean "includes but is not limited to" and "including but not limited to", so that references to included matters shall be regarded as illustrative without being either characterizing or exhaustive;
- (g) Unless otherwise specified, all references to time herein and in any document issued pursuant hereto mean local time in Toronto, Ontario and any reference to an event occurring on a Business Day shall mean prior to 5:00 p.m. on such Business Day;
- (h) Unless otherwise specified, time periods within or following which any payment is to be made or act is to be done shall be calculated by excluding the day on which the period commences and including the day on which the period ends;
- (i) Unless otherwise provided, any reference to a statute or other enactment of parliament, a legislature or other Governmental Entity includes all regulations made thereunder, all amendments to or re-enactments of such statute or regulations in force from time to time, and, if applicable, any statute or regulation that supplements or supersedes such statute or regulation;
- (j) References to a specific Recital, Article or Section shall, unless something in the subject matter or context is inconsistent therewith, be construed as references to that specific Recital, Article or Section of this Plan, whereas the terms "this Plan", "hereof", "herein", "hereto", "hereunder" and similar expressions shall be deemed to refer generally to this Plan and not to any particular Recital, Article, Section or other portion of this Plan and include any documents supplemental hereto; and
- (k) The word "or" is not exclusive.

1.2 Governing Law

This Plan shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of Ontario and the federal laws of Canada applicable therein. All questions as to the interpretation or application of this Plan and all proceedings taken in connection with this Plan and its provisions shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.

1.3 Currency

Unless otherwise stated, all references in this Plan to sums of money are expressed in, and all payments provided for herein shall be made in, United States dollars. In accordance with paragraph 35 of the Claims Procedure Order, any Claim (other than Priority Claims) in a currency other than United States dollars must be converted to United States dollars, and any

such amount shall be regarded as having been converted at the daily exchange rate quoted by the Bank of Canada for exchanging such currency to United States dollars as at the Filing Date, which for a conversion of Canadian dollars to United States dollars is CDN\$1.2759: USD\$1.00.

1.4 Date for Any Action

If the date on which any action is required to be taken hereunder by a Person is not a Business Day, such action shall be required to be taken on the next succeeding day which is a Business Day.

1.5 Time

Time shall be of the essence in this Plan.

ARTICLE 2 PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF THIS PLAN

2.1 Purpose

The purpose of this Plan is to:

- (a) implement the Recapitalization; and
- (b) allow the Applicants to reorganize and continue ongoing operations;

in the expectation that Persons who have an economic interest in the Applicants or the Non-Applicant Subsidiaries, when considered as a whole, will derive a greater benefit from the implementation of the Plan than would result from a bankruptcy of the Applicants.

2.2 Support Agreement

The Banro Parties have executed the Support Agreement pursuant to which the Consenting Parties have agreed to support this Plan.

2.3 Effectiveness

Subject to the satisfaction, completion or waiver (to the extent permitted pursuant to section 9.4) of the conditions precedent set out herein, this Plan will become effective in the sequence described in Section 7.2 from and after the Effective Time and shall be binding on and enure to the benefit of the Applicants, the Affected Creditors, the Released Parties, and all other Persons as provided for herein, or subject to, this Plan and their respective successors and assigns and their respective heirs, executors, administrators and other legal representatives, successors and assigns.

2.4 Persons Not Affected

- (a) This Plan does not affect Excluded Creditors to the extent of their Excluded Claims. Nothing in this Plan shall affect the Banro Parties' rights and defences, both legal and equitable, with respect to any Excluded Claims, including, but not limited to, all rights with respect to legal and equitable defences or entitlements to set-offs or recoupments against such Excluded Claims. Nothing herein shall constitute a waiver of any rights of any of the Applicants to dispute the quantum or validity of an Excluded Claim.

- (b) Other than with respect to the Affected Secured Claims and the Released Claims, this Plan does not affect or otherwise impair the Claims of any Person as against the Banro Barbados Entities or any of their direct subsidiaries.

ARTICLE 3

CLASSIFICATION, VOTING CLAIMS AND RELATED MATTERS

3.1 Classes

For the purposes of considering, voting on, and receiving distributions under this Plan, the Affected Creditors shall constitute two classes: (i) the Affected Secured Class; and (ii) the Affected Banro Unsecured Class.

3.2 Claims of Affected Creditors

Except as otherwise provided in the Meeting Order, Affected Creditors shall be entitled to vote their Voting Claims at the Creditors' Meetings in respect of this Plan and shall be entitled to receive distributions on account of their Proven Claims as provided under and pursuant to this Plan.

3.3 Excluded Claims

Excluded Claims shall not be compromised under the Plan. No Excluded Creditor shall be:

- (a) entitled to vote or (except as otherwise expressly stated in the Meeting Order) attend in respect of their Excluded Claims at any Creditors' Meeting to consider and approve this Plan; or
- (b) entitled to receive any distribution or consideration under this Plan in respect of such Excluded Claim.

3.4 Guarantees

No Person who has a Claim under a guarantee in respect of any Claim which is compromised under the Plan (a "**Principal Claim**") or who has any right to or claim over in respect of or to be subrogated to the rights of any Person in respect of a Principal Claim, shall:

- (a) be entitled to any greater rights as against any of the Applicants than the Person holding the Principal Claim;
- (b) be entitled to vote on this Plan to the extent that the Person holding the Principal Claim is voting on this Plan; or
- (c) be entitled to receive any distribution under this Plan to the extent that the Person holding the Principal Claim is receiving a distribution.

3.5 Creditors' Meetings

- (a) The Creditors' Meetings shall be held in accordance with this Plan, the Meeting Order and any further Order in the CCAA Proceedings. Subject to the terms of any further Order in the CCAA Proceedings, the only Persons entitled to notice of, to attend or to speak at the Creditors' Meetings are the Eligible Voting Creditors (or their respective duly-appointed proxyholders), representatives of the Monitor, the Applicants, all such parties' financial and legal advisors, the Chair, Secretary and Scrutineers (all as defined in the Meeting Order). Any other

person may be admitted to the Creditors' Meetings only by invitation of the Applicants or the Chair.

- (b) If this Plan is approved by both the Required Majorities, then this Plan shall be deemed to have been agreed to, accepted and approved by the Affected Creditors and shall be binding upon all Affected Creditors immediately upon the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate in accordance with section 9.6 hereof.

3.6 Payments to Employees

If not otherwise paid pursuant to this Plan the Applicants and/or Newco, as applicable, will pay in full all employee-related payments required by subsection 6(5) of the CCAA, provided that this Section 3.6 shall not require payment of any employee-related amounts in advance of the normal payroll cycle applicable to employees.

3.7 Procedure for Valuing Voting Claims

The procedure for valuing Voting Claims and resolving Disputed Voting Claims shall be as set forth in the Claims Procedure Order, the Meeting Order, this Plan and the CCAA. The Monitor and the Applicants shall have the right to seek the assistance of the Court in valuing any Voting Claim in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order, the Meeting Order and this Plan, if required, and to ascertain the result of any vote on this Plan.

3.8 Determination of Beneficial Noteholders' Proven Affected Secured Claims

For the purposes of rights, entitlements and distributions under this Plan, the amount of a Beneficial Noteholders' Proven Affected Secured Claim shall be determined on the basis of the principal amount of Secured Notes held by it as at the Distribution Record Date as set forth on the Master List provided by Participant Holders following the Registration Election Deadline in accordance with the Meeting Order.

ARTICLE 4 TREATMENT OF CLAIMS

4.1 Treatment of Affected Secured Claims

- (a) On the Implementation Date, in accordance with this Plan and in accordance with the steps and in the sequence set forth in Section 7.2, each of Baiyin and Gramercy, as Proven Affected Secured Creditors, shall be entitled to receive a distribution of its Affected Secured Pro Rata Share of the Class A Common Shares which shall, and shall be deemed to, be received in full and final settlement of its Affected Secured Claims.
- (b) On the Implementation Date, in accordance with this Plan and in accordance with the steps and in the sequence set forth in Section 7.2, each Proven Affected Secured Creditor other than Baiyin and Gramercy, shall be entitled to receive a distribution of its Affected Secured Pro Rata Share of the Class B Common Shares which shall, and shall be deemed to, be received in full and final settlement of its Affected Secured Claims.
- (c) Following completion of the steps set forth in Sections 4.1(a) and (b), the proportion that the number of outstanding Class A Common Shares and outstanding Class B Common Shares shall bear to the total number of Common Shares of both classes outstanding shall be equal, in each case, to the

proportion that the aggregate amount of the Affected Secured Claims of Baiyin and Gramercy, on the one hand, and the aggregate amount of the Affected Secured Claims of all other Proven Affected Secured Creditors on the other hand bear to the aggregate amount of the Affected Secured Claims of all Proven Affected Secured Creditors.

- (d) New Equity received by an Affected Creditor shall be applied first to the payment of principal of its Affected Secured Claims and if such principal is fully repaid, shall be applied to the payment of accrued interest owing on such Affected Secured Claims.
- (e) On the Implementation Date, either (i) each Proven Affected Secured Creditor shall be deemed to be a party to the Shareholders Agreement, each in its capacity as a holder of New Equity, or (ii) the constating documents of Newco shall contain the Newco Share Terms which shall apply to each Proven Affected Secured Creditor in its capacity as a holder of New Equity, as applicable.

4.2 Treatment of Affected Banro Unsecured Claims

- (a) On the Implementation Date, in accordance with this Plan and in accordance with the steps and in the sequence set forth in Section 7.2, each Proven Affected Banro Unsecured Creditor shall be entitled to receive a pro rata distribution from the Affected Banro Unsecured Pool.
- (b) All amounts received by an Affected Creditor from the Affected Banro Unsecured Pool shall be applied first to the payment of principal of its Proven Affected Banro Unsecured Claims and if such principal is fully repaid, shall be applied to the payment of accrued interest owing on such Proven Affected Banro Unsecured Claims.
- (c) Notwithstanding section 4.2(a) above, each Proven Affected Banro Unsecured Creditor with respect to its Affected Banro Unsecured Deficiency Claim waives their right under this Plan to receive any distribution from the Affected Banro Unsecured Pool.

4.3 Priority Claims

- (a) In accordance with the Sanction Order, the CCAA and with the steps and in the sequence set forth herein, Section 7.2 and 7.3, the Employee Priority Claims and the Crown Priority Claims, if any, shall be paid from the Priority Claim Reserve Account.
- (b) Subject to the Effective Time occurring: (i) all Crown Priority Claims that were outstanding as at the Filing Date shall be paid in full by the Monitor on behalf of the Applicants, from the Priority Claim Reserve within six months after the Sanction Order, as required by subsection 6(3) of the CCAA; and (ii) all Employee Priority Claims to the extent unpaid prior to the Implementation Date shall be paid by the Monitor, on behalf of the Applicants, from the Priority Claim Reserve immediately after the Sanction Order as required by subsection 6(5) of the CCAA.

4.4 Equity Claims

On the Implementation Date, in accordance with this Plan and in accordance with the steps and in the sequence set forth in Section 7.2, all Equity Claims other than Intercompany Claims that are Equity Claims (the “**Affected Equity Claims**”), and all Equity Interests, if any, shall be fully, finally, irrevocably and forever compromised, released, discharged, cancelled and barred. Holders of Affected Equity Claims or Equity Interests shall not receive any consideration or distributions under this Plan and shall not be entitled to vote on this Plan at the Creditors’ Meetings and existing shares of Banro shall be cancelled and shall be deemed to be cancelled without compensation.

4.5 Excluded Claims

Excluded Creditors in respect to and to the extent of their Excluded Claims shall not receive any consideration under this Plan in respect of their Excluded Claims. Excluded Creditors shall not be entitled to vote on this Plan at the Creditors’ Meetings in respect of their Excluded Claims.

4.6 Disputed Claims

Any Affected Banro Unsecured Creditor with a Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claim shall not be entitled to receive any distribution hereunder with respect to such Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claim unless and until such Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claim becomes a Proven Claim in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order. Distributions pursuant to and in accordance with Section 4.2 shall be paid or distributed in respect of any Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claim that is finally determined to be a Proven Claim in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order and Article 6 hereof.

4.7 Director/Officer Claims

All Director/Officer Claims that are not (i) Section 5.1(2) Director/Officer Claims, or (ii) judged by the express terms of a judgment rendered on a final determination on the merits to have resulted from criminal, fraudulent or other wilful misconduct on the part of the Director or Officer, shall be fully, finally, irrevocably and forever compromised, released, discharged, cancelled and barred without consideration on the Implementation Date. For greater certainty, any Claim of a Director or Officer for indemnification from any of the Applicants in respect of any Director/Officer Claim that is not covered by the Directors’ Charge shall be cancelled for no consideration.

4.8 Extinguishment of Claims

On the Implementation Date, in accordance with its terms and in the sequence set forth in Section 7.2 herein and in accordance with the provisions of the Sanction Order, the treatment of Affected Claims (including Proven Claims and Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claims) and all Released Claims, in each case as set forth herein, shall be final and binding on the Applicants, all Affected Creditors (and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, legal personal representatives, successors and assigns) and any Person holding a Released Claim. All Affected Claims and all Released Claims shall be fully, finally, irrevocably and forever released, discharged, cancelled and barred, and the Released Parties shall thereupon have no further obligation whatsoever in respect of the Affected Claims and the Released Claims, as applicable; provided that nothing herein releases any of the Applicants or any other Person from their obligations to make distributions in the manner and to the extent provided for in the Plan and provided further that such discharge and release of the Applicants shall be without

prejudice to the right of an Affected Creditor in respect of a Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claim to prove such Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claim in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order so that such Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claim may become a Proven Claim entitled to receive consideration under Sections 4.1 and 4.2 hereof.

4.9 Set-Off

The law of set-off applies to all Claims.

ARTICLE 5 CREATION OF POOL AND RESERVES

5.1 Creation of the Affected Banro Unsecured Pool

- (a) Three Business Days prior to the Implementation Date, Banro shall deliver to the Monitor by way of wire transfer (in accordance with the wire transfer instructions provided by the Monitor at least five (5) Business Days prior to the Implementation Date), the Cash in the amount necessary to establish the Affected Banro Unsecured Pool.
- (b) The Monitor shall hold the Affected Banro Unsecured Pool and shall distribute such Cash in the Affected Banro Unsecured Pool to Proven Affected Banro Unsecured Creditors holding Listed Claims in accordance with Article 6 hereof.

5.2 Creation of the Administrative Reserve

- (a) Three Business Days prior to the Implementation Date, Banro shall deliver to the Monitor by way of wire transfer (in accordance with the wire transfer instructions provided by the Monitor at least five (5) Business Days prior to the Implementation Date), Cash in the amount necessary to establish the Administrative Reserve.
- (b) The Monitor shall hold the Administrative Reserve in the Administrative Reserve Account for the purpose of paying the Administrative Reserve Costs in accordance with this Plan and shall distribute any remaining balance in the Administrative Reserve Account to the Applicants, in accordance with section 7.3 of the Plan.

5.3 Creation of the Priority Claim Reserve

- (a) Three Business Days prior to the Implementation Date, Banro shall deliver to the Monitor by way of wire transfer (in accordance with the wire transfer instructions provided by the Monitor at least five (5) Business Days prior to the Implementation Date), Cash in the amount necessary to establish the Priority Claim Reserve.
- (b) The Monitor shall hold the Priority Claim Reserve in the Priority Claim Reserve Account for the purpose of paying the Priority Claims in accordance with this Plan and shall distribute any remaining balance in the Priority Claim Reserve Account to the Applicants, in accordance with section 7.3 of this Plan.

ARTICLE 6
PROVISIONS REGARDING DISTRIBUTIONS AND DISBURSEMENTS

6.1 Distributions and Disbursements Generally

- (a) All distributions and disbursements to be effected pursuant to the Plan shall be made pursuant to this Article 6 and shall occur in the manner set out below under the supervision of the Monitor.
- (b) All distributions and disbursements to be effected pursuant to this Plan on account of Affected Secured Claims shall be made to the Affected Secured Creditors holding such Proven Affected Secured Claims as at the Distribution Record Date and the Applicants, the Monitor and their agents shall have no obligation to deal with a transferee or assignee of such Proven Affected Secured Claim after the Distribution Record Date in respect of any such matter. Affected Secured Creditors who assign their Affected Secured Claims after the Distribution Record Date shall be wholly responsible for ensuring that plan distributions intended to be included within such assignments are in fact delivered to the assignee and neither the Applicants, the Monitor, CDS, nor the Canadian Trustee, as applicable, shall have any liability in connection therewith.
- (c) Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Plan, no distributions or transfers of Cash shall be made by the Monitor with respect to all or any portion of a Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claim unless and only to the extent that such Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claim has become a Proven Claim.

6.2 Issuance and Delivery of New Equity

- (a) The delivery of the New Equity to be distributed under this Plan will be made either (i) by delivering share certificates representing the New Equity in the name of the applicable recipient, or (ii) through the facilities of a direct registration system operated by the Transfer Agent by providing direct registration system advices or confirmations in the name of the applicable recipient and registered electronically in Newco's records which will be maintained by the Transfer Agent.
- (b) On the Implementation Date or as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter, Newco, on account of Proven Affected Secured Creditor Claims, shall issue (or reserve for issuance, as applicable, in accordance with section 6.2(c)) the New Equity to the Transfer Agent to be held for the benefit of (i) Proven Affected Secured Creditors that are not Beneficial Noteholders, in the name of and to the address as recorded in the books and records of the Applicants or as otherwise communicated to the Applicants not less than three Business Days prior to the anticipated Implementation Date, (ii) Beneficial Noteholders that have validly provided Registration Instructions to their Participant Holders in accordance with the Meeting Order prior to the Distribution Record Date, in accordance with their Registration Instructions provided by such Beneficial Noteholders as recorded on the Master List, and (iii) Beneficial Noteholders that have not delivered Registration Instructions to their Participant Holders on or prior to the Distribution Record Date, in the name of such Beneficial Noteholder's Participant Holders in trust for such Beneficial Noteholders.

- (c) Notwithstanding Section 6.2(b), no Proven Affected Secured Creditor shall be entitled to the rights associated with the New Equity and all such New Equity shall be reserved for issuance on the books and records of Newco until such time as it has delivered its Newco Equityholder Information to the Transfer Agent and/or Newco, as applicable. In the event that a Proven Affected Secured Creditor fails to deliver its Newco Equityholder Information in accordance with this Section 6.2(c) on or before the date that is 6 months following the Implementation Date, Newco shall have no further obligation to issue or deliver, and shall have no further obligation to reserve on its books and records, any New Equity otherwise issuable to Proven Affected Secured Creditors (such equity, the **"Unissued New Equity"**) that have not delivered their Newco Equityholder Information accordance this Section 6.2(c) and all such Proven Affected Secured Creditors shall cease to have a claim to, or interest of any kind or nature against or in, the Applicants, Newco or the Unissued New Equity and the Transfer Agent shall delete such Unissued New Equity from the books and records of the Applicants as maintained by the Transfer Agent.
- (d) No fractional common shares of Newco shall be allocated or issued under this Plan. Any legal, equitable, contractual and any other rights or claims (whether actual or contingent, and whether or not previously asserted) of any Person with respect to fractional common shares of Newco issued pursuant to this Plan shall be rounded down to the nearest whole number without compensation therefor.

6.3 Distributions of Cash After Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claims Resolved

From and after the date of the resolution of all Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claims in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order (the **"Unsecured Creditor Distribution Date"**), the Monitor shall distribute to such Affected Banro Unsecured Creditor, Cash in an amount equal to its Affected Banro Unsecured Pro Rata Share, less any Withholding Obligations or statutory deductions required by Applicable Law;

6.4 Method of Payment

All distributions in Cash to Affected Banro Unsecured Creditors to be made by the Monitor under this Plan shall be made by cheque sent by prepaid ordinary mail to the address for such Affected Banro Unsecured Creditor as recorded in the books and records of the Applicants or as otherwise communicated to the Monitor not more than 3 Business Days following the granting of the Sanction Order by such Affected Banro Unsecured Creditor, or an assignee in respect of such Affected Banro Unsecured Creditor's Proven Claim.

6.5 Undeliverable Distributions

- (a) If any distribution is returned as undeliverable or is not cashed (in each case, an **"Undeliverable Distribution"**), no further distributions to such Affected Creditor shall be made unless and until the Monitor is notified by such Affected Creditor of its current address or wire particulars, at which time all such distributions shall be made to such Affected Creditor without interest.
- (b) All claims for undeliverable or un-cashed distributions in respect of Proven Claims shall be made on or before the date that is 6 months after the Final Distribution Date, after which date the Proven Claims of such Affected Creditor or successor or assign of such Affected Creditor with respect to such unclaimed or un-cashed distributions shall be forever discharged and forever barred,

without any compensation therefor, notwithstanding any Applicable Law to the contrary, at which time any Cash held by the Monitor in relation to such undeliverable or unclaimed distribution shall be returned to Banro. Nothing in the Plan or Sanction Order shall require the Monitor or the Applicants to attempt to locate the holder of any Proven Claim or Excluded Claim.

- (c) If the certificates and/or direct registration advices or confirmations representing the New Equity issued and delivered pursuant to the instructions contained in a Share Receipt Instruction Form are returned as undeliverable, then any right or claim thereto shall, as of the first anniversary of the Implementation Date, cease to represent a right or claim of any kind or nature and the right of the holder to receive the New Equity shall terminate and be deemed to be surrendered and forfeited to Newco, for no consideration.

6.6 Tax Matters

- (a) Any terms and conditions of any Affected Claims which purport to deal with the ordering of or grant of priority of payment of principal, interest, penalties or other amounts shall be deemed to be void and ineffective.
- (b) Notwithstanding any provisions of the Plan, each Person that receives a distribution, disbursement or other payment pursuant to the Plan shall have sole and exclusive responsibility for the satisfaction and payment of any Tax obligations imposed on such Person by any Taxing Authority on account of such distribution, disbursement or payment.
- (c) Any payor shall be entitled to deduct and withhold and remit from any distribution, payment or consideration otherwise payable to any Person pursuant to the Plan such amounts as are required (a **"Withholding Obligation"**) to be deducted and withheld with respect to such payment under the ITA, or any provision of federal, provincial, territorial, state, local or foreign tax law, in each case, as amended or succeeded. For greater certainty, no distribution, payment or other consideration shall be made to or on behalf of a Person until such Person has delivered to the Monitor and Banro such documentation prescribed by Applicable Law or otherwise reasonably required by the Monitor as will enable the Monitor to determine whether or not, and to what extent, such distribution, payment or consideration to such Person is subject to any Withholding Obligation imposed by any Taxing Authority.
- (d) All distributions made pursuant to the Plan shall be first in satisfaction of the portion of Affected Claims that are not subject to any Withholding Obligation.
- (e) To the extent that amounts are withheld or deducted and paid over to the applicable Taxing Authority, such withheld or deducted amounts shall be treated for all purposes of the Plan as having been paid to such Person as the remainder of the payment in respect of which such withholding and deduction were made.
- (f) For the avoidance of doubt, it is expressly acknowledged and agreed that the Monitor and any Director or Officer will not hold any assets hereunder, including Cash, or make distributions, payments or disbursements, and no provision hereof shall be construed to have such effect.

ARTICLE 7 IMPLEMENTATION

7.1 Corporate Authorizations

The adoption, execution, delivery, implementation and consummation of all matters contemplated under this Plan involving corporate action of the Applicants will occur and be effective as of the Implementation Date, and will be authorized and approved under this Plan and by the Court, where appropriate, as part of the Sanction Order, in all respects and for all purposes without any requirement of further action by shareholders, directors or officers of any of the Applicants. All necessary approvals to take actions shall be deemed to have been obtained from the Directors or the shareholders of the Applicants, as applicable, including resolution or special resolution with respect to any of the steps contemplated by this Plan shall be deemed to be effective.

7.2 Implementation Date Transactions

Commencing at the Effective Time, the following events or transactions will occur, or be deemed to have occurred and be taken and effected in five minute increments (unless otherwise indicated) and at the times set out in this section (or in such other manner or order or at such other time or times as the Applicants may determine in consultation with the Monitor and the Requisite Consenting Parties), without any further act or formality required on the part of any Person, except as may be expressly provided herein:

- (a) Banro shall transfer and shall be deemed to transfer all issued and outstanding Equity Interests of Namoya (Barbados) Limited and Twangiza Barbados Limited owned by Banro to BGB and in consideration therefor BGB shall issue one common share in the capital of BGB to Banro;
- (b) all of BGB's issued and outstanding Equity Interests held by Banro shall be cancelled without any return of capital and BGB shall simultaneously issue to Newco the New BGB Common Shares pursuant to the Newco/BGB Subscription Agreement;
- (c) Newco shall issue the Stream Warrants as consideration for the Stream Amendments;
- (d) all of the issued and outstanding Equity Interests in Banro shall be cancelled and extinguished for no consideration and without any return of capital and Banro shall issue 100 common shares to BGB;
- (e) the Administration Charge and the Directors' Charge shall continue and shall attach solely against the Administrative Reserve from and after the Implementation Date pursuant to and in accordance with the Sanction Order and shall be deemed to be released as against the other Property (as defined in the Initial Order) of the Applicants pursuant to and in accordance with the Sanction Order;
- (f) concurrently:
 - (i) Newco shall redeem and be deemed to redeem all of its Equity Interests outstanding immediately prior to the Effective Time;

- (ii) the Affected Secured Creditors shall be entitled to the treatment set out in section 4.1 hereof in full and final settlement of their Affected Secured Claims, and the Affected Secured Claims shall, and shall be deemed to be, irrevocably and finally extinguished and such Affected Secured Creditors shall have no further right, title or interest in and to its Affected Secured Claim; and
 - (iii) either (A) each Proven Affected Secured Creditor shall be deemed to be a party to the Shareholders Agreement, each in its capacity as a holder of New Equity, or (B) the constating documents of Newco shall contain the Newco Share Terms which shall apply to each Proven Affected Secured Creditor in its capacity as a holder of New Equity, as applicable;
- (g) the Affected Banro Unsecured Creditors shall be entitled to the treatment set out in section 4.2 hereof in full and final settlement of their Affected Banro Unsecured Claims, and the Affected Banro Unsecured Claims shall, and shall be deemed to be, irrevocably and finally extinguished and such Affected Banro Unsecured Creditors shall have no further right, title or interest in and to its Affected Banro Unsecured Claim other than their right to distribution under this Plan.
- (h) the Intercompany Claims shall be treated in the manner so elected by the Applicants with consent of the Requisite Consenting Parties;
- (i) simultaneously:
 - (i) the Interim Facility shall be replaced by the New Secured Facility pursuant to the New Secured Facility Credit Agreement, which New Secured Facility Credit Agreement shall be deemed to constitute Priority Lien Debt, as defined under the Amended and Restated Collateral Trust Agreement;
 - (ii) the DIP Lender's Charge shall be and shall be deemed to be discharged from the assets of the Applicants; and
 - (iii) Newco shall issue the New Secured Facility Warrants to the DIP Lender;
- (j) the directors of Banro immediately prior to the Effective Time shall be deemed to have resigned and the New Banro Board shall be deemed to have been appointed; and
- (k) the releases and injunctions referred to in accordance with Article 8 hereof shall become effective.

7.3 Post-Implementation Date Transactions

- (a) The Monitor, on behalf of the Applicants, shall pay (i) the Priority Claims pursuant to and in accordance with section 4.3 from the Priority Claim Reserve Account; (ii) any other Administrative Reserve Costs from the Administrative Reserve Account; and (iii) distributions from the Affected Banro Unsecured Pool in accordance with Article 6 hereof.
- (b) The Monitor shall, as and when it determines appropriate, transfer any unused portion of the Administrative Reserve Account to the Applicants.

ARTICLE 8 RELEASES

8.1 Plan Releases

- (a) At the Effective Time, each of the Banro Parties and their respective subsidiaries and affiliates and each of their respective shareholders, partners, Directors, Officers, current and former employees, financial advisors, legal counsel and agents, (being referred to collectively as the **"Banro Released Parties"**) shall be released and discharged from any and all demands, claims, liabilities, causes of action, debts, accounts, covenants, damages, executions and other recoveries based in whole or in part on any act or omission, transaction, dealing or other occurrence existing or taking place on or prior to the Implementation Date, applications, counterclaims, suits, sums of money, judgments, orders, including for injunctive relief or specific performance and compliance orders, expenses, encumbrances and other recoveries on account of any liability, obligation, demand or cause of action of whatever nature which any Creditor, Affected Creditor, or other Person may be entitled to assert, including any and all Claims in respect of the payment and receipt of proceeds, statutory liabilities of the Directors, Officers and employees of the Banro Released Parties and any alleged fiduciary or other duty (whether such employees are acting as a Director, Officer or employee), including any and all Claims that may be made against the Banro Released Parties where by law such Banro Released Parties may be liable in their capacity as Directors or Officers of the Applicants, whether known or unknown, matured or unmatured, foreseen or unforeseen, existing or hereafter arising, based in whole or in part on any omission, transaction, duty, responsibility, indebtedness, liability, obligation, dealing or other occurrence existing or taking place on or prior to the Effective Time arising out of or in connection with the Affected Claims, the Support Agreement, the Recapitalization, the Plan, the CCAA Proceedings, or any Director/Officer Claim any Claim that has been barred or extinguished by the Claims Procedure Order, and all such Claims shall be forever waived and released (other than the right to enforce the Applicants' obligations under the Plan, Support Agreement or any related document), all to the full extent permitted by Applicable Law, provided that nothing herein shall release or discharge (i) the Applicants from any Excluded Claims, (ii) the Directors and Officers to the extent that any claims against the Directors and Officers cannot be released under the CCAA based on statutory limitations set out in the CCAA (such as claims under section 5.1(2) of the CCAA) or (iii) any Banro Released Party if such Banro Party Released Party is judged by the express terms of a judgment rendered on a final determination on the merits to have committed criminal, fraudulent or other wilful misconduct. Notwithstanding the foregoing, all Intercompany Claims owing by any of the Banro Parties to any of the other Banro Parties shall not be released unless the Applicants, with the consent of the Requisite Consenting Parties, elect to extinguish such obligations.
- (b) At the Effective Time, the Monitor, the Requisite Consenting Parties and their respective subsidiaries and affiliates and each of their respective shareholders, partners, officers, directors, current and former employees, financial advisors, legal counsel and agents (being referred to individually as a **"Third Party Released Party"**) are hereby released and discharged from any and all demands, claims, liabilities, causes of action, debts, accounts, covenants,

damages, executions and other recoveries based in whole or in part on any act or omission, transaction, dealing or other occurrence existing or taking place on or prior to the Implementation Date, actions, applications, counterclaims, suits, sums of money, judgments, orders, including for injunctive relief or specific performance and compliance orders, expenses, encumbrances and other recoveries on account of any liability, obligation, demand or cause of action of whatever nature which any Person may be entitled to assert, whether known or unknown, matured or unmatured, foreseen or unforeseen, existing or hereafter arising, based in whole or in part on any omission, transaction, duty, responsibility, indebtedness, liability, obligation, dealing or other occurrence existing or taking place on or prior to the Implementation Date in any way relating to, arising out of or in connection with the Applicants, the Plan, the CCAA Proceedings and any Claims, including any Claim that has been barred or extinguished by the Claims Procedure Order, and all claims arising out of such actions or omissions shall be forever waived and released (other than the right to enforce the Monitor's or the Requisite Consenting Parties' obligations under the Plan, the Support Agreement or any related document), all to the full extent permitted by Applicable Law, provided that nothing herein shall release or discharge any Third Party Released Party if such Third Party Released Party is judged by the express terms of a judgment rendered on a final determination on the merits to have committed criminal, fraudulent or other wilful misconduct.

- (c) The Sanction Order will enjoin the prosecution, whether directly, derivatively or otherwise, of any claim, obligation, suit, judgment, damage, demand, debt, right, cause of action, liability or interest released, discharged, compromised or terminated pursuant to the Plan.
- (d) Nothing in the Plan shall be interpreted as restricting the application of Section 21 of the CCAA.

8.2 Timing of Releases and Injunctions

All releases and injunctions set forth in this Article 8 shall become effective on the Implementation Date.

8.3 Knowledge of Claims

Each Person to which Section 8.1 hereof applies shall be deemed to have granted the releases set forth in Section 8.1 notwithstanding that it may hereafter discover facts in addition to, or different from, those which it now knows or believes to be true, and without regard to the subsequent discovery or existence of such different or additional facts, and such party expressly waives any and all rights that it may have under any applicable law which would limit the effect of such releases to those Claims or causes of action known or suspected to exist at the time of the granting of the release.

ARTICLE 9

COURT SANCTION, CONDITIONS PRECEDENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

9.1 Application for Sanction Order

If this Plan is approved by the Required Majorities, the Applicants shall apply for the Sanction Order on the date set out in the Meeting Order or such later date as the Court may set.

9.2 Sanction Order

The Sanction Order shall be substantially in the form attached (without schedules) as Schedule "B" hereto, with such amendments as the Monitor, the Applicants and the Requisite Consenting Parties may agree.

9.3 Conditions to the Implementation Date

The implementation of this Plan shall be conditional upon the fulfillment, satisfaction or waiver (to the extent permitted by Section 9.4 hereof) of the following conditions:

- (a) the Plan shall have been approved by the Required Majorities;
- (b) the Court shall have granted the Sanction Order the operation and effect of which shall not have been stayed, reversed or amended and in the event of an appeal or application for leave to appeal, final determination shall have been made by the appellate court;
- (c) the Administrative Reserve shall have been funded by the Applicants;
- (d) the Priority Claim Reserve shall have been funded by the Applicants;
- (e) the conditions precedent to the implementation of the Recapitalization set forth in Article 8 of the Support Agreement shall have been satisfied or waived;
- (f) the Priority Lien Debt, the Gold Streams, the Shareholder Agreement and the Interim Facility and all related agreements and other documents necessary in connection with the amendments thereto contemplated by the Recapitalization and the implementation of this Plan, shall be in form and substance acceptable to the Applicants, the Monitor and the Requisite Consenting Parties and shall have become effective, subject only to the implementation of the Plan;
- (g) the Implementation Date shall have occurred no later than the Outside Date; and
- (h) the constating documents of Newco and the composition of the board of Newco effective on and after the Implementation Date shall be consistent with the Restructuring Term Sheet and otherwise acceptable to the Applicants and the Requisite Consenting Parties, acting reasonably.

9.4 Waiver of Conditions

The Applicants, in consultation with the Monitor, may at any time and from time to time waive the fulfillment or satisfaction, in whole or in part, of the conditions set out herein, to the extent and on such terms as such parties may agree to, provided however that the conditions set out in sections 9.3(e), (f), (g) and (h) may only be waived with the consent of the Requisite Consenting Parties.

9.5 Implementation Provisions

If the conditions contained in Section 9.3 are not satisfied or waived (to the extent permitted under Section 9.4) by the Outside Date, unless the Applicants, in consultation with the Monitor, and the Requisite Consenting Parties, agree in writing to extend such period, this Plan and the Sanction Order shall cease to have any further force or effect and will not be binding on any Person.

9.6 Monitor's Certificate of Plan Implementation

Upon written notice from the Applicants and the Requisite Consenting Parties (or counsel on their behalf) to the Monitor that the conditions to Plan implementation set out in Section 9.3, have been satisfied or waived, the Monitor shall, as soon as possible following receipt of such written notice, deliver to the Applicants and file with the Court, a certificate (the "**Monitor's Certificate**") which states that all conditions precedent set out in Section 9.3 have been satisfied or waived and that Implementation Date (which shall be set out on the certificate) has occurred.

ARTICLE 10 GENERAL

10.1 Deeming Provisions

In this Plan, the deeming provisions are not rebuttable and are conclusive and irrevocable.

10.2 Claims Bar Date

Nothing in this Plan extends or shall be interpreted as extending or amending the Claims Bar Date, or gives or shall be interpreted as giving any rights to any Person in respect of Claims that have been barred or extinguished pursuant to the Claims Procedure Order.

10.3 Non-Consummation

If the Implementation Date does not occur on or before the Outside Date (as the same may be extended in accordance with the terms hereof and of the Support Agreement), or if this Plan is otherwise withdrawn in accordance with its terms: (a) this Plan shall be null and void in all respects, and (b) nothing contained in this Plan, and no acts taken in preparation for consummation of this Plan, shall (i) constitute or be deemed to constitute a waiver or release of any Claims by or against the Banro Parties, their respective successors or any other Person; (ii) prejudice in any manner the rights of the Banro Parties, their respective successors or any other Person in any further proceedings involving the Banro Parties or their respective successors; or (iii) constitute an admission of any sort by the Banro Parties, their respective successors or any other Person.

10.4 Modification of Plan

- (a) The Applicants reserve the right to amend, restate, modify and/or supplement this Plan at any time and from time to time, provided that (except as provided in subsection (c) below) any such amendment, restatement, modification or supplement must be contained in a written document that is (A) filed with the Court and, if made following the Creditors' Meetings, approved by the Court, and (B) approved by the Monitor and the Requisite Consenting Parties, and communicated to the Affected Creditors in the manner required by the Court (if so required):
 - (i) if made prior to or at the Creditors' Meetings: (A) the Chair (as defined in the Meeting Order) shall communicate the details of any such amendment, restatement, modification and/or supplement to Affected Creditors and other Persons present at the Creditors' Meeting prior to any vote being taken at the Creditors' Meeting; (B) the Applicants shall provide notice to the service list of any such amendment, restatement, modification and/or supplement and shall file a copy thereof with the

Court forthwith and in any event prior to the Court hearing in respect of the Sanction Order; and (C) the Monitor shall post an electronic copy of such amendment, restatement, modification and/or supplement on the Monitor's Website forthwith and in any event prior to the Court hearing in respect of the Sanction Order;

- (ii) if made following the Creditors' Meetings: (A) the Applicants shall provide notice to the service list of any such amendment, restatement, modification and/or supplement and shall file a copy thereof with the Court; (B) the Monitor shall post an electronic copy of such amendment, restatement, modification and/or supplement on the Monitor's Website; and (C) such amendment, restatement, modification and/or supplement shall require the approval of the Court following notice to the service list.
- (b) Any amendment, modification or supplement to this Plan may be proposed by the Applicants with the consent of the Monitor and the Requisite Consenting Parties at any time prior to or at the Creditors' Meetings, with or without any prior notice or communication (other than as may be required under the Initial Order), and if so proposed and affected at the Creditors' Meetings, shall become part of this Plan for all purposes.
- (c) Any amendment, modification or supplement to this Plan may be made following the Creditors' Meetings by the Applicants, with the consent of the Monitor, without requiring filing with, or approval of, the Court, provided that it concerns a matter which is of an administrative nature and is required to better give effect to the implementation of this Plan and is not materially adverse to the financial or economic interests of any of the Consenting Parties or any Affected Creditors.

10.5 Severability of Plan Provisions

If, prior to the Effective Time, any term or provision of this Plan is held by the Court to be invalid, void or unenforceable, at the request of the Applicants, the Court shall have the power to either (a) sever such term or provision from the balance of this Plan and provide the Applicants with the option to proceed with the implementation of the balance of this Plan as of and with effect from the Effective Time, or (b) alter and interpret such term or provision to make it valid or enforceable to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with the original purpose of the term or provision held to be invalid, void or unenforceable, and such term or provision shall then be applicable as altered or interpreted. Notwithstanding any such holding, alteration or interpretation, and provided that this Plan is implemented, the remainder of the terms and provisions of this Plan shall remain in full force and effect and shall in no way be affected, impaired or invalidated by such holding, alteration or interpretation.

10.6 Preservation of Rights of Action

Except as otherwise provided in this Plan or in the Sanction Order, or in any contract, instrument, release, indenture or other agreement entered into in connection with this Plan, following the Implementation Date, the Applicants will retain and may enforce, sue on, settle, or compromise (or decline to do any of the foregoing) all claims, rights or causes of action, suits and proceedings, whether in law or in equity, whether known or unknown, that the Applicants may hold against any Person or entity without further approval of the Court.

10.7 Responsibilities of Monitor

The Monitor is acting and will continue to act in all respects in its capacity as Monitor in the CCAA Proceedings with respect to the Applicants and not in its personal or corporate capacity, and shall have no liability in connection with the implementation of this Plan, including without limitation with respect to making distributions pursuant to and in accordance with the Plan, the establishment and administration of the Affected Banro Unsecured Pool, the Administrative Reserve, the Priority Claim Reserve and the Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claims Reserve (and in each case, any adjustments with respect to same) or the timing or sequence of the plan transaction steps, in each case save and except for gross negligence and wilful misconduct. The Monitor shall not be responsible or liable whatsoever for any obligations of the Applicants. The Monitor shall at all times have the powers and protections granted to it by the Plan, the CCAA, the Initial Order, the Meeting Order, and any other Order made in the CCAA Proceedings.

10.8 Different Capacities

Persons who are affected by the Plan may be affected in more than one capacity. Unless expressly provided herein to the contrary, a Person will be entitled to participate hereunder in each such capacity. Any action taken by a Person in one capacity will not affect such Person in any other capacity, unless expressly agreed by a Person in writing or unless its Claims overlap or are otherwise duplicative.

10.9 Notices

Any notice or other communication to be delivered hereunder must be in writing and refer to this Plan and may, as hereinafter provided, be made or given by personal delivery, ordinary mail, email or by facsimile addressed to each of the respective Parties as follows:

- (a) Banro Corporation
1 First Canadian Place
100 King Street West, Suite 7005
Toronto, ON M5X 1E3

Attention: Rory Taylor
Email: rtaylor@banro.com

with a required copy (which shall not be deemed notice) to:

Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP
40 King Street West
2100 Scotia Plaza
Toronto, Ontario M5H 3C2

Attention: Ryan Jacobs/ Jane O. Dietrich
Email: rjacobs@casselsbrock.com/
jdietrich@casselsbrock.com

- (b) The Monitor
FTI Consulting Canada Inc.
79 Wellington Street West
Toronto Dominion Centre, Suite 2010, P.O. Box 104
Toronto, ON M5K 1G8

Attention: Nigel Meakin/ Toni Vanderlaan
Email: nigel.meakin@fticonsulting.com/
toni.vanderlaan@fticonsulting.com

And to:

McMillan LLP
181 Bay Street, Suite 4400
Toronto, ON M5J 2T3
Attention: Wael Rostom/ Caitlin Fell
Email: wael.rostom@mcmillan.ca/
caitlin.fell@mcmillan.ca

(c) If to Baiyin, at:

Baiyin Nonferrous Group Company, Limited
Suite 1701, Orient Plaza Block E2
1 Chang An Avenue
Beijing, China
100738

Attention: George Lu
Email: george@baiyinbj.com

With a required copy (which shall not be deemed notice) to:

McCarthy Tétrault LLP
Suite 2400
745 Thurlow Street
Vancouver, BC V6E 0C5
Attention: Sean F. Collins/ Roger Taplin
Email: scollins@mccarthy.ca/ rtaplin@mccarthy.ca

(d) If to Gramercy, at:

Gramercy Funds Management LLC
20 Dayton Avenue
Greenwich, CT 06830 USA

Attention: Robert Rauch/ Brian Nunes/ Operations
Email: rrauch@gramercy.com/
bnunes@gramercy.com/
operations@gramercy.com

With a required copy (which shall not be deemed notice) to:

Goodmans LLP
Suite 3400
333 Bay Street
Bay Adelaide Centre

Toronto, ON M5H 2S7

Attention: Kari Mackay/ Brendan O'Neill
Email: kmackay@goodmans.ca/
boneill@goodmans.ca

or to such other address as any Party may from time to time notify the others in accordance with this section. Any such communication so given or made shall be deemed to have been given or made and to have been received on the day of delivery if delivered, or on the day of faxing or emailing, provided that such day in either event is a Business Day and the communication is so delivered, faxed or emailed before 5:00 p.m. on such day. Otherwise, such communication shall be deemed to have been given and made and to have been received on the next following Business Day.

10.10 Paramountcy

From and after the Effective Time, any conflict between:

- (a) this Plan; and
- (b) the covenants, warranties, representations, terms, conditions, provisions or obligations, expressed or implied, of any contract, mortgage, security agreement, indenture, trust indenture, note, loan agreement, commitment letter, agreement for sale, lease or other agreement, written or oral and any and all amendments or supplements thereto existing between any Person and the Applicants and/or the Non-Applicant Subsidiaries as at the Implementation Date,

will be deemed to be governed by the terms, conditions and provisions of this Plan and the Sanction Order, which shall take precedence and priority.

10.11 Further Assurances

Notwithstanding that the transactions and events set out herein will occur and be deemed to occur in the order set out in this Plan without any further act or formality, each of the Persons named or referred to in, or subject to, this Plan will make, do and execute, or cause to be made, done and executed, all such further acts, deeds, agreements, transfers, assurances, instruments or documents as may reasonably be required by any of them to carry out the full intent and meaning of this Plan and to give effect to the transactions contemplated herein.

Dated this 26th day of March, 2018.

