

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF THE *BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT*,
S.B.C. 2002, C. 57, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT OF
PORT CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT (EV) INC. and EVERGREEN HOUSE DEVELOPMENT
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

APPLICATION RECORD

**(of the Applicants, Port Capital Development (EV) Inc. and
Evergreen House Development Limited Partnership)**

Counsel for the Applicants

BENNETT JONES LLP

Barristers and Solicitors
2500 – 666 Burrard Street
Vancouver, B.C. V6C 2X8

Attention: David E. Gruber

Telephone: 604.891.5154

Fax: (604) 891-5100

Email: gruberd@bennettjones.com

Date: April 16, 2021

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Place: Vancouver Registry

Dial In: 1-800-901-0218

Guest Code: 863 147 0607

Time estimate: 45 minutes

Matter to be heard in front of

Madam Justice Fitzpatrick

Application Record provided by:

Counsel for the Applicants

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF THE *BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT*,
S.B.C. 2002, C. 57, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT OF
PORT CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT (EV) INC. and EVERGREEN HOUSE DEVELOPMENT
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

INDEX TO APPLICATION RECORD

TAB	Document	Filed
1.	Notice of Application	April 13, 2021
2.	a) Draft Order - Stay Extension Order and Break Fee Approval Order b) Sealing Order	
3.	Fifth Report of the Monitor	Unfiled
4.	Confidential Supplement to the Fifth Monitor Report	Unfiled to be filed under seal
	Legislation	
5.	Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11, 11.02 and 36	
	Authorities	
6.	Quest University Canada (Re), 2020 BCSC 1845	
7.	Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 41	



No. S-205095
Vancouver Registry

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF THE *BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT*,
S.B.C. 2002, C. 57, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT OF
PORT CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT (EV) INC. and EVERGREEN HOUSE DEVELOPMENT
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

NOTICE OF APPLICATION

Names of applicants: Port Capital Development (EV) Inc. and Evergreen House Development Limited Partnership

To: The Service List

TAKE NOTICE that an application will be made by the applicants to Madam Justice Fitzpatrick at the courthouse at 800 Smithe Street Vancouver BC V6Z 2E1 on April 16, 2021 at 9:00 a.m., by MS Teams, for the order set out in Part 1 below.

Part 1: ORDERS SOUGHT

1. An Order substantially in the form attached as **Schedule A** hereto, providing for the following relief:

- (a) Abridging the time for service of this notice of application, to the extent necessary;
- (b) Extending the stay of proceedings to and including June 11, 2021;
- (c) Approving (i) the Purchase and Sale Agreement entered into on March 25, 2021 (the "PSA") between Port Capital Development (EV) Inc. and Evergreen House Development Limited Partnership as vendors (the "**Vendor**") and Landa Global

Acquisitions Ltd. (the "**Purchaser**") and (ii) the payment of a break fee to the Purchaser on the terms set out in the PSA;

2. An Order substantially in the form attached as **Schedule B** hereto, providing that the Confidential Supplement to the Fifth Report of the Monitor be filed under seal.
3. Such further and other relief as this Honourable Court may deem just.

Part 2: FACTUAL BASIS

1. The Petitioners, Evergreen House Development Limited Partnership and its general partner, Port Capital Development (EV) Inc., own the "**Terrace House Project**". The Terrace House Project consists of an ongoing development of a high-rise luxury residential strata development in the Coal Harbour neighbourhood, located at 1250 W Hastings St., Vancouver.
2. On May 29, 2020, the Petitioners obtained an order in these proceedings (the "**Initial Order**") granting them various relief pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "**CCAA**").
3. Among other things, the Initial Order established a stay of proceedings (the "**Stay of Proceedings**") effective until June 8, 2020 and appointed Ernst & Young, Inc. as monitor (the "**Monitor**") in these proceedings with enhanced powers to execute control over the Petitioners, explore restructuring opportunities and administer a "dual-track" sale and investment solicitation process to obtain an equity investment, a refinancing or alternatively a sale of the Terrace House Property (the "**SISP**").
4. On June 8, 2020, the Petitioners obtained an amended and restated initial order (the "**ARIO**") in these proceedings that, among other things:
 - (a) extended the Stay of Proceedings to and including September 3, 2020;
 - (b) approved an interim financing facility (the "**DIP Facility**") with the Interim Lender.
5. On December 1, 2020, this Honourable Court granted an extension of the stay of proceedings and a Bid Offer Agreement with respect to the Terrace House Project.

6. On February 24, 2021, this Honourable Court granted a further extension of the stay of proceedings up to and including May 4, 2021 and also authorized an increase to the DIP Facility. As part of the February 24, 2021 application, the Court was advised that the Bid Offer Agreement would not be proceeding.

Activities since the last stay extension

7. Since the date of the last stay extension, the Monitor has, among other things, with the cooperation of the Petitioners:

- a) managed the site preservation of the Terrace House Project;
- b) managed the cash flows of the Petitioners; and
- c) negotiated the PSA.

Proposed Transaction

8. As this court is aware, no successful transaction resulted from the Court Approved Sales process ("SISP"). The Petitioners have since negotiated the PSA with the Purchaser to proceed by way of either a sale of the assets or a sale of the shares of Port Capital Development (EV) Inc., the general partner in the partnership that owns the "Terrace House Project" and certain of the Limited Partnership's right, title and interest.

9. The PSA calls for a two-step approval process. At the first step, this Court is asked to approve the entering into of the PSA by the Monitor and to approve the break fee in the PSA. The Petitioners will then have 15 business days to entertain competitive proposals. If there are no competitive proposals received that are deemed superior to the PSA, the Court would then be asked to grant an approval and vesting order in favour of the purchaser. If a competitive proposal is received that is deemed superior to the PSA, the Monitor shall determine a process to select the transaction that will ultimately be brought to Court to be implemented.

10. In the event the PSA proceeds to the approval and vesting order stage, a Reverse Vesting Order would be sought to facilitate a share transaction, vesting to a newly incorporated subsidiary of Port Capital Development (EV) Inc the Excluded Assets, as defined in the PSA.

11. Proceeding by way of a Reverse Vesting Order is the preferred approach as it will result in the greatest recovery by the estate. In the case of an asset sale, the PSA provides for the purchase price to be reduced by the amount of property tax payable by the Purchaser in connection with the transfer.

12. The PSA provides for a break fee in the amount of approximately 1% of the purchase price, should a Superior Offer be selected and ultimately close. The break fee is to be paid from the proceeds of the sale.

Necessity for Stay Extension

13. The Petitioners seek an extension of the Stay of Proceedings to and including May 31 2021, to provide the Monitor with additional time to pursue alternative offers for the Terrace House Project and to advance the proposed transaction pursuant to the PSA.

14. The extension of the Stay of Proceedings will allow the Monitor and Petitioners to maintain operational control and to preserve the Terrace House Project.

15. The Petitioners have acted and continue to act in these proceedings in good faith and with due diligence.

Part 3: LEGAL BASIS

1. The Petitioners rely on the CCAA, the Supreme Court Civil Rules and the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court.

Stay Extension

2. Pursuant to s. 11.02(3) of the CCAA, the Court may extend the stay of proceedings for any period that the Court considers necessary provided that:

- (a) the extension sought is appropriate in the circumstances; and
- (b) the Petitioners have acted and are acting in good faith and with due diligence.

3. Since the Initial Order was pronounced on May 29, 2020, the Petitioners have acted and continue to act and operate in good faith and with due diligence.

4. The extension of the stay of proceedings is necessary to enable the Petitioners to continue their restructuring efforts, including pursuit of alternative offers for the Terrace House Project and advancement of the transaction under the PSA.

5. Having regard to all the circumstances and the conditions outlined in s. 11.02(3) of the CCAA, the extension of the Stay of Proceedings to and including May 31, 2021 is reasonable and appropriate. The Monitor supports the request for the extension.

Approval of the PSA

6. The Petitioners rely on the Court's inherent jurisdiction and section 11 of the CCAA which allows the Court to exercise its discretion to grant orders as appropriate towards achieving the broad statutory and policy objectives of the CCAA, for approval of the execution of the PSA and break fee.

7. While the Court is not being asked to approve the transaction or grant a vesting order as part of this application, the Petitioners also rely on section 36(1) of the CCAA provides jurisdiction to the Court to authorize the sale of a debtor company's assets out of the ordinary course of business. Section 36(3) sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors that courts are to consider in determining whether to approve a sale which involves similar considerations as to whether to approve a PSA:

- (a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
- (b) whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
- (c) whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition in bankruptcy;
- (d) the extent to which creditors were consulted;

- (e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
- (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

8. Courts applying s. 36 of the CCAA have cited a number of factors that may be considered, but the essential role of the Court is to "look at the transaction as a whole and essential decide whether or not the sale is appropriate, fair and reasonable."

9. The terms of the PSA were the result of arm's length negotiations and represent the best viable option at this time for maximizing the value derived from the Petitioners' assets.

10. The break fee contemplated in the PSA is commercially reasonable in the circumstances and is not anticipated to have a chilling effect on the ability of other parties to advance alternative offers. No creditor will be materially prejudiced by the Court's approval of the break fee.