SCHEDULE "A" **INTERPRETATION**

Definitions

"Administration Charge" has the meaning given to that term in the Initial Order;

"Administrative Reserve" means a Cash reserve, in an amount to be agreed to by the Monitor, the Applicants and the Requisite Consenting Parties at least three (3) Business Days prior to the Implementation Date, or failing agreement, the amount ordered by the Court, to be deposited by the Applicants into the Administrative Reserve Account for the purpose of paying the Administrative Reserve Costs;

"Administrative Reserve Account" means a segregated interest-bearing trust account established by the Monitor to hold the Administrative Reserve;

"Administrative Reserve Costs" means costs incurred and payments to be made on or after the Implementation Date (including costs incurred prior to the Implementation Date which remain outstanding as of the Implementation Date) in respect of: (a) the Monitor's fees and disbursements (including of its legal counsel and other consultants and advisors) in connection with the performance of its duties under the Plan and in the CCAA Proceedings, including without limitation all costs associated with resolving Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claims; (b) the Applicants' legal fees and disbursements in connection with the Plan and the CCAA Proceedings including without limitation all costs associated with resolving Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claims; (c) amounts secured by the Directors' Charge; and (d) any other reasonable amounts in respect of any other determinable contingency as the Applicants, with the consent of the Monitor and the Requisite Consenting Parties may determine in connection with the Applicants or the CCAA Proceedings;

"Affected Banro Unsecured Claim" means (i) the Listed Claims; and (ii) Affected Banro Unsecured Deficiency Claims;

"Affected Banro Unsecured Class" means the class of creditors holding Affected Banro Unsecured Claims;

"Affected Banro Unsecured Creditor" means the holder of an Affected Banro Unsecured Claim in respect of and to the extent of such Affected Banro Unsecured Claim;

"Affected Banro Unsecured Deficiency Claim" means an unsecured Claim equal to 25% of the amount of the Claim under each of: (i) the Proven Secured Notes Claim; (ii) the Proven Doré Loan Claim; and (iii) the Proven Namoya Forward II Claim;

"Affected Banro Unsecured Pool" means Cash in the amount of \$10,000.00;

"Affected Banro Unsecured Pro Rata Share" means the proportionate share of the Listed Claim of a Proven Affected Banro Unsecured Creditor to the total of all Listed Claims of Proven Affected Banro Unsecured Creditors after final determination of all Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claims in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order;

"Affected Banro Unsecured Required Majority" means a majority in number of Affected Banro Unsecured Creditors representing at least two thirds in value of the Voting Claims of

Affected Banro Unsecured Creditors who actually vote (in person or by Proxy) at the Creditors' Meeting;

"Affected Claims" means all Claims against any of the Applicants that are not Excluded Claims;

"Affected Creditor" means the holder of an Affected Claim in respect of and to the extent of such Affected Claim;

"Affected Equity Claims" has the meaning ascribed to that term in section 4.4;

"Affected Secured Claim" means Claims under (i) the Secured Notes in the amount equal to 75% of the Proven Secured Notes Claim; (ii) the Doré Loan in an amount equal to 75% of the Proven Doré Loan Claim; and (iii) the Namoya Forward II Agreement in an amount equal to 75% of the Namoya Forward II Claim;

"Affected Secured Class" means the class of creditors holding Affected Secured Claims;

"Affected Secured Creditor" means the holder of an Affected Secured Claim;

"Affected Secured Pro Rata Share" means, as to: (a) each of Baiyin and Gramercy in their capacity as Affected Secured Creditors, the proportionate share of Proven Affected Secured Claims held by it on the Distribution Record Date of all Proven Affected Secured Claims held by Baiyin and Gramercy together on the Distribution Record Date; and (b) in respect of any other Affected Secured Creditor, the proportionate share of Proven Affected Secured Claims held by it on the Distribution Record Date of all Proven Affected Secured Claims held by all Affected Secured Creditors other than Baiyin and Gramercy, on the Distribution Record Date;

"Affected Secured Required Majority" means a majority in number of Affected Secured Creditors representing at least two thirds in value of the Voting Claims of Affected Secured Creditors who actually vote (in person or by Proxy) at the Creditors' Meeting;

"Amended and Restated Collateral Trust Agreement" means the Amended and Restated Collateral Trust Agreement, dated as of April 19, 2017, among Banro, the Trustees and Equity Financial Trust Company;

"Applicable Law" means, with respect to any Person, property, transaction, event or other matter, any Law relating or applicable to such Person, property, transaction, event or other matter, including, where appropriate, any interpretation of the Law (or any part thereof) by any Person, court or tribunal having jurisdiction over it, or charged with its administration or interpretation;

"Applicants" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Recitals;

"Baiyin" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Recitals;

"Banro" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Recitals;

"Banro Barbados Entities" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Recitals;

"Banro Parties" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Recitals;

"Banro Released Parties" has the meaning ascribed to that term in section 8.1 hereof;

"Beneficial Noteholders" means a beneficial or entitlement holder of Secured Notes holding such Secured Notes in a securities account with a depository participant or other securities intermediary including, for greater certainty, such depository participant or other securities

intermediary only if and to the extent such depository participant or other securities intermediary holds the Secured Notes as a principal for its own account;

"BGB" means Banro Group (Barbados) Limited;

"Business Day" means any day, other than a Saturday, or a Sunday or a statutory or civic holiday, on which banks are generally open for business in Toronto, Ontario;

"Canadian Trustee" means TSX Trust Company;

"Cash" means cash, certificates of deposit, bank deposits, commercial paper, treasury bills and other cash equivalents;

"Cassels" means Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, legal counsel to the Applicants and the Banro Parties;

"Cayman Law" means the laws of the Cayman Islands, as in effect at the relevant time;

"CCAA" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Recitals;

"CCAA Proceedings" means the proceedings commenced by the Applicants under the CCAA as contemplated by the Initial Order;

"CDS" means Canadian Depository for Securities or its nominee, which at the date of this Plan is CDS & Co. or any successor thereof;

"Charges" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Initial Order;

"Circular" means Banro's Information Circular to be distributed pursuant to the Meeting Order;

"Claim" means:

- (a) any right or claim, including any Tax Claim, of any Person that may be asserted or made in whole or in part against any of the Applicants, in any capacity, whether or not asserted or made, in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever of any of the Applicants, and any interest accrued thereon or costs payable in respect thereof, in existence on the Filing Date, or which is based on an event, fact, act or omission which occurred in whole or in part prior to the Filing Date, whether at law or in equity, including by reason of the commission of a tort (intentional or unintentional), by reason of any breach of contract or other agreement (oral or written), by reason of any breach of duty (including, any legal, statutory, equitable or fiduciary duty) or by reason of any equity interest, right of ownership of or title to property or assets or right to a trust or deemed trust (statutory, express, implied, resulting, constructive or otherwise), and together with any security enforcement costs or legal costs associated with any such claim, and whether or not any indebtedness, liability or obligation is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, unsecured, perfected, unperfected, present or future, known or unknown, by guarantee, warranty, surety or otherwise, and whether or not any right or claim is executory or anticipatory in nature, including any claim arising from or caused by the termination, disclaimer, rescission, assignment or repudiation by any of the Applicants of any contract, lease or other agreement, whether written or oral, any claim made or asserted against any of the

Applicants through any affiliate, subsidiary, associated or related person, or any right or ability of any Person to advance a claim for an accounting, reconciliation, contribution, indemnity, restitution or otherwise with respect to any matter, grievance, action (including any class action or proceeding before an administrative tribunal), cause or chose in action, whether existing at present or commenced in the future, and including any other claims that would have been claims provable in bankruptcy had any of the Applicants become bankrupt on the Filing Date, any Equity Claim, and any claim against any of the Applicants for indemnification by any Director or Officer in respect of a Director/Officer Claim; and

- (b) any right or claim of any Person against any of the Applicants in connection with any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever owed by any of the Applicants to such Person arising out of the restructuring, disclaimer, rescission, termination or breach by any of the Applicants on or after the Filing Date of any contract, lease, warranty obligation or other agreement whether written or oral;

"Claims Procedure Order" means the Order made in these proceedings on February 1, 2018 entitled "Claims Procedure Order";

"Claims Process" means the claims process to be conducted in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order;

"Claims Bar Date" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Claims Procedure Order;

"Class A Common Share" means a Class A Common Share of Newco, each of which shall have the right to one vote at any meeting of the shareholders of Newco and shall also have attached to it such other rights and restrictions as are acceptable to the Applicants, the Monitor and the Requisite Consenting Parties, acting reasonably;

"Class B Common Share" means a Class B Common Share of Newco, which shall have attached to it such rights and restrictions as are acceptable to the Applicants, the Monitor and the Requisite Consenting Parties, acting reasonably, including, without limitation, economic rights that rank *pari passu* to those attached to the Class A Common Shares in respect of all dividends, distributions and other payments made in connection with such shares, *provided, however*, that (i) such shares shall be subject to the Newco Share Terms and (ii) such shares shall not have the right to vote at any meeting of the shareholders of Newco, except as required by Cayman Law, until the earlier of (A) the date which is 42 months following the Implementation Date; and (B) the date on which Newco completes an Exit Transaction, at which time each Class B Common Share shall have the right to one vote at any meeting of the shareholders of Newco (which voting rights shall be identical to those attached to the Class A Common Shares on a share-for-share basis);

"Consent Agreement" means the form of consent agreement attached as "Schedule B" to the Support Agreement;

"Consenting Party" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Recitals;

"Consenting Parties" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Recitals;

"Court" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Recitals;

“Creditor” means any Person having a Claim and includes without limitation the transferee or assignee of a Claim transferred and recognized as a Creditor in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order or a trustee, executor, liquidator, receiver, receiver and manager, or other Person acting on behalf of or through such Person;

“Creditors’ Meetings” means the meetings of the Affected Banro Unsecured Creditors and of the Affected Secured Creditors called for the purpose of considering and voting in respect of this Plan as described in the Meeting Order;

“Crown” means Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province of Canada;

“Crown Priority Claim” means any Claim of the Crown, for all amounts that were outstanding at the Filing Date and are of a kind that could be subject to a demand under:

- (a) subsection 224(1.2) of the ITA;
- (b) any provision of the Canada Pension Plan or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the ITA and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the Canada Pension Plan, an employee’s premium, or employer’s premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, or a premium under Part VII.1 of that Act and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts;
- (c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the ITA, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum:
 - (i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the ITA; or
 - (ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the Canada Pension Plan if the province is a “province providing a comprehensive pension plan” as defined in subsection 3(1) of the Canada Pension Plan and the provincial legislation establishes a “provincial pension plan” as defined in that subsection;

“DIP Claims” means the claims secured by the DIP Lender’s Charge;

“DIP Lender” has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Initial Order;

“DIP Lender’s Charge” has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Initial Order;

“DIP Term Sheet” has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Initial Order;

“Director” means anyone who is or was, or may be deemed to be or have been, whether by statute, operation of law or otherwise, a director or *de facto* director of any of the Applicants;

“Director/Officer Claim” any right or Claim of any Person against one or more of the Directors or Officers howsoever arising, whether or not such right or claim is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, unsecured, perfected, unperfected, present, future, known, or unknown, by guarantee, surety or otherwise, and whether or not such right is executory or anticipatory in nature, including the right or ability of any Person to advance a claim for contribution or

indemnity or otherwise with respect to any matter, action, cause or chose in action, whether existing at present or commenced in the future, including any right of contribution or indemnity, for which any Director or Officer is alleged to be by statute or otherwise by law liable to pay in his or her capacity as a Director or Officer (collectively, the “**Director/Officer Claims**”);

“**Director/Officer Indemnity Claim**” means any existing or future right of any Director or Officer of any of the Applicants against any of the Applicants that arose or arises as a result of any Person filing a Proof of Claim in respect of a Director/Officer Claim or otherwise, in respect of such Director or Officer of any of the Applicants for which such Director or Officer of any of the Applicants is entitled to be indemnified by any of the Applicants;

“**Directors’ Charge**” has the meaning ascribed to it in the Initial Order;

“**Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claim**” means an Affected Banro Unsecured Claim which has not been allowed, in whole or in part, as a Proven Affected Banro Unsecured Claim, which is validly disputed for distribution purposes in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order and which remains subject to adjudication for distribution purposes in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order;

“**Disputed Voting Claim**” means an Affected Claim or such portion thereof which has not been allowed as a Voting Claim, which is validly disputed for voting purposes in accordance with the Meeting Order or Claims Procedure Order and which remains subject to adjudication for voting purposes in accordance with the Meeting Order or Claims Procedure Order;

“**Distribution Record Date**” means the Implementation Date or such earlier date as the Applicants, the Monitor and the Requisite Consenting Parties may agree;

“**Doré Loan**” means a loan in the total principal amount of US\$10.0 million advanced pursuant to a letter agreement dated July 15, 2016 among Baiyin International Investment Ltd and Twangiza Mining S.A.;

“**DRC**” means Democratic Republic of the Congo;

“**Effective Time**” means 12:01 a.m. on the Implementation Date (or such other time as the Applicants, the Monitor and the Requisite Consenting Parties may agree);

“**Eligible Voting Creditors**” means Affected Banro Unsecured Creditors and Affected Secured Creditors, holding Voting Claims or Disputed Voting Claims;

“**Employee Priority Claims**” means, with respect to Listed Creditors who are or were employees of Banro, the following claims:

- (a) Claims of the Applicants’ employees and former employees equal to the amounts that such employees and former employees would have been qualified to receive under paragraph 136(l)(d) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) if the Applicants had become bankrupt on the Filing Date;
- (b) Claims of the Applicants’ employees and former employees for wages, salaries, commissions or compensation for services rendered by them after the Filing Date and on or before the date of the Sanction Order, together with, in the case of travelling salespersons, disbursements properly incurred by them in and about the Applicants’ business during the same period; and

- (c) any amounts in excess of (a) and (b) above, that the Applicants' employees or former employees may have been entitled to receive pursuant to the *Wage Earner Protection Program Act* if Banro had become bankrupt on the Filing Date.

"Equity Claim" has the meaning set forth in section 2(1) of the CCAA;

"Equity Interest" has the meaning set forth in section 2(1) of the CCAA;

"Excise Tax Act" means the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c.E-15, as amended and any regulations thereunder;

"Excluded Claim"

- (a) any Claims secured by any of the Charges;
- (b) any Claims that cannot be compromised pursuant to subsection 19(2) of the CCAA;
- (c) all secured Claims against the Applicants other than the Affected Secured Claims;
- (d) all unsecured Claims against the Applicants other than the Affected Banro Unsecured Claims;
- (e) Intercompany Claims;
- (f) any Priority Claims;
- (g) any Post-Filing Claims; and
- (h) any Claim entitled to the benefit of any applicable insurance policy, excluding any such Claim or portion thereof that is directly recoverable as against an Applicant;

"Excluded Creditor" means a Person who has an Excluded Claim, but only in respect of and to the extent of such Excluded Claim;

"Exit Transaction" means a transaction pursuant to which Newco is sold in accordance with the Newco Share Terms to a third-party or parties in one or more transactions, either by way of the sale of a majority of the New Equity (whether by way of a sale or pursuant to a merger, combination, amalgamation, consolidation or similar transaction) or all or substantially all of the assets of Newco (including by way of liquidation or dissolution) or a public offering of its Equity Interests, in each case as more fully defined and described in the memorandum and articles of association of Newco;

"Filing Date" means December 22, 2017;

"FTI" means FTI Consulting Canada Inc.;

"Gold Streams" means collectively, the Namoya Streaming Agreement and the Twangiza Streaming Agreement;

"Gramercy" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Recitals;

"Governmental Entity" means any government, regulatory authority, governmental department, agency, commission, bureau, official, minister, Crown corporation, court, board, tribunal or

dispute settlement panel or other law, rule or regulation-making organization or entity: (a) having or purporting to have jurisdiction on behalf of any nation, province, territory or state or any other geographic or political subdivision of any of them; or (b) exercising, or entitled or purporting to exercise any administrative, executive, judicial, legislative, policy, regulatory or taxing authority or power;

"Implementation Date" means the Business Day on which this Plan becomes effective, which shall be the day indicated on the certificate which the Monitor has filed with the Court contemplated in Section 9.6 hereof;

"Initial Order" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Recitals;

"Intercompany Claim" means any Claim, including Equity Claims, by any of the Banro Parties against other Banro Parties;

"Interim Facility" means a senior secured super priority (debtor-in-possession) interim, non-revolving credit facility up to a maximum principal amount of US\$20,000,000 dated as of December 22, 2017;

"ITA" means the *Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp.), as amended and any regulations thereunder;

"Law" means any law, statute, order, decree, consent decree, judgment, rule regulation, ordinance or other pronouncement having the effect of law whether in Canada or any other country, or any domestic or foreign state, county, province, city or other political subdivision or of any Governmental Entity;

"Listed Claims" means Claims of Listed Creditors as defined in the Claims Procedure Order;

"Meeting Order" means the Order of the Court dated February 1, 2018 in connection with the CCAA Proceedings;

"Monitor" means FTI, in its capacity as Court-appointed Monitor of the Applicants in the CCAA Proceedings;

"Monitor's Certificate" has the meaning ascribed to that term in section 9.6 hereof;

"Monitor's Website" means <http://cfcanada.fticonsulting.com/banro/>;

"Namoya Forward I Agreement" means the gold purchase and sale agreement dated April 19, 2017 among Namoya Gold Forward Holdings LLC, RFW Banro II Investments Limited, Banro and Namoya Mining S.A. (as amended or restated from time to time) in the secured amount of US\$42 million;

"Namoya Forward II Agreement" means the Purchase and Sale Agreement dated July 12, 2017 among Namoya Gold Forward Holdings II LLC, Baiyin International Investment Ltd, Banro and Namoya Mining S.A. (as amended from time to time) in the secured amount of US\$20.0 million;

"Namoya Streaming Agreement" means the Gold Purchase and Sale Agreement dated February 27, 2015 among Namoya GSA Holdings, Banro and Namoya Mining S. A. (as amended or restated from time to time);

"New Banro Board" means Banro's board of directors appointed on the Implementation Date, which shall be comprised of individuals acceptable to the Applicants and the Requisite Consenting Parties;

"New BGB Common Shares" means the 100 common shares in the capital of BGB to be issued to Newco on the Implementation Date;

"Newco" means a company to be organized under the laws of the Cayman Islands;

"Newco/BGB Subscription Agreement" means a subscription agreement to be entered into by Newco and BGB on or prior to the Implementation Date in form and substance reasonably acceptable to the Applicants and the Requisite Consenting Parties pursuant to which BGB agrees to issue to Newco, and Newco agrees to subscribe for, the New BGB Common Shares on the Implementation Date;

"Newco Equityholder Information" means such information and documentation as the Transfer Agent and/or Newco may require from recipients of the New Equity in order to comply with any anti-money laundering, know your client, proceeds of crime and other Laws applicable to the Transfer Agent and Newco, respectively, which shall be communicated to the Proven Affected Secured Creditors by the Transfer Agent and/or Newco at the information provided in such Proven Affected Secured Creditors' Registration Instructions.

"Newco Share Terms" means the rights and obligations of holders of New Equity as set forth in the Circular and/or as otherwise acceptable to the Applicants, the Monitor and the Requisite Consenting Parties, acting reasonably;

"New Equity" means, collectively, the Class A Common Shares and the Class B Common Shares of Newco which, immediately following the issuance thereof, will constitute all of the issued and outstanding shares of Newco;

"New Secured Facility" means a new secured loan facility, which facility shall have refinanced the obligations owing by the Banro Parties to the DIP Lender under the DIP Term Sheet;

"New Secured Facility Credit Agreement" means the secured term loan agreement to be entered into between the Banro Parties on the terms substantially as described in the Circular and/or as may otherwise be agreed by the Applicants and the DIP Lender, each acting reasonably, pursuant to which the New Secured Facility will be issued;

"New Secured Facility Warrants" means warrants for common shares in the capital of Newco to be issued to the DIP Lender on the Implementation Date as consideration for providing the New Secured Facility, on the terms and conditions as described in the Circular and/or as may otherwise be agreed by the Applicants and the DIP Lender, each acting reasonably;

"Noteholder" means a holder of the Secured Notes as determined in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order, including a Beneficial Noteholder;

"Non-Applicant Subsidiaries" means Banro Congo Mining S.A., Namoya Mining S.A., Lugushwa Mining S. A., Twangiza Mining S.A. and Kamituga Mining S.A.;

"Officer" means anyone who is or was, or may be deemed to be or have been, whether by statute, operation of law or otherwise, an officer or *de facto* officer of any of the Applicants;

"Order" means any order of the Court in the CCAA Proceedings;

"Outside Date" means April 30, 2018 (or such other date as the Applicants, the Monitor and the Requisite Consenting Parties may agree);

"Participant Holder" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Meeting Order;

"Person" is to be broadly interpreted and includes any individual, firm, corporation, limited or unlimited liability company, general or limited partnership, association, trust, unincorporated organization, joint venture, Governmental Entity or any agency, officer or instrumentality thereof or any other entity, wherever situate or domiciled, and whether or not having legal status;

"Plan" means this Consolidated Plan of Compromise and Reorganization and any amendments, restatements, modifications or supplements hereto made from time to time in accordance with the terms hereof or made at the direction of the Court in the Sanction Order or otherwise;

"Post-Filing Claim" means any claims against any of the Applicants that arose from the provision of authorized goods and services provided or otherwise incurred on or after the Filing Date in the ordinary course of business;

"Principal Claim" has the meaning ascribed to that term in section 3.4 hereof;

"Priority Claim" means a Crown Priority Claim or an Employee Priority Claim;

"Priority Claim Reserve" means a Cash reserve, in equal to the amount of the Priority Claims, to be deposited by the Applicants into the Priority Claim Reserve Account for the purpose of paying the Priority Claims;

"Priority Claim Reserve Account" means a segregated interest-bearing trust account established by the Monitor to hold the Priority Claim Reserve;

"Priority Lien Debt" means (i) the Twangiza Forward I Agreement; (ii) the Twangiza Forward II Agreement; and (iii) the Namoya Forward I Agreement;

"Proof of Claim" has the meaning ascribed to such term in the Claims Procedure Order;

"Proven Affected Banro Unsecured Claim" means the amount of the Affected Banro Unsecured Claim of an Affected Banro Unsecured Creditor as finally accepted and determined for distribution purposes in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order and the CCAA;

"Proven Affected Banro Unsecured Creditor" means a holder of a Proven Affected Banro Unsecured Claim;

"Proven Affected Secured Claim" means the amount of an Affected Secured Claim as finally accepted and determined for distribution purposes in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order and the CCAA;

"Proven Affected Secured Creditor" means a holder of a Proven Affected Secured Claim as at the Distribution Record Date;

"Proven Claim" means a Proven Affected Banro Unsecured Claim or a Proven Affected Secured Claim, as applicable;

"Proven Doré Loan Claim" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Meeting Order;

"Proven Namoya Forward II Claim" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Meeting Order;

"Proven Secured Notes Claim" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Meeting Order;

"Recapitalization" means a transaction on the terms set forth in the Restructuring Term Sheet;

"Registered Holder" means in respect of the Secured Notes as recorded on the books and records of the Canadian Trustee;

"Registration Election Deadline" has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Meeting Order;

"Registration Instructions" means the instructions provided by Beneficial Noteholder to its Participant Holder for the registration and issuance of its New Equity submitted in accordance with the VIEF and the Meeting Order;

"Released Claims" means the matters that are subject to release and discharge pursuant to section 8.1 hereof;

"Released Party" means each of the Banro Released Parties and the Third Party Released Parties;

"Required Majorities" means the Affected Secured Required Majority and the Affected Banro Unsecured Required Majority;

"Requisite Consenting Parties" means, collectively, Gramercy and Baiyin;

"Requisite Consenting Party Advisors" means, all of the professional advisors retained by Gramercy and Baiyin, respectively;

"Restructuring Term Sheet" means the Restructuring Term Sheet attached to the Support Agreement;

"Sanction Order" has the meaning ascribed to that term in section 9.2;

"Section 5.1(2) Director/Officer Claims" means any Director/Officer Claims that may not be compromised pursuant to section 5.1(2) of the CCAA;

"Secured Notes" means 10% Secured Notes due March 1, 2021 in the principal amount of US\$197.5 million, for which Banro Group (Barbados) Limited is the issuer and the other Banro Parties are guarantors;

"Shareholders Agreement" means the shareholders agreement made between and among the shareholders of Newco on the Implementation Date, which shall contain the Newco Share Terms and otherwise be acceptable to the Applicants, the Monitor and the Requisite Consenting Parties, acting reasonably;

"Solicitation Agent" means Kingsdale Advisors;

"Stream Amendments" means the amendments and modifications to the Gold Streams as contemplated by the Restructuring Term Sheet;

"Stream Equity Warrants" means the warrants for common shares in the capital of Newco to be issued to the purchasers under the Gold Streams as consideration for the entering into of the Stream Amendments on the terms and conditions as set forth in the Restructuring Term Sheet and/or as may otherwise be agreed by the Applicants and the purchasers under the Gold Streams, each acting reasonably;

“Support Agreement” has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Recitals;

“Tax” or **“Taxes”** means any and all taxes, duties, fees, premiums, assessments, imposts, levies and other charges of any kind whatsoever, including all interest, penalties, fines, additions to tax or other additional amounts in respect thereof, and including those levied on, or measured by, or referred to as, income, gross receipts, profits, capital, transfer, land transfer, sales, goods and services, harmonized sales, use, value-added, excise, stamp, withholding, business, franchising, property, development, occupancy, employer health, payroll, employment, health, social services, education and social security taxes, all surtaxes, all customs duties and import and export taxes, countervail and anti-dumping, all licence, franchise and registration fees and all employment insurance, health insurance and Canada, Quebec and other government pension plan premiums or contributions;

“Tax Claim” means any Claim by a Taxing Authority against the Applicants regarding any Taxes in respect of any taxation year or period;

“Taxing Authority” means any of Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada, Her Majesty the Queen in right of any province or territory of Canada, any municipality of Canada, the Canada Revenue Agency, the Canada Border Services Agency, any similar revenue or taxing authority of Canada and each and every province or territory of Canada and any political subdivision thereof and any Canadian or foreign government, regulatory authority, government department, agency, commission, bureau, minister, court, tribunal or body or regulation making entity exercising taxing authority or power;

“Transfer Agent” means the transfer agent in respect of the New Equity, which shall be acceptable to the Applicants and the Requisite Consenting Parties, acting reasonably;

“Third Party Released Parties” has the meaning ascribed to that term in section 8.1(b);

“Twangiza Forward I Agreement” means the amended and restated Gold Purchase and Sale Agreement Tranche 2/3 dated September 17, 2015 among Twangiza GFSA Holdings, Banro and Twangiza Mining S.A. (as amended or restated from time to time) in the secured amount of US\$4,492,200;

“Twangiza Forward II Agreement” means the purchase and sale Agreement dated July 12, 2017 (as amended or restated from time to time) among Baiyin International Investments Ltd, Banro and Twangiza Mining S.A. in the secured amount of US\$6.0 million;

“Twangiza Streaming Agreement” means the Gold Purchase and Sale Agreement dated December 31, 2015 among RFW Banro Investment Limited, Banro and Twangiza Mining S.A. (as amended or restated from time to time);

“Undeliverable Distribution” has the meaning given to that term in section 6.5 hereof;

“Unsecured Creditor Distribution Date” has the meaning given to that term in section 6.3 hereof;

“VIEF” means the Voting Information and Election Form (or other applicable instruction) provided to a Beneficial Noteholder by its Participant Holder;

“Voting Claim” means the amount of the Affected Claim of an Affected Creditor against the Applicant as finally accepted and determined for purposes of voting at the Creditors' Meeting, in accordance with the provisions of the Meeting Order and the CCAA;

“Withholding Obligation” means the amounts that any payor shall be entitled to deduct and withhold and remit from any distribution, payment or consideration otherwise payable to any Person pursuant to the Plan;

SCHEDULE "B"
FORM OF SANCTION ORDER

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

THE HONOURABLE MR.

JUSTICE HAINEY

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TUESDAY, THE 27th

DAY OF MARCH, 2018

**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

**AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF BANRO
CORPORATION, BANRO GROUP (BARBADOS) LIMITED, BANRO CONGO (BARBADOS)
LIMITED, NAMOYA (BARBADOS) LIMITED, LUGUSHWA (BARBADOS) LIMITED,
TWANGIZA (BARBADOS) LIMITED AND KAMITUGA (BARBADOS) LIMITED**

(the "**Applicants**")

**ORDER
(Plan Sanction)**

THIS MOTION made by the Applicants for an Order (the "**Sanction Order**") pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended ("**CCAA**") *inter alia* (a) approving and sanctioning the Amended Consolidated Plan of Compromise and Reorganization of the Applicants dated March 9, 2018 (the "**Plan**"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Schedule "A", and (b) approving the Third Report of FTI Consulting Canada Inc. in its capacity as Monitor (the "**Monitor**"), dated February 15, 2018 (the "**Third Report**") and the Fourth Report of the Monitor dated March 13, 2018 (the "**Fourth Report**"), was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the within Notice of Motion, the Affidavit of Rory James Taylor sworn March 13, 2018 including the exhibits thereto, the Confidential Affidavit of Rory James Taylor sworn March 13, 2018 (the "**Confidential Affidavit**"), the Third Report, the Fourth Report, the affidavit of Sophie Moher sworn March 26, 2018, and upon hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicants, the Monitor, Gramercy Funds Management LLC, Baiyin International

Investment Limited, Baiyin Nonferrous Group Company, Limited, VR Global Partners, L.P. and no one else appearing although duly served as appears from the affidavit of service of Sophie Moher sworn March 13, 2018, and upon being advised that this Order shall serve as the basis for reliance on the exemption provided by Section 3(a)(10) of the *United States Securities Act of 1933*, as amended, from the registration requirements otherwise imposed by that Act,

DEFINED TERMS

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that all capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall be as defined in the Plan or as in the Meeting Order made in this proceeding (the “**CCAA Proceedings**”) by Justice Hainey on February 1, 2018 (the “**Meeting Order**”), as applicable.

SERVICE, NOTICE AND MEETINGS

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Motion, the Motion Record, and the Fourth Report be and is hereby validated such that this Motion is properly returnable today and that service thereof upon any interested party other than the persons served with the Motion Record is hereby dispensed with.

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that there has been good and sufficient service, delivery and notice to all Affected Creditors of the Information Package and the Noteholder Information Package, and that the Creditors’ Meetings were duly, called, convened, held and conducted all in conformity with the CCAA and all other Orders of this Court in the CCAA Proceedings (collectively, the “**CCAA Orders**”).

SANCTION OF THE PLAN

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that:

- (a) Pursuant to the Meeting Order, the relevant classes of creditors of the Applicants for the purposes of voting to approve the Plan are the Affected Banro Unsecured Class and the Affected Secured Class;
- (b) the Plan has been approved by the Affected Banro Unsecured Required Majority and the Affected Secured Required Majority, all in conformity with the CCAA and the terms of the Meeting Order;

- (c) the Applicants have acted, and are acting, in good faith and with due diligence, and have complied with the provisions of the CCAA and the CCAA Orders in all respects;
- (d) the Court is satisfied that the Applicants have not done or purported to do anything that is not authorized by the CCAA; and
- (e) the Plan, all terms and conditions thereof, and the matters and the transactions contemplated thereby, are fair and reasonable including to all Persons who are entitled to receive equity in Newco in accordance with the Plan.

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Plan is hereby sanctioned and approved pursuant to section 6 of the CCAA and section 192 of the *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44.

PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Plan and all associated steps, compromises, transactions, arrangements, releases and reorganizations effected thereby (including, without limitation, the steps in Article 7 of the Plan) are hereby approved, shall be deemed to be implemented and shall be binding and effective as of the Effective Time in accordance with the terms of the Plan or at such other time, times or manner as may be set forth in the Plan in the sequence provided therein, and shall enure to the benefit of and be binding and effective upon the Applicants, the Directors, the Officers, the Consenting Parties, all Affected Creditors, the DIP Lender, the Released Parties and all other Persons and parties named or referred to in, affected by, or subject to the Plan as provided for in the Plan or this Order.

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Applicants, the Directors, the Officers, and the Monitor is authorized and directed to take all steps and actions and to do all things, necessary or appropriate, to implement the Plan in accordance with its terms and to enter into, execute, deliver, complete, implement and consummate all of the steps, transactions, distributions, disbursements, payments, deliveries, allocations, instruments and agreements contemplated by, and subject to the terms and conditions of, the Plan, and all such steps and actions are hereby authorized, ratified and approved. None of the Applicants, the Directors, the Officers or the Monitor shall incur any liability as a result of acting in accordance with the terms of the Plan and this Order, other than any liability arising out of or in connection with the gross negligence or wilful misconduct of such parties.

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that upon delivery of written notice from the Applicants and the Requisite Consenting Parties (or counsel on their behalf) to the Monitor that the conditions precedent as set out in the Plan have been satisfied or waived, as applicable, in accordance with the terms of the Plan, the Monitor shall as soon as reasonably practicable following receipt of such written notice, deliver to the Applicants a certificate signed by the Monitor substantially in the form attached hereto as Schedule "B" (the "**Monitor's Certificate**") certifying that all conditions precedent set out in the Plan have been satisfied or waived and that the Implementation Date has occurred and that the Plan and the provisions of this Sanction Order which come into effect on the Implementation Date are effective in accordance with their respective terms. Following the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate to the Applicants, the Monitor shall file the Monitor's Certificate with the Court, and shall post a copy of same, once filed, on the Monitor's website and provide a copy to the Service List. Upon delivery of the Monitor's Certificate to the Applicants, all applicable parties shall take such steps as are required to implement the steps set out in section 7.3 of the Plan.

COMPROMISE OF CLAIMS AND EFFECT OF PLAN

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, pursuant to and in accordance with the terms of the Plan, on the Implementation Date, all existing Claims of Affected Creditors against the Applicants shall be fully, finally, irrevocably and forever compromised, released, discharged, cancelled, extinguished and barred and all proceedings with respect to, in connection with or relating to such Affected Claims shall permanently be stayed against the Released Parties, subject only to the right of Affected Creditors to receive the distributions pursuant to the Plan and this Order in respect of their Claims, in the manner and to the extent provided for in the Plan.

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the determination of Proven Claims in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order and Plan shall be final and binding on the Applicants and all Affected Creditors.

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that an Affected Creditor holding a Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claim shall not be entitled to receive a distribution under the Plan in respect of any portion thereof unless and until such Disputed Affected Banro Unsecured Claim becomes a Proven Claim in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order and Plan.

12. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing in the Plan extends to or shall be interpreted as extending or amending the Claims Bar Date or gives or shall be interpreted as giving any rights to any Person in respect of Claims that have been barred or extinguished pursuant to the Claims Procedure Order. Any Affected Claim or Director/Officer Claim for which a Proof of Claim or Director/Officer Proof of Claim has not been filed in accordance with the Claims Procedure Order, including for greater certainty and without limitation all claims or causes of action based on the allegations contained in the Lepard Action as defined below, whether or not the holder of such Affected Claim or Director/Officer Claim has received personal notification of the claims process established by the Claims Procedure Order, have been, shall be and are hereby forever barred, extinguished and released with prejudice.

13. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that except to the extent expressly contemplated by the Plan or this Sanction Order, all obligations or agreements to which the Applicants are a party to immediately prior to the Effective Time, will be and shall remain in full force and effect as at the Implementation Date, unamended except as they may have been amended by agreement of the parties to such agreement, and no Person who is a party to any such obligation or agreement shall, following the Implementation Date, accelerate, terminate, rescind, refuse to perform or otherwise repudiate its obligations thereunder, or enforce or exercise any right (including any right of set-off, option, dilution or other remedy) or make any demand under or in respect of any such obligation or agreement, by reason of (i) any defaults or events of default arising as a result of the insolvency of the Applicants prior to the Implementation Date; (ii) any defaults, events of default or cross-defaults under or in respect of any Priority Lien Debt or Parity Lien Debt (as defined in the Amended and Restated Collateral Trust Agreement dated April 19, 2017), in each case arising prior to the Implementation Date; (iii) any change of control of the Applicants arising from the implementation of the Plan; (iv) the fact that the Applicants have sought or obtained relief under the CCAA or that the Plan has been implemented by the Applicants; (v) the effect on the Applicants of the completion of any of the transactions contemplated by the Plan; (vi) any compromises, arrangements, or reorganization effected pursuant to the Plan; or (vii) any other event(s) which occurred on or prior to the Implementation Date which would have entitled any Person to enforce rights and remedies subject to any express provisions to the contrary in any agreements entered into with the Applicants after the Filing Date.

14. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that from and after the Implementation Date, all Persons shall be deemed to have waived any and all defaults of the Applicants then existing or previously committed by the Applicants, or caused by the Applicants, directly or indirectly, or non-compliance with any covenant, warranty, representation, undertaking, positive or negative pledge, term, provision, condition or obligation, expressed or implied, in any contract, instrument, credit document, lease, guarantee, agreement for sale, deed, licence, permit or other agreement, written or oral, and any and all amendments or supplements thereto, existing between such Person and any of the Applicants arising directly or indirectly from the filing by the Applicants under the CCAA and the implementation of the Plan, and any and all notices of default and demands for payment or any step or proceeding taken or commenced in connection therewith under any such agreement shall be deemed to have been rescinded and of no further force or effect, provided that nothing herein shall be deemed to excuse the Applicants from performing their obligations under the Plan or be a waiver of defaults by the Applicants under the Plan and the related documents.

15. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that on the Implementation Date, in accordance with the Plan all Equity Interests in Banro Corporation ("**Banro**") shall be cancelled without any liability, payment or other compensation in respect thereof.

16. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that all claims or causes of action against Banro Corporation based on the allegations set out in the Class Action Complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by EMA GARP FUND L.P. and Lawrence Lepard, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated as plaintiffs (the "**Plaintiffs**") against Banro Corporation and John Clarke as defendants, bearing Case No. 18-cv-01986 (the "**Lepard Action**") constitute Affected Equity Claims.

17. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that on the Implementation Date, in accordance with section 4.4 of the Plan, all Affected Equity Claims shall be fully and finally, irrevocably and forever compromised, released, discharged, cancelled and barred and that no Person including the Plaintiffs in the Lepard Action shall be entitled to any consideration or distributions in respect of such Affected Equity Claims.

DISTRIBUTIONS

18. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that all distributions or payments by the Monitor, on behalf of the Applicants, to Affected Creditors with Proven Claims under the Plan are for the account of the Applicants and the fulfillment of the Applicants' obligations under the Plan.

19. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants are authorized to take any and all such actions as may be necessary or appropriate to comply with applicable withholding and reporting requirements. All amounts withheld on account of Taxes shall be treated for all purposes as having been paid to Affected Creditors in respect of which such withholding was made, provided such withheld amounts are remitted to the appropriate Taxing Authority.

20. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Applicants or the Monitor on behalf of the Applicants, as the case may be, shall be authorized, in connection with the making of any payment or distribution, and in connection with the taking of any step or transaction or performance of any function under or in connection with the Plan, to apply to any Governmental Entity for any consent, authorization, certificate or approval in connection therewith.

21. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, on the Implementation Date, Newco shall issue the New Equity in accordance with the Plan to be held by the Transfer Agent on behalf of each Proven Affected Secured Creditor until such time as each Proven Affected Secured Creditor has delivered its Newco Equityholder Information in accordance with the Plan. In the event that a Proven Affected Secured Creditor fails to deliver its Newco Equityholder Information in accordance with the Plan on or before the date that is six months following the Implementation Date, the New Equity otherwise issuable to such Proven Affected Secured Creditor pursuant to the Plan shall not be delivered to such Proven Affected Secured Creditor and Newco shall be entitled to cancel, and shall have no further obligation to issue or deliver, any New Equity to such Proven Affected Secured Creditors in respect of which Newco Equityholder Information was not received and such Proven Affected Secured Creditors shall cease to have a claim to, or interest of any kind or nature against or in, the Applicants, Newco or the New Equity.

CHARGES

22. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Administration Charge and the Directors' Charge shall continue in full force and effect and shall, from and after the Effective Time, attach solely against the Administrative Reserve.

23. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that as of the Effective Time, the DIP Lenders' Charge and the DIP Claims shall be released without the consent of the Requisite Consenting Parties.

RELEASES

24. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the compromises, arrangements, releases, discharges and injunctions contemplated in Article 8 of the Plan, including those granted by and for the benefit of the Released Parties are integral components thereof and that, effective on the Implementation Date, all such compromises, releases, discharges and injunctions contemplated in the Plan are effective, sanctioned, approved and given full force and effect.

25. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, to the extent not barred, released or otherwise affected by paragraph 12 above, and notwithstanding paragraph 24 above, any Person having, or claiming any entitlement or compensation relating to, a Director/Officer Claim (with the exception of any Director/Officer Claims judged by the express terms of a judgment rendered on a final determination on the merits to have resulted from criminal, fraudulent or other wilful misconduct on the part of the Director or Officer (an "**Excluded Director/Officer Claim**")) will be irrevocably limited to recovery in respect of such Director/Officer Claim solely from the proceeds of the applicable insurance policies held by the Applicants (the "**Insurance Policies**"), and Persons with any Director/Officer Claims will have no right to, and shall not, directly or indirectly, make any claim or seek any recoveries from the Applicants or any Released Party, other than enforcing such Person's rights to be paid by the applicable insurer(s) from the proceeds of the applicable Insurance Policies. Nothing in this Plan Sanction Order prejudices, compromises, releases or otherwise affects any right or defence of any insurer in respect of an Insurance Policy or any insured in respect of a Director/Officer Claim. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, from and after the Implementation Date, a Person may only commence or continue an action for an Excluded Director/Officer Claim against a Director or Officer if such Person has first obtained leave of the Court on notice to the applicable Directors and Officers, the Monitor and the Applicants.

26. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that from and after the Implementation Date any and all Persons shall be and are hereby forever barred, estopped, stayed and enjoined from commencing, taking, applying for or issuing or continuing any and all steps or proceedings, whether directly, derivatively or otherwise, and including without limitation, administrative hearings and orders, declarations or assessments, commenced, taken or proceeded with or that may be commenced,

taken or proceeded with against any Released Party in respect of all Claims and matters which are released pursuant to Article 8 of the Plan or discharged, compromised or terminated pursuant to the Plan, except as against the applicable insurer(s) to the extent that Persons with Director/Officer Claims seek to enforce rights to be paid from the proceeds of the Insurance Policies, and provided that any claimant in respect of a Director/Officer Claim that was duly filed with the Monitor by the Claims Bar Date shall be permitted to file a statement of claim in respect thereof to the extent necessary solely for the purpose of preserving such claimant's ability to pursue such Director/Officer Claim against an insurer in respect of an Insurance Policy. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, from and after the Implementation Date, a Person may only commence or continue an action against a Released Party in respect of a matter that is not released pursuant to Article 8.1(a)(iii) of the Plan if such Person has first obtained leave of the Court on notice to the applicable Released Party, the Applicants, Newco, the Monitor and the insurer(s) under any applicable Insurance Policy.

27. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, on the Implementation Date, each Affected Creditor, each holder of a Director/Officer Claim and any Person having a Released Claim shall be deemed to have consented and agreed to all of the provisions of the Plan, in its entirety, and, in particular, each Affected Creditor, each holder of a Director/Officer Claim and any Person having a Released Claim shall be deemed:

- (a) to have executed and delivered to the Monitor, the Applicants and the other Released Parties all consents, releases, assignments and waivers, statutory or otherwise, required to implement and carry out the Plan in its entirety; and
- (b) to have agreed that if there is any conflict between the provisions, express or implied, of any agreement or other arrangement, written or oral, existing between such Affected Creditor, holder of a Director/Officer Claim, and the Applicants as of the Implementation Date and the provisions of the Plan, the provisions of the Plan take precedence and priority, and the provisions of such agreement or other arrangements shall be deemed to be amended accordingly.

THE MONITOR

28. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that in addition to its prescribed rights and obligations under the CCAA and the CCAA Orders, the Monitor is granted the powers, duties and protections contemplated by and required under the Plan and that the Monitor be and is hereby authorized,

entitled and empowered to perform its duties and fulfil its obligations under the Plan to facilitate the implementation thereof and to apply to this Court for any orders necessary or advisable to carry out its powers and obligations under any other CCAA Order.

29. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, without limiting the provisions of the Initial Order or the provisions of any other CCAA Order, including this Order, the Applicants shall remain in possession and control of the Property (as defined in the Initial Order) and the Monitor shall not take possession or be deemed to be in possession and/or control of the Property.

30. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall be and are hereby directed to maintain the books and records of the Applicants for purposes of assisting the Monitor in the completion of the resolution of the Affected Banro Unsecured Claims;

31. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that in no circumstance will the Monitor have any liability for any of the Applicants' tax liabilities regardless of how or when such liabilities may have arisen.

32. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, effective upon the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate to the Applicants in accordance with paragraph 8 hereof:

(a) the Initial Order shall be amended to delete in their entirety subparagraphs 27(a), 27(c), 27(d), 27(e) and 27(f) and the Monitor shall thereafter have no obligation to perform any duty or exercise any power set out in such subparagraphs; and

(b) the Applicants shall not be subject to the restrictions, obligations, requirements or provisions of paragraphs 8-13 or 23 of the Initial Order.

EXTENSION OF STAY PERIOD

33. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Stay Period (as defined in paragraph 15 of the Initial Order) be and is hereby extended until and including the earlier of April 27, 2018 or the filing of the Monitor's Certificate.

APPROVAL OF MONITOR'S THIRD AND FOURTH REPORTS

34. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Third Report and Fourth Report and the conduct and activities of the Monitor described therein be and are hereby approved.

SEALING

35. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Confidential Affidavit be and is hereby sealed and treated as confidential.

GENERAL

36. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants, the Monitor and any other interested parties are hereby granted leave to apply to this Court for such further advice, directions or assistance as may be necessary to give effect to the terms of the Plan and any other matters that pertain to the completion of the administration of the CCAA Proceedings.

37. **THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court or any judicial, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada, the United States, or in any other foreign jurisdiction, to recognize and give effect to the Plan and this Order, to confirm the Plan and this Order as binding and effective in any appropriate foreign jurisdiction, and to assist the Applicants, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of the Plan and this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Applicants, and the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Applicants in any foreign proceeding, or to assist the Applicants and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

SCHEDULE "A"
PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND REORGANIZATION

SCHEDULE "B"
FORM OF MONITOR'S PLAN IMPLEMENTATION DATE CERTIFICATE

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST**

**IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

**AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF BANRO
CORPORATION, BANRO GROUP (BARBADOS) LIMITED, BANRO CONGO (BARBADOS)
LIMITED, NAMOYA (BARBADOS) LIMITED, LUGUSHWA (BARBADOS) LIMITED,
TWANGIZA (BARBADOS) LIMITED AND KAMITUGA (BARBADOS) LIMITED**

(the "**Applicants**")

**MONITOR'S CERTIFICATE
(Plan Implementation)**

All capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed thereto in the Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Hainey made in these proceedings on March 27, 2018 (the "**Sanction Order**").

Pursuant to paragraph 8 of the Sanction Order, FTI Consulting Canada Inc. in its capacity as Court-appointed Monitor of the Applicants (the "**Monitor**") delivers to the Applicants this certificate and hereby certifies that it has been informed in writing by the Applicants and the Requisite Consenting Parties that all of the conditions precedent set out in the Plan have been satisfied or waived, and that the Implementation Date has occurred and the Plan and the provisions of the Sanction Order which come into effect on the Implementation Date are effective in accordance with their respective terms. This Certificate will be filed with the Court and posted on the website maintained by the Monitor.

[Type text]

DATED at the City of Toronto, in the Province of Ontario, this 27th day of March, 2018 at
10:00 a.m.

FTI CONSULTING CANADA INC., in its
capacity as Court-appointed Monitor of the
Applicants and not in its personal or
corporate capacity

By: _____
Name:
Title:

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF
COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF BANRO CORPORATION, BANRO GROUP (BARBADOS) LIMITED, BANRO CONGO (BARBADOS) LIMITED,
NAMOYA (BARBADOS) LIMITED, LUGUSHWA (BARBADOS) LIMITED, TWANGIZA (BARBADOS) LIMITED AND KAMITUGA (BARBADOS) LIMITED

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

PLAN SANCTION ORDER

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Lawyers for the Applicants

[Type text]

DATED at the City of Toronto, in the Province of Ontario, this 27th day of March, 2018 at
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Tab 7



[Original](#)

2010 ONSC 222

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re

2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222, [2010] O.J.