Quest University Canada (Re), 2020 BCSC 1845

11. The Monitor is supportive of the PSA, including the break fee.

Sealing Order

12. In the leading case of *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a sealing order may be granted where (1) such an order is necessary to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (2) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 41 at para. 53

13. Sealing orders in CCAA proceedings are routinely granted in order to prevent the disclosure of confidential and commercially sensitive information regarding the market value of

the assets. Public disclosure would be prejudicial in the event the proposed transaction does not close. The sealing order sought is the least restrictive means possible to prevent disclosure of the confidential and commercially sensitive information in the Confidential Supplement.

Part 4: MATERIAL TO BE RELIED ON

14. At the hearing of this Application, the Petitioners will rely on

- (a) The Fifth Report of the Monitor to be filed; and
- (b) Such further material as counsel may advise and the Court may permit.

The applicants estimate that the application will take 30 minutes.

☒ This matter is not within the jurisdiction of a master. Madam Justice Fitzpatrick is seized of this proceeding.

TO THE PERSONS RECEIVING THIS NOTICE OF APPLICATION: If you wish to respond to this notice of application, you must, within 5 business days after service of this notice of application or, if this application is brought under Rule 9-7, within 8 business days after service of this notice of application,

- (a) file an application response in Form 33,
- (b) file the original of every affidavit, and of every other document, that
 - (i) you intend to refer to at the hearing of this application, and
 - (ii) has not already been filed in the proceeding, and
- (c) serve on the applicant 2 copies of the following, and on every other party of record one copy of the following:
 - (i) a copy of the filed application response;
 - (ii) a copy of each of the filed affidavits and other documents that you intend to refer to at the hearing of this application and that has not already been served on that person;
 - (iii) if this application is brought under Rule 9-7, any notice that you are required to give under Rule 9-7(9).

Dated: April 13, 2021



Signature of David E. Gruber
Lawyer for the Applicants

THIS NOTICE OF APPLICATION is prepared and delivered by David E. Gruber of the firm Bennett Jones LLP, Barristers & Solicitors, counsel for the applicants, File No. 090034.00003, whose place of business and address for delivery is 2500 – 666 Burrard Street, Vancouver, British Columbia, V6C 2X8. Telephone: (604) 891-7500. Facsimile: (604) 891-5100. [gruberd@bennettjones.com]

To be completed by the court only:

Order made

- ☐ in the terms requested in paragraphs _____ of Part 1 of this notice of application
- ☐ with the following variations and additional terms:

Dated: _____

Signature of ☐ Judge ☐ Master

Appendix

[The following information is provided for data collection purposes only and is of no legal effect.]

THIS APPLICATION INVOLVES THE FOLLOWING:

[Check the box(es) below for the application type(s) included in this application.]

- ☐ discovery: comply with demand for documents
- ☐ discovery: production of additional documents
- ☐ other matters concerning document discovery
- ☐ extend oral discovery
- ☐ other matter concerning oral discovery
- ☐ amend pleadings
- ☐ add/change parties
- ☐ summary judgment
- ☐ summary trial
- ☐ service
- ☐ mediation
- ☐ adjournments
- ☐ proceedings at trial
- ☐ case plan orders: amend
- ☐ case plan orders: other
- ☐ experts

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF THE *BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT*,
S.B.C. 2002, C. 57, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT OF
PORT CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT (EV) INC. and EVERGREEN HOUSE DEVELOPMENT
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION
(Stay Extension and Break Fee Approval Order)

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE)
MADAM JUSTICE FITZPATRICK) 16/April/2021

THE APPLICATION of the Petitioners coming on for hearing at Vancouver, British Columbia, by MS Teams, on the 16th day of April 2021; AND ON HEARING David Gruber, counsel for the Petitioners and those other counsel and parties listed on **Schedule "A"** hereto; AND UPON READING the material filed, including the fifth report of Ernst & Young, Inc., in its capacity as court appointed monitor, to be filed ("**Fifth Report**") and the Confidential Supplement to the Fifth Report; AND pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-36, the British Columbia Supreme Court Civil Rules and the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court;

THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES THAT:

STAY EXTENSION

1. The stay of proceedings provided for in the Initial Order pronounced in this action on May 29, 2020, as amended and restated on June 8, 2020, and further extended by Order of this

Court pronounced February 24, 2021, is hereby continued and extended to and including June 11th, 2021.

APPROVAL OF PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT and BREAK FEE

2. The Monitor's execution of the Purchase and Sale Agreement attached as Appendix I to the Confidential Supplement to the Fifth Report of the Monitor (the "**PSA**") between the Petitioners and Landa Global Acquisitions Ltd. ("**Landa**"), on behalf of the Petitioners, is hereby approved. Such approval does not constitute final approval of the transaction or vesting of the property, which shall be considered by this Court on a subsequent application.
3. Notwithstanding the Approval of the PSA, the Monitor is at liberty to conduct such further marketing and negotiations in connection with, the property of the Petitioners as determined by the Monitor.
4. The deadline for any party to submit an alternative proposal to that contained in the PSA shall be May 7, 2021.
5. The payment of the break fee to Landa on the terms and conditions provided in the PSA, is hereby approved.

GENERAL

6. Endorsement of this Order by counsel appearing on this application other than counsel for the Petitioners is hereby dispensed with.

THE FOLLOWING PARTIES APPROVE THE FORM OF THIS ORDER AND CONSENT TO EACH OF THE ORDERS, IF ANY, THAT ARE INDICATED ABOVE AS BEING BY CONSENT:

Signature of David Gruber
Lawyer for the Petitioners

BY THE COURT

REGISTRAR

Schedule "A"

(List of Counsel)

Counsel name/litigant	Party represented
Colin D. Brousson	CMLS Financial Ltd. and Desjardins Financial Security Life Assurance Company
William Roberts	Aviva Insurance Company of Canada
Peter Rubin	The Monitor, Ernst & Young, Inc.

Schedule B

No. S-205095
Vancouver Registry

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF THE *BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT*,
S.B.C. 2002, C. 57, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT OF
PORT CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT (EV) INC. and EVERGREEN HOUSE DEVELOPMENT
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

SEALING ORDER

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE)
MADAM JUSTICE FITZPATRICK) 16/April/2021

THE APPLICATION of the Petitioners coming on for hearing at Vancouver, British Columbia, by MS Teams, on the 16th day of April 2021; AND ON HEARING David Gruber, counsel for the Petitioners and those other counsel and parties listed on **Schedule "A"** hereto; AND UPON READING the material filed, including the fifth Report of Ernst & Young, Inc. in its capacity as court appointed monitor (the "**Monitor**"), to be filed ("**Fifth Report**"), and the Confidential Supplement to the Fifth Report; AND pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-36, the British Columbia Supreme Court Civil Rules and the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court;

THIS COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. Access to Sealed Items permitted by

[] Counsel of Record
[] Parties of Record
[] Further Court Order
[] **Others:** Counsel for
the Petitioners and
counsel for the
Monitor

Items to be sealed

Document Name	Date filed (Date on Court Stamp)	Number of copies filed, including any extra copies for the judge	Duration of sealing order (to specific date or until further order)	Sought	Granted	
					YES	NO
1) Entire File				☐	☐	☐
2) Specific Documents Confidential Supplement to the Fifth Report of the Monitor	To be filed	One copy, to be sealed.	Until further order.	☐	☐	☐
3) Clerk's Notes				☐	☐	☐
4) Order				☐	☐	☐
5) Reasons for Judgment				☐	☐	☐

[Remainder of page intentionally left blank]

GENERAL

2. Endorsement of this Order by counsel appearing on this application other than counsel for the Petitioners is hereby dispensed with.

THE FOLLOWING PARTIES APPROVE THE FORM OF THIS ORDER AND CONSENT TO EACH OF THE ORDERS, IF ANY, THAT ARE INDICATED ABOVE AS BEING BY CONSENT:

Signature of David Gruber
Lawyer for the Petitioners

BY THE COURT

REGISTRAR

Schedule "A"

(List of Counsel)

Counsel name/litigant	Party represented
Colin D. Brousson	CMLS Financial Ltd. and Desjardins Financial Security Life Assurance Company
William Roberts	Aviva Insurance Company of Canada
Peter Rubin	The Monitor, Ernst & Young, Inc.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF THE *BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT*,
S.B.C. 2002, C. 57, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT OF
PORT CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT (EV) INC. and EVERGREEN HOUSE DEVELOPMENT
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION
(Stay Extension and Break Fee Approval Order)

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE)
MADAM JUSTICE FITZPATRICK) 16/April/2021

THE APPLICATION of the Petitioners coming on for hearing at Vancouver, British Columbia, by MS Teams, on the 16th day of April 2021; AND ON HEARING David Gruber, counsel for the Petitioners and those other counsel and parties listed on **Schedule "A"** hereto; AND UPON READING the material filed, including the fifth report of Ernst & Young, Inc., in its capacity as court appointed monitor, to be filed ("**Fifth Report**") and the Confidential Supplement to the Fifth Report; AND pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-36, the British Columbia Supreme Court Civil Rules and the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court;

THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES THAT:

STAY EXTENSION

1. The stay of proceedings provided for in the Initial Order pronounced in this action on May 29, 2020, as amended and restated on June 8, 2020, and further extended by Order of this

Court pronounced February 24, 2021, is hereby continued and extended to and including June 11th, 2021.