No. 188, 184 A.C.W.S. (3d) 684, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115

**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT
ACT, R.S.C. 1985, C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER
OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT
OF CANWEST PUBLISHING INC./PUBLICATIONS CANWEST
INC., CANWEST BOOKS INC. AND CANWEST (CANADA) INC.**

Pepall J.

Judgment: January 18, 2010

Docket: CV-10-8533-00CL

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Alex Cobb, Duncan Ault for Applicant, LP Entities

Mario Forte for Special Committee of the Board of Directors

Andrew Kent, Hilary Clarke for Administrative Agent of the Senior Secured Lenders' Syndicate

Peter Griffin for Management Directors

Robin B. Schwill, Natalie Renner for Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders

David Byers, Maria Konyukhova for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX](#) Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

[XIX.3](#) Arrangements

[XIX.3.a](#) Approval by creditors

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX](#) Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

[XIX.5](#) Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous

CMI, entity of C Corp., obtained protection from creditors in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") proceedings in October 2009 — CPI, newspaper entities related to C, sought similar protection — CPI brought application for order pursuant to CCAA and for stay of proceedings and other benefits of order to be extended to CPI — Application granted — CPI was clearly insolvent — Community served by CPI was huge — Granting of order premised on anticipated going concern sale of newspaper business, which would serve interests of CPI and stakeholders and also community at large — Order requested would provide stability and enable CPI to pursue restructuring and preserve enterprise value for stakeholders — Without benefit of stay, CPI would have been required to pay approximately \$1.45 billion and would have been unable to continue operating business.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by creditors

CMI, entity of C Corp., obtained protection from creditors in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") proceedings in October 2009 — CPI, newspaper entities related to C, sought similar protection — CPI brought application for order pursuant to CCAA and for stay of proceedings and other benefits of order to be extended to CPI — Application granted — CPI was clearly insolvent — Community served by CPI was huge — Granting of order premised on anticipated going concern sale of newspaper business, which would serve interests of CPI and stakeholders and also community at large — Order requested would provide stability and enable CPI to pursue restructuring and preserve enterprise value for stakeholders — Without benefit of stay, CPI would have been required to pay approximately \$1.45 billion and would have been unable to continue operating business — In circumstances, it was appropriate to allow CPI to file and present plan only to secured creditors.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Pepall J.*:

Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 2254, 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2003), 310 N.R. 200 (note), 2003 CarswellOnt 730, 2003 CarswellOnt 731, 180 O.A.C. 399 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4699, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 54, 2006 CarswellOnt 264 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Philip Services Corp., Re (1999), 13 C.B.R. (4th) 159, 1999 CarswellOnt 4673 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — followed

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 4 — considered

s. 5 — considered

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.4(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.4(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.7(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — referred to

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43

s. 137(2) — considered

APPLICATION by entity of company already protected under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act for similar protection.

Pepall J.:

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

1 Canwest Global Communications Corp. ("Canwest Global") is a leading Canadian media company with interests in (i) newspaper publishing and digital media; and (ii) free-to-air television stations and subscription based specialty television channels. Canwest Global, the entities in its Canadian television business (excluding CW Investments Co. and its subsidiaries) and the National Post Company (which prior to October 30, 2009 owned and published the National Post) (collectively, the "CMI Entities"), obtained protection from their creditors in a *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ¹ ("CCAA") proceeding on October 6, 2009. ² Now, the Canwest Global Canadian newspaper entities with the exception of National Post Inc. seek similar protection. Specifically, Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc. ("CPI"), Canwest Books Inc. ("CBI"), and Canwest (Canada) Inc. ("CCI") apply for an order pursuant to the CCAA. They also seek to have the stay of proceedings and the other benefits of the order extend to Canwest Limited Partnership/Canwest Société en Commandite (the "Limited Partnership"). The Applicants and the Limited Partnership are referred to as the "LP Entities" throughout these reasons. The term "Canwest" will be used to refer to the Canwest enterprise as a whole. It includes the LP Entities and Canwest Global's other subsidiaries which are not applicants in this proceeding.

2 All appearing on this application supported the relief requested with the exception of the Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders. That Committee represents certain unsecured creditors whom I will discuss more fully later.

3 I granted the order requested with reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

4 I start with three observations. Firstly, Canwest Global, through its ownership interests in the LP Entities, is the largest publisher of daily English language newspapers in Canada. The LP Entities own and operate 12 daily newspapers across Canada. These newspapers are part of the Canadian heritage and landscape. The oldest, The Gazette, was established in Montreal in 1778. The others are the Vancouver Sun, The Province, the Ottawa Citizen, the Edmonton Journal, the Calgary Herald, The Windsor Star, the Times Colonist, The Star Phoenix, the Leader-Post, the Nanaimo Daily News and the Alberni Valley Times. These newspapers have an estimated average weekly readership that exceeds 4 million. The LP Entities also publish 23 non-daily newspapers and own and operate a number of digital media and online operations. The community served by the LP Entities is huge. In addition, based on August 31, 2009 figures, the LP Entities employ approximately 5,300 employees in Canada with approximately 1,300 of those employees working in Ontario. The granting of the order requested is premised on an anticipated going concern sale of the newspaper business of the LP Entities. This serves not just the interests of the LP Entities and their stakeholders but the Canadian community at large.

5 Secondly, the order requested may contain some shortcomings; it may not be perfect. That said, insolvency proceedings typically involve what is feasible, not what is flawless.

6 Lastly, although the builders of this insolvent business are no doubt unhappy with its fate, gratitude is not misplaced by acknowledging their role in its construction.

Background Facts

(i) Financial Difficulties

7 The LP Entities generate the majority of their revenues through the sale of advertising. In the fiscal year ended August 31, 2009, approximately 72% of the LP Entities' consolidated revenue derived from advertising. The LP Entities have been seriously affected by the economic downturn in Canada and their consolidated advertising revenues declined substantially in the latter half of 2008 and in 2009. In addition, they experienced increases in certain of their operating costs.

8 On May 29, 2009 the Limited Partnership failed, for the first time, to make certain interest and principal reduction payments and related interest and cross currency swap payments totaling approximately \$10 million in respect of its senior secured credit facilities. On the same day, the Limited Partnership announced that, as of May 31, 2009, it would be in breach of certain financial covenants set out in the credit agreement dated as of July 10, 2007 between its predecessor, Canwest Media Works Limited Partnership, The Bank of Nova Scotia as administrative agent, a syndicate of secured lenders ("the LP Secured Lenders"), and the predecessors of CCI, CPI and CBI as guarantors. The Limited Partnership also failed to make principal, interest and fee payments due pursuant to this credit agreement on June 21, June 22, July 21, July 22 and August 21, 2009.

9 The May 29, 2009, defaults under the senior secured credit facilities triggered defaults in respect of related foreign currency and interest rate swaps. The swap counterparties (the "Hedging Secured Creditors") demanded payment of \$68.9 million. These unpaid amounts rank *pari passu* with amounts owing under the LP Secured Lenders' credit facilities.

10 On or around August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership and certain of the LP Secured Lenders entered into a forbearance agreement in order to allow the LP Entities and the LP Secured Lenders the opportunity to negotiate a pre-packaged restructuring or reorganization of the affairs of the LP Entities. On November 9, 2009, the forbearance agreement expired and since then, the LP Secured Lenders have been in a position to demand payment of approximately \$953.4 million, the amount outstanding as at August 31, 2009. Nonetheless, they continued negotiations with the LP Entities. The culmination of this process is that the LP Entities are now seeking a stay of proceedings under the CCAA in order to provide them with the necessary "breathing space" to restructure and reorganize their businesses and to preserve their enterprise value for the ultimate benefit of their broader stakeholder community.

11 The Limited Partnership released its annual consolidated financial statements for the twelve months ended August 31, 2009 and 2008 on November 26, 2009. As at August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership had total consolidated assets with a net book value of approximately \$644.9 million. This included consolidated current assets of \$182.7 million and consolidated non-current assets of approximately \$462.2 million. As at that date, the Limited Partnership had total consolidated liabilities of approximately \$1.719 billion (increased from \$1.656 billion as at August 31, 2008). These liabilities consisted of consolidated current liabilities of \$1.612 billion and consolidated non-current liabilities of \$107 million.

12 The Limited Partnership had been experiencing deteriorating financial results over the past year. For the year ended August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership's consolidated revenues decreased by \$181.7

million or 15% to \$1.021 billion as compared to \$1.203 billion for the year ended August 31, 2008. For the year ended August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership reported a consolidated net loss of \$66 million compared to consolidated net earnings of \$143.5 million for fiscal 2008.

(ii) Indebtedness under the Credit Facilities

13 The indebtedness under the credit facilities of the LP Entities consists of the following.

(a) The LP senior secured credit facilities are the subject matter of the July 10, 2007 credit agreement already mentioned. They are guaranteed by CCI, CPI and CBI. The security held by the LP Secured Lenders has been reviewed by the solicitors for the proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc. and considered to be valid and enforceable.³ As at August 31, 2009, the amounts owing by the LP Entities totaled \$953.4 million exclusive of interest.⁴

(b) The Limited Partnership is a party to the aforementioned foreign currency and interest rate swaps with the Hedging Secured Creditors. Defaults under the LP senior secured credit facilities have triggered defaults in respect of these swap arrangements. Demand for repayment of amounts totaling \$68.9 million (exclusive of unpaid interest) has been made. These obligations are secured.

(c) Pursuant to a senior subordinated credit agreement dated as of July 10, 2007, between the Limited Partnership, The Bank of Nova Scotia as administrative agent for a syndicate of lenders, and others, certain subordinated lenders agreed to provide the Limited Partnership with access to a term credit facility of up to \$75 million. CCI, CPI, and CBI are guarantors. This facility is unsecured, guaranteed on an unsecured basis and currently fully drawn. On June 20, 2009, the Limited Partnership failed to make an interest payment resulting in an event of default under the credit agreement. In addition, the defaults under the senior secured credit facilities resulted in a default under this facility. The senior subordinated lenders are in a position to take steps to demand payment.

(d) Pursuant to a note indenture between the Limited Partnership, The Bank of New York Trust Company of Canada as trustee, and others, the Limited Partnership issued 9.5% per annum senior subordinated unsecured notes due 2015 in the aggregate principal amount of US \$400 million. CPI and CBI are guarantors. The notes are unsecured and guaranteed on an unsecured basis. The noteholders are in a position to take steps to demand immediate payment of all amounts outstanding under the notes as a result of events of default.

14 The LP Entities use a centralized cash management system at the Bank of Nova Scotia which they propose to continue. Obligations owed pursuant to the existing cash management arrangements are secured (the "Cash Management Creditor").

(iii) LP Entities' Response to Financial Difficulties

15 The LP Entities took a number of steps to address their circumstances with a view to improving cash flow and strengthening their balance sheet. Nonetheless, they began to experience significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and other trade creditors. The LP Entities' debt totals approximately \$1.45 billion and they do not have the liquidity required to make payment in respect of this indebtedness. They are clearly insolvent.

16 The board of directors of Canwest Global struck a special committee of directors (the "Special Committee") with a mandate to explore and consider strategic alternatives. The Special Committee has appointed Thomas Strike, the President, Corporate Development & Strategy Implementation, as

Recapitalization Officer and has retained Gary Colter of CRS Inc. as Restructuring Advisor for the LP Entities (the "CRA"). The President of CPI, Dennis Skulsky, will report directly to the Special Committee.

17 Given their problems, throughout the summer and fall of 2009, the LP Entities have participated in difficult and complex negotiations with their lenders and other stakeholders to obtain forbearance and to work towards a consensual restructuring or recapitalization.

18 An ad hoc committee of the holders of the senior subordinated unsecured notes (the "Ad Hoc Committee") was formed in July, 2009 and retained Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg as counsel. Among other things, the Limited Partnership agreed to pay the Committee's legal fees up to a maximum of \$250,000. Representatives of the Limited Partnership and their advisors have had ongoing discussions with representatives of the Ad Hoc Committee and their counsel was granted access to certain confidential information following execution of a confidentiality agreement. The Ad Hoc Committee has also engaged a financial advisor who has been granted access to the LP Entities' virtual data room which contains confidential information regarding the business and affairs of the LP Entities. There is no evidence of any satisfactory proposal having been made by the noteholders. They have been in a position to demand payment since August, 2009, but they have not done so.

19 In the meantime and in order to permit the businesses of the LP Entities to continue to operate as going concerns and in an effort to preserve the greatest number of jobs and maximize value for the stakeholders of the LP Entities, the LP Entities have been engaged in negotiations with the LP Senior Lenders, the result of which is this CCAA application.

(iv) The Support Agreement, the Secured Creditors' Plan and the Solicitation Process

20 Since August 31, 2009, the LP Entities and the LP administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders have worked together to negotiate terms for a consensual, prearranged restructuring, recapitalization or reorganization of the business and affairs of the LP Entities as a going concern. This is referred to by the parties as the Support Transaction.

21 As part of this Support Transaction, the LP Entities are seeking approval of a Support Agreement entered into by them and the administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders. 48% of the LP Secured Lenders, the Hedging Secured Creditors, and the Cash Management Creditor (the "Secured Creditors") are party to the Support Agreement.

22 Three interrelated elements are contemplated by the Support Agreement and the Support Transaction: the credit acquisition, the Secured Creditors' plan (the "Plan"), and the sale and investor solicitation process which the parties refer to as SISP.

23 The Support Agreement contains various milestones with which the LP Entities are to comply and, subject to a successful bid arising from the solicitation process (an important caveat in my view), commits them to support a credit acquisition. The credit acquisition involves an acquisition by an entity capitalized by the Secured Creditors and described as AcquireCo. AcquireCo. would acquire substantially all of the assets of the LP Entities (including the shares in National Post Inc.) and assume certain of the liabilities of the LP Entities. It is contemplated that AcquireCo. would offer employment to all or substantially all of the employees of the LP Entities and would assume all of the LP Entities' existing pension plans and existing post-retirement and post-employment benefit plans subject to a right by AcquireCo., acting commercially reasonably and after consultation with the operational management of the LP Entities, to exclude certain specified liabilities. The credit acquisition would be the subject matter of a Plan to be voted on by the Secured Creditors on or before January 31, 2010. There would only be one class. The Plan would only compromise the LP Entities' secured claims and would not affect or compromise any other claims against any of the LP

Entities ("unaffected claims"). No holders of the unaffected claims would be entitled to vote on or receive any distributions of their claims. The Secured Creditors would exchange their outstanding secured claims against the LP Entities under the LP credit agreement and the swap obligations respectively for their *pro rata* shares of the debt and equity to be issued by AcquireCo. All of the LP Entities' obligations under the LP secured claims calculated as of the date of closing less \$25 million would be deemed to be satisfied following the closing of the Acquisition Agreement. LP secured claims in the amount of \$25 million would continue to be held by AcquireCo. and constitute an outstanding unsecured claim against the LP Entities.

24 The Support Agreement contemplates that the Financial Advisor, namely RBC Dominion Securities Inc., under the supervision of the Monitor, will conduct the solicitation process. Completion of the credit acquisition process is subject to a successful bid arising from the solicitation process. In general terms, the objective of the solicitation process is to obtain a better offer (with some limitations described below) than that reflected in the credit acquisition. If none is obtained in that process, the LP Entities intend for the credit acquisition to proceed assuming approval of the Plan. Court sanction would also be required.

25 In more detailed terms, Phase I of the solicitation process is expected to last approximately 7 weeks and qualified interested parties may submit non-binding proposals to the Financial Advisor on or before February 26, 2010. Thereafter, the Monitor will assess the proposals to determine whether there is a reasonable prospect of obtaining a Superior Offer. This is in essence a cash offer that is equal to or higher than that represented by the credit acquisition. If there is such a prospect, the Monitor will recommend that the process continue into Phase II. If there is no such prospect, the Monitor will then determine whether there is a Superior Alternative Offer, that is, an offer that is not a Superior Offer but which might nonetheless receive approval from the Secured Creditors. If so, to proceed into Phase II, the Superior Alternative Offer must be supported by Secured Creditors holding more than at least 33.3% of the secured claims. If it is not so supported, the process would be terminated and the LP Entities would then apply for court sanction of the Plan.

26 Phase II is expected to last approximately 7 weeks as well. This period allows for due diligence and the submission of final binding proposals. The Monitor will then conduct an assessment akin to the Phase I process with somewhat similar attendant outcomes if there are no Superior Offers and no acceptable Alternative Superior Offers. If there were a Superior Offer or an acceptable Alternative Superior Offer, an agreement would be negotiated and the requisite approvals sought.

27 The solicitation process is designed to allow the LP Entities to test the market. One concern is that a Superior Offer that benefits the secured lenders might operate to preclude a Superior Alternative Offer that could provide a better result for the unsecured creditors. That said, the LP Entities are of the view that the solicitation process and the support transaction present the best opportunity for the businesses of the LP Entities to continue as going concerns, thereby preserving jobs as well as the economic and social benefits of their continued operation. At this stage, the alternative is a bankruptcy or liquidation which would result in significant detriment not only to the creditors and employees of the LP Entities but to the broader community that benefits from the continued operation of the LP Entities' business. I also take some comfort from the position of the Monitor which is best captured in an excerpt from its preliminary Report:

The terms of the Support Agreement and SISP were the subject of lengthy and intense arm's length negotiations between the LP Entities and the LP Administrative Agent. The Proposed Monitor supports approval of the process contemplated therein and of the approval of those documents, but without in any way fettering the various powers and discretions of the Monitor.

28 It goes without saying that the Monitor, being a court appointed officer, may apply to the court for advice and directions and also owes reporting obligations to the court.

29 As to the objection of the Ad Hoc Committee, I make the following observations. Firstly, they represent unsecured subordinated debt. They have been in a position to take action since August, 2009. Furthermore, the LP Entities have provided up to \$250,000 for them to retain legal counsel. Meanwhile, the LP Secured Lenders have been in a position to enforce their rights through a non-consensual court proceeding and have advised the LP Entities of their abilities in that regard in the event that the LP Entities did not move forward as contemplated by the Support Agreement. With the Support Agreement and the solicitation process, there is an enhanced likelihood of the continuation of going concern operations, the preservation of jobs and the maximization of value for stakeholders of the LP Entities. It seemed to me that in the face of these facts and given that the Support Agreement expired on January 8, 2010, adjourning the proceeding was not merited in the circumstances. The Committee did receive very short notice. Without being taken as encouraging or discouraging the use of the comeback clause in the order, I disagree with the submission of counsel to the Ad Hoc Committee to the effect that it is very difficult if not impossible to stop a process relying on that provision. That provision in the order is a meaningful one as is clear from the decision in [Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re](#)⁵. On a come back motion, although the positions of parties who have relied bona fide on an Initial Order should not be prejudiced, the onus is on the applicants for an Initial Order to satisfy the court that the existing terms should be upheld.

Proposed Monitor

30 The Applicants propose that FTI Consulting Canada Inc. serve as the Monitor. It currently serves as the Monitor in the CMI Entities' CCAA proceeding. It is desirable for FTI to act; it is qualified to act; and it has consented to act. It has not served in any of the incompatible capacities described in section 11.7(2) of the CCAA. The proposed Monitor has an enhanced role that is reflected in the order and which is acceptable.

Proposed Order

31 As mentioned, I granted the order requested. It is clear that the LP Entities need protection under the CCAA. The order requested will provide stability and enable the LP Entities to pursue their restructuring and preserve enterprise value for their stakeholders. Without the benefit of a stay, the LP Entities would be required to pay approximately \$1.45 billion and would be unable to continue operating their businesses.

(a) Threshold Issues

32 The chief place of business of the Applicants is Ontario. They qualify as debtor companies under the CCAA. They are affiliated companies with total claims against them that far exceed \$5 million. Demand for payment of the swap indebtedness has been made and the Applicants are in default under all of the other facilities outlined in these reasons. They do not have sufficient liquidity to satisfy their obligations. They are clearly insolvent.

(b) Limited Partnership

33 The Applicants seek to extend the stay of proceedings and the other relief requested to the Limited Partnership. The CCAA definition of a company does not include a partnership or a limited partnership but courts have exercised their inherent jurisdiction to extend the protections of an Initial CCAA Order to partnerships when it was just and convenient to do so. The relief has been held to be appropriate where the operations of the partnership are so intertwined with those of the debtor companies that irreparable harm would ensue if the requested stay were not granted: [Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re](#)⁶ and [Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re](#)⁷.

34 In this case, the Limited Partnership is the administrative backbone of the LP Entities and is integral to and intertwined with the Applicants' ongoing operations. It owns all shared information technology assets; it provides hosting services for all Canwest properties; it holds all software licences used by the LP Entities; it is party to many of the shared services agreements involving other Canwest entities; and employs approximately 390 full-time equivalent employees who work in Canwest's shared services area. The Applicants state that failure to extend the stay to the Limited Partnership would have a profoundly negative impact on the value of the Applicants, the Limited Partnership and the Canwest Global enterprise as a whole. In addition, exposing the assets of the Limited Partnership to the demands of creditors would make it impossible for the LP Entities to successfully restructure. I am persuaded that under these circumstances it is just and convenient to grant the request.

(c) Filing of the Secured Creditors' Plan

35 The LP Entities propose to present the Plan only to the Secured Creditors. Claims of unsecured creditors will not be addressed.

36 The CCAA seems to contemplate a single creditor-class plan. Sections 4 and 5 state:

s.4 Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

s.5 Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

37 Case law has interpreted these provisions as authorizing a single creditor-class plan. For instance, Blair J. (as he then was) stated in [*Philip Services Corp., Re*⁸](#): "There is no doubt that a debtor is at liberty, under the terms of sections 4 and 5 of the CCAA, to make a proposal to secured creditors or to unsecured creditors or to both groups."⁹ Similarly, in [*Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re*¹⁰](#), the Court of Appeal stated: "It may also be noted that s. 5 of the CCAA contemplates a plan which is a compromise between a debtor company and its secured creditors and that by the terms of s. 6 of the Act, applied to the facts of this case, the plan is binding only on the secured creditors and the company and not on the unsecured creditors."¹¹

38 Based on the foregoing, it is clear that a debtor has the statutory authority to present a plan to a single class of creditors. In [*Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re*](#), the issue was raised in the context of the plan's sanction by the court and a consideration of whether the plan was fair and reasonable as it eliminated the opportunity for unsecured creditors to realize anything. The basis of the argument was that the motions judge had erred in not requiring a more complete and in depth valuation of the company's assets relative to the claims of the secured creditors.

39 In this case, I am not being asked to sanction the Plan at this stage. Furthermore, the Monitor will supervise a vigorous and lengthy solicitation process to thoroughly canvass the market for alternative transactions. The solicitation should provide a good indication of market value. In addition, as counsel for the LP Entities observed, the noteholders and the LP Entities never had any forbearance agreement. The noteholders have been in a position to take action since last summer but chose not to do so. One would

expect some action on their part if they themselves believed that they "were in the money". While the process is not perfect, it is subject to the supervision of the court and the Monitor is obliged to report on its results to the court.

40 In my view it is appropriate in the circumstances to authorize the LP Entities to file and present a Plan only to the Secured Creditors.

(D) DIP Financing

41 The Applicants seek approval of a DIP facility in the amount of \$25 million which would be secured by a charge over all of the assets of the LP Entities and rank ahead of all other charges except the Administration Charge, and ahead of all other existing security interests except validly perfected purchase money security interests and certain specific statutory encumbrances.

42 Section 11.2 of the CCAA provides the statutory jurisdiction to grant a DIP charge. In [*Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*¹²](#), I addressed this provision. Firstly, an applicant should address the requirements contained in section 11.2 (1) and then address the enumerated factors found in section 11.2(4) of the CCAA. As that list is not exhaustive, it may be appropriate to consider other factors as well.

43 Applying these principles to this case and dealing firstly with section 11.2(1) of the CCAA, notice either has been given to secured creditors likely to be affected by the security or charge or alternatively they are not affected by the DIP charge. While funds are not anticipated to be immediately necessary, the cash flow statements project a good likelihood that the LP Entities will require the additional liquidity afforded by the \$25 million. The ability to borrow funds that are secured by a charge will help retain the confidence of the LP Entities' trade creditors, employees and suppliers. It is expected that the DIP facility will permit the LP Entities to conduct the solicitation process and consummate a recapitalization transaction of a sale of all or some of its assets. The charge does not secure any amounts that were owing prior to the filing. As such, there has been compliance with the provisions of section 11.2 (1).

44 Turning then to a consideration of the factors found in section 11.2(4) of the Act, the LP Entities are expected to be subject to these CCAA proceedings until July 31, 2010. Their business and financial affairs will be amply managed during the proceedings. This is a consensual filing which is reflective of the confidence of the major creditors in the current management configuration. All of these factors favour the granting of the charge. The DIP loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement and would ensure the necessary stability during the CCAA process. I have already touched upon the issue of value. That said, in relative terms, the quantum of the DIP financing is not large and there is no readily apparent material prejudice to any creditor arising from the granting of the charge and approval of the financing. I also note that it is endorsed by the proposed Monitor in its report.

45 Other factors to consider in assessing whether to approve a DIP charge include the reasonableness of the financing terms and more particularly the associated fees. Ideally there should be some evidence on this issue. Prior to entering into the forbearance agreement, the LP Entities sought proposals from other third party lenders for a DIP facility. In this case, some but not all of the Secured Creditors are participating in the financing of the DIP loan. Therefore, only some would benefit from the DIP while others could bear the burden of it. While they may have opted not to participate in the DIP financing for various reasons, the concurrence of the non participating Secured Creditors is some market indicator of the appropriateness of the terms of the DIP financing.

46 Lastly, I note that the DIP lenders have indicated that they would not provide a DIP facility if the charge was not approved. In all of these circumstances, I was prepared to approve the DIP facility and grant the DIP charge.

(e) *Critical Suppliers*

47 The LP Entities ask that they be authorized but not required to pay pre-filing amounts owing in arrears to certain suppliers if the supplier is critical to the business and ongoing operations of the LP Entities or the potential future benefit of the payments is considerable and of value to the LP Entities as a whole. Such payments could only be made with the consent of the proposed Monitor. At present, it is contemplated that such suppliers would consist of certain newspaper suppliers, newspaper distributors, logistic suppliers and the Amex Bank of Canada. The LP Entities do not seek a charge to secure payments to any of its critical suppliers.

48 Section 11.4 of the CCAA addresses critical suppliers. It states:

11.4(1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring a person to be a critical supplier to the company if the court is satisfied that the person is a supplier of goods and services to the company and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation.

(2) If the court declares the person to be a critical supplier, the court may make an order requiring the person to supply any goods or services specified by the court to the company on any terms and conditions that are consistent with the supply relationship or that the court considers appropriate.

(3) If the court makes an order under subsection (2), the court shall, in the order, declare that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge in favour of the person declared to be a critical supplier, in an amount equal to the value of the goods or services supplied upon the terms of the order.

(4) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

49 Mr. Byers, who is counsel for the Monitor, submits that the court has always had discretion to authorize the payment of critical suppliers and that section 11.4 is not intended to address that issue. Rather, it is intended to respond to a post-filing situation where a debtor company wishes to compel a supplier to supply. In those circumstances, the court may declare a person to be a critical supplier and require the person to supply. If the court chooses to compel a person to supply, it must authorize a charge as security for the supplier. Mr. Barnes, who is counsel for the LP Entities, submits that section 11.4 is not so limited. Section 11.4 (1) gives the court general jurisdiction to declare a supplier to be a "critical supplier" where the supplier provides goods or services that are essential to the ongoing business of the debtor company. The permissive as opposed to mandatory language of section 11.4 (2) supports this interpretation.

50 Section 11.4 is not very clear. As a matter of principle, one would expect the purpose of section 11.4 to be twofold: (i) to codify the authority to permit suppliers who are critical to the continued operation of the company to be paid and (ii) to require the granting of a charge in circumstances where the court is compelling a person to supply. If no charge is proposed to be granted, there is no need to give notice to the secured creditors. I am not certain that the distinction between Mr. Byers and Mr. Barnes' interpretation is of any real significance for the purposes of this case. Either section 11.4(1) does not oust the court's inherent jurisdiction to make provision for the payment of critical suppliers where no charge is requested or it provides authority to the court to declare persons to be critical suppliers. Section 11.4(1) requires the person to be a supplier of goods and services that are critical to the companies' operation but does not impose any additional conditions or limitations.

51 The LP Entities do not seek a charge but ask that they be authorized but not required to make payments for the pre-filing provision of goods and services to certain third parties who are critical and integral to their businesses. This includes newsprint and ink suppliers. The LP Entities are dependent upon a continuous and uninterrupted supply of newsprint and ink and they have insufficient inventory on hand to meet their needs. It also includes newspaper distributors who are required to distribute the newspapers of the LP Entities; American Express whose corporate card programme and accounts are used by LP Entities employees for business related expenses; and royalty fees accrued and owing to content providers for the subscription-based online service provided by FPinfomart.ca, one of the businesses of the LP Entities. The LP Entities believe that it would be damaging to both their ongoing operations and their ability to restructure if they are unable to pay their critical suppliers. I am satisfied that the LP Entities may treat these parties and those described in Mr. Strike's affidavit as critical suppliers but none will be paid without the consent of the Monitor.

(f) Administration Charge and Financial Advisor Charge

52 The Applicants also seek a charge in the amount of \$3 million to secure the fees of the Monitor, its counsel, the LP Entities' counsel, the Special Committee's financial advisor and counsel to the Special Committee, the CRA and counsel to the CRA. These are professionals whose services are critical to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities' business. This charge is to rank in priority to all other security interests in the LP Entities' assets, with the exception of purchase money security interests and specific statutory encumbrances as provided for in the proposed order.¹³ The LP Entities also request a \$10 million charge in favour of the Financial Advisor, RBC Dominion Securities Inc. The Financial Advisor is providing investment banking services to the LP Entities and is essential to the solicitation process. This charge would rank in third place, subsequent to the administration charge and the DIP charge.

53 In the past, an administration charge was granted pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court. Section 11.52 of the amended CCAA now provides statutory jurisdiction to grant an administration charge. Section 11.52 states:

On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the debtor company is subject to a security or charge - in an amount that the court considers appropriate - in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

54 I am satisfied that the issue of notice has been appropriately addressed by the LP Entities. As to whether the amounts are appropriate and whether the charges should extend to the proposed beneficiaries, the section does not contain any specific criteria for a court to consider in its assessment. It seems to me that factors that might be considered would include:

- (a) the size and complexity of the businesses being restructured;
- (b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;
- (c) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;
- (d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;
- (e) the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and
- (f) the position of the Monitor.

This is not an exhaustive list and no doubt other relevant factors will be developed in the jurisprudence.

55 There is no question that the restructuring of the LP Entities is large and highly complex and it is reasonable to expect extensive involvement by professional advisors. Each of the professionals whose fees are to be secured has played a critical role in the LP Entities restructuring activities to date and each will continue to be integral to the solicitation and restructuring process. Furthermore, there is no unwarranted duplication of roles. As to quantum of both proposed charges, I accept the Applicants' submissions that the business of the LP Entities and the tasks associated with their restructuring are of a magnitude and complexity that justify the amounts. I also take some comfort from the fact that the administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders has agreed to them. In addition, the Monitor supports the charges requested. The quantum of the administration charge appears to be fair and reasonable. As to the quantum of the charge in favour of the Financial Advisor, it is more unusual as it involves an incentive payment but I note that the Monitor conducted its own due diligence and, as mentioned, is supportive of the request. The quantum reflects an appropriate incentive to secure a desirable alternative offer. Based on all of these factors, I concluded that the two charges should be approved.

(g) Directors and Officers

56 The Applicants also seek a directors and officers charge ("D & O charge") in the amount of \$35 million as security for their indemnification obligations for liabilities imposed upon the Applicants' directors and officers. The D & O charge will rank after the Financial Advisor charge and will rank *pari passu* with the MIP charge discussed subsequently. Section 11.51 of the CCAA addresses a D & O charge. I have already discussed section 11.51 in [*Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*¹⁴](#) as it related to the request by the CMI Entities for a D & O charge. Firstly, the charge is essential to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities. The continued participation of the experienced Boards of Directors, management and employees of the LP Entities is critical to the restructuring. Retaining the current officers and directors will also avoid destabilization. Furthermore, a CCAA restructuring creates new risks and potential liabilities for the directors and officers. The amount of the charge appears to be appropriate in light of the obligations and liabilities that may be incurred by the directors and officers. The charge will not cover all of the directors' and officers' liabilities in a worse case scenario. While Canwest Global maintains D & O liability insurance, it has only been extended to February 28, 2009 and further extensions are unavailable. As of the date of the Initial Order, Canwest Global had been unable to obtain additional or replacement insurance coverage.

57 Understandably in my view, the directors have indicated that due to the potential for significant personal liability, they cannot continue their service and involvement in the restructuring absent a D & O charge. The charge also provides assurances to the employees of the LP Entities that obligations for accrued wages and termination and severance pay will be satisfied. All secured creditors have either been given notice or are unaffected by the D & O charge. Lastly, the Monitor supports the charge and I was satisfied that the charge should be granted as requested.

(h) *Management Incentive Plan and Special Arrangements*

58 The LP Entities have made amendments to employment agreements with 2 key employees and have developed certain Management Incentive Plans for 24 participants (collectively the "MIPs"). They seek a charge in the amount of \$3 million to secure these obligations. It would be subsequent to the D & O charge.

59 The CCAA is silent on charges in support of Key Employee Retention Plans ("KERPs") but they have been approved in numerous CCAA proceedings. Most recently, in [Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re](#)¹⁵, I approved the KERP requested on the basis of the factors enumerated in [Grant Forest Products Inc., Re](#)¹⁶ and given that the Monitor had carefully reviewed the charge and was supportive of the request as were the Board of Directors, the Special Committee of the Board of Directors, the Human Resources Committee of Canwest Global and the Adhoc Committee of Noteholders.

60 The MIPs in this case are designed to facilitate and encourage the continued participation of certain senior executives and other key employees who are required to guide the LP Entities through a successful restructuring. The participants are critical to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities. They are experienced executives and have played critical roles in the restructuring initiatives to date. They are integral to the continued operation of the business during the restructuring and the successful completion of a plan of restructuring, reorganization, compromise or arrangement.

61 In addition, it is probable that they would consider other employment opportunities in the absence of a charge securing their payments. The departure of senior management would distract from and undermine the restructuring process that is underway and it would be extremely difficult to find replacements for these employees. The MIPs provide appropriate incentives for the participants to remain in their current positions and ensures that they are properly compensated for their assistance in the reorganization process.

62 In this case, the MIPs and the MIP charge have been approved in form and substance by the Board of Directors and the Special Committee of Canwest Global. The proposed Monitor has also expressed its support for the MIPs and the MIP charge in its pre-filing report. In my view, the charge should be granted as requested.

(i) *Confidential Information*

63 The LP Entities request that the court seal the confidential supplement which contains individually identifiable information and compensation information including sensitive salary information about the individuals who are covered by the MIPs. It also contains an unredacted copy of the Financial Advisor's agreement. I have discretion pursuant to Section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act*¹⁷ to order that any document filed in a civil proceeding be treated as confidential, sealed and not form part of the public record. That said, public access in an important tenet of our system of justice.

64 The threshold test for sealing orders is found in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of [Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada \(Minister of Finance\)](#)¹⁸. In that case, Iacobucci J. stated that an order should only be granted when: (i) it is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (ii) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

65 In [Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re](#)¹⁹ I applied the *Sierra Club* test and approved a similar request by the Applicants for the sealing of a confidential supplement containing unredacted copies of

KERPs for the employees of the CMI Entities. Here, with respect to the first branch of the *Sierra Club* test, the confidential supplement contains unredacted copies of the MIPs. Protecting the disclosure of sensitive personal and compensation information of this nature, the disclosure of which would cause harm to both the LP Entities and the MIP participants, is an important commercial interest that should be protected. The information would be of obvious strategic advantage to competitors. Moreover, there are legitimate personal privacy concerns in issue. The MIP participants have a reasonable expectation that their names and their salary information will be kept confidential. With respect to the second branch of the *Sierra Club* test, keeping the information confidential will not have any deleterious effects. As in the [Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re](#) case, the aggregate amount of the MIP charge has been disclosed and the individual personal information adds nothing. The salutary effects of sealing the confidential supplement outweigh any conceivable deleterious effects. In the normal course, outside of the context of a CCAA proceeding, confidential personal and salary information would be kept confidential by an employer and would not find its way into the public domain. With respect to the unredacted Financial Advisor agreement, it contains commercially sensitive information the disclosure of which could be harmful to the solicitation process and the salutary effects of sealing it outweigh any deleterious effects. The confidential supplements should be sealed and not form part of the public record at least at this stage of the proceedings.

Conclusion

66 For all of these reasons, I was prepared to grant the order requested.

Application granted.

Footnotes

- [1](#) R.S.C. 1985, c. C. 36, as amended.
- [2](#) On October 30, 2009, substantially all of the assets and business of the National Post Company were transferred to the company now known as National Post Inc.
- [3](#) Subject to certain assumptions and qualifications.
- [4](#) Although not formally in evidence before the court, counsel for the LP Secured Lenders advised the court that currently \$382,889,000 in principal in Canadian dollars is outstanding along with \$458,042,000 in principal in American dollars.
- [5](#) [2006 CarswellOnt 264](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- [6](#) [2009 CarswellOnt 6184](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 29.
- [7](#) [\(1993\), 9 B.L.R. \(2d\) 275](#) (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).
- [8](#) [1999 CarswellOnt 4673](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- [9](#) Ibid at para. 16.
- [10](#) [\(2002\), 34 C.B.R. \(4th\) 157](#) (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (March 6, 2003) [\[2003 CarswellOnt 730\]](#) (S.C.C.).
- [11](#) Ibid at para. 34.
- [12](#) Supra, note 7 at paras. 31-35.
- [13](#) This exception also applies to the other charges granted.

[14](#) Supra note 7 at paras. 44-48.

[15](#) Supra note 7.

[16](#) [\[2009\] O.J. No. 3344](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

[17](#) R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, as amended.

[18](#) [\[2002\] 2 S.C.R. 522](#) (S.C.C.).

[19](#) Supra, note 7 at para. 52.

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Tab 8



[Original](#)

2010 QCCS 4450
Quebec Superior Court

AbitibiBowater Inc., Re

2010 CarswellQue 10118, 2010 QCCS 4450, 193
A.C.W.S. (3d) 360, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 80, EYB 2010-179705

In The Matter of the Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of

AbitibiBowater Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., Bowater Canadian Holdings Inc. and The Other
Petitioners Listed on Schedules "A", "B" and "C" (Debtors) and Ernst & Young Inc. (Monitor)

Clément Gascon, J.S.C.

Heard: September 20-21, 2010

Judgment: September 23, 2010

Docket: C.S. Montréal 500-11-036133-094

Counsel: Mr. Sean Dunphy, Me Guy P. Martel, Me Joseph Reynaud, for the Debtors

Me Gilles Paquin, Me Avram Fishman, for the Monitor

Mr. Robert Thornton, for the Monitor

Me Bernard Boucher, for BI Citibank (London Branch), as Agent for Citibank, N.A.

Me Jocelyn Perreault, for Bank of Nova Scotia (as Administrative and Collateral Agent)

Me Marc Duchesne, Me François Gagnon, for the Ad hoc Committee of the Senior Secured Noteholders
and U.S. Bank National Association, Indenture Trustee for the Senior Secured Noteholders

Mr. Frederick L. Myers, Mr. Robert J. Chadwick, for the Ad hoc Committee of Bondholders

Mr. Michael B. Rotsztein, for Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd.

Me Louise Hélène Guimond, for Syndicat canadien des communications, de l'énergie et du papier (SCEP)
et ses sections locales 59-N, 63, 84, 84-35, 88, 90, 92, 101, 109, 132, 138, 139, 161, 209, 227, 238, 253, 306,
352, 375, 1256 et 1455 and for Syndicat des employés(es) et employés(es) professionnels(-les) et de bureau
- Québec (SEPB) et les sections locales 110, 151 et 526

Me Neil Peden, Mr. Raj Sahni, for The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of AbitibiBowater Inc.
& al.

Me Sébastien Guy, for Cater Pillar Financial Services and Desjardins Trust inc.

Mr. Richard Butler, for Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia and the
Attorney General of British Columbia

Me Louis Dumont, Mr. Neil Rabinovitch, for Aurelius Capital Management LLC and Contrarian Capital
Management LLC

Mr. Christopher Besant, for NPower Cogen Limited

Mr. Len Marsello, for the Attorney General for Ontario

Mr. Carl Holm, for Bowater Canada Finance Company

Mr. David Ward, for Wilmington Trust US Indenture Trustee of Unsecured Notes issued by BCFC

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX](#) Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

[XIX.3 Arrangements](#)[XIX.3.b Approval by court](#)[XIX.3.b.i "Fair and reasonable"](#)**Headnote**

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

Pulp and paper company experienced financial difficulties and sought protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — In order to complete its restructuring process, company prepared plan of arrangement — Under plan, company's secured debt obligations would be paid in full while unsecured debt obligations would be converted to equity of reorganized entity — Monitor as well as overwhelming majority of stakeholders strongly supported plan while only handful of stakeholders raised limited objections — Company brought motion seeking approval of plan by Court — Motion granted — Sole issue to be determined was whether plan was fair and reasonable — Here, level of approval by creditors was significant factor to consider — Monitor's recommendation to approve plan was another significant factor, given his professionalism, objectivity and competence — As most of objecting parties had agreed upon "carve-out" wording to be included in Court's order, only two creditors actually objected to plan and it was Court's view that their objections were either ill-founded or moot — Should Court decide to go against vast majority of stakeholders' will and reject plan, not only would those stakeholders be adversely prejudiced but company would also go bankrupt — Court should not seek perfection as plan was result of many compromises and of favourable market window — Court was of view that it was important to allow company to move forthwith towards emergence from 18-month restructuring process — Therefore, Court considered it appropriate and justified to approve plan of arrangement.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Arrangements — Approbation par le tribunal — « Juste et équitable »

Compagnie papetière a connu des problèmes financiers et s'est mise sous la protection de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Afin de compléter son processus de restructuration, la compagnie a préparé un plan d'arrangement — Dans le cadre du plan, les dettes de la compagnie faisant l'objet d'une garantie seraient payées au complet tandis que les dettes de la compagnie ne faisant pas l'objet d'une garantie seraient converties en actions de l'entité restructurée — Contrôleur de même que la vaste majorité des parties intéressées étaient fortement en faveur du plan tandis qu'une poignée seulement des personnes intéressées soulevaient des objections limitées — Compagnie a déposé une requête visant l'approbation du plan par le Tribunal — Requête accueillie — Seule question à trancher était de savoir si le plan était juste et raisonnable — En l'espèce, la proportion des créanciers s'étant prononcés en faveur du plan était un élément important à considérer — Recommandation du contrôleur d'approuver le plan était un autre élément important, compte tenu de son professionnalisme, de son objectivité et de sa compétence — Comme la majeure partie des parties s'étant prononcées contre le plan avaient donné leur accord à la rédaction d'une clause de « retranchement » destinée à faire partie de l'ordonnance du Tribunal, seuls deux créanciers s'objectaient au plan dans les faits et le Tribunal était d'avis que leurs objections étaient soit sans fondement ou sans objet — S'il fallait que le Tribunal décide d'aller à l'encontre de la volonté de la vaste majorité des personnes intéressées et de rejeter le plan, non seulement ces personnes subiraient-elles des impacts négatifs mais aussi la compagnie ferait-elle faillite — Tribunal ne devrait pas chercher la perfection puisque le plan était le fruit de plusieurs compromis et le résultat d'une fenêtre d'opportunité favorable en terme de marché — Tribunal était d'avis qu'il était important que la compagnie puisse dès à présent mener à son terme un processus de restructuration long de dix-huit mois — Par conséquent, de l'avis du Tribunal, il était approprié et justifié de sanctionner le plan d'arrangement.

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TQS inc., Re (2008), 2008 CarswellQue 5282, 2008 QCCS 2448 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Unifor inc., Re (2003), 43 C.B.R. (4th) 254, 2003 CarswellQue 3404 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

Chapter 11 — referred to

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44

s. 191 — considered

s. 241 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 6 — considered

s. 9 — referred to

s. 10 — referred to

Corporations Tax Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.40

s. 107 — referred to

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15

s. 270 [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — referred to

Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.)

s. 159 — referred to

Ministère du Revenu, Loi sur le, L.R.Q., c. M-31

art. 14 — referred to

Retail Sales Tax Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.31

s. 22 — referred to

Taxation Act, 2007, S.O. 2007, c. 11, Sched. A

s. 117 — referred to

MOTION by debtor company seeking Court's approval of plan of arrangement.

Clément Gascon, J.S.C.:

Introduction

1 This judgment deals with the sanction and approval of a plan of arrangement under the *CCAA*¹. The sole issue to resolve is the fair and reasonable character of the plan. While the debtor company, the monitor and an overwhelming majority of stakeholders strongly support this sanction and approval, three dissenting voices raise limited objections. The Court provides these reasons in support of the Sanction Order it considers appropriate and justified to issue under the circumstances.

The Relevant Background

2 On April 17, 2009 [[2009 CarswellQue 14194](#) (C.S. Que.)], the Court issued an Initial Order pursuant to the *CCAA* with respect to the Abitibi Petitioners (listed in Schedule A), the Bowater Petitioners (listed in Schedule B) and the Partnerships (listed in Schedule C).

3 On the day before, April 16, 2009, AbitibiBowater Inc., Bowater Inc. and certain of their U.S. and Canadian Subsidiaries (the "*U.S. Debtors*") had, similarly, filed Voluntary Petitions for Relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

4 Since the Initial Order, the Abitibi Petitioners, the Bowater Petitioners and the Partnerships (collectively, "*Abitibi*") have, under the protection of the Court, undertaken a huge and complex restructuring of their insolvent business.

5 The restructuring of Abitibi's imposing debt of several billion dollars was a cross-border undertaking that affected tens of thousands of stakeholders, from employees, pensioners, suppliers, unions, creditors and lenders to government authorities.

6 The process has required huge efforts on the part of many, including important sacrifices from most of the stakeholders involved. To name just a few, these restructuring efforts have included the closure of certain facilities, the sale of assets, contracts repudiations, the renegotiation of collective agreements and several costs saving initiatives².