APPROVAL OF PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT and BREAK FEE

2. The Monitor's execution of the Purchase and Sale Agreement attached as Appendix I to the Confidential Supplement to the Fifth Report of the Monitor (the "**PSA**") between the Petitioners and Landa Global Acquisitions Ltd. ("**Landa**"), on behalf of the Petitioners, is hereby approved. Such approval does not constitute final approval of the transaction or vesting of the property, which shall be considered by this Court on a subsequent application.
3. Notwithstanding the Approval of the PSA, the Monitor is at liberty to conduct such further marketing and negotiations in connection with, the property of the Petitioners as determined by the Monitor.
4. The deadline for any party to submit an alternative proposal to that contained in the PSA shall be May 7, 2021.
5. The payment of the break fee to Landa on the terms and conditions provided in the PSA, is hereby approved.

GENERAL

6. Endorsement of this Order by counsel appearing on this application other than counsel for the Petitioners is hereby dispensed with.

THE FOLLOWING PARTIES APPROVE THE FORM OF THIS ORDER AND CONSENT TO EACH OF THE ORDERS, IF ANY, THAT ARE INDICATED ABOVE AS BEING BY CONSENT:



Signature of David Gruber
Lawyer for the Petitioners

BY THE COURT

REGISTRAR

Schedule "A"

(List of Counsel)

Counsel name/litigant	Party represented
Colin D. Brousson	CMLS Financial Ltd. and Desjardins Financial Security Life Assurance Company
William Roberts	Aviva Insurance Company of Canada
Peter Rubin	The Monitor, Ernst & Young, Inc.

No. S-205095
Vancouver Registry

**IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA**

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF THE *BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT*,
S.B.C. 2002, C. 57, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT OF
PORT CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT (EV) INC. and EVERGREEN HOUSE DEVELOPMENT
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION

David Gruber
BENNETT JONES LLP
Barristers & Solicitors
Suite 2400, 666 Burrard St
Vancouver, BC V6C 2X8

Business Phone: (604) 891-5150
Business E-mail: gruberd@bennettjones.com

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF THE *BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT*,
S.B.C. 2002, C. 57, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT OF
PORT CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT (EV) INC. and EVERGREEN HOUSE DEVELOPMENT
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

SEALING ORDER

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE)
MADAM JUSTICE FITZPATRICK) 16/April/2021

THE APPLICATION of the Petitioners coming on for hearing at Vancouver, British Columbia, by MS Teams, on the 16th day of April 2021; AND ON HEARING David Gruber, counsel for the Petitioners and those other counsel and parties listed on **Schedule "A"** hereto; AND UPON READING the material filed, including the fifth Report of Ernst & Young, Inc. in its capacity as court appointed monitor (the "**Monitor**"), to be filed ("**Fifth Report**"), and the Confidential Supplement to the Fifth Report; AND pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-36, the British Columbia Supreme Court Civil Rules and the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court;

THIS COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. Access to Sealed Items permitted by

[] Counsel of Record
[] Parties of Record
[] Further Court Order
[X] **Others:** Counsel for
the Petitioners and
counsel for the
Monitor

Items to be sealed


Document Name	Date filed (Date on Court Stamp)	Number of copies filed, including any extra copies for the judge	Duration of sealing order (to specific date or until further order)	Sought	Granted	
					YES	NO
1) Entire File				☐	☐	☐
2) Specific Documents Confidential Supplement to the Fifth Report of the Monitor	To be filed	One copy, to be sealed.	Until further order.	☒	☐	☐
3) Clerk's Notes				☐	☐	☐
4) Order				☐	☐	☐
5) Reasons for Judgment				☐	☐	☐

[Remainder of page intentionally left blank]

GENERAL

2. Endorsement of this Order by counsel appearing on this application other than counsel for the Petitioners is hereby dispensed with.

THE FOLLOWING PARTIES APPROVE THE FORM OF THIS ORDER AND CONSENT TO EACH OF THE ORDERS, IF ANY, THAT ARE INDICATED ABOVE AS BEING BY CONSENT:



Signature of David Gruber
Lawyer for the Petitioners

BY THE COURT

REGISTRAR

Schedule "A"

(List of Counsel)

Counsel name/litigant	Party represented
Colin D. Brousson	CMLS Financial Ltd. and Desjardins Financial Security Life Assurance Company
William Roberts	Aviva Insurance Company of Canada
Peter Rubin	The Monitor, Ernst & Young, Inc.

No. S-205095
Vancouver Registry

**IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA**

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF THE *BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT*,
S.B.C. 2002, C. 57, AS AMENDED

– AND –

IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT OF
PORT CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT (EV) INC. and EVERGREEN HOUSE DEVELOPMENT
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

SEALING ORDER

David Gruber
BENNETT JONES LLP
Barristers & Solicitors
Suite 2400, 666 Burrard St
Vancouver, BC V6C 2X8

Business Phone: (604) 891-5150
Business E-mail: gruberd@bennettjones.com

**NO. VLC-S-S205095
VANCOUVER REGISTRY**

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE *BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT*,
S.B.C. 2002, c.57, AS AMENDED

AND

IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT OF
PORT CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT (EV) INC. and EVERGREEN HOUSE DEVELOPMENT
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

FIFTH REPORT OF THE MONITOR

ERNST & YOUNG INC.

APRIL 13, 2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TO THE
FIFTH REPORT OF THE MONITOR

INTRODUCTION	1
CONDENSED BACKGROUND INFORMATION	3
TERMS OF REFERENCE.....	4
UPDATE ON THE SALE INVESTMENT AND SOLICITATION PROCESS	5
THE LANDA PSA.....	7
FIFTH CASH FLOW FORECAST	11
SEALING ORDER	13
REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE STAY OF PROCEEDINGS.....	13
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	15

LISTING OF APPENDICES
TO THE
FIFTH REPORT OF THE MONITOR

Purchase and Sale Agreement – Landa Global Acquisitions Ltd. (Redacted)	Appendix A
Fifth Report Forecast	Appendix B

INTRODUCTION

1. Port Capital Development (EV) Inc. (the “**General Partner**”) and Evergreen House Development Limited Partnership (“**Evergreen LP**”), (each a “**Petitioner**”, and collectively, the “**Petitioners**”) own a real estate development project called the “**Terrace House Project**”.
2. The General Partner is the Bare Trustee that holds title to the real property owned by the Petitioners (the “**Lands**”) with a legal description as follows:

PID: 006-721-397; LOT 18, EXCEPT THAT PART OF THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY AS DESCRIBED IN ABSOLUTE FEE PARCELS BOOK, VOLUME 9, FOLIO 317, NO. 1154C, AND EXCEPT THE SOUTH 7 FEET NOW ROAD, BLOCK 29 DISTRICT LOT 185 PLAN 92

3. The Petitioners are subsidiaries of the “**Port Capital Group**”, which is in the business of real estate development and management primarily in British Columbia, but also Toronto, Ontario.
4. On May 29, 2020, this Honourable Court pronounced an Order (the “**Initial Order**”) which, *inter alia*:

- a) appointed Ernst & Young Inc. (“**EY**”) as monitor of the Petitioners (the “**Monitor**”) in these CCAA proceedings (the “**CCAA Proceedings**”);
- b) granted a “**Stay of Proceedings**” to June 8, 2020 (the “**Stay Period**”); and
- c) granted the Monitor “**Enhanced Powers**” to execute control over the Petitioners and to explore restructuring opportunities for the Terrace House Project and administer a “dual-track” sale and investment solicitation process (the “**SISP**”) to obtain an equity investment, a refinancing or alternatively a sale of the Terrace House.

5. On June 8, 2020, this Honourable Court granted an order amending the Initial Order (the **“Amended and Restated Initial Order”** or **“ARIO”**) that among other things approved the DIP Commitment Letter and the DIP Lender’s Charge (both as defined in the First Report).
6. This Honourable Court has granted the following “Charges” that rank in the following order:
 - a) an Administration Charge in the amount of \$250,000 in favor of legal counsel for the Petitioners, the Monitor, and independent counsel to the Monitor, as security for professional fees and disbursements incurred both before and after the making of the Initial Order in respect of the within proceedings; and
 - b) the DIP Lender’s Charge in the amount of \$1,500,000.
7. The Stay Period has been extended from time-to-time and the current Stay Period expires on May 4, 2021.
8. The Monitor has previously filed five reports in these CCAA proceedings: the **“Proposed Monitor’s Report”**, the **“First Report”**, the **“Second Report”**, the **“Third Report”**, and the **“Fourth Report”**. These reports are posted on the Monitor’s website at www.ey.com/ca/terracehouse.
9. The purpose of this **“Fifth Report”** is to provide information to this Honourable Court with respect to the following:
 - a) an update on the SISP;
 - b) the Landa PSA (as defined herein);
 - c) an updated cash flow forecast for the Petitioners;
 - d) the request for an extension to the Stay Period to June 11, 2021; and
 - e) the Monitor’s conclusions and recommendation.

CONDENSED BACKGROUND INFORMATION

10. The background of the Terrace House Project and the causes of insolvency for the Petitioners is detailed in the previous reports the Monitor has prepared for this Honourable Court and are not repeated herein.
11. CMLS Financial Ltd ("**CMLS**" or the "**Construction Lender**") is the Terrace House Project's construction lender pursuant to a commitment letter dated July 4, 2019 (the "**Construction Loan**"). The Construction Loan is secured by, among other things, a first ranking mortgage against the Terrace House Project. The indebtedness on the Construction Loan was approximately \$20.1 million at the start of the within proceedings.
12. Desjardins Financial Security Life Assurance Company (the "**DIP Lender**") has provided the Petitioners access to a debtor-in-possession financing facility (the "**DIP Facility**"). As of the date of this report, the Petitioners have drawn \$1.25 million on the approved DIP Facility of \$1.5 million.
13. Aviva Insurance Company of Canada ("**Aviva**" and together with CMLS, the "**Secured Creditors**") provided a deposit protection insurance facility to permit the Petitioners to have access to the pre-sale purchasers' deposit monies for the payment of project costs. Management estimated that approximately \$14.7 million would be owing pursuant to Aviva's insurance deposit facility contingent upon the return of deposits to the pre-sale purchasers.
14. Additionally, Management estimates that there are approximately \$4.0 million in lien claimants and \$2.3 million in unsecured creditors. The unsecured indebtedness and lien claimants of the Petitioners primarily consist of amounts owing on account of trade debt, property taxes and unpaid professional firms and consultants fees.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

15. In preparing this Fifth Report and making the comments herein, the Monitor has been provided with and has herein relied upon, unaudited financial information, books, records and financial information prepared by the Petitioners, discussions with management of the Petitioners (“**Management**”), and information from other third party sources (collectively, the “**Information**”). Except as described in this Fifth Report in respect of the Cash Flow Forecast:
- a) the Monitor has reviewed the Information for reasonableness, internal consistency and use in the context in which it was provided. However, the Monitor has not audited or otherwise attempted to verify the accuracy or completeness of such information in a manner that would wholly or partially comply with Generally Accepted Assurance Standards (“**GAAS**”) pursuant to the *Chartered Professional Accountants Canada Handbook* and, accordingly, the Monitor expresses no opinion or other form of assurance contemplated under GAAS in respect of the Information; and
 - b) some of the information referred to in this Fifth Report consists of forecasts and projections. An examination or review of the financial forecast and projections, as outlined in the *Chartered Professional Accountants Canada Handbook*, has not been performed.
16. Future oriented financial information referred to in this Fifth Report was prepared based on Management’s and the Monitor’s estimates and assumptions. Readers are cautioned that since projections are based upon assumptions about future events and conditions that are not readily and currently ascertainable, the actual results will vary from the projections, even if the assumptions materialize, and the variations could be material.

17. Unless otherwise indicated, the Monitor's understanding of factual matters expressed in this Fifth Report concerning the Petitioners and their business is based on the Information, and not independent factual determinations made by the Monitor.
18. All capitalized terms used herein that are undefined have the meanings ascribed thereto in the Proposed Monitor's Report, the First Report, the Second Report, the Third Report, the Fourth Report and the Amended and Restated Initial Order.
19. Unless otherwise stated all monetary amounts contained herein are expressed in Canadian Dollars.

UPDATE ON THE SALE INVESTMENT AND SOLICITATION PROCESS

20. Paragraphs 19 – 28 of the Third Report dated November 27, 2020 provide extensive detail on the Monitor's administration of the two (2) phased SISP approved by this Honourable Court. In summary, the Monitor:
 - a) solicited the Terrace House Project to approximately 670 potential bidders, including local, national and international strategic and financial parties and real estate developers;
 - b) retained CBRE Limited in a limited capacity to market the Terrace House Project to its investor network in Asia as well as a newspaper advertisement that was published in a Hong Kong newspaper, the South China Morning Post;
 - c) populated an electronic data room (the "**Data Room**") with key financial, corporate, operational and other information including construction drawings, consultant reports and other business documents relevant to the Terrace House Project for Prospective Parties to evaluate following the signing of a CA; and

d) short-listed six (6) **“Qualified Offerors”** to participate in Phase II of the SISP and provided those parties a period of approximately six (6) weeks to acquire or refinance the Terrace House Project (those parties which submitted the offers, the **“Qualified Offerors”**).

21. The Monitor received six (6) Phase II Offers from the Qualified Offerors (the **“Phase II Bids”**) and filed copies of these offers under seal in a Confidential Supplement to the November 27, 2020 Third Report.
22. Following consultation with the Secured Creditors, the Monitor executed a **“Bid Offer Agreement”** on behalf of the Petitioners with Bosa Properties (OC) Inc. (the **“Bid Offeror”**). The execution of the Bid Offer Agreement was approved by this Honourable Court on December 1, 2020.
23. The Bid Offer Agreement provided the Bid Offeror to February 16, 2021 (the **“Due Diligence Period”**) to complete a satisfactory feasibility study and due diligence analysis (the **“Feasibility Study”**) relating to the economics of the Terrace House Project, and to obtain construction financing.
24. The Fourth Report describes that on February 16, 2021, the Bid Offeror provided the Monitor with a feasibility study (the **“Confidential Feasibility Study”**) on the Terrace House Project and put forward a proposal that varied from the Bid Offer that was not acceptable to CMLS; and accordingly, the Monitor in consultation with CMLS did not advance Bid Offer to a definitive agreement.

THE LANDA PSA

Summary

25. Landa Global Acquisition Inc. ("**Landa**") was one of the six (6) parties that submitted a bid (the "**Landa SISP Bid**") in Phase II of the SISP. The Landa SISP Bid contained the fewest conditions and required the least amount of due diligence of the Phase II Bids.
26. When it became known that the Bid Offer Agreement with the Bid Offeror failed to materialize into a definitive agreement, Landa advised the Monitor of, a) their continued interest in an acquisition of the Terrace House Project, and b) their ability to formalize and submit an unconditional offer in the near term.
27. On March 1, 2021, Landa sent the Monitor a letter of intent (the "**Revised Landa Offer**") to acquire the Terrace House Project. The Monitor reviewed the Revised Landa Offer with CMLS; and following a series of discussions, the Monitor (on behalf of the Petitioners and subject to Court approval) and Landa executed a purchase and sale agreement (the "**Landa PSA**") dated March 25, 2021, the key terms of which include the following:
 - a) a Purchase Price that is payable in cash;
 - b) a break-fee equal to approximately 1% of the Purchase Price payable from the proceeds of a Superior Offer (as defined in the Landa PSA and discussed below);
 - c) financing conditions that have since been satisfied or waived and no due diligence conditions;
 - d) notwithstanding the execution of the Landa PSA, the Petitioners and Monitor may engage in further marketing of, or negotiations in connection with, the Terrace Project (the "**Final Marketing Phase**") as described below to solicit superior cash bids akin to a final sealed bid process; and

e) the Petitioners shall seek:

- i. a Reverse Vesting Order (“**RVO**”) from this Honourable Court to allow the Purchaser to acquire the General Partner and the Purchased Assets free and clear of all Encumbrances except certain limited Permitted Encumbrances; or
- ii. should this Honourable Court not grant the RVO, an Approval and Vesting Order (“**AVO**”) to acquire the assets of the Petitioners free and clear of all Encumbrances except certain limited Permitted Encumbrances; and
- iii. should this Honourable Court refuse to grant the RVO, the Purchase Price shall be adjusted on a dollar-for-dollar basis by the property transfer tax (the “**PTT**”) that will be payable should a transfer of title to the Lands occur; and accordingly the Monitor is of the view that the sale of the General Partner pursuant to a RVO will result in a materially higher recovery to creditors.

28. The Landa PSA requires confidentiality with respect to the Purchase Price; and as such a copy of the Landa PSA which redacts information relating to the Purchase Price (and such other information that could be used to perform a reverse calculation of the Purchase Price) is attached hereto as **Appendix “A”**. An unredacted copy of the Landa PSA together with a calculation of the PTT that may be payable in the event of a transfer of title will be provided to this Court as an attachment to a confidential supplement to this Fifth Report (the “**Confidential Supplement**”). A sealing order will be sought in connection with the Confidential Supplement in order to maintain the confidentiality respecting the terms of the Landa PSA in order to maintain the integrity of the Cash Bid Process.

29. The Monitor on behalf of the Petitioners seeks an Order of this Honourable Court approving the Landa PSA (the “**Preliminary Order**”). The Petitioners intend to seek a “**Vesting Order**” in relation to the Landa PSA (if no superior offers are received) or another party (if a superior offer is received that contemplates a sale transaction), when the Final Marketing Phase concludes. For clarity, the Petitioners do not currently seek the approval of the RVO described below in relation to the Landa PSA (or the AVO as an alternative).

The Final Marketing Phase

30. The Final Marketing Phase has been designed in recognition of the following criteria:
- a) these CCAA proceedings commenced on May 29, 2020;
 - b) the SISP, as approved by the Court, commenced in June 2020;
 - c) the Monitor has already administered a robust SISP over a period of approximately nine (9) months;
 - d) the Monitor has previously provided the six (6) Qualified Offerors an opportunity (at their own expense) to review the documents in the Data Room, to access the site and management to perform site visits and ask questions with respect to the project, and to submit their best offers in the SISP;
 - e) none of the offers received to date are sufficient to re-pay the Secured Creditors in full after the full amount of the approved DIP Facility of \$1.5 million is repaid;
 - f) Each of the Qualified Offerors, and any other party, has had sufficient time and opportunity to review the project in order to submit a cash offer (similar to Landa); and
 - g) the PSA is supported by the Construction Lenders.