7 In a span of less than 18 months, more than 740 entries have been docketed in the Court record that now comprises in excess of 12 boxes of documents. The Court has, so far, rendered over 100 different judgments and orders. The Stay Period has been extended seven times. It presently expires on September 30, 2010.

8 Abitibi is now nearing emergence from this *CCAA* restructuring process.

9 In May 2010, after an extensive review of the available alternatives, and pursuant to lengthy negotiations and consultations with creditors' groups, regulators and stakeholders, Abitibi filed its Plan of Reorganization and Compromise in the *CCAA* restructuring process (the "*CCAA Plan*³"). A joint Plan of Reorganization was also filed at the same time in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court process (the "*U.S. Plan*").

10 In essence, the Plans provided for the payment in full, on the Implementation Date and consummation of the U.S. Plan, of all of Abitibi's and U.S. Debtors' secured debt obligations.

11 As for their unsecured debt obligations, save for few exceptions, the Plans contemplated their conversion to equity of the post emergence reorganized Abitibi. If the Plans are implemented, the net value would likely translate into a recovery under the *CCAA* Plan corresponding to the following approximate rates for the various Affected Unsecured Creditors Classes:

- (a) 3.4% for the ACI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class;
- (b) 17.1% for the ACCC Affected Unsecured Creditor Class;
- (c) 4.2% for the Saguenay Forest Products Affected Unsecured Creditor Class;
- (d) 36.5% for the BCFPI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class;
- (e) 20.8% for the Bowater Maritimes Affected Unsecured Creditor Class; and
- (f) 43% for the ACNSI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class.

12 With respect to the remaining Petitioners, the illustrative recoveries under the *CCAA* Plan would be nil, as these entities have nominal assets.

13 As an alternative to this debt to equity swap, the basic structure of the *CCAA* Plan included as well the possibility of smaller unsecured creditors receiving a cash distribution of 50% of the face amount of their Proven Claim if such was less than \$6,073, or if they opted to reduce their claim to that amount.

14 In short, the purpose of the *CCAA* Plan was to provide for a coordinated restructuring and compromise of Abitibi's debt obligations, while at the same time reorganizing and simplifying its corporate and capital structure.

15 On September 14, 2010, Abitibi's Creditors' Meeting to vote on the *CCAA* Plan was convened, held and conducted. The resolution approving the *CCAA* Plan was overwhelmingly approved by the Affected Unsecured Creditors of Abitibi, save for the Creditors of one the twenty Classes involved, namely, the BCFC Affected Unsecured Creditors Class.

16 Majorities well in excess of the statutorily required simple majority in number and two-third majority in value of the Affected Unsecured Claims held by the Affected Unsecured Creditors were attained. On a combined basis, the percentages were 97.07% in number and 93.47% in value.

17 Of the 5,793 votes cast by creditors holding claims totalling some 8,9 billion dollars, over 8,3 billion dollars worth of claims voted in favour of approving the *CCAA* Plan.

The Motion⁴ at Issue

18 Today, as required by Section 6 of the *CCAA*, the Court is asked to sanction and approve the *CCAA* Plan. The effect of the Court's approval is to bind Abitibi and its Affected Unsecured Creditors to the terms of the *CCAA* Plan.

19 The exercise of the Court's authority to sanction a compromise or arrangement under the *CCAA* is a matter of judicial discretion. In that exercise, the general requirements to be met are well established. In summary, before doing so, the Court must be satisfied that ⁵:

- a) There has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements;
- b) Nothing has been done or purported to be done that was not authorized by the *CCAA*; and
- c) The Plan is fair and reasonable.

20 Only the third condition is truly at stake here. Despite Abitibi's creditors' huge support of the fairness and the reasonableness of the *CCAA* Plan, some dissenting voices have raised objections.

21 They include:

- a) The BCFC Noteholders' Objection;
- b) The Contestations of the Provinces of Ontario and British Columbia; and
- c) The Contestation of NPower Cogen Limited.

22 For the reasons that follow, the Court is satisfied that the *CCAA* Plan is fair and reasonable. The Contestations of the Provinces of Ontario and British Columbia and of NPower Cogen Limited have now been satisfactorily resolved by adding to the Sanction Order sought limited "carve-out" provisions in that regard. As for the only other objection that remains, namely that of some of the BCFC Noteholders, the Court considers that it should be discarded.

23 It is thus appropriate to immediately approve the *CCAA* Plan and issue the Sanction Order sought, albeit with some minor modifications to the wording of specific conclusions that the Court deems necessary.

24 In the Court's view, it is important to allow Abitibi to move forthwith towards emergence from the *CCAA* restructuring process it undertook eighteen month ago.

25 No one seriously disputes that there is risk associated with delaying the sanction of the *CCAA* Plan. This risk includes the fact that part of the exit financing sought by Abitibi is dependent upon the capital markets being receptive to the high yield notes or term debt being offered, in a context where such markets are volatile. There is, undoubtedly, continuing uncertainty with respect to the strength of the economic recovery and the effect this could have on the financial markets.

26 Moreover, there are numerous arrangements that Abitibi and their key stakeholders have agreed to or are in the process of settling that are key to the successful implementation of the *CCAA* Plan, including collective bargaining agreements with employees and pension funding arrangements with regulators. Any undue delay with implementation of the *CCAA* Plan increases the risk that these arrangements may require alterations or amendments.

27 Finally, at hearing, Mr. Robertson, the Chief Restructuring Officer, testified that the monthly cost of any delay in Abitibi's emergence from this *CCAA* process is the neighbourhood of 30 million dollars. That includes the direct professional costs and financing costs of the restructuring itself, as well as the savings that

the labour cost reductions and the exit financing negotiated by Abitibi will generate as of the Implementation Date.

28 The Court cannot ignore this reality in dealing rapidly with the objections raised to the sanction and approval of the *CCAA* Plan.

Analysis

1. The Court's approval of the *CCAA* Plan

29 As already indicated, the first and second general requirements set out previously dealing with the statutory requirements and the absence of unauthorized conduct are not at issue.

30 On the one hand, the Monitor has reached the conclusion that Abitibi is and has been in strict compliance with all statutory requirements. Nobody suggests that this is not the case.

31 On the other hand, all materials filed and procedures taken by Abitibi were authorized by the *CCAA* and the orders of this Court. The numerous reports of the Monitor (well over sixty to date) make no reference to any act or conduct by Abitibi that was not authorized by the *CCAA*; rather, the Monitor is of the view that Abitibi has not done or purported to do anything that was not authorized by the *CCAA*⁶.

32 In fact, in connection with each request for an extension of the stay of proceedings, the Monitor has reported that Abitibi was acting in good faith and with due diligence. The Court has not made any contrary finding during the course of these proceedings.

33 Turning to the fairness and reasonableness of a *CCAA* Plan requirement, its assessment requires the Court to consider the relative degrees of prejudice that would flow from granting or refusing the relief sought. To that end, in reviewing the fairness and reasonableness of a given plan, the Court does not and should not require perfection⁷.

34 Considering that a plan is, first and foremost, a compromise and arrangement reached, between a debtor company and its creditors, there is, indeed, a heavy onus on parties seeking to upset a plan where the required majorities have overwhelmingly supported it. From that standpoint, a court should not lightly second-guess the business decisions reached by the creditors as a body⁸.

35 In that regard, courts in this country have held that the level of approval by the creditors is a significant factor in determining whether a *CCAA* Plan is fair and reasonable⁹. Here, the majorities in favour of the *CCAA* Plan, both in number and in value, are very high. This indicates a significant and very strong support of the *CCAA* Plan by the Affected Unsecured Creditors of Abitibi.

36 Likewise, in its Fifty-Seventh Report, the Monitor advised the creditors that their approval of the *CCAA* Plan would be a reasonable decision. He recommended that they approve the *CCAA* Plan then. In its Fifty-Eighth Report, the Monitor reaffirmed its view that the *CCAA* Plan was fair and reasonable. The recommendation was for the Court to sanction and approve the *CCAA* Plan.

37 In a matter such as this one, where the Monitor has worked through out the restructuring with professionalism, objectivity and competence, such a recommendation carries a lot of weight.

38 The Court considers that the *CCAA* Plan represents a truly successful compromise and restructuring, fully in line with the objectives of the *CCAA*. Despite its weaknesses and imperfections, and notwithstanding the huge sacrifices and losses it imposes upon numerous stakeholders, the *CCAA* Plan remains a practical, reasonable and responsible solution to Abitibi's insolvency.

39 Its implementation will preserve significant social and economic benefits to the Canadian economy, including enabling about 11,900 employees (as of March 31, 2010) to retain their employment, and allowing hundreds of municipalities, suppliers and contractors in several regions of Ontario and Quebec to continue deriving benefits from a stronger and more competitive important player in the forest products industry.

40 In addition, the business of Abitibi will continue to operate, pension plans will not be terminated, and the Affected Unsecured Creditors will receive distributions (including payment in full to small creditors).

41 Moreover, simply no alternative to the *CCAA* Plan has been offered to the creditors of Abitibi. To the contrary, it appears obvious that in the event the Court does not sanction the *CCAA* Plan, the considerable advantages that it creates will be most likely lost, such that Abitibi may well be placed into bankruptcy.

42 If that were to be the case, no one seriously disputes that most of the creditors would end up being in a more disadvantageous position than with the approval of the *CCAA* Plan. As outlined in the Monitor's 57th Report, the alternative scenario, a liquidation of Abitibi's business, will not prove to be as advantageous for its creditors, let alone its stakeholders as a whole.

43 All in all, the economic and business interests of those directly concerned with the end result have spoken vigorously pursuant to a well-conducted democratic process. This is certainly not a case where the Court should override the express and strong wishes of the debtor company and its creditors and the Monitor's objective analysis that supports it.

44 Bearing these comments in mind, the Court notes as well that none of the objections raised support the conclusion that the *CCAA* Plan is unfair or unreasonable.

2. The BCFC Noteholders' objections

45 In the end, only Aurelius Capital Management LP and Contrarian Capital Management LLC (the "Noteholders") oppose the sanction of the *CCAA* Plan [10](#).

46 These Noteholders, through their managed funds entities, hold about one-third of some six hundred million US dollars of Unsecured Notes issued by Bowater Canada Finance Company ("BCFC") and which are guaranteed by Bowater Incorporated. These notes are BCFC's only material liabilities.

47 BCFC was a Petitioner under the *CCAA* proceedings and a Debtor in the parallel proceedings under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. However, its creditors voted to reject the *CCAA* Plan: while 76.8% of the Class of Affected Unsecured Creditors of BCFC approved the *CCAA* Plan in number, only 48% thereof voted in favour in dollar value. The required majorities of the *CCAA* were therefore not met.

48 As a result of this no vote occurrence, the Affected Unsecured Creditors of BCFC, including the Noteholders, are Unaffected Creditors under the *CCAA* Plan: they will not receive the distribution contemplated by the plan. As for BCFC itself, this outcome entails that it is not an "Applicant" for the purpose of this Sanction Order.

49 Still, the terms of the *CCAA* Plan specifically provide for the compromise and release of any claims BCFC may have against the other Petitioners pursuant, for instance, to any inter company transactions. Similarly, the *CCAA* Plan specifies that BCFC's equity interests in any other Petitioner can be exchanged, cancelled, redeemed or otherwise dealt with for nil consideration.

50 In their objections to the sanction of the *CCAA* Plan, the Noteholders raise, in essence, three arguments:

(a) They maintain that BCFC did not have an opportunity to vote on the *CCAA* Plan and that no process has been established to provide for BCFC to receive distribution as a creditor of the other Petitioners;

(b) They criticize the overly broad and inappropriate character of the release provisions of the *CCAA* Plan;

(c) They contend that the NAFTA Settlement Funds have not been appropriately allocated.

51 With respect, the Court considers that these objections are ill founded.

52 First, given the vote by the creditors of BCFC that rejected the *CCAA* Plan and its specific terms in the event of such a situation, the initial ground of contestation is moot for all intents and purposes.

53 In addition, pursuant to a hearing held on September 16 and 17, 2010, on an Abitibi's *Motion for Advice and Directions*, Mayrand J. already concluded that BCFC had simply no claims against the other Petitioners, save with respect to the Contribution Claim referred to in that motion and that is not affected by the *CCAA* Plan in any event.

54 There is no need to now review or reconsider this issue that has been heard, argued and decided, mostly in a context where the Noteholders had ample opportunity to then present fully their arguments.

55 In her reasons for judgment filed earlier today in the Court record, Mayrand J. notably ruled that the alleged Inter Company Claims of BCFC had no merit pursuant to a detailed analysis of what took place.

56 For one, the Monitor, in its Amended 49th Report, had made a thorough review of the transactions at issue and concluded that they did not appear to give rise to any inter company debt owing to BCFC.

57 On top of that, Mayrand J. noted as well that the Independent Advisors, who were appointed in the Chapter 11 U.S. Proceedings to investigate the Inter Company Transactions that were the subject of the Inter Company Claims, had completed their report in this regard. As explained in its 58th Report, the Monitor understands that they were of the view that BCFC had no other claims to file against any other Petitioner. In her reasons, Mayrand J. concluded that this was the only reasonable inference to draw from the evidence she heard.

58 As highlighted by Mayrand J. in these reasons, despite having received this report of the Independent Advisors, the Noteholders have not agreed to release its content. Conversely, they have not invoked any of its findings in support of their position either.

59 That is not all. In her reasons for judgment, Mayrand J. indicated that a detailed presentation of the Independent Advisors report was made to BCFC's Board of Directors on September 7, 2010. This notwithstanding, BCFC elected not to do anything in that regard since then.

60 As a matter of fact, at no point in time did BCFC ever file, in the context of the current *CCAA* Proceedings, any claim against any other Petitioner. None of its creditors, including the Noteholders, have either purported to do so for and/or on behalf of BCFC. This is quite telling. After all, the transactions at issue date back many years and this restructuring process has been going on for close to eighteen months.

61 To sum up, short of making allegations that no facts or analysis appear to support or claiming an insufficiency of process because the independent and objective ones followed so far did not lead to the result they wanted, the Noteholders simply have nothing of substance to put forward.

62 Contrary to what they contend, there is no need for yet again another additional process to deal with this question. To so conclude would be tantamount to allowing the Noteholders to take hostage the *CCAA* restructuring process and derail Abitibi's emergence for no valid reason.

63 The other argument of the Noteholders to the effect that BCFC would have had a claim as the holder of preferred shares of BCHI leads to similar comments. It is, again, hardly supported by anything. In any event, assuming the restructuring transactions contemplated under the *CCAA* Plan entail their cancellation for nil consideration, which is apparently not necessarily the case for the time being, there would be nothing unusual in having the equity holders of insolvent companies not receive anything in a compromise and plan of arrangement approved in a *CCAA* restructuring process.

64 In such a context, the Court disagrees with the Noteholders' assertion that BCFC did not have an opportunity to vote on the *CCAA* Plan or that no process was established to provide the latter to receive distribution as a potential creditor of the other Petitioners.

65 To argue that the *CCAA* Plan is not fair and reasonable on the basis of these alleged claims of BCFC against the other Petitioners has no support based on the relevant facts and Mayrand J.'s analysis of that specific point.

66 Second, given these findings, the issue of the breadth and appropriateness of the releases provided under the *CCAA* Plan simply does not concern the Noteholders.

67 As stated by Abitibi's Counsel at hearing, BCFC is neither an "Applicant" under the terms of the releases of the *CCAA* Plan nor pursuant to the Sanction Order. As such, BCFC does not give or get releases as a result of the Sanction Order. The *CCAA* Plan does not release BCFC nor its directors or officers acting as such.

68 As it is not included as an "Applicant", there is no need to provide any type of convoluted "carve-out" provision as the Noteholders requested. As properly suggested by Abitibi, it will rather suffice to include a mere clarification at paragraph 15 of the Sanction Order to reaffirm that in the context of the releases and the Sanction Order, "Applicant" does not include BCFC.

69 As for the Noteholders themselves, they are Unaffected Creditors under the *CCAA* Plan as a result of the no vote of their Class.

70 In essence, the main concern of the Noteholders as to the scope of the releases contemplated by the *CCAA* Plan and the Sanction Order is a mere issue of clarity. In the Court's opinion, this is sufficiently dealt with by the addition made to the wording of paragraph 15 of the Sanction Order.

71 Besides that, as explained earlier, any complaint by the Noteholders that the alleged inter company claims of BCFC are improperly compromised by the *CCAA* Plan has no merit. If their true objective is to indirectly protect their contentions to that end by challenging the wording of the releases, it is unjustified and without basis. The Court already said so.

72 Save for these arguments raised by the Noteholders that the Court rejects, it is worth noting that none of the stakeholders of Abitibi object to the scope of the releases of the *CCAA* Plan or their appropriateness given the global compromise reached through the debt to equity swap and the reorganization contemplated by the plan.

73 The *CCAA* permits the inclusion of releases (even ones involving third parties) in a plan of compromise or arrangement when there is a reasonable connection between the claims being released and compromised and the restructuring achieved by the plan. Amongst others, the broad nature of the terms "compromise

or arrangement", the binding nature of a plan that has received creditors' approval, and the principles that parties should be able to put in a plan what could lawfully be incorporated into any other contract support the authority of the Court to approve these kind of releases¹¹. In accordance with these principles, the Quebec Superior Court has, in the past, sanctioned plans that included releases of parties making significant contribution to a restructuring¹².

74 The additional argument raised by the Noteholders with respect to the difference between the releases that could be approved by this Court as compared to those that the U.S. Bankruptcy Court may issue in respect of the Chapter 11 Plan is not convincing.

75 The fact that under the Chapter 11 Plan, creditors may elect not to provide releases to directors and officers of applicable entities does not render similar kind of releases granted under the *CCAA* Plan invalid or improper. That the result may be different in a jurisdiction as opposed to the other does not make the *CCAA* Plan unfair and unreasonable simply for that reason.

76 Third, the last objection of the Noteholders to the effect that the NAFTA Settlement Funds have not been properly allocated is simply a red herring. It is aimed at provoking a useless debate with respect to which the Noteholders have, in essence, no standing.

77 The Monitor testified that the NAFTA Settlement has no impact whatsoever upon BCFC. If it is at all relevant, all the assets involved in this settlement belonged to another of the Petitioners, ACCC, with respect to whom the Noteholders are not a creditor.

78 In addition, this apparent contestation of the allocation of the NAFTA Settlement Funds is a collateral attack on the Order granted by this Court on September 1, 2010, which approved the settlement of Abitibi's NAFTA claims against the Government of Canada, as well as the related payment to be made to the reorganised successor Canadian operating entity upon emergence. No one has appealed this NAFTA Settlement Order.

79 That said, in their oral argument, the Noteholders have finally argued that the Court should lift the Stay of Proceedings Order inasmuch as BCFC was concerned. The last extension of the Stay was granted on September 1, 2010, without objection; it expires on September 30, 2010. It is clear from the wording of this Sanction Order that any extension beyond September 30, 2010 will not apply to BCFC.

80 The Court considers this request made verbally by the Noteholders as unfounded.

81 No written motion was ever served in that regard to start with. In addition, the Stay remains in effect against BCFC up until September 30, 2010, that is, for about a week or so. The explanations offered by Abitibi's Counsel to leave it as such for the time being are reasonable under the circumstances. It appears proper to allow a few days to the interested parties to ascertain the impact, if any, of the Stay not being applicable anymore to BCFC, if alone to ascertain how this impacts upon the various charges created by the Initial Order and subsequent Orders issued by the Court during the course of these proceedings.

82 There is no support for the concern of the Noteholders as to an ulterior motive of Abitibi for maintaining in place this Stay of Proceedings against BCFC up until September 30, 2010.

83 All things considered, in the Court's opinion, it would be quite unfair and unreasonable to deny the sanction of the *CCAA* Plan for the benefit of all the stakeholders involved on the basis of the arguments raised by the Noteholders.

84 Their objections either reargue issues that have been heard, considered and decided, complain of a lack a clarity of the scope of releases that the addition of a few words to the Sanction Order properly addresses, or

voice queries about the allocation of important funds to the Abitibi's emergence from the *CCAA* that simply do not concern the entities of which the Noteholders are allegedly creditors, be it in Canada or in the U.S.

85 When one remains mindful of the relative degrees of prejudice that would flow from granting or refusing the relief sought, it is obvious that the scales heavily tilt in favour of granting the Sanction Order sought.

3. The Contestations of the Provinces of Ontario and British Columbia

86 Following negotiations that the Provinces involved and Abitibi pursued, with the assistance of the Monitor, up to the very last minute, the interested parties have agreed upon a "carve-out" wording that is satisfactory to every one with respect to some potential environmental liabilities of Abitibi in the event future circumstances trigger a concrete dispute in that regard.

87 In the Court's view, this is, by far, the most preferred solution to adopt with respect to the disagreement that exists on their respective position as to potential proceedings that may arise in the future under environmental legislation. This approach facilitates the approval of the *CCAA* Plan and the successful restructuring of Abitibi, without affecting the right of any affected party in this respect.

88 The "carve-out" provisions agreed upon will be included in the Sanction Order.

4. The Contestation of NPower Cogen Limited

89 By its Contestation, NPower Cogen Limited sought to preserve its rights with respect to what it called the "Cogen Motion", namely a "*motion to be brought by Cogen before this Honourable Court to have various claims heard*" (para. 24(b) and 43 of NPower Cogen Limited Contestation).

90 Here again, Abitibi and NPower Cogen Limited have agreed on an acceptable "carve-out" wording to be included in the Sanction Order in that regard. As a result, there is no need to discuss the impact of this Contestation any further.

5. Abitibi's Reorganization

91 The Motion finally deals with the corporate reorganization of Abitibi and the Sanction Order includes declarations and orders dealing with it.

92 The test to be applied by the Court in determining whether to approve a reorganization under Section 191 of the *CBCA* is similar to the test applied in deciding whether to sanction a plan of arrangement under the *CCAA*, namely: (a) there must be compliance with all statutory requirements; (b) the debtor company must be acting in good faith; and (c) the capital restructuring must be fair and reasonable ¹³.

93 It is not disputed by anyone that these requirements have been fulfilled here.

6. The wording of the Sanction Order

94 In closing, the Court made numerous comments to Abitibi's Counsel on the wording of the Sanction Order initially sought in the Motion. These comments have been taken into account in the subsequent in depth revisions of the Sanction Order that the Court is now issuing. The Court is satisfied with the corrections, adjustments and deletions made to what was originally requested.

For these Reasons, The Court:

1 ***GRANTS*** the Motion.

Definitions

2 *DECLARES* that any capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Order shall have the meaning ascribed thereto in the *CCAA* Plan¹⁴ and the Creditors' Meeting Order, as the case may be.

Service and Meeting

3 *DECLARES* that the notices given of the presentation of the Motion and related Sanction Hearing are proper and sufficient, and in accordance with the Creditors' Meeting Order.

4 *DECLARES* that there has been proper and sufficient service and notice of the Meeting Materials, including the *CCAA* Plan, the Circular and the Notice to Creditors in connection with the Creditors' Meeting, to all Affected Unsecured Creditors, and that the Creditors' Meeting was duly convened, held and conducted in conformity with the *CCAA*, the Creditors' Meeting Order and all other applicable orders of the Court.

5 *DECLARES* that no meetings or votes of (i) holders of Equity Securities and/or (ii) holders of equity securities of ABH are required in connection with the *CCAA* Plan and its implementation, including the implementation of the Restructuring Transactions as set out in the Restructuring Transactions Notice dated September 1, 2010, as amended on September 13, 2010.

CCAA Plan Sanction

6 *DECLARES* that:

a) the *CCAA* Plan and its implementation (including the implementation of the Restructuring Transactions) have been approved by the Required Majorities of Affected Unsecured Creditors in each of the following classes in conformity with the *CCAA*: ACI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the ACCC Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the 15.5% Guarantor Applicant Affected Unsecured Creditor Classes, the Saguenay Forest Products Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the BCFPI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the AbitibiBowater Canada Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the Bowater Maritimes Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the ACNSI Affected Unsecured Creditor Class, the Office Products Affected Unsecured Creditor Class and the Recycling Affected Unsecured Creditor Class;

b) the *CCAA* Plan was not approved by the Required Majority of Affected Unsecured Creditors in the BCFC Affected Unsecured Creditors Class and that the Holders of BCFC Affected Unsecured Claims are therefore deemed to be Unaffected Creditors holding Excluded Claims against BCFC for the purpose of the *CCAA* Plan and this Order, and that BCFC is therefore deemed not to be an Applicant for the purpose of this Order;

c) the Court is satisfied that the Petitioners and the Partnerships have complied with the provisions of the *CCAA* and all the orders made by this Court in the context of these *CCAA* Proceedings in all respects;

d) the Court is satisfied that no Petitioner or Partnership has either done or purported to do anything that is not authorized by the *CCAA*; and

e) the *CCAA* Plan (and its implementation, including the implementation of the Restructuring Transactions), is fair and reasonable, and in the best interests of the Applicants and the Partnerships, the Affected Unsecured Creditors, the other stakeholders of the Applicants and all other Persons stipulated in the *CCAA* Plan.

7 *ORDERS* that the *CCAA* Plan and its implementation, including the implementation of the Restructuring Transactions, are sanctioned and approved pursuant to Section 6 of the *CCAA* and Section 191 of the *CBCA*, and, as at the Implementation Date, will be effective and will enure to the benefit of and be binding upon the Applicants, the Partnerships, the Reorganized Debtors, the Affected Unsecured Creditors, the other stakeholders of the Applicants and all other Persons stipulated in the *CCAA* Plan.

CCAA Plan Implementation

8 *DECLARES* that the Applicants, the Partnerships, the Reorganized Debtors and the Monitor, as the case may be, are authorized and directed to take all steps and actions necessary or appropriate, as determined by the Applicants, the Partnerships and the Reorganized Debtors in accordance with and subject to the terms of the *CCAA* Plan, to implement and effect the *CCAA* Plan, including the Restructuring Transactions, in the manner and the sequence as set forth in the *CCAA* Plan, the Restructuring Transactions Notice and this Order, and such steps and actions are hereby approved.

9 *AUTHORIZES* the Applicants, the Partnerships and the Reorganized Debtors to request, if need be, one or more order(s) from this Court, including *CCAA* Vesting Order(s), for the transfer and assignment of assets to the Applicants, the Partnerships, the Reorganized Debtors or other entities referred to in the Restructuring Transactions Notice, free and clear of any financial charges, as necessary or desirable to implement and effect the Restructuring Transactions as set forth in the Restructuring Transactions Notice.

10 *DECLARES* that, pursuant to Section 191 of the *CBCA*, the articles of AbitibiBowater Canada will be amended by new articles of reorganization in the manner and at the time set forth in the Restructuring Transactions Notice.

11 *DECLARES* that all Applicants and Partnerships to be dissolved pursuant to the Restructuring Transactions shall be deemed dissolved for all purposes without the necessity for any other or further action by or on behalf of any Person, including the Applicants or the Partnerships or their respective securityholders, directors, officers, managers or partners or for any payments to be made in connection therewith, provided, however, that the Applicants, the Partnerships and the Reorganized Debtors shall cause to be filed with the appropriate Governmental Entities articles, agreements or other documents of dissolution for the dissolved Applicants or Partnerships to the extent required by applicable Law.

12 *DECLARES* that, subject to the performance by the Applicants and the Partnerships of their obligations under the *CCAA* Plan, and in accordance with Section 8.1 of the *CCAA* Plan, all contracts, leases, Timber Supply and Forest Management Agreements ("TSFMA") and outstanding and unused volumes of cutting rights (backlog) thereunder, joint venture agreements, agreements and other arrangements to which the Applicants or the Partnerships are a party and that have not been terminated including as part of the Restructuring Transactions or repudiated in accordance with the terms of the Initial Order will be and remain in full force and effect, unamended, as at the Implementation Date, and no Person who is a party to any such contract, lease, agreement or other arrangement may accelerate, terminate, rescind, refuse to perform or otherwise repudiate its obligations thereunder, or enforce or exercise any right (including any right of dilution or other remedy) or make any demand under or in respect of any such contract, lease, agreement or other arrangement and no automatic termination will have any validity or effect by reason of:

- a) any event that occurred on or prior to the Implementation Date and is not continuing that would have entitled such Person to enforce those rights or remedies (including defaults, events of default, or termination events arising as a result of the insolvency of the Applicants and the Partnerships);

b) the insolvency of the Applicants, the Partnerships or any affiliate thereof or the fact that the Applicants, the Partnerships or any affiliate thereof sought or obtained relief under the *CCAA*, the *CBCA* or the Bankruptcy Code or any other applicable legislation;

c) any of the terms of the *CCAA* Plan, the U.S. Plan or any action contemplated therein, including the Restructuring Transactions Notice;

d) any settlements, compromises or arrangements effected pursuant to the *CCAA* Plan or the U.S. Plan or any action taken or transaction effected pursuant to the *CCAA* Plan or the U.S. Plan; or

e) any change in the control, transfer of equity interest or transfer of assets of the Applicants, the Partnerships, the joint ventures, or any affiliate thereof, or of any entity in which any of the Applicants or the Partnerships held an equity interest arising from the implementation of the *CCAA* Plan (including the Restructuring Transactions Notice) or the U.S. Plan, or the transfer of any asset as part of or in connection with the Restructuring Transactions Notice.

13 *DECLARES* that any consent or authorization required from a third party, including any Governmental Entity, under any such contracts, leases, TSFMAs and outstanding and unused volumes of cutting rights (backlog) thereunder, joint venture agreements, agreements or other arrangements in respect of any change of control, transfer of equity interest, transfer of assets or transfer of any asset as part of or in connection with the Restructuring Transactions Notice be deemed satisfied or obtained, as applicable.

14 *DECLARES* that the determination of Proven Claims in accordance with the Claims Procedure Orders, the Cross-border Claims Protocol, the Cross-border Voting Protocol and the Creditors' Meeting Order shall be final and binding on the Applicants, the Partnerships, the Reorganized Debtors and all Affected Unsecured Creditors.

Releases and Discharges

15 *CONFIRMS* the releases contemplated by Section 6.10 of the *CCAA* Plan and *DECLARES* that the said releases constitute good faith compromises and settlements of the matters covered thereby, and that such compromises and settlements are in the best interests of the Applicants and its stakeholders, are fair, equitable, and are integral elements of the restructuring and resolution of these proceedings in accordance with the *CCAA* Plan, it being understood that for the purpose of these releases and/or this Order, the terms "Applicants" or "Applicant" are not meant to include Bowater Canada Finance Corporation ("*BCFC*").

16 *ORDERS* that, upon payment in full in cash of all BI DIP Claims and ULC DIP Claim in accordance with the *CCAA* Plan, the BI DIP Lenders and the BI DIP Agent or ULC, as the case may be, shall at the request of the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors, without delay, execute and deliver to the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors such releases, discharges, authorizations and directions, instruments, notices and other documents as the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors may reasonably request for the purpose of evidencing and/or registering the release and discharge of any and all Financial Charges with respect to the BI DIP Claims or the ULC DIP Claim, as the case may be, the whole at the expense of the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors.

17 *ORDERS* that, upon payment in full in cash of their Secured Claims in accordance with the *CCAA* Plan, the ACCC Administrative Agent, the ACCC Term Lenders, the BCFPI Administrative Agent, the BCFPI Lenders, the Canadian Secured Notes Indenture Trustee and any Holders of a Secured Claim, as the case may be, shall at the request of the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors, without delay, execute and deliver to the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors such releases, discharges, authorizations and directions, instruments, notices and other documents as the Applicants, the

Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors may reasonably request for the purpose of evidencing and/or registering the release and discharge of any and all Financial Charges with respect to the ACCC Term Loan Claim, BCFPI Secured Bank Claim, Canadian Secured Notes Claim or any other Secured Claim, as the case may be, the whole at the expense of the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors.

For the purposes of the present paragraph [17], in the event of any dispute as to the amount of any Secured Claim, the Applicants, Partnerships or Reorganized Debtors, as the case may be, shall be permitted to pay to the Monitor the full amount in dispute (as specified by the affected Secured Creditor or by this Court upon summary application) and, upon payment of the amount not in dispute, receive the releases, discharges, authorizations, directions, instruments notices or other documents as provided for therein. Any amount paid to the Monitor in accordance with this paragraph shall be held in trust by the Monitor for the holder of the Secured Claim and the payer as their interests shall be determined by agreement between the parties or, failing agreement, as directed by this Court after summary application.

18 *PRECLUDES* the prosecution against the Applicants, the Partnerships or the Reorganized Debtors, whether directly, derivatively or otherwise, of any claim, obligation, suit, judgment, damage, demand, debt, right, cause of action, liability or interest released, discharged or terminated pursuant to the *CCAA* Plan.

Accounts with Financial Institutions

19 *ORDERS* that any and all financial institutions (the "Financial Institutions") with which the Applicants, the Partnerships and the Reorganized Debtors have or will have accounts (the "Accounts") shall process and/or facilitate the transfer of, or changes to, such Accounts in order to implement the *CCAA* Plan and the transactions contemplated thereby, including the Restructuring Transactions.

20 *ORDERS* that Mr. Allen Dea, Vice-President and Treasurer of ABH, or any other officer or director of the Reorganized Debtors, is empowered to take all required acts with any of the Financial Institutions to affect the transfer of, or changes to, the Accounts in order to facilitate the implementation of the *CCAA* Plan and the transactions contemplated thereby, including the Restructuring Transactions.

Effect of failure to implement CCAA Plan

21 *ORDERS* that, in the event that the Implementation Date does not occur, Affected Unsecured Creditors shall not be bound to the valuation, settlement or compromise of their Affected Claims at the amount of their Proven Claims in accordance with the *CCAA* Plan, the Claims Procedure Orders or the Creditors' Meeting Order. For greater certainty, nothing in the *CCAA* Plan, the Claims Procedure Orders, the Creditors' Meeting Order or in any settlement, compromise, agreement, document or instrument made or entered into in connection therewith or in contemplation thereof shall, in any way, prejudice, quantify, adjudicate, modify, release, waive or otherwise affect the validity, enforceability or quantum of any Claim against the Applicants or the Partnerships, including in the *CCAA* Proceedings or any other proceeding or process, in the event that the Implementation Date does not occur.

Charges created in the CCAA Proceedings

22 *ORDERS* that, upon the Implementation Date, all *CCAA* Charges against the Applicants and the Partnerships or their property created by the *CCAA* Initial Order or any subsequent orders shall be determined, discharged and released, provided that the BI DIP Lenders Charge shall be cancelled on the condition that the BI DIP Claims are paid in full on the Implementation Date.

Fees and Disbursements

23 *ORDERS* and *DECLARES* that, on and after the Implementation Date, the obligation to pay the reasonable fees and disbursements of the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor and counsel to the Applicants and the Partnerships, in each case at their standard rates and charges and including any amounts outstanding as of the Implementation Date, in respect of the *CCAA* Plan, including the implementation of the Restructuring Transactions, shall become obligations of Reorganized ABH.

Exit Financing

24 *ORDERS* that the Applicants are authorized and empowered to execute, deliver and perform any credit agreements, instruments of indebtedness, guarantees, security documents, deeds, and other documents, as may be required in connection with the Exit Facilities.

Stay Extension

25 *EXTENDS* the Stay Period in respect of the Applicants until the Implementation Date.

26 *DECLARES* that all orders made in the *CCAA* Proceedings shall continue in full force and effect in accordance with their respective terms, except to the extent that such Orders are varied by, or inconsistent with, this Order, the Creditors' Meeting Order, or any further Order of this Court.

Monitor and Chief Restructuring Officer

27 *DECLARES* that the protections afforded to Ernst & Young Inc., as Monitor and as officer of this Court, and to the Chief Restructuring Officer pursuant to the terms of the Initial Order and the other Orders made in the *CCAA* Proceedings, shall not expire or terminate on the Implementation Date and, subject to the terms hereof, shall remain effective and in full force and effect.

28 *ORDERS* and *DECLARES* that any distributions under the *CCAA* Plan and this Order shall not constitute a "distribution" and the Monitor shall not constitute a "legal representative" or "representative" of the Applicants for the purposes of section 159 of the Income Tax Act (Canada), section 270 of the Excise Tax Act (Canada), section 14 of the Act Respecting the Ministère du Revenu (Québec), section 107 of the Corporations Tax Act (Ontario), section 22 of the Retail Sales Tax Act (Ontario), section 117 of the Taxation Act, 2007 (Ontario) or any other similar federal, provincial or territorial tax legislation (collectively the "Tax Statutes") given that the Monitor is only a Disbursing Agent under the *CCAA* Plan, and the Monitor in making such payments is not "distributing", nor shall be considered to "distribute" nor to have "distributed", such funds for the purpose of the Tax Statutes, and the Monitor shall not incur any liability under the Tax Statutes in respect of it making any payments ordered or permitted hereunder, and is hereby forever released, remised and discharged from any claims against it under or pursuant to the Tax Statutes or otherwise at law, arising in respect of payments made under the *CCAA* Plan and this Order and any claims of this nature are hereby forever barred.

29 *ORDERS* and *DECLARES* that the Disbursing Agent, the Applicants and the Reorganized Debtors, as necessary, are authorized to take any and all actions as may be necessary or appropriate to comply with applicable Tax withholding and reporting requirements, including withholding a number of shares of New ABH Common Stock equal in value to the amount required to comply with such withholding requirements from the shares of New ABH Common Stock to be distributed to current or former employees and making the necessary arrangements for the sale of such shares on the TSX or the New York Stock Exchange on behalf of the current or former employees to satisfy such withholding requirements. All amounts withheld on account of Taxes shall be treated for all purposes as having been paid to the Affected Unsecured Creditor in respect of which such withholding was made, provided such withheld amounts are remitted to the appropriate Governmental Entity.

Claims Officers

30 *DECLARES* that, in accordance with paragraph [25] hereof, any claims officer appointed in accordance with the Claims Procedure Orders shall continue to have the authority conferred upon, and to the benefit from all protections afforded to, claims officers pursuant to Orders in the *CCAA* Proceedings.

General

31 *ORDERS* that, notwithstanding any other provision in this Order, the *CCAA* Plan or these *CCAA* Proceedings, the rights of the public authorities of British Columbia, Ontario or New Brunswick to take the position in or with respect to any future proceedings under environmental legislation that this or any other Order does not affect such proceedings by reason that such proceedings are not in relation to a claim within the meaning of the *CCAA* or are otherwise beyond the jurisdiction of Parliament or a court under the *CCAA* to affect in any way is fully reserved; as is reserved the right of any affected party to take any position to the contrary.

32 *DECLARES* that nothing in this Order or the *CCAA* Plan shall preclude NPower Cogen Limited ("Cogen") from bringing a motion for, or this Court from granting, the relief sought in respect of the facts and issues set out in the Claims Submission of Cogen dated August 10, 2010 (the "Claim Submission"), and the Reply Submission of Cogen dated August 24, 2010, provided that such relief shall be limited to the following:

a) a declaration that Cogen's claim against Abitibi Consolidated Inc. ("Abitibi") and its officers and directors, arising from the supply of electricity and steam to Bridgewater Paper Company Limited between November 1, 2009 and February 2, 2010 in the amount of £9,447,548 plus interest accruing at the rate of 3% *per annum* from February 2, 2010 onwards (the "Claim Amount") is (i) unaffected by the *CCAA* Plan or Sanction Order; (ii) is an Excluded Claim; or (iii) is a Secured Claim; (iv) is a D&O Claim; or (v) is a liability of Abitibi under its Guarantee;

b) an Order directing Abitibi and its Directors and Officers to pay the Claim Amount to Cogen forthwith; or

c) in the alternative to (b), an order granting leave, if leave be required, to commence proceedings for the payment of the Claim Amount under s. 241 of the *CBCA* and otherwise against Abitibi and its directors and officers in respect of same.

33 *DECLARES* that any of the Applicants, the Partnerships, the Reorganized Debtors or the Monitor may, from time to time, apply to this Court for directions concerning the exercise of their respective powers, duties and rights hereunder or in respect of the proper execution of the Order on notice to the Service List.

34 *DECLARES* that this Order shall have full force and effect in all provinces and territories in Canada.

35 *REQUESTS* the aid and recognition of any Court or administrative body in any Province of Canada and any Canadian federal court or administrative body and any federal or state court or administrative body in the United States of America and any court or administrative body elsewhere, to act in aid of and to be complementary to this Court in carrying out the terms of the Order, including the registration of this Order in any office of public record by any such court or administrative body or by any Person affected by the Order.

Provisional Execution

36 *ORDERS* the provisional execution of this Order notwithstanding any appeal and without the necessity of furnishing any security;

37 *WITHOUT COSTS.*

Schedule "A" — Abitibi Petitioners

1. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED INC.*
2. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED COMPANY OF CANADA*
3. *3224112 NOVA SCOTIA LIMITED*
4. *MARKETING DONOHUE INC.*
5. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED CANADIAN OFFICE PRODUCTS HOLDINGS INC.*
6. *3834328 CANADA INC.*
7. *6169678 CANADA INC.*
8. *4042140 CANADA INC.*
9. *DONOHUE RECYCLING INC.*
10. *1508756 ONTARIO INC.*
11. *3217925 NOVA SCOTIA COMPANY*
12. *LA TUQUE FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*
13. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED NOVA SCOTIA INCORPORATED*
14. *SAGUENAY FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*
15. *TERRA NOVA EXPLORATIONS LTD.*
16. *THE JONQUIERE PULP COMPANY*
17. *THE INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE AND TERMINAL COMPANY*
18. *SCRAMBLE MINING LTD.*
19. *9150-3383 QUÉBEC INC.*
20. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED (U.K.) INC.*

Schedule "B" — Bowater Petitioners

1. *BOWATER CANADIAN HOLDINGS INC.*
2. *BOWATER CANADA FINANCE CORPORATION*
3. *BOWATER CANADIAN LIMITED*
4. *3231378 NOVA SCOTIA COMPANY*

5. *ABITIBIBOWATER CANADA INC.*
6. *BOWATER CANADA TREASURY CORPORATION*
7. *BOWATER CANADIAN FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*
8. *BOWATER SHELBURNE CORPORATION*
9. *BOWATER LAHAVE CORPORATION*
10. *ST-MAURICE RIVER DRIVE COMPANY LIMITED*
11. *BOWATER TREATED WOOD INC.*
12. *CANEXEL HARDBOARD INC.*
13. *9068-9050 QUÉBEC INC.*
14. *ALLIANCE FOREST PRODUCTS (2001) INC.*
15. *BOWATER BELLEDUNE SAWMILL INC.*
16. *BOWATER MARITIMES INC.*
17. *BOWATER MITIS INC.*
18. *BOWATER GUÉRETTE INC.*
19. *BOWATER COUTURIER INC.*

Schedule "C" — 18.6 CCAA Petitioners

1. *ABITIBIBOWATER INC.*
2. *ABITIBIBOWATER US HOLDING 1 CORP.*
3. *BOWATER VENTURES INC.*
4. *BOWATER INCORPORATED*
5. *BOWATER NUWAY INC.*
6. *BOWATER NUWAY MID-STATES INC.*
7. *CATAWBA PROPERTY HOLDINGS LLC*
8. *BOWATER FINANCE COMPANY INC.*
9. *BOWATER SOUTH AMERICAN HOLDINGS INCORPORATED*
10. *BOWATER AMERICA INC.*
11. *LAKE SUPERIOR FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*
12. *BOWATER NEWSPRINT SOUTH LLC*

13. BOWATER NEWSPRINT SOUTH OPERATIONS LLC

14. BOWATER FINANCE II, LLC

15. BOWATER ALABAMA LLC

16. COOSA PINES GOLF CLUB HOLDINGS LLC

Motion granted.

Footnotes

- [1](#) *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.
- [2](#) See Monitor's Fifty-Seventh Report dated September 7, 2010, and Monitor's Fifty-Ninth Report dated September 17, 2010.
- [3](#) This Plan of Reorganisation and Compromise (as modified, amended or supplemented by CCAA Plan Supplements 3.2, 6.1(a)(i) (as amended on September 13, 2010) and 6.1(a)(ii) dated September 1, 2010, CCAA Plan Supplements 6.8(a), 6.8(b) (as amended on September 13, 2010), 6.8(d), 6.9(1) and 6.9(2) dated September 3, 2010, and the First Plan Amendment dated September 10, 2010, and as may be further modified, amended, or supplemented in accordance with the terms of such Plan of Reorganization and Compromise) (collectively, the "CCAA Plan") is included as Schedules E and F to the Supplemental 59th Report of the Monitor dated September 21, 2010.
- [4](#) Motion for an Order Sanctioning the Plan of Reorganization and Compromise and Other Relief (the "Motion"), pursuant to Sections 6, 9 and 10 of the CCAA and Section 191 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 (the "CBCA").
- [5](#) *Boutiques San Francisco Inc. (Arrangement relatif aux)*, SOQUIJ AZ-50263185, B.E. 2004BE-775 (S.C.); *Cable Satisfaction International Inc. v. Richter & Associés inc.*, J.E. 2004-907 (C.S. Que.) [[2004 CarswellQue 810](#) (C.S. Que.)].
- [6](#) See Monitor's Fifty-Eight Report dated September 16, 2010.
- [7](#) *T. Eaton Co., Re* ([1999](#)), [15 C.B.R. \(4th\) 311](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Sammi Atlas Inc. (Re)* ([1998](#)), [3 C.B.R. \(4th\) 171](#) (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *PSINET Ltd., Re* (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- [8](#) *Uniforêt inc., Re* (C.S. Que.) [[2003 CarswellQue 3404](#) (C.S. Que.)], *TQS inc., Re*, [2008 QCCS 2448](#) (C.S. Que.), B.E. 2008BE-834; *PSINET Ltd., Re* (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re)* ([1993](#)), [12 O.R. \(3d\) 500](#) (Ont. Gen. Div.).
- [9](#) *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re)* ([1993](#)), [12 O.R. \(3d\) 500](#) (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Boutiques San Francisco inc. (Arrangement relatif aux)*, SOQUIJ AZ-50263185, B.E. 2004BE-775; *PSINET Ltd., Re* (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Northland Properties Ltd., Re* ([1988](#)), [73 C.B.R. \(N.S.\) 175](#) (B.C. S.C.), affirmed [73 C.B.R. \(N.S.\) 195](#) (B.C. C.A.).
- [10](#) The Indenture Trustee acting under the Unsecured Notes supports the Noteholders in their objections.
- [11](#) See, in this respect, *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, [2008 ONCA 587](#) (Ont. C.A.); *Charles-Auguste Fortier inc., Re* ([2008](#)), J.E. 2009-9, [2008 QCCS 5388](#) (C.S. Que.); *Hy Bloom inc. c. Banque Nationale du Canada*, [\[2010\] R.J.Q. 912](#) (C.S. Que.).
- [12](#) *Quebecor World Inc. (Arrangement relatif à)*, S.C. Montreal, N° 500-11-032338-085, 2009-06-30, Mongeon J.