31. The table below provides a timeline for the key milestones contemplated in the Landa PSA:

Estimated Date	Milestone
April 16, 2021	Obtain Preliminary Order
April 16, 2021	Commencement of the Final Marketing Phase
April 20, 2021	Payment of second deposit by Landa (first deposit already paid)
May 7, 2021 (being 15 business days following commencement of the Final Marketing Phase)	End of the Final Marketing Phase
May 28, 2021 (being 15 business days after the Final Marketing Phase)	Conditions removal deadline if Superior Offers are received by May 7, 2021 <u>or</u> Granting of the Vesting Order in relation to Landa PSA if no Superior Offers are received

32. Of note, the Landa PSA is structured such that any other prospective bidders have 15 business days from the date of the Preliminary Order to submit a superior cash offer. Such offers may have conditions attached to them, but such conditions must be capable of being satisfied or waived within a further 15 business days from the date such offer is accepted. While a competing bid may have such conditions, the conditionality of any bids received will be a consideration as to whether any such bids are in fact Superior Offers to that of the Landa bid as set out in the Landa PSA.

The Break Fee

33. Break fees are commonly included in restructuring transactions. The Monitor has reviewed recent and similar break fee precedents and considers the break fee associated with the Landa PSA (of approximately 1% of the Purchase Price) to be reasonable and on the low end of similarly risked precedent transactions.

34. A break fee serves several purposes including incentivizing interested parties to incur time and cost (including opportunity costs as well as cash costs including legal and other due diligence costs) to commit to a transaction. While break fees are commonly associated with stalking horse bids, that is not always the case. In this particular instance, the process resulting in the Landa PSA: (a) materially enhances certainty of outcome, (b) allows for the Final Marketing Process that requires other interested parties to submit best and final cash offers, and (c) establishes a fully negotiated form of purchase agreement that other parties can utilize to submit offers of an efficient and cost effective basis.
35. The Monitor also notes that the Landa PSA is the best viable option at this time, the terms of the Landa PSA were the result of arms' length negotiations, the Break Fee is supported by CMLS, there is no expense reimbursement payable to Landa, and the Break Fee will only be payable out of the proceeds of a superior transaction thus generating an increased recovery for creditors.

FIFTH CASH FLOW FORECAST

36. The Monitor, on behalf of the Petitioners, has prepared a weekly cash flow projection (the **"Fifth Report Forecast"**) for the period of April 3, 2021 to June 11, 2021 (the **"Fifth Report Cash Flow Period"**).
37. A copy of the Fifth Report Forecast along with its notes and assumptions are attached hereto as **Appendix "B"** and is summarized and compared to actual expenses incurred below:

	Forecast	Actual	Variance	Forecast
	February 20, 2021 to April 2, 2021			April 3 to June 11
Beginning Cash	924	924	-	27,219
Receipts	209,139	-	(209,139)	252,474
Disbursements	(472,094)	(223,705)	248,389	(515,804)
Insurance	(76,470)	(76,470)	-	(76,470)
Site preservation	(19,144)	(12,215)	6,929	(29,749)
Glass storage	(13,098)	(6,549)	6,549	(19,647)
Consultants – city requirements	(3,735)	(1,534)	2,201	(5,956)
Crane lease	(16,170)	(8,085)	8,085	(24,255)
Permit costs	(2,088)	-	2,088	(1,476)
General, admin & misc	(27,521)	(33,238)	(5,717)	(49,805)
Contingency	(63,000)	-	63,000	(67,500)
Restructuring costs	(189,157)	(57,998)	131,159	(199,448)
DIP interest & fee payment	(61,711)	(27,616)	34,095	(41,500)
Total Cash before DIP Financing	(262,031)	(222,781)	39,250	(236,113)
DIP Financing Draw	411,710	250,000	(161,710)	248,500
Ending Cash after DIP Financing	149,679	27,219	(122,460)	12,387

38. Broadly speaking, the positive variance in disbursements noted above is attributable to timing differences and spending restraint.
39. Cash receipts contemplated in the Fifth Report Forecast are comprised of the following:
- a) an estimated refund of \$34,139 for GST paid on disbursements incurred during these CCAA proceedings; and
 - b) an estimated refund of \$218,335 for a deposit held by BC Hydro for design fees associated with a proposed electrical system for the Terrace House Project.
40. Restructuring costs contemplated in the Fifth Report Forecast include the payment of professional fees of the Monitor, the Monitor's legal counsel, and the Petitioner's legal counsel some of which relate to services already rendered.
41. The Fifth Report Forecast contemplates payments of \$76,470 for insurance premiums for an extension of the policies through to June 30, 2021.

42. The Fifth Report Forecast does not contemplate any cash outlay for construction costs, other than those required for site preservation.

SEALING ORDER

43. As referenced above, the unredacted Landa PSA shall be provided to this Honourable Court through the Confidential Supplement, for which a sealing order will be sought.
44. The Monitor requests that the Confidential Supplement be accepted by this Honourable Court for filing under seal, as the information contained herein is commercially sensitive in that it contains the purchase price of the contemplated transaction.
45. The Monitor is of the view that public disclosure of the materials contained in the Confidential Supplement would be detrimental to the integrity of the Cash Bid Process, and detrimental to the Petitioner's commercial interests and the ability to maximize value for the Petitioner's stakeholders through the Cash Bid Process.

REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE STAY OF PROCEEDINGS

46. The Stay Period is currently set to expire on May 4, 2021. The Monitor on behalf of the Petitioners is requesting an extension of the Stay Period until June 11, 2021, being the approximate anticipated timeframe for the completion of the Landa SPA, or should a Superior Offer be derived, the anticipated timeframe to present such offer to this Honourable Court for consideration and/or approval.

47. The Monitor has considered the onus that resides with the Petitioners to demonstrate that an extension of the Stay of Proceedings by this Honourable Court is warranted, having regard to:

- a) the circumstances that justify the making of an extension order;
- b) the good faith efforts of the Petitioners to effect the restructuring; and
- c) the due diligence with which the Petitioners are advancing the restructuring.

Circumstances that justify the extension sought

48. In the Monitor's view, the extension of the Stay of Proceedings is necessary in order to:

- a) administer the above noted Cash Bid Process;
- b) to seek the close of the Landa Transaction, or should the Cash Bid Process result in a Superior Offer, to bring forward the Superior Offer to this Honourable Court for approval; and
- c) maintain operational control and preserve the Terrace House Project.

49. Moreover, as is depicted in the Fifth Report Cash Flow Forecast, the Monitor projects that the Petitioners will have sufficient liquidity and cash on hand to fund their ongoing obligations through to June 11, 2021.

Good Faith Efforts and Due Diligence

50. The Monitor on behalf of the Petitioners has working in good faith and with due diligence on a plan to identify, if possible, a buyer or investor for the Terrace House Project.

51. The Petitioners have complied with all of the requirements under the CCAA, as well as the various orders granted by this Honourable Court in this proceeding.

52. For the foregoing reasons, the Monitor supports the Petitioners' request for an order extending the Stay Period to June 11, 2021.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

53. Based on the foregoing, the Monitor recommends that this Honourable Court grant Order(s) approving the following:

- a) extending the Stay Period from May 4, 2021 to June 11, 2021;
- b) approving the Landa PSA; and
- c) approving a sealing order with respect to the Landa PSA.

All of which is respectfully submitted this 13th day of April, 2021.

ERNST & YOUNG INC.

in its capacity as Monitor
of Port Capital Development (EV) Inc. and
Evergreen House Development Limited Partnership
and not in its personal or corporate capacity

Per:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'MB' or similar initials, written in a cursive style.

Michael Bell, CPA, CA, CIRP LIT
Senior Vice President

Appendix A

**PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT
(TERRACE HOUSE, VANCOUVER, BC)**

THIS AGREEMENT is dated for reference March 25, 2021 and is made

AMONG:

PORT CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT (EV) INC., a British Columbia corporation formed under the *Business Corporations Act* (British Columbia)

(the “**GP**”)

AND:

EVERGREEN HOUSE DEVELOPMENT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a British Columbia limited partnership formed under the *Partnership Act* (British Columbia)

(the “**Limited Partnership**” and, together with the GP, the “**Vendor**”)

AND:

LANDA GLOBAL ACQUISITIONS LTD., a British Columbia company formed under the *Business Corporations Act* (British Columbia)

(the “**Purchaser**”)

BACKGROUND:

- A. The Vendor is the legal and beneficial owner of the lands and premises legally described in Part 1 of Schedule A (the “**Lands**”).
- B. The Vendor obtained an initial order of the Supreme Court of British Columbia dated May 29, 2020 under the *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act*, which among other things, commenced the CCAA Proceedings and granted an initial stay of proceedings in respect of the Vendor.
- C. The Purchaser submitted to the Monitor a non-binding letter of intent dated March 1, 2021, which was amended by way of email correspondence sent by the Purchaser on March 4, 2021 (collectively, the “**LOI**”), that contemplated that the parties would commence negotiations of this Agreement on the terms set out in such LOI.
- D. The Vendor has agreed to sell and the Purchaser has agreed to purchase all of the Vendor’s right, title, and interest in and to the Purchased Assets (as defined in this Agreement) on the terms and conditions set out in this Agreement.

FOR CONSIDERATION, the receipt and sufficiency of which is acknowledged by each of the parties, the parties agree as follows:

ARTICLE 1 - INTERPRETATION

1.1 Definitions. In this Agreement:

- (a) **“Approved Contracts”** means those Contracts entered into by the Vendor and any third party consultants in connection with the Project along with any other material Contracts which the Purchaser has approved by way of notice in writing to the Vendor on or before the Condition Date.
- (b) **“Approval and Vesting Order”** has the meaning given to it in Section 8.4(b)(ii).
- (c) **“Authorized Parties”** has the meaning given to it in Section 11.17.
- (d) **“Balance”** has the meaning given to it in Section 2.2(c).
- (e) **“Bona Fide Offer”** means a binding offer to purchase all or part of the Purchased Assets from a Prospective Purchaser, which offer contains no conditions that are not capable of being satisfied or waived by the parties within fifteen (15) Business Days or less of the date on which such offer is accepted by both parties thereto, and which offer does not include any non-monetary consideration from the Prospective Purchaser for such Purchased Assets.
- (f) **“Break Fee”** means [REDACTED] inclusive of any applicable taxes.
- (g) **“Buildings”** means all buildings and improvements located on the Lands.
- (h) **“Business Day”** means any day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, Boxing Day, Easter Monday or statutory holiday in British Columbia.
- (i) **“Buyer”** means a purchaser of one or more condominium units at the Property pursuant to Pre-Sale Contracts.
- (j) **“Buyer List”** means a list of all Buyers specifying the name of each Buyer (or if applicable any assignee or sublessee) as stated in the applicable Pre-Sale Contract, such Buyer’s address and the amount of any deposits held by or on behalf of the Vendor in accordance such Pre-Sale Contract.
- (k) **“CCAA Proceedings”** means the legal proceedings in the Court under the *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act*, Vancouver Registry No. S-205095.
- (l) **“Chattels”** means all of the personal property owned by the Vendor and used in connection with Project including without limitation, all fixtures, leasehold improvements, glass, personal property, plant, and equipment, inventory including spare parts, furniture whether moveable or built-in, computer hardware, kitchen equipment, tools and supplies, whether the same is located on the Lands or otherwise.
- (m) **“Closing Date”** means the date that is the later of (i) the date that is 30 days after the granting of the Final Order; and (ii) the date that all applicable appeal periods in connection with the Final Order have expired.
- (n) **“Closing Documents”** has the meaning given to it in Section 9.4.
- (o) **“Condition Date”** means the date on which the conditions precedent set out in Section 8.1(a) are satisfied or waived.

- (p) **“Construction Commitment”** has the meaning given to it in Section 3.2(a)(ii).
- (q) **“Consultant Reports”** means all consultant reports and studies that were commissioned by the Vendor in connection with the Project.
- (r) **“Contracts”** means all contracts or agreements, other than Title Contracts and Pre-Sale Contracts, relating to the use or operation of the Property or any part thereof or the design, development and construction of the Project, including, without limitation, the consulting agreements in connection with the Property or any part thereof made by or on behalf of the Vendor relating to the Property.
- (s) **“Court”** means the Supreme Court of British Columbia.
- (t) **“Creditors”** means creditors of the Vendor.
- (u) **“Delay Notice”** has the meaning given to it in Section 11.13.
- (v) **“Deposit”** means the deposits referred to in Sections 2.2(a) and 2.2(b).
- (w) **“Encumbrance”** means any legal notation, charge, lien, interest or other encumbrance or title defect of whatever kind or nature, regardless of form, whether or not registered or registrable and whether or not consensual or arising by law (statutory or otherwise), including any mortgage, lien, pledge, debenture, trust deed, assignment by way of security, security interest, conditional sales contract or similar interest or instrument charging, or creating a security interest in, the Purchased Assets or any part thereof or interest therein, and any agreement, lease, licence, option or claim, easement, right of way, restriction, execution or other encumbrance (including any notice or other registration in respect of any of the foregoing) affecting title to or the ownership of the Purchased Assets or any part thereof or interest therein.
- (x) **“ETA”** has the meaning given to it in Section 10.1.
- (y) **“Execution Date”** means the date of this Agreement.
- (z) **“Excluded Assets”** means: (i) all shares of capital stock or other equity interest in securities in any entity other than the Shares; (ii) any partnership interest in the Limited Partnership; (iii) Contracts which are not Approved Contracts; (iv) all Liability of the Vendor arising prior to the Closing Date including, but not limited to, Liability owed to lenders, service contractors or third parties of any kind including all Liability under the Approved Contracts or Plans, Permits and Approvals; (v) any Liability relating to or arising out of the Excluded Assets including, without limitation, Liability for terminating, not complying with or a defaulting under any Contract; (vi) any Liability of the Vendor for taxes resulting from the Vendor's sale of the Purchased Assets; (vii) all employees, employment agreements, executive personnel agreements, officer or director agreements, union contracts, collective agreements, employee wages, employee benefit plans or payments, pension obligations, employee tax withholding obligations, employee health or dental plan obligations, all grievances, arbitrations, employee complaints or claims, labour relations board actions or other employee proceedings and similar obligations of the Vendor; (viii) all Liability for payment of fees for operations of the Purchased

Assets up to the Closing Date; (ix) any proceedings, claims or actions commenced in any court initiated against the Vendor or threatened against the Vendor; (x) the costs and expenses and Liability of the Vendor under the CCAA Proceedings; (xi) any Liability for a breach or non-compliance with any applicable law; (xii) the Liability of the Vendor under this Agreement and any other assets, property or obligations which pursuant to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, remain the property of the Vendor after the completion of the transactions contemplated herein including, without limitation, the rights of the Vendor under this Agreement; (xiii) any proceedings, claims or causes of action for the benefit of the Vendor; (xiv) all cash of the Vendor; (xv) Receivables; and (xvi) all Pre-Sale Contracts including, for greater certainty, all deposits provided pursuant to the Pre-Sale Contracts and all claims, causes of action or rights in relation to such deposits.

- (aa) **"Excusable Delay"** means any delay in the performance or observance by the Vendor or Purchaser of any obligation or act of the Vendor or Purchaser, as applicable, hereunder which occurs as a consequence of or is attributable to any circumstance which is not caused by any default or act of commission or omission of that party and which is beyond the reasonable control of that party, including without limiting the generality of the foregoing, strikes or labour or industrial disturbances (including lock-outs), civil disturbances, acts, orders, legislation, regulations, good faith compliance with an order, directive, guideline or other recommendation of any governmental or other public authorities (including, without limitation, health authorities or occupational safety authorities), acts of public enemies, war, riots, sabotage, blockades, embargoes, shortages of materials and suppliers, shortages of labour, lightning, earthquakes, fire, storms, pandemics, epidemics, quarantines and health emergencies, hurricanes, floods, wash-outs, explosions and acts of God, but excluding, for clarity, the financial circumstances of the Purchaser.
- (bb) **"Final Offer Date"** means the date that is fifteen (15) Business Days after the issuance of the Preliminary Order.
- (cc) **"Final Order"** has the meaning given to it in Section 8.4(b).
- (dd) **"Governmental Authority"** means (i) any domestic or foreign government, whether national, federal, provincial, state, territorial, municipal or local (whether administrative, legislative, executive or otherwise), (ii) any agency, authority, ministry, department, regulatory body, court, central bank, bureau, board or other instrumentality having legislative, judicial, taxing, regulatory, prosecutorial or administrative powers or functions of, or pertaining to, government, (iii) any court, tribunal, commission, individual, arbitrator, arbitration panel or other body having adjudicative, regulatory, judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative or similar functions, and (iv) any other body or entity created under the authority of or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of any of the foregoing, including any stock or other securities exchange or professional association.
- (ee) **"GST"** has the meaning given to it in Section 10.1.
- (ff) **"GST Certificate"** has the meaning given to it in Section 10.1.

- (gg) **"Intellectual Property"** means all intellectual property and proprietary rights of any kind in connection with the Project, including the "Terrace House" name, architectural design and instruments of service and all rights to the branding, logo and design in connection with the same.
- (hh) **"Interim Period"** means the period commencing on the Execution Date until and including the Closing Date.
- (ii) **"Land Title Office"** means the Land Title and Survey Authority of British Columbia, land title office applicable to the Lands.
- (jj) **"Lands"** has the meaning given to it in Recital A.
- (kk) **"Liability"** means any debts, claim, liability, duty, responsibility, obligations, commitment, assessment, cost, expense, loss, expenditure, charge, fee, penalty, fine, contribution or premium of any kind or nature whatsoever, whether known or unknown, asserted or unasserted, absolute or contingent, direct or indirect, or due or to become due and regardless of when sustained, incurred or asserted or when the relevant events occurred or circumstances existed.
- (ll) **"LOI"** has the meaning given to it in Recital C.
- (mm) **"LP Agreement"** means the limited partnership agreement of Evergreen House Development Limited Partnership made as of June 30, 2014 and restated as of March 13, 2015 between those persons who from time to time execute the agreement and become a limited partner, as limited partners, and the GP, as general partner, as further amended and restated, modified or supplemented from time to time.
- (nn) **"Material Loss"** means the loss or damage to or destruction of the Property or any part of it to such an extent that the replacement or repair of it cannot be substantially completed: (i) at a cost of less than \$1,000,000.00; or (ii) within six (6) months of the occurrence.
- (oo) **"Monitor"** means Ernst & Young Inc., in its capacity as monitor of the CCAA Proceedings or such other monitor or monitors as are appointed by the Court from time to time in connection with the CCAA Proceedings.
- (pp) **"Order"** means an order of the Court.
- (qq) **"Permitted Encumbrances"** means the Encumbrances set out in Part 2 of Schedule A.
- (rr) **"Plans, Permits and Approvals"** means: (i) all plans and specifications pertaining to the construction of the Project, including, without limitation, all structural, architectural, mechanical, electrical, landscape and interior design and specifications for the Project; and (ii) all planning approvals, permits, licences, development agreements, crane swing, underpinning and airspace agreements with respect to the Project.
- (ss) **"Preliminary Order"** has the meaning given to it in Section 8.4(a).