[13](#) *Raymor Industries inc. (Proposition de)*, [\[2010\] R.J.Q. 608](#), [2010 QCCS 376](#) (C.S. Que.); *Quebecor World Inc. (Arrangement relatif à)*, S.C. Montreal, N° 500-11-032338-085, 2009-06-30, Mongeon J., at para. 7-8; *MEI Computer Technology Group Inc., Re* [\[2005 CarswellQue 13408\]](#) (C.S. Que.), (S.C., 2005-11-14), SOQUIJ AZ-50380254, 2005 CanLII 54083; *Doman Industries Ltd., Re*, [2003 BCSC 375](#) (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]); *Laidlaw, Re* (Ont. S.C.J.).

[14](#) It is understood that for the purposes of this Sanction Order, the CCAA Plan is the Plan of Reorganisation and Compromise (as modified, amended or supplemented by CCAA Plan Supplements 3.2, 6.1(a)(i) (as amended on September 13, 2010) and 6.1(a)(ii) dated September 1, 2010, CCAA Plan Supplements 6.8(a), 6.8(b) (as amended on September 13, 2010), 6.8(d), 6.9(1) and 6.9(2) dated September 3, 2010, and the First Plan Amendment dated September 10, 2010, and as may be further modified, amended, or supplemented in accordance with the terms of such Plan of Reorganization and Compromise) included as Schedules E and F to the Supplemental 59th Report of the Monitor dated September 21, 2010.

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Tab 9



[Original](#)

2010 ONSC 4209

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re

2010 CarswellOnt 5510, 2010 ONSC 4209, 191 A.C.W.S. (3d) 378, 70 C.B.R. (5th) 1

**IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 11 OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT
OF CANWEST GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS

Pepall J.

Judgment: July 28, 2010
Docket: CV-09-8396-00CL

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Jeremy Dacks, Shawn Irving for CMI Entities
David Byers, Marie Konyukhova for Monitor
Robin B. Schwill, Vince Mercier for Shaw Communications Inc.
Derek Bell for Canwest Shareholders Group (the "Existing Shareholders")
Mario Forte for Special Committee of the Board of Directors
Robert Chadwick, Logan Willis for Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders
Amanda Darrach for Canwest Retirees
Peter Osborne for Management Directors
Steven Weisz for CIBC Asset-Based Lending Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX](#) Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

[XIX.3](#) Arrangements

[XIX.3.b](#) Approval by court

[XIX.3.b.i](#) "Fair and reasonable"

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

Debtors were group of related companies that successfully applied for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Competitor agreed to acquire all of debtors' television broadcasting interests — Acquisition price was to be used to satisfy claims of certain senior subordinated noteholders and certain other creditors — All of television company's equity-based compensation plans would be terminated and existing shareholders would not receive any compensation — Remaining debtors would likely be liquidated, wound-up, dissolved, placed into bankruptcy, or otherwise abandoned — Noteholders and other creditors whose claims were to be satisfied voted overwhelmingly in favour of plan of compromise, arrangement, and reorganization — Debtors brought application for order sanctioning plan and for related relief — Application granted — All statutory requirements had been satisfied and no unauthorized steps had been taken — Plan was fair and reasonable — Unequal distribution amongst creditors was fair and

reasonable in this case — Size of noteholder debt was substantial and had been guaranteed by several debtors — Noteholders held blocking position in any restructuring and they had been cooperative in exploring alternative outcomes — No other alternative transaction would have provided greater recovery than recoveries contemplated in plan — Additionally, there had not been any oppression of creditor rights or unfairness to shareholders — Plan was in public interest since it would achieve going concern outcome for television business and resolve various disputes.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Pepall J.*:

Air Canada, Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 469, 47 C.B.R. (4th) 169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

A&M Cookie Co. Canada, Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 3473 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Armbro Enterprises Inc., Re (1993), 1993 CarswellOnt 241, 22 C.B.R. (3d) 80 (Ont. Bkcty.) — considered

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Beatrice Foods Inc., Re (1996), 43 C.B.R. (4th) 10, 1996 CarswellOnt 5598 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re (1995), 1995 CarswellOnt 3702 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2007), 2007 CarswellAlta 1050, 2007 ABQB 504, 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 415 A.R. 196, 33 B.L.R. (4th) 68 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 2000 CarswellAlta 662, 2000 ABQB 442, 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 2000 CarswellAlta 919, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 314, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 46, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 52, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 86, 2000 ABCA 238, 266 A.R. 131, 228 W.A.C. 131 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 88 Alta. L.R. (3d) 8, 2001 ABCA 9, 2000 CarswellAlta 1556, [2001] 4 W.W.R. 1, 277 A.R. 179, 242 W.A.C. 179 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2001), 2001 CarswellAlta 888, 2001 CarswellAlta 889, 275 N.R. 386 (note), 293 A.R. 351 (note), 257 W.A.C. 351 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

Laidlaw, Re (2003), 39 C.B.R. (4th) 239, 2003 CarswellOnt 787 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

MEI Computer Technology Group Inc., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellQue 13408 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re*) 12 O.R. (3d) 500, 1993 CarswellOnt 182 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Unifor inc., Re (2003), 43 C.B.R. (4th) 254, 2003 CarswellQue 3404 (C.S. Que.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44

s. 173 — considered

s. 173(1)(e) — considered

s. 173(1)(h) — considered

s. 191 — considered

s. 191(1) "reorganization" (c) — considered

s. 191(2) — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) "debtor company" — referred to

s. 6 — considered

s. 6(1) — considered

s. 6(2) — considered

s. 6(3) — considered

s. 6(5) — considered

s. 6(6) — considered

s. 6(8) — referred to

s. 36 — considered

APPLICATION by debtors for order sanctioning plan of compromise, arrangement, and reorganization and for related relief.

Pepall J.:

1 This is the culmination of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*¹ restructuring of the CMI Entities. The proceeding started in court on October 6, 2009, experienced numerous peaks and valleys, and now has resulted in a request for an order sanctioning a plan of compromise, arrangement and reorganization (the "Plan"). It has been a short road in relative terms but not without its challenges and idiosyncrasies. To complicate matters, this restructuring was hot on the heels of the amendments to the CCAA that were introduced on September 18, 2009. Nonetheless, the CMI Entities have now successfully concluded a Plan for which they seek a sanction order. They also request an order approving the Plan Emergence Agreement, and other related relief. Lastly, they seek a post-filing claims procedure order.

2 The details of this restructuring have been outlined in numerous previous decisions rendered by me and I do not propose to repeat all of them.

The Plan and its Implementation

3 The basis for the Plan is the amended Shaw transaction. It will see a wholly owned subsidiary of Shaw Communications Inc. ("Shaw") acquire all of the interests in the free-to-air television stations and subscription-based specialty television channels currently owned by Canwest Television Limited Partnership ("CTLP") and its subsidiaries and all of the interests in the specialty television stations currently owned by CW Investments and its subsidiaries, as well as certain other assets of the CMI Entities. Shaw will pay to CMI US \$440 million in cash to be used by CMI to satisfy the claims of the 8% Senior Subordinated Noteholders (the "Noteholders") against the CMI Entities. In the event that the implementation of the Plan occurs after September 30, 2010, an additional cash amount of US \$2.9 million per month will be paid to CMI by Shaw and allocated by CMI to the Noteholders. An additional \$38 million will be paid by Shaw to the Monitor at the direction of CMI to be used to satisfy the claims of the Affected Creditors (as that

term is defined in the Plan) other than the Noteholders, subject to a pro rata increase in that cash amount for certain restructuring period claims in certain circumstances.

4 In accordance with the Meeting Order, the Plan separates Affected Creditors into two classes for voting purposes:

(a) the Noteholders; and

(b) the Ordinary Creditors. Convenience Class Creditors are deemed to be in, and to vote as, members of the Ordinary Creditors' Class.

5 The Plan divides the Ordinary Creditors' pool into two sub-pools, namely the Ordinary CTLP Creditors' Sub-pool and the Ordinary CMI Creditors' Sub-pool. The former comprises two-thirds of the value and is for claims against the CTLP Plan Entities and the latter reflects one-third of the value and is used to satisfy claims against Plan Entities other than the CTLP Plan Entities. In its 16th Report, the Monitor performed an analysis of the relative value of the assets of the CMI Plan Entities and the CTLP Plan Entities and the possible recoveries on a going concern liquidation and based on that analysis, concluded that it was fair and reasonable that Affected Creditors of the CTLP Plan Entities share pro rata in two-thirds of the Ordinary Creditors' pool and Affected Creditors of the Plan Entities other than the CTLP Plan Entities share pro rata in one-third of the Ordinary Creditors' pool.

6 It is contemplated that the Plan will be implemented by no later than September 30, 2010.

7 The Existing Shareholders will not be entitled to any distributions under the Plan or other compensation from the CMI Entities on account of their equity interests in Canwest Global. All equity compensation plans of Canwest Global will be extinguished and any outstanding options, restricted share units and other equity-based awards outstanding thereunder will be terminated and cancelled and the participants therein shall not be entitled to any distributions under the Plan.

8 On a distribution date to be determined by the Monitor following the Plan implementation date, all Affected Creditors with proven distribution claims against the Plan Entities will receive distributions from cash received by CMI (or the Monitor at CMI's direction) from Shaw, the Plan Sponsor, in accordance with the Plan. The directors and officers of the remaining CMI Entities and other subsidiaries of Canwest Global will resign on or about the Plan implementation date.

9 Following the implementation of the Plan, CTLP and CW Investments will be indirect, wholly-owned subsidiaries of Shaw, and the multiple voting shares, subordinate voting shares and non-voting shares of Canwest Global will be delisted from the TSX Venture Exchange. It is anticipated that the remaining CMI Entities and certain other subsidiaries of Canwest Global will be liquidated, wound-up, dissolved, placed into bankruptcy or otherwise abandoned.

10 In furtherance of the Minutes of Settlement that were entered into with the Existing Shareholders, the articles of Canwest Global will be amended under section 191 of the CBCA to facilitate the settlement. In particular, Canwest Global will reorganize the authorized capital of Canwest Global into (a) an unlimited number of new multiple voting shares, new subordinated voting shares and new non-voting shares; and (b) an unlimited number of new non-voting preferred shares. The terms of the new non-voting preferred shares will provide for the mandatory transfer of the new preferred shares held by the Existing Shareholders to a designated entity affiliated with Shaw for an aggregate amount of \$11 million to be paid upon delivery by Canwest Global of the transfer notice to the transfer agent. Following delivery of the transfer notice, the Shaw designated entity will donate and surrender the new preferred shares acquired by it to Canwest Global for cancellation.

11 Canwest Global, CMI, CTLP, New Canwest, Shaw, 7316712 and the Monitor entered into the Plan Emergence Agreement dated June 25, 2010 detailing certain steps that will be taken before, upon and after the implementation of the plan. These steps primarily relate to the funding of various costs that are payable by the CMI Entities on emergence from the CCAA proceeding. This includes payments that will be made or may be made by the Monitor to satisfy post-filing amounts owing by the CMI Entities. The schedule of costs has not yet been finalized.

Creditor Meetings

12 Creditor meetings were held on July 19, 2010 in Toronto, Ontario. Support for the Plan was overwhelming. 100% in number representing 100% in value of the beneficial owners of the 8% senior subordinated notes who provided instructions for voting at the Noteholder meeting approved the resolution. Beneficial Noteholders holding approximately 95% of the principal amount of the outstanding notes validly voted at the Noteholder meeting.

13 The Ordinary Creditors with proven voting claims who submitted voting instructions in person or by proxy represented approximately 83% of their number and 92% of the value of such claims. In excess of 99% in number representing in excess of 99% in value of the Ordinary Creditors holding proven voting claims that were present in person or by proxy at the meeting voted or were deemed to vote in favour of the resolution.

Sanction Test

14 Section 6(1) of the CCAA provides that the court has discretion to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement if it has achieved the requisite double majority vote. The criteria that a debtor company must satisfy in seeking the court's approval are:

- (a) there must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements;
- (b) all material filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to be done which is not authorized by the CCAA; and
- (c) the Plan must be fair and reasonable.

See [*Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*](#)²

(a) Statutory Requirements

15 I am satisfied that all statutory requirements have been met. I already determined that the Applicants qualified as debtor companies under section 2 of the CCAA and that they had total claims against them exceeding \$5 million. The notice of meeting was sent in accordance with the Meeting Order. Similarly, the classification of Affected Creditors for voting purposes was addressed in the Meeting Order which was unopposed and not appealed. The meetings were both properly constituted and voting in each was properly carried out. Clearly the Plan was approved by the requisite majorities.

16 Section 6(3), 6(5) and 6(6) of the CCAA provide that the court may not sanction a plan unless the plan contains certain specified provisions concerning crown claims, employee claims and pension claims. Section 4.6 of Plan provides that the claims listed in paragraph (l) of the definition of "Unaffected Claims" shall be paid in full from a fund known as the Plan Implementation Fund within six months of the sanction order. The Fund consists of cash, certain other assets and further contributions from Shaw. Paragraph (l) of the definition of "Unaffected Claims" includes any Claims in respect of any payments referred to in section 6(3), 6(5) and 6(6) of the CCAA. I am satisfied that these provisions of section 6 of the CCAA have been satisfied.

(b) Unauthorized Steps

17 In considering whether any unauthorized steps have been taken by a debtor company, it has been held that in making such a determination, the court should rely on the parties and their stakeholders and the reports of the Monitor: [*Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*](#)³.

18 The CMI Entities have regularly filed affidavits addressing key developments in this restructuring. In addition, the Monitor has provided regular reports (17 at last count) and has opined that the CMI Entities have acted and continue to act in good faith and with due diligence and have not breached any requirements under the CCAA or any order of this court. If it was not obvious from the hearing on June 23, 2010, it should be stressed that there is no payment of any equity claim pursuant to section 6(8) of the CCAA. As noted by the Monitor in its 16th Report, settlement with the Existing Shareholders did not and does not in any way impact the anticipated recovery to the Affected Creditors of the CMI Entities. Indeed I referenced the inapplicability of section 6(8) of the CCAA in my Reasons of June 23, 2010. The second criterion relating to unauthorized steps has been met.

(c) Fair and Reasonable

19 The third criterion to consider is the requirement to demonstrate that a plan is fair and reasonable. As Paperny J. (as she then was) stated in [*Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*](#):

The court's role on a sanction hearing is to consider whether the plan fairly balances the interests of all stakeholders. Faced with an insolvent organization, its role is to look forward and ask: does this plan represent a fair and reasonable compromise that will permit a viable commercial entity to emerge? It is also an exercise in assessing current reality by comparing available commercial alternatives to what is offered in the proposed plan.⁴

20 My discretion should be informed by the objectives of the CCAA, namely to facilitate the reorganization of a debtor company for the benefit of the company, its creditors, shareholders, employees and in many instances, a much broader constituency of affected persons.

21 In assessing whether a proposed plan is fair and reasonable, considerations include the following:

- (a) whether the claims were properly classified and whether the requisite majority of creditors approved the plan;
- (b) what creditors would have received on bankruptcy or liquidation as compared to the plan;
- (c) alternatives available to the plan and bankruptcy;
- (d) oppression of the rights of creditors;
- (e) unfairness to shareholders; and
- (f) the public interest.

22 I have already addressed the issue of classification and the vote. Obviously there is an unequal distribution amongst the creditors of the CMI Entities. Distribution to the Noteholders is expected to result in recovery of principal, pre-filing interest and a portion of post-filing accrued and default interest. The range of recoveries for Ordinary Creditors is much less. The recovery of the Noteholders is substantially more attractive than that of Ordinary Creditors. This is not unheard of. In [*Ambro Enterprises Inc., Re*](#)⁵

Blair J. (as he then was) approved a plan which included an uneven allocation in favour of a single major creditor, the Royal Bank, over the objection of other creditors. Blair J. wrote:

"I am not persuaded that there is a sufficient tilt in the allocation of these new common shares in favour of RBC to justify the court in interfering with the business decision made by the creditor class in approving the proposed Plan, as they have done. RBC's cooperation is a sine qua non for the Plan, or any Plan, to work and it is the only creditor continuing to advance funds to the applicants to finance the proposed re-organization."⁶

23 Similarly, in *Uniforét inc., Re*⁷ a plan provided for payment in full to an unsecured creditor. This treatment was much more generous than that received by other creditors. There, the Québec Superior Court sanctioned the plan and noted that a plan can be more generous to some creditors and still fair to all creditors. The creditor in question had stepped into the breach on several occasions to keep the company afloat in the four years preceding the filing of the plan and the court was of the view that the conduct merited special treatment. See also Romaine J.'s orders dated October 26, 2009 in *SemCanada Crude Company et al.*

24 I am prepared to accept that the recovery for the Noteholders is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. The size of the Noteholder debt was substantial. CMI's obligations under the notes were guaranteed by several of the CMI Entities. No issue has been taken with the guarantees. As stated before and as observed by the Monitor, the Noteholders held a blocking position in any restructuring. Furthermore, the liquidity and continued support provided by the Ad Hoc Committee both prior to and during these proceedings gave the CMI Entities the opportunity to pursue a going concern restructuring of their businesses. A description of the role of the Noteholders is found in Mr. Strike's affidavit sworn July 20, 2010, filed on this motion.

25 Turning to alternatives, the CMI Entities have been exploring strategic alternatives since February, 2009. Between November, 2009 and February, 2010, RBC Capital Markets conducted the equity investment solicitation process of which I have already commented. While there is always a theoretical possibility that a more advantageous plan could be developed than the Plan proposed, the Monitor has concluded that there is no reason to believe that restarting the equity investment solicitation process or marketing 100% of the CMI Entities assets would result in a better or equally desirable outcome. Furthermore, restarting the process could lead to operational difficulties including issues relating to the CMI Entities' large studio suppliers and advertisers. The Monitor has also confirmed that it is unlikely that the recovery for a going concern liquidation sale of the assets of the CMI Entities would result in greater recovery to the creditors of the CMI Entities. I am not satisfied that there is any other alternative transaction that would provide greater recovery than the recoveries contemplated in the Plan. Additionally, I am not persuaded that there is any oppression of creditor rights or unfairness to shareholders.

26 The last consideration I wish to address is the public interest. If the Plan is implemented, the CMI Entities will have achieved a going concern outcome for the business of the CTLP Plan Entities that fully and finally deals with the Goldman Sachs Parties, the Shareholders Agreement and the defaulted 8% senior subordinated notes. It will ensure the continuation of employment for substantially all of the employees of the Plan Entities and will provide stability for the CMI Entities, pensioners, suppliers, customers and other stakeholders. In addition, the Plan will maintain for the general public broad access to and choice of news, public and other information and entertainment programming. Broadcasting of news, public and entertainment programming is an important public service, and the bankruptcy and liquidation of the CMI Entities would have a negative impact on the Canadian public.

27 I should also mention section 36 of the CCAA which was added by the recent amendments to the Act which came into force on September 18, 2009. This section provides that a debtor company may not

sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. The section goes on to address factors a court is to consider. In my view, section 36 does not apply to transfers contemplated by a Plan. These transfers are merely steps that are required to implement the Plan and to facilitate the restructuring of the Plan Entities' businesses. Furthermore, as the CMI Entities are seeking approval of the Plan itself, there is no risk of any abuse. There is a further safeguard in that the Plan including the asset transfers contemplated therein has been voted on and approved by Affected Creditors.

28 The Plan does include broad releases including some third party releases. In [*ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*](#)⁸, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the CCAA court has jurisdiction to approve a plan of compromise or arrangement that includes third party releases. The [*Metcalfe*](#) case was extraordinary and exceptional in nature. It responded to dire circumstances and had a plan that included releases that were fundamental to the restructuring. The Court held that the releases in question had to be justified as part of the compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. There must be a reasonable connection between the third party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of the third party release in the plan.

29 In the [*Metcalfe*](#) decision, Blair J.A. discussed in detail the issue of releases of third parties. I do not propose to revisit this issue, save and except to stress that in my view, third party releases should be the exception and should not be requested or granted as a matter of course.

30 In this case, the releases are broad and extend to include the Noteholders, the Ad Hoc Committee and others. Fraud, wilful misconduct and gross negligence are excluded. I have already addressed, on numerous occasions, the role of the Noteholders and the Ad Hoc Committee. I am satisfied that the CMI Entities would not have been able to restructure without materially addressing the notes and developing a plan satisfactory to the Ad Hoc Committee and the Noteholders. The release of claims is rationally connected to the overall purpose of the Plan and full disclosure of the releases was made in the Plan, the information circular, the motion material served in connection with the Meeting Order and on this motion. No one has appeared to oppose the sanction of the Plan that contains these releases and they are considered by the Monitor to be fair and reasonable. Under the circumstances, I am prepared to sanction the Plan containing these releases.

31 Lastly, the Monitor is of the view that the Plan is advantageous to Affected Creditors, is fair and reasonable and recommends its sanction. The board, the senior management of the CMI Entities, the Ad Hoc Committee, and the CMI CRA all support sanction of the Plan as do all those appearing today.

32 In my view, the Plan is fair and reasonable and I am granting the sanction order requested.⁹

33 The Applicants also seek approval of the Plan Emergence Agreement. The Plan Emergence Agreement outlines steps that will be taken prior to, upon, or following implementation of the Plan and is a necessary corollary of the Plan. It does not confiscate the rights of any creditors and is necessarily incidental to the Plan. I have the jurisdiction to approve such an agreement: [*Air Canada, Re*](#)¹⁰ and [*Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re*](#)¹¹ I am satisfied that the agreement is fair and reasonable and should be approved.

34 It is proposed that on the Plan implementation date the articles of Canwest Global will be amended to facilitate the settlement reached with the Existing Shareholders. Section 191 of the CBCA permits the court to order necessary amendments to the articles of a corporation without shareholder approval or a dissent right. In particular, section 191(1)(c) provides that reorganization means a court order made under any other Act of Parliament that affects the rights among the corporation, its shareholders and creditors. The CCAA is such an Act: [*Beatrice Foods Inc., Re*](#)¹² and [*Laidlaw, Re*](#)¹³. Pursuant to section 191(2), if a

corporation is subject to a subsection (1) order, its articles may be amended to effect any change that might lawfully be made by an amendment under section 173. Section 173(1)(e) and (h) of the CBCA provides that:

(1) Subject to sections 176 and 177, the articles of a corporation may by special resolution be amended to

(e) create new classes of shares;

(h) change the shares of any class or series, whether issued or unissued, into a different number of shares of the same class or series or into the same or a different number of shares of other classes or series.

35 Section 6(2) of the CCAA provides that if a court sanctions a compromise or arrangement, it may order that the debtor's constating instrument be amended in accordance with the compromise or arrangement to reflect any change that may lawfully be made under federal or provincial law.

36 In exercising its discretion to approve a reorganization under section 191 of the CBCA, the court must be satisfied that: (a) there has been compliance with all statutory requirements; (b) the debtor company is acting in good faith; and (c) the capital restructuring is fair and reasonable: [A&M Cookie Co. Canada, Re](#)¹⁴ and [MEI Computer Technology Group Inc., Re](#)¹⁵

37 I am satisfied that the statutory requirements have been met as the contemplated reorganization falls within the conditions provided for in sections 191 and 173 of the CBCA. I am also satisfied that Canwest Global and the other CMI Entities were acting in good faith in attempting to resolve the Existing Shareholder dispute. Furthermore, the reorganization is a necessary step in the implementation of the Plan in that it facilitates agreement reached on June 23, 2010 with the Existing Shareholders. In my view, the reorganization is fair and reasonable and was a vital step in addressing a significant impediment to a satisfactory resolution of outstanding issues.

38 A post-filing claims procedure order is also sought. The procedure is designed to solicit, identify and quantify post-filing claims. The Monitor who participated in the negotiation of the proposed order is satisfied that its terms are fair and reasonable as am I.

39 In closing, I would like to say that generally speaking, the quality of oral argument and the materials filed in this CCAA proceeding has been very high throughout. I would like to express my appreciation to all counsel and the Monitor in that regard. The sanction order and the post-filing claims procedure order are granted.

Application granted.

Footnotes

¹ R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended.

² [2000 ABQB 442](#) (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 60, leave to appeal denied [2000 ABCA 238](#) (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), aff'd [2001 ABCA 9](#) (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused July 12, 2001 [[2001 CarswellAlta 888](#) (S.C.C.)].

³ Ibid, at para. 64 citing *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.*, [1993] O.J. No. 545 (Ont. Gen. Div.) and *Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re*, [1995] O.J. No. 274 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

⁴ Ibid, at para. 3.

⁵ (1993), 22 C.B.R. (3d) 80 (Ont. Bkcty.).

[6](#) *Ibid*, at para. 6.

[7](#) [\(2003\), 43 C.B.R. \(4th\) 254](#) (C.S. Que.).

[8](#) [\(2008\), 92 O.R. \(3d\) 513](#) (Ont. C.A.).

[9](#) The Sanction Order is extraordinarily long and in large measure repeats the Plan provisions. In future, counsel should attempt to simplify and shorten these sorts of orders.

[10](#) [\(2004\), 47 C.B.R. \(4th\) 169](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

[11](#) [\(2007\), 35 C.B.R. \(5th\) 1](#) (Alta. Q.B.).

[12](#) [\(1996\), 43 C.B.R. \(4th\) 10](#) (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

[13](#) [\(2003\), 39 C.B.R. \(4th\) 239](#) (Ont. S.C.J.).

[14](#) [\[2009\] O.J. No. 2427](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 8/

[15](#) [\[2005\] Q.J. No. 22993](#) (C.S. Que.) at para. 9.

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Tab 10



[Original](#)

2008 ONCA 587
Ontario Court of Appeal

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.

2008 CarswellOnt 4811, 2008 ONCA 587, [2008] O.J. No. 3164, 168 A.C.W.S. (3d) 698, 240
O.A.C. 245, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123, 92 O.R. (3d) 513

**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT
INVOLVING METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS II
CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS III CORP.,
METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS V CORP., METCALFE &
MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XI CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XII CORP., 4446372 CANADA INC. AND 6932819
CANADA INC., TRUSTEES OF THE CONDUITS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A" HERETO

THE INVESTORS REPRESENTED ON THE PAN-CANADIAN INVESTORS COMMITTEE FOR
THIRD-PARTY STRUCTURED ASSET-BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER LISTED IN SCHEDULE
"B" HERETO (Applicants / Respondents in Appeal) and METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE
INVESTMENTS II CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS III
CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS V CORP., METCALFE
& MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XI CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XII CORP., 4446372 CANADA INC. AND 6932819 CANADA
INC., TRUSTEES OF THE CONDUITS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A" HERETO (Respondents /
Respondents in Appeal) and AIR TRANSAT A.T. INC., TRANSAT TOURS CANADA INC., THE JEAN
COUTU GROUP (PJC) INC., AÉROPORTS DE MONTRÉAL INC., AÉROPORTS DE MONTRÉAL
CAPITAL INC., POMERLEAU ONTARIO INC., POMERLEAU INC., LABOPHARM INC., DOMTAR
INC., DOMTAR PULP AND PAPER PRODUCTS INC., GIRO INC., VÊTEMENTS DE SPORTS
R.G.R. INC., 131519 CANADA INC., AIR JAZZ LP, PETRIFOND FOUNDATION COMPANY
LIMITED, PETRIFOND FOUNDATION MIDWEST LIMITED, SERVICES HYPOTHÉCAIRES
LA PATRIMONIALE INC., TECSYS INC. SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE DE FINANCEMENT DU
QUÉBEC, VIBROSYSTEM INC., INTERQUISA CANADA L.P., REDCORP VENTURES LTD.,
JURA ENERGY CORPORATION, IVANHOE MINES LTD., WEBTECH WIRELESS INC., WYNN
CAPITAL CORPORATION INC., HY BLOOM INC., CARDACIAN MORTGAGE SERVICES,
INC., WEST ENERGY LTD., SABRE ENERTY LTD., PETROLIFERA PETROLEUM LTD.,
VAQUERO RESOURCES LTD. and STANDARD ENERGY INC. (Respondents / Appellants)

J.I. Laskin, E.A. Cronk, R.A. Blair JJ.A.

Heard: June 25-26, 2008

Judgment: August 18, 2008^{*}

Docket: CA C48969

Proceedings: affirming *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 2008
CarswellOnt 3523, 43 C.B.R. (5th) 269 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])

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Kenneth T. Rosenberg, Lily Harmer, Max Starnino for Jura Energy Corporation, Redcorp Ventures Ltd.
Craig J. Hill, Sam P. Rappos for Monitors (ABCP Appeals)
Jeffrey C. Carhart, Joseph Marin for Ad Hoc Committee, Pricewaterhouse Coopers Inc., in its capacity as Financial Advisor
Mario J. Forte for Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec
John B. Laskin for National Bank Financial Inc., National Bank of Canada
Thomas McRae, Arthur O. Jacques for Ad Hoc Retail Creditors Committee (Brian Hunter, et al)
Howard Shapray, Q.C., Stephen Fitterman for Ivanhoe Mines Ltd.
Kevin P. McElcheran, Heather L. Meredith for Canadian Banks, BMO, CIBC RBC, Bank of Nova Scotia, T.D. Bank
Jeffrey S. Leon for CIBC Mellon Trust Company, Computershare Trust Company of Canada, BNY Trust Company of Canada, as Indenture Trustees
Usman Sheikh for Coventree Capital Inc.
Allan Sternberg, Sam R. Sasso for Brookfield Asset Management and Partners Ltd., Hy Bloom Inc., Cardacian Mortgage Services Inc.
Neil C. Saxe for Dominion Bond Rating Service
James A. Woods, Sebastien Richemont, Marie-Anne Paquette for Air Transat A.T. Inc., Transat Tours Canada Inc., Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc., Aéroports de Montréal, Aéroports de Montréal Capital Inc., Pomerleau Ontario Inc., Pomerleau Inc., Labopharm Inc., Agence Métropolitaine de Transport (AMT), Giro Inc., Vêtements de sports RGR Inc., 131519 Canada Inc., Tecsys Inc., New Gold Inc., Jazz Air LP
Scott A. Turner for Webtech Wireless Inc., Wynn Capital Corporation Inc., West Energy Ltd., Sabre Energy Ltd., Petrolifera Petroleum Ltd., Vaquero Resources Ltd., and Standard Energy Ltd.
R. Graham Phoenix for Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp., Quanto Financial Corporation and Metcalfe & Mansfield Capital Corp.

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XVII](#) Practice and procedure in courts

[XVII.7](#) Appeals

[XVII.7.b](#) To Court of Appeal

[XVII.7.b.ii](#) Availability

[XVII.7.b.ii.D](#) Miscellaneous cases

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX](#) Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

[XIX.3](#) Arrangements

[XIX.3.b](#) Approval by court

[XIX.3.b.iv](#) Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — Miscellaneous issues

Releases — Parties were financial institutions, dealers and noteholders in market for Asset Backed Commercial Paper ("ABCP") — Canadian ABCP market experienced liquidity crisis — Plan of Compromise and Arrangement ("Plan") was put forward under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") — Plan included releases for claims against banks and dealers in negligence, misrepresentation and fraud, with "carve out" allowing fraudulent misrepresentations claims — Noteholders voted in favour of Plan — Minority noteholders ("opponents") opposed Plan based on releases — Applicants' application for approval of Plan was granted — Opponents brought application for leave to appeal and appeal from that decision — Application granted; appeal dismissed — CCAA permits inclusion of third party releases in plan of compromise or arrangement to be sanctioned by court where those releases were reasonably connected to proposed restructuring — It is implicit in language of CCAA that court has authority to sanction plans incorporating third-party releases that are reasonably related to proposed restructuring — CCAA is supporting framework for resolution of corporate insolvencies in public interest — Parties are entitled to put anything in Plan that could lawfully be incorporated into any contract — Plan of compromise or arrangement may propose that creditors agree to compromise claims against debtor and to release third parties, just as any debtor and creditor might agree to such terms in contract between them — Once statutory mechanism regarding voter approval and court sanctioning has been complied with, plan becomes binding on all creditors.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Practice and procedure in courts — Appeals — To Court of Appeal — Availability — Miscellaneous cases

Leave to appeal — Parties were financial institutions, dealers and noteholders in market for Asset Backed Commercial Paper ("ABCP") — Canadian ABCP market experienced liquidity crisis — Plan of Compromise and Arrangement ("Plan") was put forward under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") — Plan included releases for claims against banks and dealers in negligence, misrepresentation and fraud, with "carve out" allowing fraudulent misrepresentations claims — Noteholders voted in favour of Plan — Minority noteholders ("opponents") opposed Plan based on releases — Applicants' application for approval of Plan was granted — Opponents brought application for leave to appeal and appeal from that decision — Application granted; appeal dismissed — Criteria for granting leave to appeal in CCAA proceedings was met — Proposed appeal raised issues of considerable importance to restructuring proceedings under CCAA Canada-wide — These were serious and arguable grounds of appeal and appeal would not unduly delay progress of proceedings.

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s. 92 — referred to

s. 92 ¶ 13 — referred to

Words and phrases considered:

arrangement

"Arrangement" is broader than "compromise" and would appear to include any scheme for reorganizing the affairs of the debtor.

APPEAL by opponents of creditor-initiated plan from judgment reported at *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 3523, 43 C.B.R. (5th) 269, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 74 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), granting application for approval of plan.

R.A. Blair J.A.:

A. Introduction

1 In August 2007 a liquidity crisis suddenly threatened the Canadian market in Asset Backed Commercial Paper ("ABCP"). The crisis was triggered by a loss of confidence amongst investors stemming from the news of widespread defaults on U.S. sub-prime mortgages. The loss of confidence placed the Canadian financial market at risk generally and was reflective of an economic volatility worldwide.

2 By agreement amongst the major Canadian participants, the \$32 billion Canadian market in third-party ABCP was frozen on August 13, 2007 pending an attempt to resolve the crisis through a restructuring of that market. The Pan-Canadian Investors Committee, chaired by Purdy Crawford, C.C., Q.C., was formed and ultimately put forward the creditor-initiated Plan of Compromise and Arrangement that forms the subject-matter of these proceedings. The Plan was sanctioned by Colin L. Campbell J. on June 5, 2008.

3 Certain creditors who opposed the Plan seek leave to appeal and, if leave is granted, appeal from that decision. They raise an important point regarding the permissible scope of a restructuring under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended ("CCAA"): can the court sanction a Plan that calls for creditors to provide releases to third parties who are themselves solvent and not creditors of the debtor company? They also argue that, if the answer to this question is yes, the application judge erred in holding that this Plan, with its particular releases (which bar some claims even in fraud), was fair and reasonable and therefore in sanctioning it under the CCAA.

Leave to Appeal

4 Because of the particular circumstances and urgency of these proceedings, the court agreed to collapse an oral hearing for leave to appeal with the hearing of the appeal itself. At the outset of argument we encouraged counsel to combine their submissions on both matters.

5 The proposed appeal raises issues of considerable importance to restructuring proceedings under the CCAA Canada-wide. There are serious and arguable grounds of appeal and — given the expedited timetable — the appeal will not unduly delay the progress of the proceedings. I am satisfied that the criteria for granting leave to appeal in CCAA proceedings, set out in such cases as *Cineplex Odeon Corp., Re* (2001), 24 C.B.R. (4th) 201 (Ont. C.A.), and *Country Style Food Services Inc., Re* (2002), 158 O.A.C. 30 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]), are met. I would grant leave to appeal.

Appeal

6 For the reasons that follow, however, I would dismiss the appeal.

B. Facts

The Parties

7 The appellants are holders of ABCP Notes who oppose the Plan. They do so principally on the basis that it requires them to grant releases to third party financial institutions against whom they say they have claims for relief arising out of their purchase of ABCP Notes. Amongst them are an airline, a tour operator, a mining company, a wireless provider, a pharmaceuticals retailer, and several holding companies and energy companies.

8 Each of the appellants has large sums invested in ABCP — in some cases, hundreds of millions of dollars. Nonetheless, the collective holdings of the appellants — slightly over \$1 billion — represent only a small fraction of the more than \$32 billion of ABCP involved in the restructuring.

9 The lead respondent is the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee which was responsible for the creation and negotiation of the Plan on behalf of the creditors. Other respondents include various major international financial institutions, the five largest Canadian banks, several trust companies, and some smaller holders of ABCP product. They participated in the market in a number of different ways.

The ABCP Market

10 Asset Backed Commercial Paper is a sophisticated and hitherto well-accepted financial instrument. It is primarily a form of short-term investment — usually 30 to 90 days — typically with a low interest yield only slightly better than that available through other short-term paper from a government or bank. It is said to be "asset backed" because the cash that is used to purchase an ABCP Note is converted into a portfolio of financial assets or other asset interests that in turn provide security for the repayment of the notes.

11 ABCP was often presented by those selling it as a safe investment, somewhat like a guaranteed investment certificate.

12 The Canadian market for ABCP is significant and administratively complex. As of August 2007, investors had placed over \$116 billion in Canadian ABCP. Investors range from individual pensioners to large institutional bodies. On the selling and distribution end, numerous players are involved, including chartered banks, investment houses and other financial institutions. Some of these players participated in multiple ways. The Plan in this proceeding relates to approximately \$32 billion of non-bank sponsored ABCP the restructuring of which is considered essential to the preservation of the Canadian ABCP market.

13 As I understand it, prior to August 2007 when it was frozen, the ABCP market worked as follows.

14 Various corporations (the "Sponsors") would arrange for entities they control ("Conduits") to make ABCP Notes available to be sold to investors through "Dealers" (banks and other investment dealers). Typically, ABCP was issued by series and sometimes by classes within a series.

15 The cash from the purchase of the ABCP Notes was used to purchase assets which were held by trustees of the Conduits ("Issuer Trustees") and which stood as security for repayment of the notes. Financial institutions that sold or provided the Conduits with the assets that secured the ABCP are known as "Asset Providers". To help ensure that investors would be able to redeem their notes, "Liquidity Providers" agreed to provide funds that could be drawn upon to meet the demands of maturing ABCP Notes in certain circumstances. Most Asset Providers were also Liquidity Providers. Many of these banks and financial institutions were also holders of ABCP Notes ("Noteholders"). The Asset and Liquidity Providers held first charges on the assets.

16 When the market was working well, cash from the purchase of new ABCP Notes was also used to pay off maturing ABCP Notes; alternatively, Noteholders simply rolled their maturing notes over into new ones. As I will explain, however, there was a potential underlying predicament with this scheme.

The Liquidity Crisis

17 The types of assets and asset interests acquired to "back" the ABCP Notes are varied and complex. They were generally long-term assets such as residential mortgages, credit card receivables, auto loans, cash collateralized debt obligations and derivative investments such as credit default swaps. Their particular characteristics do not matter for the purpose of this appeal, but they shared a common feature that proved to be the Achilles heel of the ABCP market: because of their long-term nature there was an inherent timing mismatch between the cash they generated and the cash needed to repay maturing ABCP Notes.

18 When uncertainty began to spread through the ABCP marketplace in the summer of 2007, investors stopped buying the ABCP product and existing Noteholders ceased to roll over their maturing notes. There was no cash to redeem those notes. Although calls were made on the Liquidity Providers for payment, most of the Liquidity Providers declined to fund the redemption of the notes, arguing that the conditions for liquidity funding had not been met in the circumstances. Hence the "liquidity crisis" in the ABCP market.

19 The crisis was fuelled largely by a lack of transparency in the ABCP scheme. Investors could not tell what assets were backing their notes — partly because the ABCP Notes were often sold before or at the same time as the assets backing them were acquired; partly because of the sheer complexity of certain of the underlying assets; and partly because of assertions of confidentiality by those involved with the assets. As fears arising from the spreading U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis mushroomed, investors became increasingly concerned that their ABCP Notes may be supported by those crumbling assets. For the reasons outlined above, however, they were unable to redeem their maturing ABCP Notes.

The Montreal Protocol

20 The liquidity crisis could have triggered a wholesale liquidation of the assets, at depressed prices. But it did not. During the week of August 13, 2007, the ABCP market in Canada froze — the result of a standstill arrangement orchestrated on the heels of the crisis by numerous market participants, including Asset Providers, Liquidity Providers, Noteholders and other financial industry representatives. Under the standstill agreement — known as the Montréal Protocol — the parties committed to restructuring the ABCP market with a view, as much as possible, to preserving the value of the assets and of the notes.

21 The work of implementing the restructuring fell to the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee, an applicant in the proceeding and respondent in the appeal. The Committee is composed of 17 financial and investment institutions, including chartered banks, credit unions, a pension board, a Crown corporation, and a university board of governors. All 17 members are themselves Noteholders; three of them also participated in the ABCP market in other capacities as well. Between them, they hold about two thirds of the \$32 billion of ABCP sought to be restructured in these proceedings.

22 Mr. Crawford was named the Committee's chair. He thus had a unique vantage point on the work of the Committee and the restructuring process as a whole. His lengthy affidavit strongly informed the application judge's understanding of the factual context, and our own. He was not cross-examined and his evidence is unchallenged.

23 Beginning in September 2007, the Committee worked to craft a plan that would preserve the value of the notes and assets, satisfy the various stakeholders to the extent possible, and restore confidence in an important segment of the Canadian financial marketplace. In March 2008, it and the other applicants sought CCAA protection for the ABCP debtors and the approval of a Plan that had been pre-negotiated with some, but not all, of those affected by the misfortunes in the Canadian ABCP market.

The Plan

a) Plan Overview

24 Although the ABCP market involves many different players and kinds of assets, each with their own challenges, the committee opted for a single plan. In Mr. Crawford's words, "all of the ABCP suffers from common problems that are best addressed by a common solution." The Plan the Committee developed is highly complex and involves many parties. In its essence, the Plan would convert the Noteholders' paper — which has been frozen and therefore effectively worthless for many months — into new, long-term notes that would trade freely, but with a discounted face value. The hope is that a strong secondary market for the notes will emerge in the long run.

25 The Plan aims to improve transparency by providing investors with detailed information about the assets supporting their ABCP Notes. It also addresses the timing mismatch between the notes and the assets by adjusting the maturity provisions and interest rates on the new notes. Further, the Plan adjusts some of the underlying credit default swap contracts by increasing the thresholds for default triggering events; in

this way, the likelihood of a forced liquidation flowing from the credit default swap holder's prior security is reduced and, in turn, the risk for ABCP investors is decreased.

26 Under the Plan, the vast majority of the assets underlying ABCP would be pooled into two master asset vehicles (MAV1 and MAV2). The pooling is designed to increase the collateral available and thus make the notes more secure.

27 The Plan does not apply to investors holding less than \$1 million of notes. However, certain Dealers have agreed to buy the ABCP of those of their customers holding less than the \$1-million threshold, and to extend financial assistance to these customers. Principal among these Dealers are National Bank and Canaccord, two of the respondent financial institutions the appellants most object to releasing. The application judge found that these developments appeared to be designed to secure votes in favour of the Plan by various Noteholders, and were apparently successful in doing so. If the Plan is approved, they also provide considerable relief to the many small investors who find themselves unwittingly caught in the ABDP collapse.

b) The Releases

28 This appeal focuses on one specific aspect of the Plan: the comprehensive series of releases of third parties provided for in Article 10.

29 The Plan calls for the release of Canadian banks, Dealers, Noteholders, Asset Providers, Issuer Trustees, Liquidity Providers, and other market participants — in Mr. Crawford's words, "virtually all participants in the Canadian ABCP market" — from any liability associated with ABCP, with the exception of certain narrow claims relating to fraud. For instance, under the Plan as approved, creditors will have to give up their claims against the Dealers who sold them their ABCP Notes, including challenges to the way the Dealers characterized the ABCP and provided (or did not provide) information about the ABCP. The claims against the proposed defendants are mainly in tort: negligence, misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, failure to act prudently as a dealer/advisor, acting in conflict of interest, and in a few cases fraud or potential fraud. There are also allegations of breach of fiduciary duty and claims for other equitable relief.

30 The application judge found that, in general, the claims for damages include the face value of the Notes, plus interest and additional penalties and damages.

31 The releases, in effect, are part of a *quid pro quo*. Generally speaking, they are designed to compensate various participants in the market for the contributions they would make to the restructuring. Those contributions under the Plan include the requirements that:

- a) Asset Providers assume an increased risk in their credit default swap contracts, disclose certain proprietary information in relation to the assets, and provide below-cost financing for margin funding facilities that are designed to make the notes more secure;
- b) Sponsors — who in addition have cooperated with the Investors' Committee throughout the process, including by sharing certain proprietary information — give up their existing contracts;
- c) The Canadian banks provide below-cost financing for the margin funding facility and,
- d) Other parties make other contributions under the Plan.

32 According to Mr. Crawford's affidavit, the releases are part of the Plan "because certain key participants, whose participation is vital to the restructuring, have made comprehensive releases a condition for their participation."

The CCAA Proceedings to Date

33 On March 17, 2008 the applicants sought and obtained an Initial Order under the CCAA staying any proceedings relating to the ABCP crisis and providing for a meeting of the Noteholders to vote on the proposed Plan. The meeting was held on April 25th. The vote was overwhelmingly in support of the Plan — 96% of the Noteholders voted in favour. At the instance of certain Noteholders, and as requested by the application judge (who has supervised the proceedings from the outset), the Monitor broke down the voting results according to those Noteholders who had worked on or with the Investors' Committee to develop the Plan and those Noteholders who had not. Re-calculated on this basis the results remained firmly in favour of the proposed Plan — 99% of those connected with the development of the Plan voted positively, as did 80% of those Noteholders who had not been involved in its formulation.

34 The vote thus provided the Plan with the "double majority" approval — a majority of creditors representing two-thirds in value of the claims — required under s. 6 of the CCAA.

35 Following the successful vote, the applicants sought court approval of the Plan under s. 6. Hearings were held on May 12 and 13. On May 16, the application judge issued a brief endorsement in which he concluded that he did not have sufficient facts to decide whether all the releases proposed in the Plan were authorized by the CCAA. While the application judge was prepared to approve the releases of negligence claims, he was not prepared at that point to sanction the release of fraud claims. Noting the urgency of the situation and the serious consequences that would result from the Plan's failure, the application judge nevertheless directed the parties back to the bargaining table to try to work out a claims process for addressing legitimate claims of fraud.