- (tt) **"Pre-Sale Contracts"** means each of those agreements between the Vendor and a Buyer in respect of the purchase and sale of one or more condominium units at the Property. For greater certainty, a Pre-Sale Contract is not a Contract.
- (uu) **"Project"** means the construction and development of the Building on the Lands.
- (vv) **"Property"** means the Lands and the Buildings.
- (ww) **"Prospective Purchaser"** has the meaning given to it in Section 8.7.
- (xx) **"Purchase Price"** means subject to Section 5.4, [REDACTED], exclusive of any applicable taxes.
- (yy) **"Purchased Assets"** means:
 - (i) in the event that a Reverse Vesting Order is granted by the Court:
 - (A) the Shares; and
 - (B) all of the Limited Partnership's right, title and interest, in and to the following assets and properties:
 - (I) the Property;
 - (II) the Chattels;
 - (III) the Approved Contracts;
 - (IV) the Title Contracts;
 - (V) the Plans, Permits and Approvals;
 - (VI) the Warranties;
 - (VII) subject to such transfer being approved by the necessary parties in accordance with Section 3.1(c)(i), the Intellectual Property;
 - (VIII) all insurance and new home warranties obtained in connection with the Project; and
 - (IX) all marketing materials prepared in connection with the Project,
 - excluding, for certainty, the Excluded Assets; or
 - (ii) in the event that an Approval and Vesting Order is granted by the Court:
 - (A) all of the Vendor's right, title and interest, in and to the following assets and properties:
 - (I) the Property;

- (II) the Chattels;
- (III) the Approved Contracts;
- (IV) the Title Contracts;
- (V) the Plans, Permits and Approvals;
- (VI) the Warranties;
- (VII) subject to such transfer being approved by the necessary parties in accordance with Section 3.1(c)(i), the Intellectual Property;
- (VIII) all insurance and new home warranties obtained in connection with the Project; and
- (IX) all marketing materials prepared in connection with the Project,

excluding, for certainty, the Excluded Assets.

- (zz) **"Purchaser's Solicitors"** means Lawson Lundell LLP or such other firm or firms of solicitors or agents as are retained by the Purchaser from time to time and written notice of which is provided to the Vendor.
- (aaa) **"Receivables"** means the Vendor's interest in all receivables including, without limitation, receivables relating to amounts owed by a Buyer in connection with a Pre-Sale Contract, any grants, subsidies (including the Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy), tax relief or gifts or any other receivable.
- (bbb) **"Required Financing"** has the meaning given to it in Section 3.2(a)(i).
- (ccc) **"Reverse Vesting Order"** has the meaning given to it in Section 8.4(b)(i).
- (ddd) **"Shares"** means all of the issued and outstanding shares in the capital of the GP.
- (eee) **"ShellCo"** means that entity, appointed by the Vendor in connection with a Reverse Vesting Order, to which all Excluded Assets will be transferred by the Vendor in connection with the closing of the transactions contemplated herein and that will replace the GP in its role as general partner of the Limited Partnership. ShellCo will be a subsidiary of GP, brought into the CCAA Proceedings and subsequently assigned into bankruptcy.
- (fff) **"Specified Date"** has the meaning given to it in Section 11.13.
- (ggg) **"Superior Offer"** has the meaning given to it in Section 8.7.
- (hhh) **"Title Contracts"** means, collectively, those agreements and instruments affecting the Property or any part thereof, including without limitation, the Permitted Encumbrances and any municipal site plan and development agreements, crane swing, underpinning and airspace agreements, common use agreements and

easement agreements, concession or other agreements with any governmental authority or other public authorities having jurisdiction, and any new agreements of similar nature respecting the Property or any part thereof (other than the Contracts or Approved Contracts). For greater certainty, a Title Contract is not a Contract.

- (iii) **"Vendor's Solicitors"** means Bennett Jones LLP or such other firm or firms of solicitors or agents as are retained by the Vendor from time to time and written notice of which is provided to the Purchaser.
- (jjj) **"Warranties"** means all subsisting warranties and guarantees in connection with the Project or any part thereof that are assignable without consent and in effect on the Closing Date.

ARTICLE 2 – PURCHASE AND SALE

2.1 Agreement of Purchase and Sale. Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the Vendor agrees to sell and the Purchaser agrees to purchase the Purchased Assets for the Purchase Price on the Closing Date free and clear of all Encumbrances, except for the Permitted Encumbrances.

2.2 Payment of Purchase Price. The Purchase Price for the Purchased Assets will be paid by the Purchaser as follows:

- (a) by a first deposit of [REDACTED] paid to the Vendor's Solicitors by wire transfer within two (2) Business Days after the Execution Date;
- (b) by a second deposit of [REDACTED] paid to the Vendor's Solicitors by wire transfer within two (2) Business Days after the granting of the Preliminary Order; and
- (c) by payment of the balance (the **"Balance"**) of the Purchase Price, as adjusted in accordance with Article 5, on the Closing Date as provided in Article 9.

2.3 Deposit. The Vendor shall cause the Vendor's Solicitors to: (i) deposit the Deposit in an interest bearing trust account promptly following receipt of the Deposit; and (ii) pay the Deposit and any interest that may accrue on it only as set out in this Agreement or as directed in writing by the Vendor and the Purchaser or as directed by a court of competent jurisdiction. The Vendor shall cause the Vendor's Solicitors to pay the Deposit to:

- (a) the Vendor without interest (less the \$10.00 paid by the Vendor to the Purchaser pursuant to Section 8.8):
 - (i) on account of the Purchase Price on the Closing Date as set out in Article 9; or
 - (ii) as liquidated damages upon the default of the Purchaser if the Purchaser is in default of its obligation to complete the transactions contemplated by this Agreement, unless such default is waived in writing by the Vendor and which payment shall be in full satisfaction of all claims the Vendor may have by reason of such default;

- (b) the Purchaser with interest (less the \$10.00 paid by the Purchaser to the Vendor pursuant to Section 8.3):
 - (i) if the Purchaser is not required to complete the transaction contemplated by this Agreement, promptly following the date on which the Purchaser becomes entitled not to complete the transactions contemplated by this Agreement;
 - (ii) upon the default of the Vendor without prejudice to any other right or remedy of the Purchaser, if the Vendor is in default of its obligation to complete the transactions contemplated by this Agreement, unless such default is waived in writing by the Purchaser and provided that the maximum aggregate liability of the Vendor in connection with such a default is limited and shall not exceed an amount equal to the Deposit; or
 - (iii) if any or all of the conditions set out in Sections 8.1, 8.4 and 8.6(a) have not been satisfied or waived.

2.4 Allocation of Purchase Price. The parties agree that:

- (a) in the event that a Reverse Vesting Order is granted, the Purchase Price shall be allocated among the Purchased Assets as follows: (i) [REDACTED] to the Shares; (ii) [REDACTED] to the Lands and Buildings; and (iii) [REDACTED] to the remaining Purchased Assets; and
- (b) in the event that an Approval and Vesting Order is granted, the Purchase Price shall be allocated among the Purchased Assets as follows: (i) [REDACTED] to the Lands and Buildings; and (ii) [REDACTED] to all other Purchased Assets.

ARTICLE 3 – GENERAL COVENANTS

3.1 Covenants of the Vendor. The Vendor:

- (a) throughout the Interim Period, will upkeep and maintain the Property in its present condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted, and will manage the Property in a professional and diligent manner and as a careful and prudent owner would do in accordance with current practices in the CCAA Proceedings and in compliance with all applicable laws, regulations and orders;
- (b) throughout the Interim Period, will maintain in full force and effect insurance coverage for fire, earthquake and all risks in respect of the Property as well as commercial liability coverage until closing on the Closing Date, in such amounts and on such terms as would a prudent owner;
- (c) throughout the Interim Period, will use commercially reasonable efforts to:
 - (i) obtain all consents, approvals and authorizations that may be required in order to provide the Purchaser with the right to use Intellectual Property for the purposes of the marketing, development and construction of the Project as of the Closing Date;