36 The result of this renegotiation was a "fraud carve-out" — an amendment to the Plan excluding certain fraud claims from the Plan's releases. The carve-out did not encompass all possible claims of fraud, however. It was limited in three key respects. First, it applied only to claims against ABCP Dealers. Secondly, it applied only to cases involving an express fraudulent misrepresentation made with the intention to induce purchase and in circumstances where the person making the representation knew it to be false. Thirdly, the carve-out limited available damages to the value of the notes, minus any funds distributed as part of the Plan. The appellants argue vigorously that such a limited release respecting fraud claims is unacceptable and should not have been sanctioned by the application judge.

37 A second sanction hearing — this time involving the amended Plan (with the fraud carve-out) — was held on June 3, 2008. Two days later, Campbell J. released his reasons for decision, approving and sanctioning the Plan on the basis both that he had jurisdiction to sanction a Plan calling for third-party releases and that the Plan including the third-party releases in question here was fair and reasonable.

38 The appellants attack both of these determinations.

C. Law and Analysis

39 There are two principal questions for determination on this appeal:

- 1) As a matter of law, may a CCAA plan contain a release of claims against anyone other than the debtor company or its directors?
- 2) If the answer to that question is yes, did the application judge err in the exercise of his discretion to sanction the Plan as fair and reasonable given the nature of the releases called for under it?

(1) Legal Authority for the Releases

40 The standard of review on this first issue — whether, as a matter of law, a CCAA plan may contain third-party releases — is correctness.

41 The appellants submit that a court has no jurisdiction or legal authority under the CCAA to sanction a plan that imposes an obligation on creditors to give releases to third parties other than the directors of the debtor company.¹ The requirement that objecting creditors release claims against third parties is illegal, they contend, because:

- a) on a proper interpretation, the CCAA does not permit such releases;
- b) the court is not entitled to "fill in the gaps" in the CCAA or rely upon its inherent jurisdiction to create such authority because to do so would be contrary to the principle that Parliament did not intend to interfere with private property rights or rights of action in the absence of clear statutory language to that effect;
- c) the releases constitute an unconstitutional confiscation of private property that is within the exclusive domain of the provinces under s. 92 of the *Constitution Act*, 1867;
- d) the releases are invalid under Quebec rules of public order; and because
- e) the prevailing jurisprudence supports these conclusions.

42 I would not give effect to any of these submissions.

Interpretation, "Gap Filling" and Inherent Jurisdiction

43 On a proper interpretation, in my view, the CCAA permits the inclusion of third party releases in a plan of compromise or arrangement to be sanctioned by the court where those releases are reasonably connected to the proposed restructuring. I am led to this conclusion by a combination of (a) the open-ended, flexible character of the CCAA itself, (b) the broad nature of the term "compromise or arrangement" as used in the Act, and (c) the express statutory effect of the "double-majority" vote and court sanction which render the plan binding on *all* creditors, including those unwilling to accept certain portions of it. The first of these signals a flexible approach to the application of the Act in new and evolving situations, an active judicial role in its application and interpretation, and a liberal approach to that interpretation. The second provides the entrée to negotiations between the parties affected in the restructuring and furnishes them with the ability to apply the broad scope of their ingenuity in fashioning the proposal. The latter afford necessary protection to unwilling creditors who may be deprived of certain of their civil and property rights as a result of the process.

44 The CCAA is skeletal in nature. It does not contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred. Judges must therefore play a role in fleshing out the details of the statutory scheme. The scope of the Act and the powers of the court under it are not limitless. It is beyond controversy, however, that the CCAA is remedial legislation to be liberally construed in accordance with the modern purposive approach to statutory interpretation. It is designed to be a flexible instrument and it is that very flexibility which gives the Act its efficacy: *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge*, *Re* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]). As Farley J. noted in *Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at 111, "[t]he history of CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation."

45 Much has been said, however, about the "evolution of judicial interpretation" and there is some controversy over both the source and scope of that authority. Is the source of the court's authority statutory,

discerned solely through application of the principles of statutory interpretation, for example? Or does it rest in the court's ability to "fill in the gaps" in legislation? Or in the court's inherent jurisdiction?

46 These issues have recently been canvassed by the Honourable Georgina R. Jackson and Dr. Janis Sarra in their publication "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters,"² and there was considerable argument on these issues before the application judge and before us. While I generally agree with the authors' suggestion that the courts should adopt a hierarchical approach in their resort to these interpretive tools — statutory interpretation, gap-filling, discretion and inherent jurisdiction — it is not necessary in my view to go beyond the general principles of statutory interpretation to resolve the issues on this appeal. Because I am satisfied that it is implicit in the language of the CCAA itself that the court has authority to sanction plans incorporating third-party releases that are reasonably related to the proposed restructuring, there is no "gap-filling" to be done and no need to fall back on inherent jurisdiction. In this respect, I take a somewhat different approach than the application judge did.

47 The Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed generally — and in the insolvency context particularly — that remedial statutes are to be interpreted liberally and in accordance with Professor Driedger's modern principle of statutory interpretation. Driedger advocated that "the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament": *Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Re.*, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 (S.C.C.) at para. 21, quoting E.A. Driedger, *Construction of Statutes*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983); *Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) at para. 26.

48 More broadly, I believe that the proper approach to the judicial interpretation and application of statutes — particularly those like the CCAA that are skeletal in nature — is succinctly and accurately summarized by Jackson and Sarra in their recent article, *supra*, at p. 56:

The exercise of a statutory authority requires the statute to be construed. The plain meaning or textualist approach has given way to a search for the object and goals of the statute and the intentionalist approach. This latter approach makes use of the purposive approach and the mischief rule, including its codification under interpretation statutes that every enactment is deemed remedial, and is to be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects. This latter approach advocates reading the statute as a whole and being mindful of Driedger's "one principle", that the words of the Act are to be read in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. It is important that courts first interpret the statute before them and exercise their authority pursuant to the statute, before reaching for other tools in the judicial toolbox. Statutory interpretation using the principles articulated above leaves room for gap-filling in the common law provinces and a consideration of purpose in *Québec* as a manifestation of the judge's overall task of statutory interpretation. Finally, the jurisprudence in relation to statutory interpretation demonstrates the fluidity inherent in the judge's task in seeking the objects of the statute and the intention of the legislature.

49 I adopt these principles.

50 The remedial purpose of the CCAA — as its title affirms — is to facilitate compromises or arrangements between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors. In *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C. C.A.) at 318, Gibbs J.A. summarized very concisely the purpose, object and scheme of the Act:

Almost inevitably, liquidation destroyed the shareholders' investment, yielded little by way of recovery to the creditors, and exacerbated the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment. The government of the day sought, through the C.C.A.A., to create a regime whereby the principals of the company and the creditors could be brought together under the supervision of the court to attempt a reorganization or compromise or arrangement under which the company could continue in business.

51 The CCAA was enacted in 1933 and was necessary — as the then Secretary of State noted in introducing the Bill on First Reading — "because of the prevailing commercial and industrial depression" and the need to alleviate the effects of business bankruptcies in that context: see the statement of the Hon. C.H. Cahan, Secretary of State, *House of Commons Debates (Hansard)* (April 20, 1933) at 4091. One of the greatest effects of that Depression was what Gibbs J.A. described as "the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment". Since then, courts have recognized that the Act has a broader dimension than simply the direct relations between the debtor company and its creditors and that this broader public dimension must be weighed in the balance together with the interests of those most directly affected: see, for example, *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), per Doherty J.A. in dissent; *Skydome Corp., Re* (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 125 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re* (1998), 7 C.B.R. (4th) 51 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

52 In this respect, I agree with the following statement of Doherty J.A. in *Elan*, *supra*, at pp. 306-307:

. . . [T]he Act was designed to serve a "broad constituency of investors, creditors and employees".³ Because of that "broad constituency" the court must, when considering applications brought under the Act, *have regard not only to the individuals and organizations directly affected by the application, but also to the wider public interest.* [Emphasis added.]

Application of the Principles of Interpretation

53 An interpretation of the CCAA that recognizes its broader socio-economic purposes and objects is apt in this case. As the application judge pointed out, the restructuring underpins the financial viability of the Canadian ABCP market itself.

54 The appellants argue that the application judge erred in taking this approach and in treating the Plan and the proceedings as an attempt to restructure a financial market (the ABCP market) rather than simply the affairs between the debtor corporations who caused the ABCP Notes to be issued and their creditors. The Act is designed, they say, only to effect reorganizations between a corporate debtor and its creditors and not to attempt to restructure entire marketplaces.

55 This perspective is flawed in at least two respects, however, in my opinion. First, it reflects a view of the purpose and objects of the CCAA that is too narrow. Secondly, it overlooks the reality of the ABCP marketplace and the context of the restructuring in question here. It may be true that, in their capacity as ABCP Dealers, the releasee financial institutions are "third-parties" to the restructuring in the sense that they are not creditors of the debtor corporations. However, in their capacities as *Asset Providers* and *Liquidity Providers*, they are not only creditors but they are prior secured creditors to the Noteholders. Furthermore — as the application judge found — in these latter capacities they are making significant contributions to the restructuring by "foregoing immediate rights to assets and ... providing real and tangible input for the preservation and enhancement of the Notes" (para. 76). In this context, therefore, the application judge's remark at para. 50 that the restructuring "involves the commitment and participation of all parties" in the ABCP market makes sense, as do his earlier comments at paras. 48-49:

Given the nature of the ABCP market and all of its participants, it is more appropriate to consider all Noteholders as claimants and the object of the Plan to restore liquidity to the assets being the Notes themselves. The restoration of the liquidity of the market necessitates the participation (including more tangible contribution by many) of all Noteholders.

In these circumstances, *it is unduly technical to classify the Issuer Trustees as debtors and the claims of the Noteholders as between themselves and others as being those of third party creditors*, although I recognize that the restructuring structure of the CCAA requires the corporations as the vehicles for restructuring. [Emphasis added.]

56 The application judge did observe that "[t]he insolvency is of the ABCP market itself, the restructuring is that of the market for such paper ..." (para. 50). He did so, however, to point out the uniqueness of the Plan before him and its industry-wide significance and not to suggest that he need have no regard to the provisions of the CCAA permitting a restructuring as between debtor and creditors. His focus was on *the effect* of the restructuring, a perfectly permissible perspective, given the broad purpose and objects of the Act. This is apparent from his later references. For example, in balancing the arguments against approving releases that might include aspects of fraud, he responded that "what is at issue is a liquidity crisis that affects the ABCP market in Canada" (para. 125). In addition, in his reasoning on the fair-and-reasonable issue, he stated at para. 142: "Apart from the Plan itself, there is a need to restore confidence in the financial system in Canada and this Plan is a legitimate use of the CCAA to accomplish that goal."

57 I agree. I see no error on the part of the application judge in approaching the fairness assessment or the interpretation issue with these considerations in mind. They provide the context in which the purpose, objects and scheme of the CCAA are to be considered.

The Statutory Wording

58 Keeping in mind the interpretive principles outlined above, I turn now to a consideration of the provisions of the CCAA. Where in the words of the statute is the court clothed with authority to approve a plan incorporating a requirement for third-party releases? As summarized earlier, the answer to that question, in my view, is to be found in:

- a) the skeletal nature of the CCAA;
- b) Parliament's reliance upon the broad notions of "compromise" and "arrangement" to establish the framework within which the parties may work to put forward a restructuring plan; and in
- c) the creation of the statutory mechanism binding all creditors in classes to the compromise or arrangement once it has surpassed the high "double majority" voting threshold and obtained court sanction as "fair and reasonable".

Therein lies the expression of Parliament's intention to permit the parties to negotiate and vote on, and the court to sanction, third-party releases relating to a restructuring.

59 Sections 4 and 6 of the CCAA state:

4. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company, of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

6. Where a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding

(a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and

(b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or is in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

Compromise or Arrangement

60 While there may be little practical distinction between "compromise" and "arrangement" in many respects, the two are not necessarily the same. "Arrangement" is broader than "compromise" and would appear to include any scheme for reorganizing the affairs of the debtor: Houlden & Morawetz, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada*, loose-leaf, 3rd ed., vol. 4 (Toronto: Thomson Carswell) at 10A-12.2, N§10. It has been said to be "a very wide and indefinite [word]": *Reference re Refund of Dues Paid under s.47 (f) of Timber Regulations in the Western Provinces*, [1935] A.C. 184 (Canada P.C.) at 197, affirming S.C.C. [1933] S.C.R. 616 (S.C.C.). See also, *Guardian Assurance Co., Re*, [1917] 1 Ch. 431 (Eng. C.A.) at 448, 450; *T&N Ltd., Re* (2006), [2007] 1 All E.R. 851 (Eng. Ch. Div.).

61 The CCAA is a sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest. Parliament wisely avoided attempting to anticipate the myriad of business deals that could evolve from the fertile and creative minds of negotiators restructuring their financial affairs. It left the shape and details of those deals to be worked out within the framework of the comprehensive and flexible concepts of a "compromise" and "arrangement." I see no reason why a release in favour of a third party, negotiated as part of a package between a debtor and creditor and reasonably relating to the proposed restructuring cannot fall within that framework.

62 A proposal under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S., 1985, c. B-3 (the "BIA") is a contract: *Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ideal Petroleum (1959) Ltd.*, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 230 (S.C.C.) at 239; *Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Armitage* (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 688 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 11. In my view, a compromise or arrangement under the CCAA is directly analogous to a proposal for these purposes, and therefore is to be treated as a contract between the debtor and its creditors. Consequently, parties are entitled to put anything into such a plan that could lawfully be incorporated into any contract. See *Air Canada, Re* (2004), 2 C.B.R. (5th) 4 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 6; *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 518.

63 There is nothing to prevent a debtor and a creditor from including in a contract between them a term providing that the creditor release a third party. The term is binding as between the debtor and creditor. In the CCAA context, therefore, a plan of compromise or arrangement may propose that creditors agree to compromise claims against the debtor and to release third parties, just as any debtor and creditor might agree to such a term in a contract between them. Once the statutory mechanism regarding voter approval and court sanctioning has been complied with, the plan — including the provision for releases — becomes binding on all creditors (including the dissenting minority).

64 *T&N Ltd., Re, supra*, is instructive in this regard. It is a rare example of a court focussing on and examining the meaning and breadth of the term "arrangement". T&N and its associated companies were engaged in the manufacture, distribution and sale of asbestos-containing products. They became the subject of many claims by former employees, who had been exposed to asbestos dust in the course of their employment, and their dependents. The T&N companies applied for protection under s. 425 of the U.K. *Companies Act 1985*, a provision virtually identical to the scheme of the CCAA — including the concepts of compromise or arrangement.⁴

65 T&N carried employers' liability insurance. However, the employers' liability insurers (the "EL insurers") denied coverage. This issue was litigated and ultimately resolved through the establishment of a multi-million pound fund against which the employees and their dependants (the "EL claimants") would assert their claims. In return, T&N's former employees and dependants (the "EL claimants") agreed to forego any further claims against the EL insurers. This settlement was incorporated into the plan of compromise and arrangement between the T&N companies and the EL claimants that was voted on and put forward for court sanction.

66 Certain creditors argued that the court could not sanction the plan because it did not constitute a "compromise or arrangement" between T&N and the EL claimants since it did not purport to affect rights as between them but only the EL claimants' rights against the EL insurers. The Court rejected this argument. Richards J. adopted previous jurisprudence — cited earlier in these reasons — to the effect that the word "arrangement" has a very broad meaning and that, while both a compromise and an arrangement involve some "give and take", an arrangement need not involve a compromise or be confined to a case of dispute or difficulty (paras. 46-51). He referred to what would be the equivalent of a solvent arrangement under Canadian corporate legislation as an example.⁵ Finally, he pointed out that the compromised rights of the EL claimants against the EL insurers were not unconnected with the EL claimants' rights against the T&N companies; the scheme of arrangement involving the EL insurers was "an integral part of a single proposal affecting all the parties" (para. 52). He concluded his reasoning with these observations (para. 53):

In my judgment it is not a necessary element of an arrangement for the purposes of s 425 of the 1985 Act that it should alter the rights existing between the company and the creditors or members with whom it is made. No doubt in most cases it will alter those rights. But, provided that the context and content of the scheme are such as properly to constitute an arrangement between the company and the members or creditors concerned, it will fall within s 425. It is ... neither necessary nor desirable to attempt a definition of arrangement. The legislature has not done so. To insist on an alteration of rights, or a termination of rights as in the case of schemes to effect takeovers or mergers, is to impose a restriction which is neither warranted by the statutory language nor justified by the courts' approach over many years to give the term its widest meaning. *Nor is an arrangement necessarily outside the section, because its effect is to alter the rights of creditors against another party or because such alteration could be achieved by a scheme of arrangement with that party.* [Emphasis added.]

67 I find Richard J.'s analysis helpful and persuasive. In effect, the claimants in *T&N* were being asked to release their claims against the EL insurers in exchange for a call on the fund. Here, the appellants are being required to release their claims against certain financial third parties in exchange for what is anticipated to be an improved position for all ABCP Noteholders, stemming from the contributions the financial third parties are making to the ABCP restructuring. The situations are quite comparable.

The Binding Mechanism

68 Parliament's reliance on the expansive terms "compromise" or "arrangement" does not stand alone, however. Effective insolvency restructurings would not be possible without a statutory mechanism to bind

an unwilling minority of creditors. Unanimity is frequently impossible in such situations. But the minority must be protected too. Parliament's solution to this quandary was to permit a wide range of proposals to be negotiated and put forward (the compromise or arrangement) and to bind *all* creditors by class to the terms of the plan, but to do so only where the proposal can gain the support of the requisite "double majority" of votes⁶ and obtain the sanction of the court on the basis that it is fair and reasonable. In this way, the scheme of the CCAA supports the intention of Parliament to encourage a wide variety of solutions to corporate insolvencies without unjustifiably overriding the rights of dissenting creditors.

The Required Nexus

69 In keeping with this scheme and purpose, I do not suggest that any and all releases between creditors of the debtor company seeking to restructure and third parties may be made the subject of a compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. Nor do I think the fact that the releases may be "necessary" in the sense that the third parties or the debtor may refuse to proceed without them, of itself, advances the argument in favour of finding jurisdiction (although it may well be relevant in terms of the fairness and reasonableness analysis).

70 The release of the claim in question must be justified as part of the compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. In short, there must be a reasonable connection between the third party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of the third party release in the plan. This nexus exists here, in my view.

71 In the course of his reasons, the application judge made the following findings, all of which are amply supported on the record:

- a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;
- b) *The claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it;*
- c) The Plan cannot succeed without the releases;
- d) *The parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan;* and
- e) The Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders generally.

72 Here, then — as was the case in *T&N* — there is a close connection between the claims being released and the restructuring proposal. The tort claims arise out of the sale and distribution of the ABCP Notes and their collapse in value, just as do the contractual claims of the creditors against the debtor companies. The purpose of the restructuring is to stabilize and shore up the value of those notes in the long run. The third parties being released are making separate contributions to enable those results to materialize. Those contributions are identified earlier, at para. 31 of these reasons. The application judge found that the claims being released are not independent of or unrelated to the claims that the Noteholders have against the debtor companies; they are closely connected to the value of the ABCP Notes and are required for the Plan to succeed. At paras. 76-77 he said:

[76] I do not consider that the Plan in this case involves a change in relationship among creditors "that does not directly involve the Company." Those who support the Plan and are to be released are "directly involved in the Company" in the sense that many are foregoing immediate rights to assets and are providing real and tangible input for the preservation and enhancement of the Notes. It would be unduly restrictive to suggest that the moving parties' claims against released parties do not involve the

Company, since the claims are directly related to the value of the Notes. The value of the Notes is in this case the value of the Company.

[77] This Plan, as it deals with releases, doesn't change the relationship of the creditors apart from involving the Company and its Notes.

73 I am satisfied that the wording of the CCAA — construed in light of the purpose, objects and scheme of the Act and in accordance with the modern principles of statutory interpretation — supports the court's jurisdiction and authority to sanction the Plan proposed here, including the contested third-party releases contained in it.

The Jurisprudence

74 Third party releases have become a frequent feature in Canadian restructurings since the decision of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal refused by (2000), 266 A.R. 131 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), and (2001), 293 A.R. 351 (note) (S.C.C.). In *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re* (2006), 25 C.B.R. (5th) 231 (Ont. S.C.J.) Justice Ground remarked (para. 8):

[It] is not uncommon in CCAA proceedings, in the context of a plan of compromise and arrangement, to compromise claims against the Applicants and other parties against whom such claims or related claims are made.

75 We were referred to at least a dozen court-approved CCAA plans from across the country that included broad third-party releases. With the exception of *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, however, the releases in those restructurings — including *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re* — were not opposed. The appellants argue that those cases are wrongly decided, because the court simply does not have the authority to approve such releases.

76 In *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* the releases in question were opposed, however. Paperny J. (as she then was) concluded the court had jurisdiction to approve them and her decision is said to be the well-spring of the trend towards third-party releases referred to above. Based on the foregoing analysis, I agree with her conclusion although for reasons that differ from those cited by her.

77 Justice Paperny began her analysis of the release issue with the observation at para. 87 that "[p]rior to 1997, the CCAA did not provide for compromises of claims against anyone other than the petitioning company." It will be apparent from the analysis in these reasons that I do not accept that premise, notwithstanding the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*,⁷ of which her comment may have been reflective. Paperny J.'s reference to 1997 was a reference to the amendments of that year adding s. 5.1 to the CCAA, which provides for limited releases in favour of directors. Given the limited scope of s. 5.1, Justice Paperny was thus faced with the argument — dealt with later in these reasons — that Parliament must not have intended to extend the authority to approve third-party releases beyond the scope of this section. She chose to address this contention by concluding that, although the amendments "[did] not authorize a release of claims against third parties other than directors, [they did] not prohibit such releases either" (para. 92).

78 Respectfully, I would not adopt the interpretive principle that the CCAA permits releases because it does not expressly prohibit them. Rather, as I explain in these reasons, I believe the open-ended CCAA permits third-party releases that are reasonably related to the restructuring at issue because they are encompassed in the comprehensive terms "compromise" and "arrangement" and because of the double-voting majority and court sanctioning statutory mechanism that makes them binding on unwilling creditors.

79 The appellants rely on a number of authorities, which they submit support the proposition that the CCAA may not be used to compromise claims as between anyone other than the debtor company and its creditors. Principal amongst these are *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*, *supra*; *NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc.* (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 514 (Ont. C.A.); *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada* (2001), 19 B.L.R. (3d) 286 (B.C. S.C.); and *Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 78 O.R. (3d) 241 (Ont. C.A.) ("*Stelco I*"). I do not think these cases assist the appellants, however. With the exception of *Steinberg Inc.*, they do not involve third party claims that were reasonably connected to the restructuring. As I shall explain, it is my opinion that *Steinberg Inc.* does not express a correct view of the law, and I decline to follow it.

80 In *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd.*, Tysoe J. made the following comment at para. 24:

[The purpose of the CCAA proceeding] is not to deal with disputes between a creditor of a company and a third party, even if the company was also involved in the subject matter of the dispute. While issues between the debtor company and non-creditors are sometimes dealt with in CCAA proceedings, it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company.

81 This statement must be understood in its context, however. *Pacific Coastal Airlines* had been a regional carrier for Canadian Airlines prior to the CCAA reorganization of the latter in 2000. In the action in question it was seeking to assert separate tort claims against Air Canada for contractual interference and inducing breach of contract in relation to certain rights it had to the use of Canadian's flight designator code prior to the CCAA proceeding. Air Canada sought to have the action dismissed on grounds of *res judicata* or issue estoppel because of the CCAA proceeding. Tysoe J. rejected the argument.

82 The facts in *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd.* are not analogous to the circumstances of this case, however. There is no suggestion that a resolution of *Pacific Coastal's* separate tort claim against Air Canada was in any way connected to the Canadian Airlines restructuring, even though Canadian — at a contractual level — may have had some involvement with the particular dispute. Here, however, the disputes that are the subject-matter of the impugned releases are not simply "disputes between parties other than the debtor company". They are closely connected to the disputes being resolved between the debtor companies and their creditors and to the restructuring itself.

83 Nor is the decision of this Court in the *NBD Bank, Canada* case dispositive. It arose out of the financial collapse of Algoma Steel, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dofasco. The Bank had advanced funds to Algoma allegedly on the strength of misrepresentations by Algoma's Vice-President, James Melville. The plan of compromise and arrangement that was sanctioned by Farley J. in the Algoma CCAA restructuring contained a clause releasing Algoma from all claims creditors "may have had against Algoma or its directors, officers, employees and advisors." Mr. Melville was found liable for negligent misrepresentation in a subsequent action by the Bank. On appeal, he argued that since the Bank was barred from suing Algoma for misrepresentation by its officers, permitting it to pursue the same cause of action against him personally would subvert the CCAA process — in short, he was personally protected by the CCAA release.

84 Rosenberg J.A., writing for this Court, rejected this argument. The appellants here rely particularly upon his following observations at paras. 53-54:

53 In my view, the appellant has not demonstrated that allowing the respondent to pursue its claim against him would undermine or subvert the purposes of the Act. As this court noted in *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 at 297, the CCAA is remedial legislation "intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both". It is a means of avoiding a liquidation that may yield little for the creditors,

especially unsecured creditors like the respondent, and the debtor company shareholders. However, the appellant has not shown that allowing a creditor to continue an action against an officer for negligent misrepresentation would erode the effectiveness of the Act.

54 In fact, to refuse on policy grounds to impose liability on an officer of the corporation for negligent misrepresentation would contradict the policy of Parliament as demonstrated in recent amendments to the CCAA and the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. Those Acts now contemplate that an arrangement or proposal may include a term for compromise of certain types of claims against directors of the company except claims that "are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors". L.W. Houlden and C.H. Morawetz, the editors of *The 2000 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at p. 192 are of the view that the policy behind the provision is to encourage directors of an insolvent corporation to remain in office so that the affairs of the corporation can be reorganized. I can see no similar policy interest in barring an action against an officer of the company who, prior to the insolvency, has misrepresented the financial affairs of the corporation to its creditors. It may be necessary to permit the compromise of claims against the debtor corporation, otherwise it may not be possible to successfully reorganize the corporation. The same considerations do not apply to individual officers. Rather, it would seem to me that it would be contrary to good policy to immunize officers from the consequences of their negligent statements which might otherwise be made in anticipation of being forgiven under a subsequent corporate proposal or arrangement. [Footnote omitted.]

85 Once again, this statement must be assessed in context. Whether Justice Farley had the authority in the earlier Algoma CCAA proceedings to sanction a plan that included third party releases was not under consideration at all. What the Court was determining in *NBD Bank, Canada* was whether the release extended by its terms to protect a third party. In fact, on its face, it does not appear to do so. Justice Rosenberg concluded only that not allowing Mr. Melville to rely upon the release did not subvert the purpose of the CCAA. As the application judge here observed, "there is little factual similarity in *NBD Bank, Canada* to the facts now before the Court" (para. 71). Contrary to the facts of this case, in *NBD Bank, Canada* the creditors had not agreed to grant a release to officers; they had not voted on such a release and the court had not assessed the fairness and reasonableness of such a release as a term of a complex arrangement involving significant contributions by the beneficiaries of the release — as is the situation here. Thus, *NBD Bank, Canada* is of little assistance in determining whether the court has authority to sanction a plan that calls for third party releases.

86 The appellants also rely upon the decision of this Court in *Stelco I*. There, the Court was dealing with the scope of the CCAA in connection with a dispute over what were called the "Turnover Payments". Under an inter-creditor agreement one group of creditors had subordinated their rights to another group and agreed to hold in trust and "turn over" any proceeds received from Stelco until the senior group was paid in full. On a disputed classification motion, the Subordinated Debt Holders argued that they should be in a separate class from the Senior Debt Holders. Farley J. refused to make such an order in the court below, stating:

[Sections] 4, 5 and 6 [of the CCAA] talk of compromises or arrangements between a company and its creditors. There is no mention of this extending by statute to encompass a change of relationship among the creditors vis-à-vis the creditors themselves *and not directly involving the company*. [Citations omitted; emphasis added.]

See *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 7.

87 This Court upheld that decision. The legal relationship between each group of creditors and Stelco was the same, albeit there were inter-creditor differences, and creditors were to be classified in accordance with

their legal rights. In addition, the need for timely classification and voting decisions in the CCAA process militated against enmeshing the classification process in the vagaries of inter-corporate disputes. In short, the issues before the Court were quite different from those raised on this appeal.

88 Indeed, the Stelco plan, as sanctioned, included third party releases (albeit uncontested ones). This Court subsequently dealt with the same inter-creditor agreement on an appeal where the Subordinated Debt Holders argued that the inter-creditor subordination provisions were beyond the reach of the CCAA and therefore that they were entitled to a separate civil action to determine their rights under the agreement: *Stelco Inc., Re* (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) ("*Stelco II*"). The Court rejected that argument and held that where the creditors' rights amongst themselves were sufficiently related to the debtor and its plan, they were properly brought within the scope of the CCAA plan. The Court said (para. 11):

In [*Stelco I*] — the classification case — the court observed that it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company ... [*H*]owever, the present case is not simply an inter-creditor dispute that does not involve the debtor company; it is a dispute that is inextricably connected to the restructuring process. [Emphasis added.]

89 The approach I would take to the disposition of this appeal is consistent with that view. As I have noted, the third party releases here are very closely connected to the ABCP restructuring process.

90 Some of the appellants — particularly those represented by Mr. Woods — rely heavily upon the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*, *supra*. They say that it is determinative of the release issue. In *Steinberg*, the Court held that the CCAA, as worded at the time, did not permit the release of directors of the debtor corporation and that third-party releases were not within the purview of the Act. Deschamps J.A. (as she then was) said (paras. 42, 54 and 58 — English translation):

[42] Even if one can understand the extreme pressure weighing on the creditors and the respondent at the time of the sanctioning, a plan of arrangement is not the appropriate forum to settle disputes other than the claims that are the subject of the arrangement. In other words, one cannot, under the pretext of an absence of formal directives in the Act, transform an arrangement into a potpourri.

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[54] The Act offers the respondent a way to arrive at a compromise with its creditors. It does not go so far as to offer an umbrella to all the persons within its orbit by permitting them to shelter themselves from any recourse.

.

[58] The [CCAA] and the case law clearly do not permit extending the application of an arrangement to persons other than the respondent and its creditors and, consequently, the plan should not have been sanctioned as is [that is, including the releases of the directors].

91 Justices Vallerand and Delisle, in separate judgments, agreed. Justice Vallerand summarized his view of the consequences of extending the scope of the CCAA to third party releases in this fashion (para. 7):

In short, the Act will have become the Companies' and Their Officers and Employees Creditors Arrangement Act — an awful mess — and likely not attain its purpose, which is to enable the company to survive in the face of its creditors and through their will, and not in the face of the creditors of its officers. This is why I feel, just like my colleague, that such a clause is contrary to the Act's mode of operation, contrary to its purposes and, for this reason, is to be banned.

92 Justice Delisle, on the other hand, appears to have rejected the releases because of their broad nature — they released directors from all claims, including those that were altogether unrelated to their corporate duties with the debtor company — rather than because of a lack of authority to sanction under the Act.

Indeed, he seems to have recognized the wide range of circumstances that could be included within the term "compromise or arrangement". He is the only one who addressed that term. At para. 90 he said:

The CCAA is drafted in general terms. It does not specify, among other things, what must be understood by "compromise or arrangement". However, it may be inferred from the purpose of this [A]ct that these terms *encompass all that should enable the person who has recourse to it to fully dispose of his debts*, both those that exist on the date when he has recourse to the statute and *those contingent on the insolvency in which he finds himself ...* [Emphasis added.]

93 The decision of the Court did not reflect a view that the terms of a compromise or arrangement should "encompass all that should enable the person who has recourse to [the Act] to dispose of his debts ... and those contingent on the insolvency in which he finds himself," however. On occasion such an outlook might embrace third parties other than the debtor and its creditors in order to make the arrangement work. Nor would it be surprising that, in such circumstances, the third parties might seek the protection of releases, or that the debtor might do so on their behalf. Thus, the perspective adopted by the majority in *Steinberg Inc.*, in my view, is too narrow, having regard to the language, purpose and objects of the CCAA and the intention of Parliament. They made no attempt to consider and explain why a compromise or arrangement could not include third-party releases. In addition, the decision appears to have been based, at least partly, on a rejection of the use of contract-law concepts in analysing the Act — an approach inconsistent with the jurisprudence referred to above.

94 Finally, the majority in *Steinberg Inc.* seems to have proceeded on the basis that the CCAA cannot interfere with civil or property rights under Quebec law. Mr. Woods advanced this argument before this Court in his factum, but did not press it in oral argument. Indeed, he conceded that if the Act encompasses the authority to sanction a plan containing third-party releases — as I have concluded it does — the provisions of the CCAA, as valid federal insolvency legislation, are paramount over provincial legislation. I shall return to the constitutional issues raised by the appellants later in these reasons.

95 Accordingly, to the extent *Steinberg Inc.* stands for the proposition that the court does not have authority under the CCAA to sanction a plan that incorporates third-party releases, I do not believe it to be a correct statement of the law and I respectfully decline to follow it. The modern approach to interpretation of the Act in accordance with its nature and purpose militates against a narrow interpretation and towards one that facilitates and encourages compromises and arrangements. Had the majority in *Steinberg Inc.* considered the broad nature of the terms "compromise" and "arrangement" and the jurisprudence I have referred to above, they might well have come to a different conclusion.

The 1997 Amendments

96 *Steinberg Inc.* led to amendments to the CCAA, however. In 1997, s. 5.1 was added, dealing specifically with releases pertaining to directors of the debtor company. It states:

5.1(1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.

Exception

(2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that

(a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or

(b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.

Powers of court

(3) The court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

Resignation or removal of directors

(4) Where all of the directors have resigned or have been removed by the shareholders without replacement, any person who manages or supervises the management of the business and affairs of the debtor company shall be deemed to be a director for the purposes of this section.

1997, c. 12, s. 122.

97 Perhaps the appellants' strongest argument is that these amendments confirm a prior lack of authority in the court to sanction a plan including third party releases. If the power existed, why would Parliament feel it necessary to add an amendment specifically permitting such releases (subject to the exceptions indicated) in favour of directors? *Expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, is the Latin maxim sometimes relied on to articulate the principle of interpretation implied in that question: to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.

98 The maxim is not helpful in these circumstances, however. The reality is that there *may* be another explanation why Parliament acted as it did. As one commentator has noted:⁸

Far from being a rule, [the maxim *expressio unius*] is not even lexicographically accurate, because it is simply not true, generally, that the mere express conferral of a right or privilege in one kind of situation implies the denial of the equivalent right or privilege in other kinds. Sometimes it does and sometimes it does not, and whether it does or does not depends on the particular circumstances of context. Without contextual support, therefore there is not even a mild presumption here. Accordingly, the maxim is at best a description, after the fact, of what the court has discovered from context.

99 As I have said, the 1997 amendments to the CCAA providing for releases in favour of directors of debtor companies in limited circumstances were a response to the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Steinberg Inc.*. A similar amendment was made with respect to proposals in the BIA at the same time. The rationale behind these amendments was to encourage directors of an insolvent company to remain in office during a restructuring, rather than resign. The assumption was that by remaining in office the directors would provide some stability while the affairs of the company were being reorganized: see Houlden & Morawetz, vol.1, *supra*, at 2-144, E§11A; *Royal Penfield Inc., Re*, [2003] R.J.Q. 2157 (C.S. Que.) at paras. 44-46.

100 Parliament thus had a particular focus and a particular purpose in enacting the 1997 amendments to the CCAA and the BIA. While there is some merit in the appellants' argument on this point, at the end of the day I do not accept that Parliament intended to signal by its enactment of s. 5.1 that it was depriving the court of authority to sanction plans of compromise or arrangement in all circumstances where they incorporate third party releases in favour of anyone other than the debtor's directors. For the reasons articulated above, I am satisfied that the court does have the authority to do so. Whether it sanctions the plan is a matter for the fairness hearing.

The Deprivation of Proprietary Rights

101 Mr. Shapray very effectively led the appellants' argument that legislation must not be construed so as to interfere with or prejudice established contractual or proprietary rights — including the right to bring an action — in the absence of a clear indication of legislative intention to that effect: *Halsbury's Laws of England*, 4th ed. reissue, vol. 44 (1) (London: Butterworths, 1995) at paras. 1438, 1464 and 1467; Driedger, 2nd ed., *supra*, at 183; Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes*, 4th ed., (Markham: Butterworths, 2002) at 399. I accept the importance of this principle. For the reasons I have explained, however, I am satisfied that Parliament's intention to clothe the court with authority to consider and sanction a plan that contains third party releases is expressed with sufficient clarity in the "compromise or arrangement" language of the CCAA coupled with the statutory voting and sanctioning mechanism making the provisions of the plan binding on all creditors. This is not a situation of impermissible "gap-filling" in the case of legislation severely affecting property rights; it is a question of finding meaning in the language of the Act itself. I would therefore not give effect to the appellants' submissions in this regard.

The Division of Powers and Paramountcy

102 Mr. Woods and Mr. Sternberg submit that extending the reach of the CCAA process to the compromise of claims as between solvent creditors of the debtor company and solvent third parties to the proceeding is constitutionally impermissible. They say that under the guise of the federal insolvency power pursuant to s. 91(21) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*, this approach would improperly affect the rights of civil claimants to assert their causes of action, a provincial matter falling within s. 92(13), and contravene the rules of public order pursuant to the *Civil Code of Quebec*.

103 I do not accept these submissions. It has long been established that the CCAA is valid federal legislation under the federal insolvency power: *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 (S.C.C.). As the Supreme Court confirmed in that case (p. 661), citing Viscount Cave L.C. in *Quebec (Attorney General) v. Bélanger (Trustee of)*, [1928] A.C. 187 (Canada P.C.), "the exclusive legislative authority to deal with all matters within the domain of bankruptcy and insolvency is vested in Parliament." Chief Justice Duff elaborated:

Matters normally constituting part of a bankruptcy scheme but not in their essence matters of bankruptcy and insolvency may, of course, from another point of view and in another aspect be dealt with by a provincial legislature; but, when treated as matters pertaining to bankruptcy and insolvency, they clearly fall within the legislative authority of the Dominion.

104 That is exactly the case here. The power to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement that contains third-party releases of the type opposed by the appellants is embedded in the wording of the CCAA. The fact that this may interfere with a claimant's right to pursue a civil action — normally a matter of provincial concern — or trump Quebec rules of public order is constitutionally immaterial. The CCAA is a valid exercise of federal power. Provided the matter in question falls within the legislation directly or as necessarily incidental to the exercise of that power, the CCAA governs. To the extent that its provisions are inconsistent with provincial legislation, the federal legislation is paramount. Mr. Woods properly conceded this during argument.

Conclusion With Respect to Legal Authority

105 For all of the foregoing reasons, then, I conclude that the application judge had the jurisdiction and legal authority to sanction the Plan as put forward.

(2) The Plan is "Fair and Reasonable"

106 The second major attack on the application judge's decision is that he erred in finding that the Plan is "fair and reasonable" and in sanctioning it on that basis. This attack is centred on the nature of the third-party releases contemplated and, in particular, on the fact that they will permit the release of some claims based in fraud.

107 Whether a plan of compromise or arrangement is fair and reasonable is a matter of mixed fact and law, and one on which the application judge exercises a large measure of discretion. The standard of review on this issue is therefore one of deference. In the absence of a demonstrable error an appellate court will not interfere: see *Ravelston Corp., Re* (2007), 31 C.B.R. (5th) 233 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]).

108 I would not interfere with the application judge's decision in this regard. While the notion of releases in favour of third parties — including leading Canadian financial institutions — that extend to claims of fraud is distasteful, there is no legal impediment to the inclusion of a release for claims based in fraud in a plan of compromise or arrangement. The application judge had been living with and supervising the ABCP restructuring from its outset. He was intimately attuned to its dynamics. In the end he concluded that the benefits of the Plan to the creditors as a whole, and to the debtor companies, outweighed the negative aspects of compelling the unwilling appellants to execute the releases as finally put forward.

109 The application judge was concerned about the inclusion of fraud in the contemplated releases and at the May hearing adjourned the final disposition of the sanctioning hearing in an effort to encourage the parties to negotiate a resolution. The result was the "fraud carve-out" referred to earlier in these reasons.

110 The appellants argue that the fraud carve-out is inadequate because of its narrow scope. It (i) applies only to ABCP Dealers, (ii) limits the type of damages that may be claimed (no punitive damages, for example), (iii) defines "fraud" narrowly, excluding many rights that would be protected by common law, equity and the Quebec concept of public order, and (iv) limits claims to representations made directly to Noteholders. The appellants submit it is contrary to public policy to sanction a plan containing such a limited restriction on the type of fraud claims that may be pursued against the third parties.

111 The law does not condone fraud. It is the most serious kind of civil claim. There is therefore some force to the appellants' submission. On the other hand, as noted, there is no legal impediment to granting the release of an antecedent claim in fraud, provided the claim is in the contemplation of the parties to the release at the time it is given: *Fotinis Restaurant Corp. v. White Spot Ltd* (1998), 38 B.L.R. (2d) 251 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) at paras. 9 and 18. There may be disputes about the scope or extent of what is released, but parties are entitled to settle allegations of fraud in civil proceedings — the claims here all being untested allegations of fraud — and to include releases of such claims as part of that settlement.

112 The application judge was alive to the merits of the appellants' submissions. He was satisfied in the end, however, that the need "to avoid the potential cascade of litigation that ... would result if a broader 'carve out' were to be allowed" (para. 113) outweighed the negative aspects of approving releases with the narrower carve-out provision. Implementation of the Plan, in his view, would work to the overall greater benefit of the Noteholders as a whole. I can find no error in principle in the exercise of his discretion in arriving at this decision. It was his call to make.

113 At para. 71 above I recited a number of factual findings the application judge made in concluding that approval of the Plan was within his jurisdiction under the CCAA and that it was fair and reasonable. For convenience, I reiterate them here — with two additional findings — because they provide an important foundation for his analysis concerning the fairness and reasonableness of the Plan. The application judge found that:

- a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;

- b) The claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it;
- c) The Plan cannot succeed without the releases;
- d) The parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan;
- e) The Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders generally;
- f) The voting creditors who have approved the Plan did so with knowledge of the nature and effect of the releases; and that,
- g) The releases are fair and reasonable and not overly broad or offensive to public policy.

114 These findings are all supported on the record. Contrary to the submission of some of the appellants, they do not constitute a new and hitherto untried "test" for the sanctioning of a plan under the CCAA. They simply represent findings of fact and inferences on the part of the application judge that underpin his conclusions on jurisdiction and fairness.

115 The appellants all contend that the obligation to release the third parties from claims in fraud, tort, breach of fiduciary duty, etc. is confiscatory and amounts to a requirement that they — as individual creditors — make the equivalent of a greater financial contribution to the Plan. In his usual lively fashion, Mr. Sternberg asked us the same rhetorical question he posed to the application judge. As he put it, how could the court countenance the compromise of what in the future might turn out to be fraud perpetrated at the highest levels of Canadian and foreign banks? Several appellants complain that the proposed Plan is unfair to them because they will make very little additional recovery if the Plan goes forward, but will be required to forfeit a cause of action against third-party financial institutions that may yield them significant recovery. Others protest that they are being treated unequally because they are ineligible for relief programs that Liquidity Providers such as Canaccord have made available to other smaller investors.

116 All of these arguments are persuasive to varying degrees when considered in isolation. The application judge did not have that luxury, however. He was required to consider the circumstances of the restructuring as a whole, including the reality that many of the financial institutions were not only acting as Dealers or brokers of the ABCP Notes (with the impugned releases relating to the financial institutions in these capacities, for the most part) but also as Asset and Liquidity Providers (with the financial institutions making significant contributions to the restructuring in these capacities).

117 In insolvency restructuring proceedings almost everyone loses something. To the extent that creditors are required to compromise their claims, it can always be proclaimed that their rights are being unfairly confiscated and that they are being called upon to make the equivalent of a further financial contribution to the compromise or arrangement. Judges have observed on a number of occasions that CCAA proceedings involve "a balancing of prejudices," inasmuch as everyone is adversely affected in some fashion.

118 Here, the debtor corporations being restructured represent the issuers of the more than \$32 billion in non-bank sponsored ABCP Notes. The proposed compromise and arrangement affects that entire segment of the ABCP market and the financial markets as a whole. In that respect, the application judge was correct in adverting to the importance of the restructuring to the resolution of the ABCP liquidity crisis and to the need to restore confidence in the financial system in Canada. He was required to consider and balance the interests of *all* Noteholders, not just the interests of the appellants, whose notes represent only about 3% of that total. That is what he did.

119 The application judge noted at para. 126 that the Plan represented "a reasonable balance between benefit to all Noteholders and enhanced recovery for those who can make out specific claims in fraud" within the fraud carve-out provisions of the releases. He also recognized at para. 134 that:

No Plan of this size and complexity could be expected to satisfy all affected by it. The size of the majority who have approved it is testament to its overall fairness. No plan to address a crisis of this magnitude can work perfect equity among all stakeholders.

120 In my view we ought not to interfere with his decision that the Plan is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances.

D. Disposition

121 For the foregoing reasons, I would grant leave to appeal from the decision of Justice Campbell, but dismiss the appeal.

J.I. Laskin J.A.:

I agree.

E.A. Cronk J.A.:

I agree.

Schedule A — Conduits

Apollo Trust

Apsley Trust

Aria Trust

Aurora Trust

Comet Trust

Encore Trust

Gemini Trust

Ironstone Trust

MMAI-I Trust

Newshore Canadian Trust

Opus Trust

Planet Trust

Rocket Trust

Selkirk Funding Trust

Silverstone Trust

Slate Trust

Structured Asset Trust

Structured Investment Trust III

Symphony Trust

Whitehall Trust

Schedule B — Applicants

ATB Financial

Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec

Canaccord Capital Corporation

Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation

Canada Post Corporation

Credit Union Central Alberta Limited

Credit Union Central of BC

Credit Union Central of Canada

Credit Union Central of Ontario

Credit Union Central of Saskatchewan

Desjardins Group

Magna International Inc.

National Bank of Canada/National Bank Financial Inc.

NAV Canada

Northwater Capital Management Inc.

Public Sector Pension Investment Board

The Governors of the University of Alberta

Schedule A — Counsel

- 1) Benjamin Zarnett and Frederick L. Myers for the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee
- 2) Aubrey E. Kauffman and Stuart Brotman for 4446372 Canada Inc. and 6932819 Canada Inc.
- 3) Peter F.C. Howard and Samaneh Hosseini for Bank of America N.A.; Citibank N.A.; Citibank Canada, in its capacity as Credit Derivative Swap Counterparty and not in any other capacity; Deutsche Bank AG; HSBC Bank Canada; HSBC Bank USA, National Association; Merrill Lynch

International; Merrill Lynch Capital Services, Inc.; Swiss Re Financial Products Corporation; and UBS AG

4) Kenneth T. Rosenberg, Lily Harmer and Max Starnino for Jura Energy Corporation and Redcorp Ventures Ltd.

5) Craig J. Hill and Sam P. Rappos for the Monitors (ABCP Appeals)

6) Jeffrey C. Carhart and Joseph Marin for Ad Hoc Committee and Pricewaterhouse Coopers Inc., in its capacity as Financial Advisor

7) Mario J. Forte for Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec

8) John B. Laskin for National Bank Financial Inc. and National Bank of Canada

9) Thomas McRae and Arthur O. Jacques for Ad Hoc Retail Creditors Committee (Brian Hunter, et al)

10) Howard Shapray, Q.C. and Stephen Fitterman for Ivanhoe Mines Ltd.

11) Kevin P. McElcheran and Heather L. Meredith for Canadian Banks, BMO, CIBC RBC, Bank of Nova Scotia and T.D. Bank

12) Jeffrey S. Leon for CIBC Mellon Trust Company, Computershare Trust Company of Canada and BNY Trust Company of Canada, as Indenture Trustees

13) Usman Sheikh for Coventree Capital Inc.

14) Allan Sternberg and Sam R. Sasso for Brookfield Asset Management and Partners Ltd. and Hy Bloom Inc. and Cardacian Mortgage Services Inc.

15) Neil C. Saxe for Dominion Bond Rating Service

16) James A. Woods, Sebastien Richemont and Marie-Anne Paquette for Air Transat A.T. Inc., Transat Tours Canada Inc., The Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc., Aéroports de Montréal, Aéroports de Montréal Capital Inc., Pomerleau Ontario Inc., Pomerleau Inc., Labopharm Inc., Agence Métropolitaine de Transport (AMT), Giro Inc., Vêtements de sports RGR Inc., 131519 Canada Inc., Tecsys Inc., New Gold Inc. and Jazz Air LP

17) Scott A. Turner for Webtech Wireless Inc., Wynn Capital Corporation Inc., West Energy Ltd., Sabre Energy Ltd., Petrolifera Petroleum Ltd., Vaquero Resources Ltd., and Standard Energy Ltd.

18) R. Graham Phoenix for Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp., Quanto Financial Corporation and Metcalfe & Mansfield Capital Corp.

Application granted; appeal dismissed.

Footnotes

*
— Leave to appeal refused at *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 5432, 2008 CarswellOnt 5433 (S.C.C.).

- [1](#) Section 5.1 of the CCAA specifically authorizes the granting of releases to directors in certain circumstances.
- [2](#) Justice Georgina R. Jackson and Dr. Janis P. Sarra, "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters" in Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2007* (Vancouver: Thomson Carswell, 2007).
- [3](#) Citing Gibbs J.A. in *Chef Ready Foods, supra*, at pp.319-320.
- [4](#) The Legislative Debates at the time the CCAA was introduced in Parliament in April 1933 make it clear that the CCAA is patterned after the predecessor provisions of s. 425 of the *Companies Act 1985* (U.K.): see *House of Commons Debates (Hansard), supra*.
- [5](#) See *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 192; *Ontario Business Corporations Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, s. 182.
- [6](#) A majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors (s. 6)
- [7](#) *Steinberg Inc.* was originally reported in French: *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*, [1993] R.J.Q. 1684 (C.A. Que.). All paragraph references to *Steinberg Inc.* in this judgment are from the unofficial English translation available at [1993 CarswellQue 2055](#) (C.A. Que.)
- [8](#) Reed Dickerson, *The Interpretation and Application of Statutes* (1975) at pp.234-235, cited in Bryan A. Garner, ed., *Black's Law Dictionary*, 8th ed. (West Group, St. Paul, Minn., 2004) at 621.

Tab 11



[Original](#)

2012 ONSC 234

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Kitchener Frame Ltd., Re

2012 CarswellOnt 1347, 2012 ONSC 234, 212 A.C.W.S. (3d) 631, 86 C.B.R. (5th) 274

**In the Matter of the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as Amended**

In the Matter of the Consolidated Proposal of Kitchener Frame
Limited and Thyssenkrupp Budd Canada, Inc. (Applicants)

Morawetz J.

Judgment: February 3, 2012

Docket: CV-11-9298-00CL

Counsel: Edward A. Sellers, Jeremy E. Dacks for Applicants
Hugh O'Reilly — Non-Union Representative Counsel
L.N. Gottheil — Union Representative Counsel
John Porter for Proposal Trustee, Ernst & Young Inc.
Michael McGraw for CIBC Mellon Trust Company
Deborah McPhail for Financial Services Commission of Ontario

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[VI](#) Proposal

[VI.4](#) Approval by court

[VI.4.b](#) Conditions

[VI.4.b.i](#) General principles

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Approval by court — Conditions — General principles
Applicants KFL and BC were inactive entities with no operating assets and no material liquid assets
— Applicants had significant and mounting obligations including pension and other non-pension post-
employment benefit (OPEB) obligations to their former employees and surviving spouses of such former
employees or others entitled to claim through such persons — Affiliates of BC provided up to date funding
for pension and OPEB obligations, however, given that KFL and BC had no active operations status quo
was unsustainable — KFL and BC brought motion to sanction amended consolidated proposal — Motion
was granted — Proposal was reasonable — Proposal was calculated to benefit general body of creditors —
Proposal was made in good faith — Proposal contained broad release in favour of applicants and certain
third parties — Release of third-parties was permitted — Release covered all affected claims, pension claims,
and existing escrow fund claims — Release did not cover criminal or wilful misconduct with respect to any
matters set out in s. 50(14) of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act — Unaffected claims were specifically carved
out of release — No creditors or stakeholders objected to scope of release which was fully disclosed in
negotiations — There was no express prohibition in BIA against including third-party releases in proposal
— Any provision of BIA which purported to limit ability of debtor to contract with its creditors had to

be clear and explicit — Third-party releases were permissible under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) and court should strive, where language of both statutes supported it, to give both statutes harmonious interpretation — There was no principled basis on which analysis and treatment of third-party release in BIA proposal proceeding should differ from CCAA proceeding — Released parties contributed in tangle and realistic way to proposal — Without inclusion of releases it was unlikely that certain parties would have supported proposal — Releases benefited applicants and creditors generally — Applicants provided full and adequate disclosure of releases and their effect.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

A. & F. Baillargeon Express Inc., Re (1993), 27 C.B.R. (3d) 36, 1993 CarswellQue 49 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Air Canada, Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 1842, 2 C.B.R. (5th) 4 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Allen-Vanguard Corp., Re (2011), 2011 CarswellOnt 1279, 2011 ONSC 733 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Angiotech Pharmaceuticals Inc., Re (2011), 2011 BCSC 450, 2011 CarswellBC 841, 76 C.B.R. (5th) 210 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Ashley v. Marlow Group Private Portfolio Management Inc. (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 3449, 22 C.B.R. (5th) 126, 270 D.L.R. (4th) 744 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

C.F.G. Construction inc., Re (2010), [2010] R.J.Q. 2360, 2010 CarswellQue 10226, 2010 QCCS 4643 (C.S. Que.) — considered

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2010), 70 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 2010 ONSC 4209, 2010 CarswellOnt 5510 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Cosmic Adventures Halifax Inc., Re (1999), 13 C.B.R. (4th) 22, 1999 CarswellNS 320 (N.S. S.C.) — considered

Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ideal Petroleum (1959) Ltd. (1976), 1976 CarswellQue 32, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 230, 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 84, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 63, (sub nom. *Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ideal Petroleum (1969) Ltd.*) 14 N.R. 503, 1976 CarswellQue 25 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Farrell, Re (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 1015, 40 C.B.R. (4th) 53 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Kern Agencies Ltd., (No. 2), Re (1931), 1931 CarswellSask 3, [1931] 2 W.W.R. 633, 13 C.B.R. 11 (Sask. C.A.) — considered

Lofchik, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 194, 1 C.B.R. (4th) 245 (Ont. Bkcty.) — referred to

Magnus One Energy Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellAlta 488, 2009 ABQB 200, 53 C.B.R. (5th) 243 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Mayer, Re (1994), 25 C.B.R. (3d) 113, 1994 CarswellOnt 268 (Ont. Bkcty.) — referred to

Mister C's Ltd., Re (1995), 1995 CarswellOnt 372, 32 C.B.R. (3d) 242 (Ont. Bkcty.) — considered

N.T.W. Management Group Ltd., Re (1994), 29 C.B.R. (3d) 139, 1994 CarswellOnt 325 (Ont. Bkcty.) — referred to

NAV Canada c. Wilmington Trust Co. (2006), 2006 CarswellQue 4890, 2006 CarswellQue 4891, 2006 SCC 24, (sub nom. *Greater Toronto Airports Authority v. International Lease Finance Corp.*) 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), (sub nom. *Canada 3000 Inc., (Bankrupt), Re*) 349 N.R. 1, (sub nom. *Canada 3000 Inc., Re*) [2006] 1 S.C.R. 865, 10 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 66, 20 C.B.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Canada 3000 Inc. (Bankrupt), Re*) 212 O.A.C. 338, (sub nom. *Canada 3000 Inc., Re*) 269 D.L.R. (4th) 79 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re (1995), 34 C.B.R. (3d) 93, 1995 CarswellOnt 340 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to
Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re (1997), 45 C.B.R. (3d) 85, 143 D.L.R. (4th) 536, 1997 CarswellOnt 657 (Ont. Bkcty.) — referred to
Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Armitage (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 4120, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 160, 50 O.R. (3d) 688, 137 O.A.C. 74 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to
Steeves, Re (2001), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 317, 208 Sask. R. 84, 2001 SKQB 265, 2001 CarswellSask 392 (Sask. Q.B.) — referred to
Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re (2010), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.)*) [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 503 W.A.C. 1, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 409 N.R. 201, (sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re*) 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383 (S.C.C.) — followed

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

Pt. III — referred to

s. 50(14) — considered

s. 54(2)(d) — considered

s. 59(2) — considered

s. 62(3) — considered

s. 136(1) — referred to

s. 178(2) — referred to

s. 179 — considered

s. 183 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 5.1 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — referred to

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15

Generally — referred to

MOTION by applicants for court sanction of proposal under Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act which contained third-party release.

Morawetz J.:

1 At the conclusion of this unopposed motion, the requested relief was granted. Counsel indicated that it would be helpful if the court could provide reasons in due course, specifically on the issue of a third-party release in the context of a proposal under Part III of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("BIA").

2 Kitchener Frame Limited ("KFL") and Thyssenkrupp Budd Canada Inc. ("Budd Canada"), and together with KFL, (the "Applicants"), brought this motion for an order (the "Sanction Order") to sanction the amended consolidated proposal involving the Applicants dated August 31, 2011 (the "Consolidated Proposal") pursuant to the provisions of the *BIA*. Relief was also sought authorizing the Applicants and Ernst & Young Inc., in its capacity as proposal trustee of each of the Applicants (the "Proposal Trustee") to take all steps necessary to implement the Consolidated Proposal in accordance with its terms.

3 The Applicants submit that the requested relief is reasonable, that it benefits the general body of the Applicants' creditors and meets all other statutory requirements. Further, the Applicants submit that the court should also consider that the voting affected creditors (the "Affected Creditors") unanimously supported the Consolidated Proposal. As such, the Applicants submit that they have met the test as set out in s. 59(2) of the *BIA* with respect to approval of the Consolidated Proposal.

4 The motion of the Applicants was supported by the Proposal Trustee. The Proposal Trustee filed its report recommending approval of the Consolidated Proposal and indicated that the Consolidated Proposal was in the best interests of the Affected Creditors.

5 KFL and Budd Canada are inactive entities with no operating assets and no material liquid assets (other than the Escrow Funds). They do have significant and mounting obligations including pension and other non-pension post-employment benefit ("OPEB") obligations to the Applicants' former employees and certain former employees of Budcan Holdings Inc. or the surviving spouses of such former employees or others who may be entitled to claim through such persons in the *BIA* proceedings, including the OPEB creditors.

6 The background facts with respect to this motion are fully set out in the affidavit of Mr. William E. Aziz, sworn on September 13, 2011.

7 Affiliates of Budd Canada have provided up to date funding to Budd Canada to enable Budd Canada to fund, on behalf of KFL, such pension and OPEB obligations. However, given that KFL and Budd Canada have no active operations, the *status quo* is unsustainable.

8 The Applicants have acknowledged that they are insolvent and, in connection with the *BIA* proposal, proceedings were commenced on July 4, 2011.

9 On July 7, 2011, Wilton-Siegel J. granted Procedural Consolidation Orders in respect of KFL and Budd Canada which authorized the procedural consolidation of the Applicants and permitted them to file a single consolidated proposal to their creditors.

10 The Orders of Wilton-Siegel J. also appointed separate representative counsel to represent the interests of the Union and Non-Union OPEB creditors and further authorized the Applicants to continue making payments to Blue Cross in respect of the OPEB Claims during the *BIA* proposal proceedings.

11 On August 2, 2011, an order was granted extending the time to file a proposal to August 19, 2011.

12 The parties proceeded to negotiate the terms of the Consolidated Proposal, which meetings involved the Applicants, the Proposal Trustee, senior members of the CAW, Union Representative Counsel and Non-Union Representative Counsel.

13 An agreement in principle was reached which essentially provided for the monetization and compromise of the OPEB claims of the OPEB creditors resulting in a one-time, lump-sum payment to each OPEB creditor term upon implementation of the Consolidated Proposal. The Consolidated Proposal also provides that the Applicants and their affiliates will forego any recoveries on account of their secured and

unsecured inter-company claims, which total approximately \$120 million. A condition precedent was the payment of sufficient funds to the Pension Fund Trustee such that when such funds are combined with the value of the assets held in the Pension Plans, the Pension Fund Trustee will be able to fully annuitize the Applicants' pension obligations and pay the commuted values to those creditors with pension claims who so elected so as to provide for the satisfaction of the Applicants' pension obligations in full.

14 On August 19, 2011, the Applicants filed the Consolidated Proposal. Subsequent amendments were made on August 31, 2011 in advance of the creditors' meeting to reflect certain amendments to the proposal.

15 The creditors' meeting was held on September 1, 2011 and, at the meeting, the Consolidated Proposal, as amended, was accepted by the required majority of creditors. Over 99.9% in number and over 99.8% in dollar value of the Affected Creditors' Class voted to accept the Consolidated Proposal. The Proposal Trustee noted that all creditors voted in favour of the Consolidated Proposal, with the exception of one creditor, Canada Revenue Agency (with 0.1% of the number of votes representing 0.2% of the value of the vote) who attended the meeting but abstained from voting. Therefore, the Consolidated Proposal was unanimously approved by the Affected Creditors. The Applicants thus satisfied the required "double majority" voting threshold required by the *BIA*.

16 The issue on the motion was whether the court should sanction the Consolidated Proposal, including the substantive consolidation and releases contained therein.

17 Pursuant to s. 54(2)(d) of the *BIA*, a proposal is deemed to be accepted by the creditors if it has achieved the requisite "double majority" voting threshold at a duly constituted meeting of creditors.

18 The *BIA* requires the proposal trustee to apply to court to sanction the proposal. At such hearing, s. 59(2) of the *BIA* requires that the court refuse to approve the proposal where its terms are not reasonable or not calculated to benefit the general body of creditors.

19 In order to satisfy s. 59(2) test, the courts have held that the following three-pronged test must be satisfied:

- (a) the proposal is reasonable;
- (b) the proposal is calculated to benefit the general body of creditors; and
- (c) the proposal is made in good faith.

See *Mayer, Re* (1994), 25 C.B.R. (3d) 113 (Ont. Bkcty.); *Steeves, Re* (2001), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 317 (Sask. Q.B.); *Magnus One Energy Corp., Re* (2009), 53 C.B.R. (5th) 243 (Alta. Q.B.).

20 The first two factors are set out in s. 59(2) of the *BIA* while the last factor has been implied by the court as an exercise of its equitable jurisdiction. The courts have generally taken into account the interests of the debtor, the interests of the creditors and the interests of the public at large in the integrity of the bankruptcy system. See *Farrell, Re* (2003), 40 C.B.R. (4th) 53 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

21 The courts have also accorded substantial deference to the majority vote of creditors at a meeting of creditors; see *Lofchik, Re*, [1998] O.J. No. 332 (Ont. Bkcty.). Similarly, the courts have also accorded deference to the recommendation of the proposal trustee. See *Magnus One, supra*.

22 With respect to the first branch of the test for sanctioning a proposal, the debtor must satisfy the court that the proposal is reasonable. The court is authorized to only approve proposals which are reasonable and calculated to benefit the general body of creditors. The court should also consider the payment terms of the proposal and whether the distributions provided for are adequate to meet the requirements of commercial

morality and maintaining the integrity of the bankruptcy system. For a discussion on this point, see [Lofchik](#), *supra*, and [Farrell](#), *supra*.

23 In this case, the Applicants submit that, if the Consolidated Proposal is sanctioned, they would be in a position to satisfy all other conditions precedent to closing on or prior to the date of the proposal ("Proposal Implementation Date").

24 With respect to the treatment of the Collective Bargaining Agreements, the Applicants and the CAW brought a joint application before the Ontario Labour Relations Board ("OLRB") on an expedited basis seeking the OLRB's consent to an early termination of the Collective Bargaining Agreements. Further, the CAW has agreed to abandon its collective bargaining rights in connection with the Collective Bargaining Agreements.

25 With respect to the terms and conditions of a Senior Secured Loan Agreement between Budd Canada and TK Finance dated as of December 22, 2010, TK Finance provided a secured creditor facility to the Applicants to fund certain working capital requirements before and during the *BIA* proposal proceedings. As a result of the approval of the Consolidated Proposal at the meeting of creditors, TK Finance agreed to provide additional credit facilities to Budd Canada such that the Applicants would be in a position to pay all amounts required to be paid by or on behalf of the Applicants in connection with the Consolidated Proposal.

26 On the issue as to whether creditors will receive greater recovery under the Consolidated Proposal than they would receive in the bankruptcy, it is noted that creditors with Pension Claims are unaffected by the Consolidated Proposal. The Consolidated Proposal provides for the satisfaction of Pension Claims in full as a condition precedent to implementation.

27 With respect to Affected Creditors, the Applicants submit that they will receive far greater recovery from distributions under the Consolidated Proposal than the Affected Creditors would receive in the event of the bankruptcies of the Applicants. (See Sanction Affidavit of Mr. Aziz at para. 61.)

28 The Proposal Trustee has stated that the Consolidated Proposal is advantageous to creditors for the reasons outlined in its Report and, in particular:

(a) the recoveries to creditors with claims in respect of OPEBs are considerably greater under the Amended Proposal than in a bankruptcy;

(b) payments under the Amended Proposal are expected in a timely manner shortly after the implementation of the Amended Proposal;

(c) the timing and quantum of distributions pursuant to the Amended Proposal are certain while distributions under a bankruptcy are dependent on the results of litigation, which cannot be predicted with certainty; and

(d) the Pension Plans (as described in the Proposal Trustee's Report) will be fully funded with funds from the Pension Escrow (as described in the Proposal Trustee's Report) and, if necessary, additional funding from an affiliate of the Companies if the funds in the Pension Escrow are not sufficient. In a bankruptcy, the Pension Plans may not be fully funded.

29 The Applicants take the position that the Consolidated Proposal meets the requirements of commercial morality and maintains the integrity of the bankruptcy system, in light of the superior coverage to be afforded to the Applicants' creditors under the Consolidated Proposal than in the event of bankruptcy.

30 The Applicants also submit that substantive consolidation inherent in the proposal will not prejudice any of the Affected Creditors and is appropriate in the circumstances. Although not expressly contemplated under the *BIA*, the Applicants submit that the court may look to its incidental, ancillary and auxiliary jurisdiction under s. 183 of the *BIA* and its equitable jurisdiction to grant an order for substantive consolidation. See *Ashley v. Marlow Group Private Portfolio Management Inc.* (2006), 22 C.B.R. (5th) 126 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). In deciding whether to grant substantive consolidation, courts have held that it should not be done at the expense of, or possible prejudice of, any particular creditor. See *Ashley*, *supra*. However, counsel submits that this court should take into account practical business considerations in applying the *BIA*. See *A. & F. Baillargeon Express Inc., Re* (1993), 27 C.B.R. (3d) 36 (C.S. Que.).

31 In this case, the Applicants submit that substantive consolidation inherent in the Consolidated Proposal is appropriate in the circumstances due to, among other things, the intertwined nature of the Applicants' assets and liabilities. Each Applicant had substantially the same creditor base and known liabilities (other than certain Excluded Claims). In addition, KFL had no cash or cash equivalents and the Applicants are each dependant on the Escrow Funds and borrowings under the Restated Senior Secured Loan Agreement to fund the same underlying pension and OPEB obligations and costs relating to the Proposal Proceedings.

32 The Applicants submit that creditors in neither estate will be materially prejudiced by substantive consolidation and based on the fact that no creditor objected to the substantial consolidation, counsel submits the Consolidated Proposal ought to be approved.

33 With respect to whether the Consolidated Proposal is calculated to benefit the general body of creditors, TK Finance would be entitled to priority distributions out of the estate in a bankruptcy scenario. However, the Applicants and their affiliates have agreed to forego recoveries under the Consolidated Proposal on account of their secured and unsecured intercompany claims in the amount of approximately \$120 million, thus enhancing the level of recovery for the Affected Creditors, virtually all of whom are OPEB creditors. It is also noted that TK Finance will be contributing over \$35 million to fund the Consolidated Proposal.

34 On this basis, the Applicants submit that the Consolidated Proposal is calculated to benefit the general body of creditors.

35 With respect to the requirement of the proposal being made in good faith, the debtor must satisfy the court that it has provided full disclosure to its creditors of its assets and encumbrances against such assets.

36 In this case, the Applicants and the Proposal Trustee have involved the creditors pursuant to the Representative Counsel Order, and through negotiations with the Union Representative Counsel and Non-Union Representative Counsel.

37 There is also evidence that the Applicants have widely disseminated information regarding their *BIA* proposal proceedings through the media and through postings on the Proposal Trustee's website. Information packages have also prepared by the Proposal Trustee for the creditors.

38 Finally, the Proposal Trustee has noted that the Applicants' conduct, both prior to and subsequent to the commencement of the *BIA* proposal proceedings, is not subject to censure in any respect and that the Applicants' have acted in good faith.

39 There is also evidence that the Consolidated Proposal continues requisite statutory terms. The Consolidated Proposal provides for the payment of preferred claims under s. 136(1) of the *BIA*.

40 Section 7.1 of the Consolidated Proposal contains a broad release in favour of the Applicants and in favour of certain third parties (the "Release"). In particular, the Release benefits the Proposal Trustee,

Martinrea, the CAW, Union Representative Counsel, Non-Union Representative Counsel, Blue Cross, the Escrow Agent, the present and former shareholders and affiliates of the Applicants (including Thyssenkrupp USA, Inc. ("TK USA"), TK Finance, Thyssenkrupp Canada Inc. ("TK Canada") and Thyssenkrupp Budd Company), as well as their subsidiaries, directors, officers, members, partners, employees, auditors, financial advisors, legal counsel and agents of any of these parties and any person liable jointly or derivatively through any or all of the beneficiaries of the of the release (referred to individually as a "Released Party").

41 The Release covers all Affected Claims, Pension Claims and Escrow Fund Claims existing on or prior to the later of the Proposal Implementation Date and the date on which actions are taken to implement the Consolidated Proposal.

42 The Release provides that all such claims are released and waived (other than the right to enforce the Applicants' or Proposal Trustee's obligations under the Consolidated Proposal) to the full extent permitted by applicable law. However, nothing in the Consolidated Proposal releases or discharges any Released Party for any criminal or other wilful misconduct or any present or former directors of the Applicants with respect to any matters set out in s. 50(14) of the *BIA*. Unaffected Claims are specifically carved out of the Release.

43 The Applicants submit that the Release is both permissible under the *BIA* and appropriately granted in the context of the *BIA* proposal proceedings. Further, counsel submits, to the extent that the Release benefits third parties other than the Applicants, the Release is not prohibited by the *BIA* and it satisfies the criteria that has been established in granting third-party releases under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("*CCAA*"). Moreover, counsel submits that the scope of the Release is no broader than necessary to give effect to the purpose of the Consolidated Proposal and the contributions made by the third parties to the success of the Consolidated Proposal.

44 No creditors or stakeholders objected to the scope of the Release which was fully disclosed in the negotiations, including the fact that the inclusion of the third-party releases was required to be part of the Consolidated Proposal. Counsel advises that the scope of the Release was referred to in the materials sent by the Proposal Trustee to the Affected Creditors prior to the meeting, specifically discussed at the meeting and adopted by the unanimous vote of the voting Affected Creditors.

45 Counsel also submits that there is no provision in the *BIA* that clearly and expressly precludes the Applicants from including the Release in the Consolidated Proposal as long as the court is satisfied that the Consolidated Proposal is reasonable and for the general benefit of creditors.

46 In this respect, it seems to me, that the governing statutes should not be technically or stringently interpreted in the insolvency context but, rather, should be interpreted in a manner that is flexible rather than technical and literal, in order to deal with the numerous situations and variations which arise from time to time. Further, taking a technical approach to the interpretation of the *BIA* would defeat the purpose of the legislation. See *N.T.W. Management Group Ltd., Re* (1994), 29 C.B.R. (3d) 139 (Ont. Bkcty.); *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re* (1995), 34 C.B.R. (3d) 93 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re* (1997), 45 C.B.R. (3d) 85 (Ont. Bkcty.).

47 Moreover, the statutes which deal with the same subject matter are to be interpreted with the presumption of harmony, coherence and consistency. See *NAV Canada c. Wilmington Trust Co.*, 2006 SCC 24 (S.C.C.). This principle militates in favour of adopting an interpretation of the *BIA* that is harmonious, to the greatest extent possible, with the interpretation that has been given to the *CCAA*.

48 Counsel points out that historically, some case law has taken the position that s. 62(3) of the *BIA* precludes a proposal from containing a release that benefits third parties. Counsel submits that this result is not supported by a plain meaning of s. 62(3) and its interaction with other key sections in the *BIA*.

49 Subsection 62(3) of the *BIA* reads as follows:

(3) The acceptance of a proposal by a creditor does not release any person who would not be released under this Act by the discharge of the debtor.

50 Counsel submits that there are two possible interpretations of this subsection:

(a) It prohibits third party releases — in other words, the phrase "does not release any person" is interpreted to mean "cannot release any person"; or

(b) It simply states that acceptance of a proposal does not automatically release any party other than the debtor — in other words, the phrase "does not release any person" is interpreted to mean "does not release any person without more"; it is protective not prohibitive.

51 I agree with counsel's submission that the latter interpretation of s. 62(3) of the *BIA* conforms with the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words used. If Parliament had intended that only the debtor could be released, s. 62(3) would have been drafted more simply to say exactly that.

52 Counsel further submits that the narrow interpretation would be a stringent and inflexible interpretation of the *BIA*, contrary to accepted wisdom that the *BIA* should be interpreted in a flexible, purposive manner.

53 The *BIA* proposal provisions are designed to offer debtors an opportunity to carry out a going concern or value maximizing restructuring in order to avoid a bankruptcy and related liquidation and that these purposes justify taking a broad, flexible and purposive approach to the interpretation of the relevant provisions. This interpretation is supported by *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, [2010 SCC 60](#) (S.C.C.).

54 Further, I agree with counsel's submissions that a more flexible purposive interpretation is in keeping with modern statutory principles and the need to give purposive interpretation to insolvency legislation must start from the proposition that there is no express prohibition in the *BIA* against including third-party releases in a proposal. At most, there are certain limited constraints on the scope of such releases, such as in s. 179 of the *BIA*, and the provision dealing specifically with the release of directors.

55 In the absence of an express prohibition against including third-party releases in a proposal, counsel submits that it must be presumed that such releases are permitted (subject to compliance with any limited express restrictions, such as in the case of a release of directors). By extension, counsel submits that the court is entitled to approve a proposal containing a third-party release if the court is able to satisfy itself that the proposal (including the third-party release) is reasonable and for the general benefit for creditors such that all creditors (including the minority who did not vote in favour of the proposal) can be required to forego their claims against parties other than the debtors.

56 The Applicants also submit that s. 62(3) of the *BIA* can only be properly understood when read together with other key sections of the *BIA*, particularly s. 179 which concerns the effect of an order of discharge:

179. An order of discharge does not release a person who at the time of the bankruptcy was a partner or co-trustee with the bankrupt or was jointly bound or had made a joint contract with the bankrupt, or a person who was surety or in the nature of a surety for the bankrupt.

57 The order of discharge of a bankrupt has the effect of releasing the bankrupt from all claims provable in bankruptcy (section 178(2) *BIA*). In the absence of s. 179, this release could result in the automatic release at law of certain types of claims that are identified in s. 179. For example, under guarantee law, the discharge of the principal debt results in the automatic discharge of a guarantor. Similarly, counsel points out the

settlement or satisfaction of a debt by one joint obligor generally results in the automatic release of both joint obligors. Section 179 therefore serves the limited purpose of altering the result that would incur at law, indicating that the rule that the *BIA* generally is that there is no automatic release of third-party guarantors of co-obligors when a bankrupt is discharged.

58 Counsel submits that s. 62(3), which confirms that s. 179 applies to a proposal, was clearly intended to fulfil a very limited role — namely, to confirm that there is no automatic release of the specific types of co-obligors identified in s. 179 when a proposal is approved by the creditors and by the court. Counsel submits that it does not go further and preclude the creditors and the court from approving a proposal which contains the third-party release of the types of co-obligors set out in s. 179. I am in agreement with these submissions.

59 Specific considerations also apply when releasing directors of a debtor company. The *BIA* contains specific limitations on the permissible scope of such releases as set out in s. 50(14). For this reason, there is a specific section in the *BIA* proposal provisions outlining the principles governing such a release. However, counsel argues, the presence of the provisions outlining the circumstances in which a proposal can contain a release of claims against the debtor's directors does not give rise to an inference that the directors are the only third parties that can be released in a proposal. Rather, the inference is that there are considerations applicable to a release or compromise of claims against directors that do not apply generally to other third parties. Hence, it is necessary to deal with this particular type of compromise and release expressly.

60 I am also in agreement with the alternative submissions made by counsel in this area to the effect that if s. 62(3) of the *BIA* operates as a prohibition it refers only to those limitations that are expressly identified in the *BIA*, such as in s. 179 of the *BIA* and the specific limitations on the scope of releases that can benefit directors of the debtor.

61 Counsel submits that the Applicants' position regarding the proper interpretation of s. 62(3) of the *BIA* and its place in the scheme of the *BIA* is consistent with the generally accepted principle that a proposal under the *BIA* is a contract. See *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, [2008 ONCA 587](#) (Ont. C.A.); *Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ideal Petroleum (1959) Ltd.* ([1976](#)), [\[1978\] 1 S.C.R. 230](#) (S.C.C.); and *Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Armitage* ([2000](#)), [20 C.B.R. \(4th\) 160](#) (Ont. C.A.). Consequently, counsel submits that parties are entitled to put anything into a proposal that could lawfully be incorporated into any contract (see *Air Canada, Re* ([2004](#)), [2 C.B.R. \(5th\) 4](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])) and that given that the prescribed majority creditors have the statutory right under the *BIA* to bind a minority, however, this principle is subject to any limitations that are contained in the express wording of the *BIA*.

62 On this point, it seems to me, that any provision of the *BIA* which purports to limit the ability of the debtor to contract with its creditors should be clear and explicit. To hold otherwise would result in severely limiting the debtor's ability to contract with its creditors, thereby the decreasing the likelihood that a viable proposal could be reached. This would manifestly defeat the purpose of the proposal provisions of the *BIA*.

63 The Applicants further submit that creditors' interests — including the interests of the minority creditors who do not vote in favour of a proposal containing a third-party release — are sufficiently protected by the overriding ability of a court to refuse to approve a proposal with an overly broad third-party release, or where the release results in the proposal failing to demonstrate that it is for the benefit of the general body of creditors. The Applicants submit that the application of the *Metcalfe* criteria to the release is a mechanism whereby this court can assure itself that these preconditions to approve the Consolidated Proposal contained in the Release have been satisfied.

64 The Applicants acknowledge that there are several cases in which courts have held that a *BIA* proposal that includes a third-party release cannot be approved by the court but submits that these cases are based on a mistaken premise, are readily distinguishable and do not reflect the modern approach to Canadian insolvency law. Further, they submit that none of these cases are binding on this court and should not be followed.

65 In *Kern Agencies Ltd., (No. 2), Re* (1931), 13 C.B.R. 11 (Sask. C.A.), the court refused to approve a proposal that contained a release of the debtor's directors, officers and employees. Counsel points out that the court's refusal was based on a provision of the predecessor to the *BIA* which specifically provided that a proposal could only be binding on creditors (as far as relates to any debts due to them from the debtor). The current *BIA* does not contain equivalent general language. This case is clearly distinguishable.

66 In *Mister C's Ltd., Re* (1995), 32 C.B.R. (3d) 242 (Ont. Bkcty.), the court refused to approve a proposal that had received creditor approval. The court cited numerous bases for its conclusion that the proposal was not reasonable or calculated to benefit the general body of creditors, one of which was the release of the principals of the debtor company. The scope of the release was only one of the issues with the proposal, which had additional significant issues (procedural irregularities, favourable terms for insiders, and inequitable treatment of creditors generally). I agree with counsel to the Applicants that this case can be distinguished.

67 *Cosmic Adventures Halifax Inc., Re* (1999), 13 C.B.R. (4th) 22 (N.S. S.C.) relies on *Kern* and furthermore the Applicants submit that the discussion of third-party releases is technically *obiter* because the proposal was amended on consent.

68 The fourth case is *C.F.G. Construction inc., Re*, 2010 CarswellQue 10226 (C.S. Que.) where the Quebec Superior Court refused to approve a proposal containing a release of two sureties of the debtor. The case was decided on alternate grounds — either that the *BIA* did not permit a release of sureties, or in any event, the release could not be justified on the facts. I agree with the Applicants that this case is distinguishable. The case deals with the release of sureties and does not stand for any broader proposition.

69 In general, the Applicants' submission on this issue is that the court should apply the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in *Metcalfe*, together with the binding principle set out by the Supreme Court in *Ted Leroy Trucking*, dictating a more liberal approach to the permissibility of third-party releases in *BIA* proposals than is taken by the Quebec court in *C.F.G. Construction Inc.* I agree.

70 The object of proposals under the *BIA* is to permit the debtor to restructure its business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets, which is precisely the same purpose as the *CCAA*. Although there are some differences between the two regimes and the *BIA* can generally be characterized as more "rules based", the thrust of the case law and the legislative reform has been towards harmonizing aspects of insolvency law common to the two statutory schemes to the extent possible, encouraging reorganization over liquidation. See *Ted Leroy Trucking*.

71 Recent case law has indicated that, in appropriate circumstances, third-party releases can be included in a plan of compromise and arrangement that is approved under the *CCAA*. See *Metcalfe*. The *CCAA* does not contain any express provisions permitting such third-party releases apart from certain limitations that apply to the compromise of claims against directors of the debtor company. See *CCAA* s. 5.1 and *Allen-Vanguard Corp., Re*, 2011 ONSC 733 (Ont. S.C.J.).

72 Counsel submits that although the mechanisms for dealing with the release of sureties and similar claimants are somewhat different in the *BIA* and *CCAA*, the differences are not of such significance that

the presence of s. 62(3) of the *BIA* should be viewed as dictating a different approach to third-party releases generally from the approach that applies under the *CCAA*. I agree with this submission.

73 I also accept that if s. 62(3) of the *BIA* is interpreted as a prohibition against including the third-party release in the *BIA* proposal, the *BIA* and the *CCAA* would be in clear disharmony on this point. An interpretation of the *BIA* which leads to a result that is different from the *CCAA* should only be adopted pursuant to clear statutory language which, in my view, is not present in the *BIA*.

74 The most recent and persuasive example of the application of such a harmonious approach to the interpretation of the *BIA* and the *CCAA* can be found in *Ted Leroy Trucking*.

75 At issue in *Ted Leroy Trucking* was how to resolve an apparent conflict between the deemed trust provisions of the *Excise Tax Act* and the provisions of the *CCAA*. The language of the *Excise Tax Act* created a deemed trust over GST amounts collected by the debtor that was stated to apply "despite any other Act of Parliament". The *CCAA* stated that the deemed trust for GST did not apply under the *CCAA*, unless the funds otherwise specified the criteria for a "true" trust. The court was required to determine which federal provision should prevail.

76 By contrast, the same issue did not arise under the *BIA*, due to the language in the *Excise Tax Act* specifically indicating that the continued existence of the deemed trust depended on the terms of the *BIA*. The *BIA* contained a similar provision to the *CCAA* indicating that the deemed trust for GST amounts would no longer apply in a *BIA* proceeding.

77 Deschamps J., on behalf of six other members of the court, with Fish J. concurring and Abella J. dissenting, held that the proper interpretation of the statutes was that the *CCAA* provision should prevail, the deemed trust under the *Excise Tax Act* would cease to exist in a *CCAA* proceeding. In resolving the conflict between the *Excise Tax Act* and the *CCAA*, Deschamps J. noted the strange asymmetry which would arise if the *BIA* and *CCAA* were not in harmony on this issue:

Moreover, a strange asymmetry would arise if the interpretation giving the *ETA* priority over the *CCAA* urged by the Crown is adopted here: the Crown would retain priority over GST claims during *CCAA* proceedings but not in bankruptcy. As courts have reflected, this can only encourage statute shopping by secured creditors in cases such as this one where the debtor's assets cannot satisfy both the secured creditors' and the Crown's claims (*Gauntlet*, at para. 21). If creditors' claims were better protected by liquidation under the *BIA*, creditors' incentives would lie overwhelmingly with avoiding proceedings under the *CCAA* and not risking a failed reorganization. Giving a key player in any insolvency such skewed incentives against reorganizing under the *CCAA* can only undermine that statute's remedial objectives and risk inviting the very social ills that it was enacted to avert.

78 It seems to me that these principles indicate that the court should generally strive, where the language of both statutes can support it, to give both statutes a harmonious interpretation to avoid the ills that can arise from "statute-shopping". These considerations, counsel submits, militate against adopting a strained reading of s. 62(3) of the *BIA* as a prohibition against third-party releases in a *BIA* proposal. I agree. In my opinion, there is no principled basis on which the analysis and treatment of a third-party release in a *BIA* proposal proceeding should differ from a *CCAA* proceeding.

79 The Applicants submit that it logically follows that the court is entitled to approve the Consolidated Proposal, including the Release, on the basis that it is reasonable and calculated to benefit the general body of creditors. Further, in keeping with the principles of harmonious interpretation of the *BIA* and the *CCAA*, the court should satisfy itself that the *Metcalfe* criteria, which apply to the approval of a third-party release under the *CCAA*, has been satisfied in relation to the Release.

80 In *Metcalf*, the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that the requirements that must be satisfied to justify a third-party release are:

- (a) the parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;
- (b) the claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan (Proposal) and necessary for it;
- (c) the Plan (Proposal) cannot succeed without the releases;
- (d) the parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan (Proposal); and
- (e) the Plan (Proposal) will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditors generally.

81 These requirements have also been referenced in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* (2010), 70 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) and *Angiotech Pharmaceuticals Inc., Re* (2011), 76 C.B.R. (5th) 210 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]).

82 No single requirement listed above is determinative and the analysis must take into account the facts particular to each claim.

83 The Applicants submit that the Release satisfies each of the *Metcalf* criteria. Firstly, counsel submits that following the closing of the Asset Purchase Agreement in 2006, Budd Canada had no operating assets or income and relied on inter-company advances to fund the pension and OPEB requirements to be made by Budd Canada on behalf of KFL pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement. Such funded amounts total approximately \$112.7 million in pension payments and \$24.6 million in OPEB payments between the closing of the Asset Purchase Agreement and the Filing Date. In addition, TK Finance has been providing Budd Canada and KFL with the necessary funding to pay the professional and other costs associated with the *BIA* Proposal Proceedings and will continue to fund such amounts through the Proposal Implementation Date. Moreover, TK Canada and TK Finance have agreed to forego recoveries under the Consolidated Proposal on account of their existing secured and unsecured intercompany loans in the amount of approximately \$120 million.

84 Counsel submits that the releases provided in respect of the Applicants' affiliates are the *quid pro quo* for the sacrifices made by such affiliates to significantly enlarge recoveries for the unsecured creditors of the Applicants, particularly the OPEB creditors and reflects that the affiliates have provided over \$135 million over the last five years in respect of the pension and OPEB amounts and additional availability of approximately \$49 million to allow the Applicants to discharge their obligations to their former employees and retirees. Without the Releases, counsel submits, the Applicants' affiliates would have little or no incentive to contribute funds to the Consolidated Proposal and to waive their own rights against the Applicants.

85 The Release in favour of Martinrea is fully discussed at paragraphs 121-127 of the factum. The Applicants submit that the third-party releases set out in the Consolidated Proposal are clearly rationally related, necessary and essential to the Consolidated Proposal and are not overly broad.

86 Having reviewed the submissions in detail, I am in agreement that the Released Parties are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Consolidated Proposal.

87 I am also satisfied that without the Applicants' commitment to include the Release in the Consolidated Proposal to protect the Released Parties, it is unlikely that certain of such parties would have been prepared

to support the Consolidated Proposal. The releases provided in respect of the Applicants' affiliates are particularly significant in this regard, since the sacrifices and monetary contributions of such affiliates are the primary reason that the Applicants have been able to make the Consolidated Proposal. Further, I am also satisfied that without the Release, the Applicants would be unable to satisfy the borrowing conditions under the Amended and Restated Senior Secured Loan Agreement with respect to the Applicants having only certain permitted liabilities after the Proposal Implementation Date. The alternative for the Applicants is bankruptcy, a scenario in which their affiliates' claims aggregating approximately \$120 million would significantly erode recoveries for the unsecured creditors of the Applicants.

88 I am also satisfied that the Releases benefit the Applicants and creditors generally. The primary non-affiliated Creditors of the Applicants are the OPEB Creditors and Creditors with Pension Claims, together with the CRA. The Consolidated Proposal, in my view, clearly benefits these Creditors by generating higher recoveries than could be obtained from the bankruptcies of the Applicants. Moreover, the timing of any such bankruptcy recoveries is uncertain. As noted by the Proposal Trustee, the amount that the Affected Creditors would receive in the event of the bankruptcies of the Applicants is uncertain both in terms of quantum and timing, with the Applicants' funding of OPEB Claims terminating on bankruptcy, but distributions to the OPEB Creditors and other Creditors delayed for at least a year or two but perhaps much longer.

89 The Applicants and their affiliates also benefit from the Release as an affiliate of the Applicants may become enabled to use the net operating losses (NOL) following a series of transactions that are expected to occur immediately following the Proposal Implementation Date.

90 I am also satisfied that the Applicants have provided full and adequate disclosure of the Releases and their effect. Full disclosure was made in the proposal term sheet circulated to both Representative Counsel in early August 2011. The Release was negotiated as part of the Consolidated Proposal and the scope of the Release was disclosed by the Proposal Trustee in its Report to the creditors on the terms of the Consolidated Proposal, which Report was circulated by the Proposal Trustee to the Applicants' known creditors in advance of the creditors' meeting.

91 I am satisfied that the Applicants, with the assistance of the Proposal Trustee, took appropriate steps to ensure that the Affected Creditors were aware of the existence of the release provisions prior to the creditors' meeting.

92 For the foregoing reasons, I have concluded that the Release contained in the Consolidated Proposal meets the *Metcalfe* criteria and should be approved.

93 In the result, I am satisfied that the section 59(2) *BIA* test has been met and that it is appropriate to grant the Sanction Order in the form of the draft order attached to the Motion Record. An order has been signed to give effect to the foregoing.

Motion granted.

Tab 12



[Original](#)

2013 ONSC 2519

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re

2013 CarswellOnt 7670, 2013 ONSC 2519, [2013] O.J.

No. 2664, 229 A.C.W.S. (3d) 24, 3 C.B.R. (6th) 83

**In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended**

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise and Arrangement of Skylink Aviation Inc. Applicant

Morawetz J.

Heard: April 23, 2013

Oral reasons: April 23, 2013

Docket: CV-13-1003300CL

Counsel: Robert J. Chadwick, Logan Willis for SkyLink Aviation Inc.

Harvey Chaiton for Arbib, Babrar and Sunbeam Helicopters

Emily Stock for Certain Former and Current Directors, for Insured Claims

S.R. Orzy, Sean Zweig for Noteholders

Shayne Kukulowicz for Certain Directors and Officers

M.P. Gottlieb, A. Winton for Monitor, Duff & Phelps

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX](#) Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

[XIX.3](#) Arrangements

[XIX.3.b](#) Approval by court

[XIX.3.b.i](#) "Fair and reasonable"

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX](#) Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

[XIX.3](#) Arrangements

[XIX.3.b](#) Approval by court

[XIX.3.b.iii](#) Creditor approval

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX](#) Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

[XIX.5](#) Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

Debtor entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act for purpose of recapitalization — Plan sought to refinance first lien debt, cancel secured notes in exchange for consideration including new common shares and new debt, and compromise of certain unsecured liabilities — Settlements were arranged with certain claimants, including releases regarding potential claims — Debtor brought application for

extension of stay and sanctioning plan of arrangement and compromise — Application granted — Plan was not opposed and had strong support from creditors — Debtor complied with procedural requirements of Act, and orders including initial order — Debtor acted in good faith and with due diligence — Plan was fair and reasonable — Releases were necessary part of plan and had been negotiated amongst appropriate parties.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — Creditor approval

Debtor entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act for purpose of recapitalization — Plan sought to refinance first lien debt, cancel secured notes in exchange for consideration including new common shares and new debt, and compromise of certain unsecured liabilities — Settlements were arranged with certain claimants, including releases regarding potential claims — Debtor brought application for extension of stay and sanctioning plan of arrangement and compromise — Application granted — Plan was not opposed and had strong support from creditors — Debtor complied with procedural requirements of Act, and orders including initial order — Debtor acted in good faith and with due diligence — Plan was fair and reasonable — Releases were necessary part of plan and had been negotiated amongst appropriate parties.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous
Sealing confidential materials.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by Morawetz J.:

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 3523, 43 C.B.R. (5th) 269, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 74 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 257 O.A.C. 400 (note), 2008 CarswellOnt 5432, 2008 CarswellOnt 5433, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 390 N.R. 393 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 2000 CarswellAlta 662, 2000 ABQB 442, 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 2000 CarswellAlta 919, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 314, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 46, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 52, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 86, 2000 ABCA 238, 266 A.R. 131, 228 W.A.C. 131 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 88 Alta. L.R. (3d) 8, 2001 ABCA 9, 2000 CarswellAlta 1556, [2001] 4 W.W.R. 1, 277 A.R. 179, 242 W.A.C. 179 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2001), 2001 CarswellAlta 888, 2001 CarswellAlta 889, 275 N.R. 386 (note), 293 A.R. 351 (note), 257 W.A.C. 351 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re*) 12 O.R. (3d) 500, 1993 CarswellOnt 182 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered
Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — followed

SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re ([2013](#)), [2013 CarswellOnt 2785](#), [2013 ONSC 1500](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 5.1(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — referred to

s. 19(2) — referred to

APPLICATION by debtor for approval of plan under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* and to extend stay.

Morawetz J.:

1 SkyLink Aviation Inc. ("SkyLink Aviation", the "Company" or the "Applicant"), seeks an Order (the "Sanction Order"), among other things:

(a) sanctioning SkyLink Aviation's Plan of Compromise and Arrangement dated April 18, 2013 (as it may be amended in accordance with its terms, the "Plan") pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA");

(b) declaring that the New Shareholders Agreement is effective and binding on all holders of New Common Shares and any Persons entitled to receive New Common Shares pursuant to the Plan; and

(c) extending the Stay Period, as defined in the Initial Order of this Court granted March 8, 2013 ([2013 CarswellOnt 2785](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])) (the "Initial Order").

2 No party opposed the requested relief.

3 Counsel to the Company submits that the Plan has strong support from the creditors and achieves the Company's goal of a going-concern recapitalization transaction (the "Recapitalization") that minimizes any impact on operations and maximizes value for the Company's stakeholders.

4 Counsel further submits that the Plan is fair and reasonable and offers a greater benefit to the Company's stakeholders than other restructuring or sale alternatives. The Plan has been approved by the Affected Creditors with 95.3% in number representing 93.6% in value of the Affected Unsecured Creditors Class and 97.1% in number representing 99.99% in value of the Secured Noteholders Class voting in favour of the Plan (inclusive of Voting Claims and Disputed Voting Claims).

5 The request for court approval is supported by the Initial Consenting Noteholders, the First Lien Lenders and the Monitor.

The Facts

6 SkyLink Aviation, together with the SkyLink Subsidiaries (as defined in the Affidavit of Jan Ottens sworn April 21, 2013) (collectively, "SkyLink"), is a leading provider of global aviation transportation and logistics services, primarily fixed-wing and rotary-wing air transport and related activities (the "SkyLink Business").

7 SkyLink is responsible for providing non-combat life-supporting functions to both its own personnel and those of its suppliers and clients in high-risk conflict zones.

8 SkyLink Aviation experienced financial challenges that necessitated a recapitalization of the Company under the CCAA. On March 8, 2013, the Company sought protection from its creditors under the CCAA and obtained the Initial Order which appointed Duff & Phelps Canada Restructuring Inc. as the monitor of the Applicant in this CCAA Proceeding (the "Monitor").

9 The primary purpose of the CCAA Proceeding is to expeditiously implement the Recapitalization. The Recapitalization involves: (i) the refinancing of the Company's first lien debt; (ii) the cancellation of the Secured Notes in exchange for the issuance by the Company of consideration that includes new common shares and new debt; and (iii) the compromise of certain unsecured liabilities, including the portion of the Noteholders' claim that is treated as unsecured under the Plan.

10 On March 8, 2013, I granted the Claims Procedure Order approving the Claims Procedure to ascertain all of the claims against the Company and its directors and officers. SkyLink Aviation, with the assistance of the Monitor, carried out the Claims Procedure in accordance with the terms of the Claims Procedure Order.

11 Pursuant to the Claims Procedure Order, the Secured Noteholders Allowed Claim, was determined by the Applicant, with the consent of the Monitor and the Majority Initial Consenting Noteholders, to be approximately \$123.4 million.

12 The Secured Noteholders Allowed Claim was allowed for both voting and distribution purposes against the Applicant as follows:

(a) \$28.5 million, as agreed among the Applicant, the Monitor and the Majority Initial Consenting Noteholders, was allowed as secured Claims against the Applicant (collectively the "Secured Noteholders Allowed Secured Claim"); and

(b) \$94.9 million, the balance of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Claim, was allowed as an unsecured Claim against the Applicant (collectively the "Secured Noteholders Allowed Unsecured Claim").

13 The value of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Secured Claim is consistent with the enterprise value range set out in the valuation dated March 7, 2013 (the "Valuation") prepared by Duff & Phelps Canada Limited.

14 The Claims Procedure resulted in \$133.7 million in Affected Unsecured Claims, consisting of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Unsecured Claim of \$94.9 million and other unsecured Claims of \$38.8 million, being filed against the Company.

15 In addition, ten claims were filed against the Directors and Officers totalling approximately \$21 million. Approximately \$13 million of these claims were also filed against the Company.

16 Following the commencement of these proceedings, SkyLink Aviation entered into discussions with certain creditors in an effort to consensually resolve the Affected Unsecured Claims and Director/Officer Claims asserted by them. These negotiations, and the settlement agreements ultimately reached with these creditors, resulted in amendments to the original version of the Plan filed on March 8, 2013 (the "Original Plan").

Purpose and Effect of the Plan

17 In developing the Plan, counsel submits that the Company sought to, among other things: (i) ensure a going-concern result for the SkyLink Business; (ii) minimize any impact on operations; (iii) maximize value for the Company's stakeholders; and (iv) achieve a fair and reasonable balance among its Affected Creditors.

18 The Plan provides for a full and final release and discharge of the Affected Claims and Released Claims, a settlement of, and consideration for, all Allowed Affected Claims and a recapitalization of the Applicant.

19 Unaffected Creditors will not be affected by the Plan (subject to recovery in respect of Insured Claims being limited to the proceeds of applicable Insurance Policies) and will not receive any consideration or distributions under the Plan in respect of their Unaffected Claims (except to the extent their Unaffected Claims are paid in full on the Plan Implementation Date in accordance with the express terms of the Plan).

20 Equity Claims and Equity Interests will be extinguished under the Plan and any Equity Claimants will not receive any consideration or distributions under the Plan.

21 The Plan provides for the release of a number of parties (the "Released Parties"), including SkyLink Aviation, the Released Directors/Officers, the Released Shareholders, the SkyLink Subsidiaries and the directors and officers of the SkyLink Subsidiaries in respect of Claims relating to SkyLink Aviation, Director/Officer Claims and any claims arising from or connected to the Plan, the Recapitalization, the CCAA proceedings or other related matters. These releases were negotiated as part of the overall framework of compromises in the Plan, and such releases are necessary to and facilitate the successful completion of the Plan and the Recapitalization.

22 The Plan does not release: (i) the right to enforce SkyLink Aviation's obligations under the Plan; (ii) any Released Party from fraud or wilful misconduct; (iii) SkyLink Aviation from any Claim that is not permitted to be released pursuant to Section 19(2) of the CCAA; or (iv) any Director or Officer from any Director/Officer Claim that is not permitted to be released pursuant to Section 5.1(2) of the CCAA. Further, as noted above, the Plan does not release Director/Officer Wages Claims or Insured Claims, provided that any recourse in respect of such claims is limited to proceeds, if any, of the applicable Insurance Policies.

Meetings of Creditors

23 At the Meetings, the resolution to approve the Plan was passed by the required majorities in both classes of creditors. Specifically, the Affected Creditors approved the Plan by the following majorities:

(a) Affected Unsecured Creditors Class:

95.3% in number and 93.6% in value (inclusive of Voting Claims and Disputed Voting Claims);

97.4% in number and 99.9% in value (Voting Claims only); and

(b) Secured Noteholders Class:

97.1% in number and 99.99% in value.

24 Counsel to the Company submits that the results of the vote taken in the Affected Unsecured Creditors Class would not change materially based on the inclusion or exclusion of the Disputed Voting Claims as the required majorities for approval of the Plan under the CCAA would be achieved regardless of whether the Disputed Voting Claims are included in the voting results.

25 Counsel for the Company submits that the Plan provides that the shareholders agreement among the existing shareholders of SkyLink Aviation will be terminated on the Plan Implementation Date. A new shareholders agreement (the "New Shareholders' Agreement"), which is to apply in respect of the holders of the New Common Shares as of the Plan Implementation Date, has been negotiated between and among: (i) the Initial Consenting Noteholders (and each of their independent counsel), who will collectively hold

more than 90% of the New Common Shares; and (ii) counsel to the Note Indenture Trustee, who acted as a representative for the interests of the post-Recapitalization minority shareholders.

Requirements for Approval

26 The general requirements for court approval of a CCAA plan are well established:

- (a) there must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements;
- (b) all materials filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to have been done which is not authorized by the CCAA; and
- (c) the plan must be fair and reasonable.

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.)).

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re, 2000 ABQB 442 (Alta. Q.B.), at para 60, leave to appeal refused 2000 ABCA 238 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), affirmed (2000), 2001 ABCA 9 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 60 (S.C.C.).

27 Since the commencement of the CCAA Proceeding, I am satisfied that SkyLink Aviation has complied with the procedural requirements of the CCAA, the Initial Order and all other Orders granted by the Court during the CCAA Proceeding.

28 With respect to the second part of the test I am satisfied that throughout the course of the CCAA Proceeding, SkyLink Aviation has acted in good faith and with due diligence and has complied with the requirements of the CCAA and the Orders of this Honourable Court.

29 Counsel to SkyLink submits that the Plan is fair and reasonable for a number of reasons including:

- (a) the Plan represents a compromise among the Applicant and the Affected Creditors resulting from dialogue and negotiations among the Company and its creditors, with the support of the Monitor and its counsel;
- (b) the classification of the Company's creditors into two Voting Classes, the Secured Noteholders Class and the Affected Unsecured Creditors Class, was approved by this Court pursuant to the Meetings Order. This classification was not opposed at the hearing to approve the Meetings Order or thereafter at the comeback hearing;
- (c) the amount of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Secured Claim is consistent with the enterprise value range provided for in the Valuation and is supported by the Monitor;
- (d) the Affected Creditors voted to approve the Plan at the Meetings;
- (e) the Plan is economically feasible;
- (f) the Plan provides for the continued operation of the world-wide business of SkyLink with no disruption to customers and provides for an expedient recapitalization of the Company's balance sheet, thereby preserving the goingconcern value of the SkyLink Business;

I accept these submissions and conclude that the Plan is fair and reasonable.

30 In considering the appropriateness of the terms and scope of third party releases, the courts will take into account the particular circumstances of a case and the purpose of the CCAA:

The concept that has been accepted is that the Court does have jurisdiction, taking into account the nature and purpose of the CCAA, to sanction the release of third parties where the factual circumstances are deemed appropriate for the success of a Plan.

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 43 C.B.R. (5th) 269 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); affirmed 2008 ONCA 587 (Ont. C.A.) leave to appeal refused (2008), 257 O.A.C. 400 (note) (S.C.C.).

31 Counsel to the Company submits that the third party releases provided under the Plan protect the Released Parties from potential claims relating to the Applicant based on conduct taking place on or prior to the later of the Plan Implementation Date and the date on which actions are taken to implement the Plan. The Plan does not release any Released Party for fraud or wilful misconduct.

32 Counsel to the Company submits the releases provided in the Plan were negotiated as part of the overall framework of compromises in the Plan, and these releases are necessary to and facilitate the successful completion of the Plan and the Recapitalization and that there is a reasonable connection between the releases contemplated by the Plan and the restructuring to be achieved by the Plan to warrant inclusion of such releases in the Plan.

33 I am satisfied that the releases of the Released Directors/Officers and the Released Shareholders contained in the Plan are appropriate in the circumstances for a number of reasons including:

- (a) the releases of the Released Directors/Officers and the Released Shareholders were negotiated as part of the overall framework of compromises in the Plan;
- (b) the Released Directors/Officers consist of parties who, in the absence of the Plan releases, would have Claims for indemnification against SkyLink Aviation;
- (c) the inclusion of certain parties among the Released Directors/Officers and the Released Shareholders was an essential component of the settlement of several Claims and Director/Officer Claims;
- (d) full disclosure of the releases was made to creditors in the Initial Affidavit, the Plan, the Information Statement, the Monitor's Second Report and the Ottens' Affidavit;
- (e) the Monitor considers the scope of the releases contained in the Plan to be reasonable in the circumstances.

34 I am satisfied that the Plan represents a compromise that balances the rights and interests of the Company's stakeholders and the releases provided for in the Plan are integral to the framework of compromises in the Plan.

Sealing the Confidential Appendix

35 The Applicant also requests that an order to seal the confidential appendix to the Monitor's Third Report (the "Confidential Appendix"), which outlines the Monitor's analysis and conclusions with respect to the amount of the Secured Noteholders Allowed Secured Claim.

36 The Confidential Appendix contains sensitive commercial information, the disclosure of which could be harmful to stakeholders. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the test set out in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) (WL Can) at para. 53 has been met and the Confidential Appendix should be sealed.

Extension of Stay Period

37 The Applicant also requests an extension of the Stay Period until May 31, 2013.

38 I am satisfied that the Company has acted and, is acting, in good faith and with due diligence such that the extension request is justified and is granted.

Application granted.

Tab 13



[Original](#)

2017 ABQB 508

Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Re Canada North Group Inc

2017 CarswellAlta 1609, 2017 ABQB 508, [2017] A.W.L.D. 5084,

2017 D.T.C. 5110, 283 A.C.W.S. (3d) 255, 51 C.B.R. (6th) 282

**In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36, as amended**

And In the Matter of a Plan of Arrangement of Canada North Group Inc., Canada North Camps Inc., Campcorp Structures Ltd., D.J. Catering Ltd., 816956 Alberta Ltd. and 1371047 Alberta Ltd.

S.D. Hillier J.

Heard: July 27, 2017

Judgment: August 17, 2017

Docket: Edmonton 1703-12327

Counsel: S.A. Wanke, S. Norris, for Applicants / Cross-Respondents

C.P. Russell, Q.C., for Respondent / Cross-Applicant

D.R. Bieganek, Q.C., for Monitor, Ernst & Young LLP

J. Oliver, for Business Development Bank of Canada

T.M. Warner, for ECN Capital Corp.

M.J. McCabe, Q.C., for PricewaterhouseCoopers

R.J. Wasylyshyn, for Weslease Income Growth Fund LP

H.M.B. Ferris, for First Island Financial Services Ltd.

G.F. Body, for Canada Revenue Agency

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX](#) Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

[XIX.2](#) Initial application

[XIX.2.b](#) Grant of stay

[XIX.2.b.vii](#) Extension of order

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Grant of stay — Extension of order

Debtors were group of companies involved in work camps in natural resource sector, modular construction manufacturing, camp land rentals, and real estate holdings including golf course — Debtors had used services of secured creditor for significant period of time — Debtors' operations and profitability were significantly impacted by downturn in economy — Debtors issued notices of intention to make proposals under Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and obtained initial stay of proceedings under s. 11.02(1) of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Debtors brought application for extension of stay under s. 11.02(2) of CCAA, and for ancillary relief — Creditor brought cross-application for order lifting stay and appointing either full or interim receiver — Application granted; cross-application dismissed —

Stay was extended with date for review being set; debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing was increased; affiliated company was added as debtor; monitor's first report was approved; and stay was expanded to include third parties involved in debtors' projects — Chief restructuring officer had begun consultations with unsolicited parties who had expressed interest, and structure for plan of arrangement was now important priority — It was not shown that debtors had failed to act in good faith to extent of disentitling extension sought, and extension of stay was in best interest subject to further vigorous review within reasonable period of time — Increase in DIP financing was required to address anticipated cash flow shortage resulting from welcome work during what was typically slower season for debtors — Operations of affiliated company were inextricably linked to those of debtors.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by S.D. Hillier J.:

Alberta Treasury Branches v. Tallgrass Energy Corp (2013), 2013 ABQB 432, 2013 CarswellAlta 1496, 8 C.B.R. (6th) 161 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Alexis Paragon Limited Partnership, Re (2014), 2014 ABQB 65, 2014 CarswellAlta 165, 9 C.B.R. (6th) 43 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Azure Dynamics Corp., Re (2012), 2012 BCSC 781, 2012 CarswellBC 1545, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 310 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 2010 ONSC 222, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

GuestLogix Inc., Re (2016), 2016 ONSC 1348, 2016 CarswellOnt 3323 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Hunters Trailer & Marine Ltd., Re (2001), 2001 ABQB 1094, 2001 CarswellAlta 1636, 30 C.B.R. (4th) 206, 305 A.R. 175 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 720, 19 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

North American Tungsten Corp., Re (2015), 2015 BCSC 1376, 2015 CarswellBC 2232 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Pacific Shores Resort & Spa Ltd., Re (2011), 2011 BCSC 1775, 2011 CarswellBC 3500, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 248 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — referred to

San Francisco Gifts Ltd., Re (2005), 2005 ABQB 91, 2005 CarswellAlta 174, 10 C.B.R. (5th) 275, 42 Alta. L.R. (4th) 377, 378 A.R. 361 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re (2010), 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, (sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re*) 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.)*) [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 296 B.C.A.C. 1, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 503 W.A.C. 1 (S.C.C.) — referred to

U.S. Steel Canada Inc., Re (2014), 2014 ONSC 6145, 2014 CarswellOnt 16465, 20 C.B.R. (6th) 116 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

4519922 Canada Inc., Re (2015), 2015 ONSC 124, 2015 CarswellOnt 178, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 44 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 47 — referred to

s. 243 — referred to

s. 244 — referred to

Business Corporations Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. B-9

Generally — referred to

s. 99(a) — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.02(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.02(2) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — referred to

s. 11.02(3) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 36.1(2) [en. 2007, c. 36, s. 78] — considered

Judicature Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. J-2

s. 13(2) — referred to

Personal Property Security Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-7

s. 65(7) — referred to

APPLICATION by debtors for extension of stay under s. 11.02(2) of *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, and for ancillary relief; CROSS-APPLICATION by creditor for order lifting stay and appointing either full or interim receiver.

S.D. Hillier J.:

I Introduction

1 Canada North Camps Inc. (CNC), Campcorp Structures Ltd., D.J. Catering Ltd., 816956 Alberta Ltd. and 1371047 Alberta Ltd. (collectively, the Group) request extension of a Stay under s. 11.02(2) of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, RSC 1985, c C-36 (*CCAA*) until November 3, 2017 and ancillary orders.

2 The Canadian Western Bank (CWB) cross-applies for an order lifting the Stay and appointing either a full or interim Receiver pursuant to s. 243 (or ss. 47 and 244 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c B-3 (*BIA*)), s. 13(2) of the *Judicature Act*, RSA 2000, c J-2, s. 99(a) of the *Business Corporations Act*, RSA 2000, c B-9, and s. 65(7) of the *Personal Property Security Act*, RSA 2000, c P-7.

II History

3 The Group operates or provides a number of services including work camps in the natural resource sector, modular construction manufacturing, camp land rentals as well as real estate holdings including a golf course. CWB has been the Group's major secured creditor for a significant period of time.

4 1919209 Alberta Ltd. (1919) is an insolvent affiliated debtor holding company of two of the companies in the Group. It was incorporated to lease camp equipment from Weslease Income Growth Fund LP (Weslease) and provide that camp equipment to Canada North Camps Inc. for its use. 1919's operations are integrated with those of the other applicants.

5 CNC entered into an agreement to construct a camp on Wandering River. 1371047, and Wandering River Properties Ltd. (owned 2/3 by 1371047) subsequently purchased a parcel for that purpose. CNC joined with the local Heart Lake First Nation and formed Heart Lake CNC LP, Heart Lake Canada North Group GP Ltd., Wandering River Properties Ltd., and Canada North Group LP Holdings Ltd.

6 An action by Max Fuel Distributors Ltd. as against Shayne McCracken arises from the operation of the camp business. The other creditors of the Group are stayed from enforcing collateral claims against Shayne McCracken.

7 The Group's operations and profitability have been significantly impacted since 2014 by the downturn in the economy. Earlier attempts by the Group and CWB to deal with the debt and cash flow issues proved to be unsuccessful.

8 In March 2017, the parties signed a Forbearance Agreement but problems continued. When they were unable to reach a new resolution in a full meeting on June 21, 2017, the Group issued Notices of Intention to make proposals under the *BIA* effective June 26, 2017.

9 On July 5, 2017, Nielsen J. granted an initial Stay under s. 11.02(1) of the *CCAA*. He imposed numerous terms, including that:

- Ernst & Young be appointed as Monitor;
- R. e. I. Group Inc. be appointed as Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO);
- the Stay continue until August 3, 2017, subject to review;
- Debtor in Possession (DIP) financing from the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) be made available, not to exceed \$1M;
- Notice of Intention proceedings under the *BIA* be "taken up" and continued under the *CCAA*.

10 On July 27, 2017, the Group applied under s. 11.02(2) of the *CCAA* for an extension of the Stay to November 3, 2017. It also applied to add 1919 as an applicant in these proceedings.

11 As well, it applied to expand the Stay to apply to proceedings against the entities involved in the Wandering River contract, and against Shayne McCracken.

12 Finally, the Group applied for an increase in the DIP financing to a maximum of \$2,500,000 and an interim lender's charge up to the same amount due to elevated costs associated with a significant short-term increase in work under a camps contract with the British Columbia provincial government for workers on the wildfires.

13 The CWB cross-applied for an order lifting the Stay and appointing a full or interim Receiver.

14 The Monitor sought approval of his First Report and activities, a suspension of limitation periods on claims, and the power to examine the parties regarding questioned transactions on lot sales prior to the *CCAA* Order (preferences) under s. 36.2 of the *CCAA*. Other interested parties also made submissions as affecting their interests.

15 In an oral decision, this Court extended the Stay to September 29, 2017 with a review to be held on September 26, 2017. The cross-application was dismissed. The Court also issued a series of ancillary directions. The parties were advised that written reasons would be issued dealing with the main issue as to extension of the Stay or appointment of a Receiver. These are the written reasons.

III Affidavit Evidence

16 The Group's stated preliminary plan is to return operations to profitability as demand increases, consider sale of some of its assets, and seek new financing or equity investment as required in order to provide a viable Plan of Arrangement.

17 The Group has presented extensive affidavits from Ms. Shayne McCracken, Director and Secretary of the applicants, in support of the various applications, containing the following key assertions:

- the Group has acted in good faith and with due diligence, working closely with the CRO and cooperating with the Monitor as they gain an understanding of the business and structure;
- the Group has specifically worked with the CRO and Monitor to improve financial reporting and accounting processes;
- together they have taken initial steps to develop a Plan of Arrangement to present to creditors, including a detailed overview of assets and liabilities;
- the Group has been the subject of unsolicited investment and purchase interest, which the Group, Monitor and CRO are pursuing;
- meetings have taken place with interested parties as well as arrangements related to drawdowns on DIP financing;
- work has included contracts with the Province of British Columbia to address efforts in consequence of raging wildfires in that province.

18 Ms. McCracken's affidavits purport to meet head on the concerns of CWB with the accounting treatment of certain accounts receivable, particularly in relation to the Grand Rapids Pipeline Project and the margining of custom negotiated deferred revenue. In late 2016, cost estimates were prepared for demobilization of the Grand Rapids camp, including removal of the camp for just over \$2M and reclamation work estimated at roughly \$5.36M based on detailed costing. Ms. McCracken asserted that the practice of clients assuming the costs of setting up and removing camps by advance invoicing is used by others in the camp industry.

19 The margining of custom negotiated deferred revenue allows the Group access to necessary financing to commence work prior to being paid. Ms. McCracken found support for the accounting practice in question in the custom negotiated deferred revenue term of the margining requirement that was part of the credit agreement with CWB.

20 Two significant receivables were placed on the books between March and May 2017 (it is unclear when they were actually posted and sent to the client) on Grand Rapids. This ostensibly led to a claim against the financing and increased CWB's exposure significantly at a time when the parties were trying to sort things out following the Forbearance Agreement in mid-March.

21 Ms. McCracken specifically denied CWB's allegation that these invoices were provided in bad faith to artificially inflate the amount available on the operating line. She deposed that the invoicing for this work was reviewed by the Group's corporate counsel. As well, it was part of the financial reporting to CWB and there were regular conversations with account managers at CWB who were aware of the origin and nature of all significant receivables, including the Grand Rapid receivables. Ms. McCracken maintained the view that the receivables were appropriately margined as deferred revenue.

22 Ms. McCracken noted that Grand Rapids has now raised issues with respect to payment of some of the invoices and a meeting is scheduled with it in Calgary in early August to discuss payment of those invoices.

23 Ms. Jessica Taha filed extensive material for CWB challenging the Stay, and supporting the appointment of a Receiver. The following assertions are germane, particularly as concerns margining of receivables:

- the Group had been margining receivables for which work had not yet been done (citing Grand Rapids);
- as a result, the operating line was overdrawn by over \$3.8M for work not yet done which only came to light at the June 21, 2017 meeting; subsequent information reflects that it is overdrawn by \$8M;
- the Group had only performed 10% of required work on one contract and only 40% for another, and none of this was consistent with the margining as represented by the Group, and arranged between the parties dating back to 2012;
- despite representations to the contrary before Nielsen J., CWB was not aware of this prior to the June 21, 2017 meeting.

24 Ms. Taha attested to her belief that as the level of work dropped dramatically in the economic downturn, the Group changed its approach without advising CWB, and started to render invoices for work which had not yet been done, categorizing those invoices as deferred revenue capable of margining.

25 In response, Ms. McCracken maintained her position that the Grand Rapids deferred revenue was properly included in the financial statements. She deposed that Ms. Taha's position that deferred revenue was only permitted to be used for margining based on the percentage of the work performed is inconsistent with the supporting material provided by Ms. Taha. The Group kept their branch representatives apprised of the status of the deferred revenue inclusions in the margining calculations and none raised a concern.

26 In counter response, CWB prepared three affidavits of senior officers at the Edmonton Main Branch deposing that they were unaware of the material amounts that were being margined without the work having been done, and each was unaware of anyone else at CWB having had such knowledge until the meeting on June 21, 2017.

27 Glenn MacDougall, Manager of ECN Capital Corp. (ECN), also filed an affidavit. ECN is an equipment lessor and creditor of the Group. In short, he opines that the work resulting from the BC wildfires is a temporary salve on the Group's financial circumstances, and it is unlikely that the Group will be able to make a viable Plan of Arrangement. He deposed that ECN would be materially prejudiced by the continuation of the Stay, as it will erode the value of ECN's security.

28 With respect to expanding the Stay, Ms. McCracken deposed that direct claims against affiliates have been reviewed. The Group now seeks to expand the stay to specific affiliates where those affiliates are facing claims directly connected to the overall camp operations, in order to preserve the *status quo*, prevent unnecessary expenditures of effort on litigation, maximize recovery for all parties, and allow for an orderly determination of priority and claims.

29 Regarding inclusion of 1919, Ms. McCracken deposed that 1919 has no revenue other than lease income from Canada North and is completely dependent on such payments to fulfill its obligations under the leases. It is included in the consolidated cash flow projections and financial statements for the Group, as it is treated as a flow through entity. The equipment it leases is essential to the uninterrupted operations of the Group.

30 Finally, Ms. McCracken explained that the increased work for the B.C. government, although welcome, creates a cash flow issue as the work is invoiced approximately a week after completion and receipt of payment typically takes approximately four weeks from invoicing. Consequently, the Group anticipates a cash flow shortage in August 2017 that will not be met by the present DIP facility. On July 21, 2017, the interim lender approved an increase to the DIP financing to a maximum of \$2,500,000.

IV Monitor's First Report

31 The Monitor has provided a First Report, advising of various steps taken in conjunction with the CRO, highlights of which include:

General

- a new cash management procedure has been initiated to ensure efficient control of cash and cash reporting, with a review of cash flow projections;
- the Group's management and staff have been making significant efforts in all respects and are cooperating fully with the efforts of the CRO;
- based on the Monitor's own work with Group management, the Group appears to have acted in good faith and with due diligence;
- the actual end cash balance for the two weeks ending July 15, 2017 was higher than projected by over \$400K and collections higher than projected by nearly \$350K;
- while cash disbursements were lower, this was largely due to temporary deferrals;
- the contracts relating to the B.C. wildfires will have a significant positive impact on future cash inflows and receivables.

Accounts Receivable

- the Group has used atypical accounting practices as reflected in four areas;
- the steps being adopted in response to CWB's concerns include removing Grand Rapids and Heart Lake related receivables as a conservative strategy while quantum is reviewed;
- some but not all of the room guarantees or reservations have been reversed out.

Status of Restructuring Efforts and Related Plan

- the Group's business and operations are very complex;
- the CRO believes, based on preliminary work to date and co-operation of the management team, that there is certainly potential for a going concern plan that could provide significantly greater value to stakeholders as compared to a liquidation;
- the CRO is of the initial view that several profit and gross margin improvements have been realized by the Group due to changes to operations, staffing and other operational matters.

1919

- the leasing arrangement with Weslease has been extended for use by the Group valued at approximately \$6M and listed as: three Jack+Jill dorms, two power distribution centres and one waste water treatment plant;
- expansion of the Stay to include 1919 is reasonable.

32 As well, the Monitor and the Group have been in contact with various parties who have expressed interest in participating in a restructuring through refinancing, purchasing assets or investing in the Group.

V Law

33 An initial Stay under s. 11.02(1) of the *CCAA* may be imposed for a maximum period of 30 days. The role of this Court on a subsequent application under s. 11.02(2) is not to re-evaluate the initial decision, but rather to consider whether the applicant has established that the current circumstances support an extension as being appropriate and that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence, as required under s. 11.02(3).

34 The purpose of the *CCAA* is to permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets. Appropriateness of an extension under the *CCAA* is assessed by inquiring into whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*. A stay can be lifted if the reorganization is doomed to failure, but where the order sought realistically advances those objectives, a *CCAA* court has the discretion to grant it: *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd.*, *Re*, [2010 SCC 60](#) (S.C.C.) at paras 15, 70, 71, [\[2010\] 3 S.C.R. 379](#) (S.C.C.).

35 In applying for an extension, the applicant must provide evidence of at least "a kernel of a plan" which will advance the *CCAA* objectives: *North American Tungsten Corp.*, *Re*, [2015 BCSC 1376](#), [2015 CarswellBC 2232](#) (B.C. S.C.) at para 26, citing *Azure Dynamics Corp.*, *Re*, [2012 BCSC 781](#), [91 C.B.R. \(5th\) 310](#) (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]).

36 Pursuant to s. 11.02(3), the applicant is required to demonstrate that it has acted, and continues to act, in good faith. Honesty is at the core of "good faith": *San Francisco Gifts Ltd.*, *Re*, [2005 ABQB 91](#) (Alta. Q.B.) at para 16, [\(2005\), 10 C.B.R. \(5th\) 275](#) (Alta. Q.B.).

37 Section 11.02(3) refers to consideration of good faith and due diligence in both the past and present tense. Romaine J. in *Alberta Treasury Branches v. Tallgrass Energy Corp.*, [2013 ABQB 432](#) (Alta. Q.B.) at para 13, [\(2013\), 8 C.B.R. \(6th\) 161](#) (Alta. Q.B.) confirmed the language of s. 11.02(3), to the effect that the court needs to be satisfied that the applicant has acted in the past, and is acting, in good faith. See also *Alexis Paragon Limited Partnership*, *Re*, [2014 ABQB 65](#) (Alta. Q.B.) at para 16, [\(2014\), 9 C.B.R. \(6th\) 43](#) (Alta. Q.B.).

38 By contrast, in *Muscletech Research & Development Inc.*, *Re*, [\[2006\] O.J. No. 462](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para 4, [\(2006\), 19 C.B.R. \(5th\) 57](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), Farley J. held that the question of good faith relates to how the parties are conducting themselves in the context of the *CCAA* proceedings. Courts in subsequent cases adopted this view: *Pacific Shores Resort & Spa Ltd.*, *Re*, [2011 BCSC 1775](#) (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) at para 31-32, [\[2011\] B.C.J. No. 2482](#) (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]), and *4519922 Canada Inc.*, *Re*, [2015 ONSC 124](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) in paras 44-46, [\(2015\), 22 C.B.R. \(6th\) 44](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

39 In *GuestLogix Inc.*, *Re*, [2016 ONSC 1348](#), [\[2016\] O.J. No. 1129](#) (Ont. S.C.J.), the Court expanded the stay to proceedings against a guarantor, noting that it was insolvent and in default of its obligations, highly

integrated with the debtor company, and the debtor company would be able to include all the assets of the guarantor in a potential transaction if the guarantor were added.

40 The Court has broad equitable jurisdiction to determine appropriate allocation among assets of administration, interim financing and directors' charges: *Hunters Trailer & Marine Ltd., Re*, [2001 ABQB 1094, 30 C.B.R. \(4th\) 206](#) (Alta. Q.B.). The Court in *Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, [2010 ONSC 222](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para 54, [\(2010\), 63 C.B.R. \(5th\) 115](#) (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) set out factors to be considered in determining priority of charges under s. 11.52 of the *CCAA* which are critical to the successful restructuring of the business:

- (a) the size and complexity of the businesses being restructured;
- (b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;
- (c) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;
- (d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;
- (e) the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and
- (f) the position of the Monitor.

41 Section 11.2(4) of the *CCAA* provides that in deciding whether to make an order allowing DIP financing, the Court must consider:

- (a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to *CCAA* proceedings;
- (b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;
- (c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;
- (d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;
- (e) the nature and value of the company's property;
- (f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and
- (g) the monitor's report.

42 In *U.S. Steel Canada Inc., Re*, [2014 ONSC 6145](#) (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras 12-18, [\(2014\), 20 C.B.R. \(6th\) 116](#) (Ont. S.C.J.) the Court discussed the authority under s. 11.2 to grant priority to the DIP lender's charge to secure the DIP loan. In addition to the factors set out in s. 11.2(4), it considered the following in granting priority:

- (a) notice had been given to all of the secured parties likely to be affected and broadly to all *PPSA* registrants, and other interested entities;
- (b) the maximum amount of the DIP loan was appropriate based on the anticipated cash flow requirements of the applicant as reflected in its cash flow projections for the entire restructuring period, in order to continue to carry on its business during the restructuring period;
- (c) the cash flows were the subject of a favourable report of the Monitor in its First Report;

(d) the Applicant's business would continue to be managed by the applicant's management with the assistance of the CRO during the restructuring period;

(e) the existing operational relationships between the applicant and its largest creditor would continue; and

(f) the DIP loan would assist in, and enhance, the restructuring process.

VI Analysis

Extension of Order

43 Various factors were profiled by Ms. Wanke before Nielsen J. to support the Group's position that a restructuring under the *CCAA* is possible; if the objective is liquidation, then appointment of a Receiver is appropriate. Nielsen J. recognized the possibility of a successful restructuring in rejecting the application to appoint a Receiver and granting the application to impose a Stay under the *CCAA* with a Monitor and CRO. In recognizing that a lot of work had been done, he found that those supporting the steps to restructure should be given that opportunity in the collective best interest despite the prejudice of deferral and risk as regards repayment of CWB and other creditors.

44 I now have the responsibility to measure the progress in the period leading up to expiry of the initial Stay. Without second-guessing the initial decision, I must assess the current circumstances, including the good faith and due diligence of the parties in light of steps taken to date.

45 The legislative objective of a *CCAA* order is to provide the Court considerable scope to maintain the *status quo* for a company to make proposal arrangements to facilitate remaining in operation for a collective benefit. One may have preferred to see some further advancement on the "germ of a Plan" but I am satisfied that the CRO has begun consultations with unsolicited parties who have expressed an interest and that a structure for such a Plan is now an important priority.

46 I am mindful that the Monitor was obliged to report on just under three weeks of activity in rendering a First Report by July 24, 2017. Various factors have impacted the lack of concrete progress on a Plan at this point, including the value of the Group as a going concern estimated at \$97M (equipment, manufacturing and real estate) with diverse activities, assets and work product, the complexity of restructuring, and the need to modernize the sophistication of a family operation that is unable to operate as it has done historically.

47 Professional advisors are now in place assisting in this required modernization. Potential investors have and continue to express interest in the Group. It appears that DIP funding has been used prudently to cover operational expenses including higher than expected professional expenses. Cash flows are quite healthy and the Group owns a number of assets of marketable value.

48 CWB notes that Nielsen J. indicated on the initial Stay application that the Group would have to show more than a germ of a plan at the next hearing. It is not entirely surprising that three weeks did not prove long enough to complete the steps necessary to create a Plan of Arrangement. There is no allegation of delay or inertia by the Monitor or the CRO in performance of significant responsibilities undertaken since confirmation of their appointment July 5, 2017. The Monitor reported that the Group has been working with due diligence and in full cooperation. A number of competing interests require the attention of the Monitor. Having considered all of the circumstances before the Court, I am satisfied that the Group has established due diligence.

49 It bears noting that CWB is not the only party who would be affected by receivership. Employees, other creditors, clients, and the public would also be affected. Changes have already been implemented by the CRO, as observed and reported by the Monitor.

50 The Group has had the recent opportunity to enter into contracts with the Province of B.C. in relation to the wildfires. It appears that despite the Group's liquidity crisis — impacted by various factors, including market conditions — the business of the Group may well be salvageable. This assessment appears to be supported by: the cash flow projections, recoveries on receivables, and changes begun by the CRO in consultation with the Monitor with particular regard to increased work potential and to increase the sophistication of accounting.

51 However, CWB takes the position that the Group has been in default of its obligations to CWB for many months. CWB extended time for the Group to find refinancing and continued to make available to the Group the operating line facility in the amount of \$12,000,000, margined on accounts receivable of the Group. CWB asserts that the Group took advantage of CWB by falsely including one or more multi-million dollar accounts receivable for which the work had not yet been done.

52 The parties disagree as to whether the law supports serious consideration of past bad faith if it is relevant to the viability of the *CCAA* proposal or its continuation.

53 The language of s. 11.02(3) of the *CCAA* does not temporally restrict the consideration of bad faith. The wording of that provision is captured broadly in [Tallgrass](#). It would appear that [Muscletech](#) and the cases which followed it stand for the proposition that courts should look only to conduct in the context of the *CCAA* process. This represents a restrictive reading of s. 11.02(3) and the purpose of such a narrow interpretation is unclear.

54 It is logical that past due diligence will usually have minimal relevance as a factor. However, past bad faith illuminated after *CCAA* proceedings have been initiated may undermine the confidence of creditors and the Court in the viability of *CCAA* proceedings. In my view, past bad faith may well be a relevant factor in the Court's assessment under s. 11.02(3). This is in keeping with the approach taken in *Alexis Paragon Limited Partnership*, [Re, 2014 ABQB 65](#) (Alta. Q.B.) at paras 37-38.

55 I note that the facts in this case are distinguishable from those in [San Francisco](#) where the alleged deception appeared to be aimed at deriving an advantage from customers through knock off products and counterfeit safety labels, rather than deriving an advantage from a financing secured creditor through accounting practices as alleged here by CWB.

56 Again, the major issue in this regard is, and has been profiled as, the status of accounts receivable in terms of the margining of contracts for work not yet performed or not fully performed.

57 CWB takes the position that, upon consultation with her client and corporate counsel, Ms. Wanke misrepresented the situation to Nielsen J. in her oral submissions on July 5, 2017. While this Court is not reviewing the basis for Nielsen J.'s order, the issue of margining was raised at that time and the allegation of bad faith remains a live issue. I understand the interpretation placed by CWB on the representations made in front of Nielsen J. both from Affidavits and then information provided to legal counsel. Ms. Wanke summarized her understanding as being that this was part of the camp business on the books of the Group and not a lack of good faith. I accept her expression on this review to the effect that she would have preferred to have been more familiar with the Grand Rapids contract at the time but that this issue only surfaced latterly. She said she would have stated the client's position somewhat differently, but that the net effect remains that the margining was consistent with the Group's understanding of its entitlement.

58 CWB's concerns regarding the margining are understandable. It takes the position that while margining on deferred revenue was permissible, the Grand Rapids contracts do not qualify for that treatment according to the terms as agreed to between the parties notwithstanding the assertions advanced by the Group. CWB says there was an understanding as relates to the formula to be applied to these receivables that was violated, especially as to the two major Grand Rapids accounts issued between the end of March 2017 and beginning of May 2017. Counsel for CWB took the Court through a number of documents relating to the credit agreement between CWB and the Group to explain what the Group's reasonable understanding should have been in relation to contracts qualifying for special treatment of the accounts receivable for margining purposes.

59 The Monitor has reviewed and discounted a number of entries as inappropriate; it will likely have to further endorse commitment to revise other receivables. The Court agrees that a commitment to revise other receivables may be appropriate. However, there are a number of priorities competing for the attention of the CRO. It is difficult to measure whether any breaches of the protocol were intentionally deceptive as distinct from aggressive and misguided. That distinction is harder to make based on duelling affidavits as distinct from oral testimony, questioning or at minimum some objective detailed analysis by the Monitor to assist the Court's interpretation of events.

60 I have struggled to understand the treatment of invoicing as to the records of accounts receivable, particularly as the idea of charging for work not done is rather foreign to my experience as to the entitlement to collect. So too, the deferral of the time for payment extending from 45 days to 120 days obfuscates the idea of entitlement. The matter is complicated by the risk and relative reliability of these receivables as assets, distinct from a bad or at least tainted debt that needs to be monitored for collection procedures. All of these aspects appear to arise in far greater sums for 2016 than in any previous year which, understandably, is further troubling to principals at CWB.

61 I endorse the concerns of CWB as legitimate. Even in the absence of a finding of bad faith, the practice employed as reflected in treatment of the Grand Rapids receivables raises legitimate concerns regarding the future viability of the Group. I accept that the practice in question has resulted in margining which has led to overall debt to CWB which is incongruent with the Group's receivables as they would be represented in the normal course, as confirmed in the Monitor's First Report.

62 I also note CWB's concern that the cash flow projection relied on by the Monitor did not take into account unpaid professional fees relating to the work toward reorganization, and the projected loss to the end of October 2017 is considerably offset only by the fortuitous and uncertain wildfire camp work. CWB's receivables, to the extent they are collectible, are being used up by payment of the professional fees and interim financing.

63 Nevertheless, I am not prepared to conclude on the basis of the material as presented to me that the Group has failed to act in good faith to the extent of disentiing the extension sought.

64 Clearly, the parties now disagree on the interpretation of the arrangement between them as regards margining based on deferred revenue. The issue before this Court is not the correct interpretation of the various document referred to by CWB's counsel, but rather whether the Group's reliance on its understanding amounted to bad faith. There has been no trial of the latter issue. While raising questions, the evidence adduced on this application falls short of supporting a finding of bad faith in the sense of knowing reliance on an unsupportable interpretation of the documents, or intentional concealing of the practice or any relevant financial information. This is particularly so in light of the evidence of the Group's understanding that the arrangement between CWB and the Group expressly contemplated that the Group was permitted to margin deferred revenue when no work had been done.

65 If the CWB was not aware of the effect or extent of this type of margining, it is not clear from the evidence that the Group understood it was acting other than consistently with the intention of the parties in this regard. This view of the matter is generally supported by the Monitor's information that the sophistication of all facets of the accounting system in place has not kept up with the sophistication of its business. The CRO is working to address accounting practices which require improvement.

66 There is undeniably a considerable difference in the parties' interpretations of the conduct and reporting. Obviously, a debtor may be motivated to maximize access to funding. The past practice here is somewhat unclear, but even if the Group exceeded the terms or protocol as generally agreed, I do not ascribe bad faith to its actions.

67 Overall, I find that extension of the Stay is in the best interest. However, a further vigorous review must take place within a reasonable period of time.

68 The November 3, 2017 date targeted by the Group is not reasonable in the circumstances.

69 As such, the next hearing is set for September 26, 2017. The Court will require a Report from the Monitor at least 7 business days prior to that date.

Increase in DIP Financing

70 Ms. McCracken suggests in her affidavit that they only need a small increase in the DIP loan to cover operations in light of healthy cash flows and significant assets.

71 While the creditors may rightly take issue with the characterization of the increase as "small", I approve the request to increase the DIP financing from \$1M to \$2.5M in the form of order proposed by counsel for the Group to address the anticipated cash flow shortage resulting from welcome work during what is typically a slower season for the Group. Counsel for CWB took no issue with the form of order.

72 At the close of submissions, counsel for CRA alerted the Court, as well as BDC in particular, that it took issue with the increase in DIP financing and that it would be applying for priority with respect to \$1.14M owing to the Minister by the Group for unremitted source deductions and GST. It was seeking an order to vary so as to put the administrative charge, director's charge and interim lender charges in second place behind the CRA. In light of that information, BDC counsel indicated that the CRA's position would not impair BDC's ability to advance the DIP financing, noting that the matter would be argued at a later date.

1919

73 The application to add 1919 was not opposed. As was the case in [Guestlogix](#), the operations of 1919 are inextricably linked to those of the Group, as it leases important equipment and provides it Canada North.

74 I order that 1919 be added as a party included in the Group. Counsel for the Group agreed to include in the order a clause restating the allocation provision in the initial Stay Order to recognize that Welease has made this concern known at this point. Counsel for CWB did not take issue with such a provision in the order.

Approval of Monitor's First Report

75 And at the request of the Monitor, I approve:

- his First Report and activities;

- suspend the limitation periods on claims;
- confer power to examine parties on questioned transactions regarding lot sales prior to *CCAA*.

76 The further Report of the Monitor is required at least 7 days before the next hearing.

Expansion of Stay

77 The Stay is expanded to apply to proceedings against Heart Lake and associated parties involved in the Grand Rapids contracts, and proceedings by Max Fuel against Ms. McCracken. Counsel for CWB did not take issue with this. In the result, the applications for appointment of a Receiver, interim or otherwise, are dismissed.

Sealing of Confidential Information

78 I order that the confidential information identified as such on the Court file be sealed.

Service Protocol to Reduce Costs

79 The Monitor is to maintain a service list of parties who provide the Monitor with email addresses. Those parties may be served by email effective the date of the email. All others are to be served by the Monitor posting its and others' materials on its website, effective as at the date of posting.

VII Conclusion

80 I have determined that it is in the collective interest to extend the *CCAA* Stay to September 29, 2017. The Order will be subject to review by me on September 26, 2017 in usual consultation with the Court Coordinator.

Application granted; cross-application dismissed.