- (ii) obtain an extension of at least six months from the City of Vancouver in connection with the building permit for the Project; and
 - (iii) obtain reliance letters in favour of the Purchaser in connection with those Consultant Reports that the Purchaser identifies to the Vendor, in writing, not less than fifteen (15) Business Days prior to the Closing Date;
- (d) will, as soon as reasonably possible following the granting of the Preliminary Order, deliver to the Purchaser a copy of the Buyer List;
- (e) from the Execution Date until the satisfaction or waiver of all of the conditions precedent set out in Section 8.1(a), will not enter into any commitment or agreement or contract, or modify any material terms or terminate any of the Approved Contracts, Permitted Encumbrances, Title Contracts, Plans, Permits and Approvals, or any mortgage or charge relating to the Purchased Assets or that would form an Encumbrance on the Purchased Assets without prior written notice to the Purchaser, and from the date of satisfaction or waiver by the Purchaser of all of the conditions precedent set out in Section 8.1(a) will not enter into any commitment or agreement or contract, or modify any material terms or terminate any of the Approved Contracts, Permitted Encumbrances, Title Contracts, Plans, Permits and Approvals, or any mortgage or charge relating to the Purchased Assets or that would form an Encumbrance on the Purchased Assets without the prior written consent of the Purchaser, which the Purchaser may withhold in its sole discretion;
- (f) will, on or prior to the Closing Date, cancel, disclaim or terminate at its expense all Contracts other than Approved Contracts;
- (g) will take or cause to be taken all proper steps and actions and corporate proceedings on its part to enable the Vendor to vest a good and marketable title to the Purchased Assets in the Purchaser free and clear of all Encumbrances except for Permitted Encumbrances and to enable the Vendor to carry out the sale of the Purchased Assets and to execute and deliver this Agreement as valid and binding obligations of the Vendor; and
- (h) will promptly notify the Purchaser if the Vendor becomes aware that, after the date of this Agreement, any of its representations or warranties in this Agreement become untrue or incorrect or if any covenants, terms or conditions in this Agreement are breached or cannot be performed.

3.2 Covenants of the Purchaser. The Purchaser:

- (a) covenants to use commercially reasonable efforts to, as soon as reasonably possible following the Execution Date:
 - (i) obtain a financing commitment on terms acceptable to the Purchaser, acting reasonably, from one or more of the Creditors to provide land financing in connection with the Project as of the Closing Date in an amount equal to at least 50% of the Purchase Price, for a term of two years with two six-month extension options (the “**Required Financing**”); and

- (ii) obtain a written statement from one or more of the Creditors that such Creditor(s) are prepared to consider a construction financing facility in connection with the Project that does not require an unrelated third-party construction manager or general contractor, and certain other terms to be mutually agreed to between the Purchaser and Creditor(s) (the "**Construction Commitment**"),

and, upon the Purchaser obtaining the Required Financing and/or the Construction Commitment, the Purchaser will deliver written confirmation thereof to the Vendor within a reasonable period of time following its obtaining of the Required Financing and the Construction Commitment, respectively;

- (b) will on or before 5:00 p.m. (Vancouver time) on the Condition Date provide the Vendor with notice of the Contracts which it will accept as Approved Contracts; and
- (c) will promptly notify the Vendor if the Purchaser becomes aware that, after the date of this Agreement, any of its representations or warranties in this Agreement become untrue or incorrect or if any covenants, terms or conditions in this Agreement are breached or cannot be performed.

ARTICLE 4 – RISK

4.1 Risk. The Purchased Assets will be at the risk of the Vendor until completion of closing on the Closing Date and thereafter at the risk of the Purchaser.

4.2 Material Loss Damage. If there is any Material Loss prior to the passing of risk as set out in Section 4.1, the Purchaser will, within fifteen (15) days following such Material Loss, by notice in writing at its option either:

- (a) terminate this Agreement, in which case the Deposit together with accrued interest will be paid to the Purchaser and neither party will be under any further obligation to the other; or
- (b) elect to complete the purchase of the Purchased Assets, in which case the insurance proceeds and the right to receive the proceeds of all insurance will be assigned by the Vendor to the Purchaser on the Closing Date and the Purchase Price shall be reduced by the amount of any insurance deductible that has not been paid by the Vendor.

Failure by the Purchaser to so elect within the period set out above will be deemed to be an election to complete the purchase of the Purchased Assets. The Vendor will promptly notify the Purchaser if it becomes aware of any Material Loss.

ARTICLE 5 – ADJUSTMENTS AND RELATED MATTERS

5.1 Adjustments. The Purchase Price payable by the Purchaser to the Vendor for the Purchased Assets will be subject to adjustment. All adjustments with respect to the Purchased Assets, including taxes, utilities, deposits and interest on deposits (if any), and other items normally adjusted between a vendor and purchaser in the sale of similar properties in British Columbia will be adjusted as of the Closing Date so that the Vendor will bear and pay all expenses

and receive all income related to the Purchased Assets accruing prior to the Closing Date and the Purchaser will bear and pay all expenses and receive all income related to the Purchased Assets accruing on and after the Closing Date and the Purchase Price will be adjusted accordingly. The Vendor shall cause any water, gas, or electrical meter readings required to make the adjustments herein.

5.2 Statement of Adjustments. A statement of adjustments will be delivered to the Purchaser by the Vendor at least five (5) Business Days prior to the Closing Date and shall have annexed to it complete details of the calculations used by the Vendor to arrive at all debits and credits on the statement of adjustments. On request, the Vendor shall give the Purchaser access to the Vendor's working papers and backup materials in order to confirm the statement of adjustments.

5.3 Re-Adjustment Determination. The parties acknowledge and agree that there will be no re-adjustment after the Closing Date.

5.4 Purchase Price Reduction. In the event that an Approval and Vesting Order (rather than a Reverse Vesting Order) is granted by the Court, the parties agree that the Purchase Price shall be reduced by an amount equal to the amount of property transfer tax payable by the Purchaser in connection with the transfer of the Property to the Purchaser on the Closing Date.

ARTICLE 6 – POSSESSION

6.1 Possession Date. The Purchaser will, upon completion of the purchase and sale have possession of all Purchased Assets as of the Closing Date free and clear of all Encumbrances subject only to the Permitted Encumbrances.

6.2 Non-assignable Assets. If any of the Purchased Assets are not transferable without consent of a third party by the terms of the applicable instruments, the Vendor shall use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain such consent prior to the Closing Date and, if such consent is not obtained by the Closing Date, the Vendor shall use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain an Order in the CCAA Proceedings transferring or assigning, as applicable, such Purchased Assets to the Purchaser. For certainty, any failure to obtain the consent of any such third party will not constitute a default of the Vendor nor will it entitle the Purchaser to terminate this Agreement.

ARTICLE 7 – REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

7.1 Vendor's Representations and Warranties. The Vendor represents and warrants to the Purchaser, regardless of any independent investigations that the Purchaser may cause to be made, that as at the date of this Agreement:

- (a) the Limited Partnership is a limited partnership formed under the *Partnership Act* (British Columbia) and has the power and authority to own the Purchased Assets, to enter into this Agreement, and to perform its obligations under this Agreement, all of which have been authorized by all necessary proceedings;
- (b) the GP is a corporation formed under the *Business Corporations Act* (British Columbia) and has the power and authority to own the Purchased Assets, in its capacity as general partner of the Limited Partnership or in its own capacity, as applicable, to enter into this Agreement, and to perform its obligations under this Agreement, all of which have been authorized by all necessary proceedings;

- (c) the Limited Partnership is a Canadian partnership within the meaning of the *Income Tax Act* (Canada); and
- (d) the GP is not a non-resident of Canada within the meaning of the *Income Tax Act* (Canada).

7.2 Survival of Vendor's Representations and Warranties. The representations and warranties contained in Section 7.1 will survive the Closing Date and will continue in full force and effect for the benefit of the Purchaser after the Closing Date for a period of 12 months, unless otherwise expressly indicated herein, notwithstanding any independent inquiry or investigation by the Purchaser or the satisfaction or waiver by the Purchaser of any condition set out in Section 8.1, the subject matter of which is contained in a representation or warranty in this Agreement.

7.3 Purchaser's Representations and Warranties. The Purchaser represents and warrants to the Vendor, regardless of any independent investigation that the Vendor may cause to be made that:

- (a) the Purchaser is a corporation incorporated and existing under the laws of British Columbia;
- (b) the Purchaser has the corporate power and authority to enter into this Agreement and to perform its obligations under this Agreement;
- (c) there is no action or proceeding pending or to the best of the Purchaser's knowledge, threatened against the Purchaser before any court, arbiter, arbitration panel, administrative tribunal or agency which, if decided adversely to the Purchaser, might materially affect the Purchaser's ability to perform the Purchaser's obligations hereunder;
- (d) neither the Purchaser's entering into this Agreement nor the performance of its terms will result in the breach of or constitute a default under any term or provision of any indenture, mortgage, deed of trust or other agreement to which the Purchaser is bound or subject;
- (e) the Purchaser is not a non-Canadian for the purposes of the *Investment Canada Act* (Canada); and
- (f) the Purchaser is not a foreign entity for the purposes of the *Property Transfer Tax Act* (British Columbia).

7.4 Survival of Purchaser's Representations and Warranties. The representations and warranties contained in Section 7.3 will survive the Closing Date and will continue in full force and effect for the benefit of the Vendor after the Closing Date for a period of 12 months, unless otherwise expressly indicated herein, notwithstanding any independent inquiry or investigation by the Vendor.

7.5 "As Is" Purchase. The Purchaser acknowledges and agrees that:

- (a) in entering into this Agreement and completing the transactions contemplated herein, except for the representations and warranties of the Vendor set out in

Section 7.1, the Purchaser has relied and will continue to rely solely upon its own due diligence with respect to the Purchased Assets;

- (b) the Purchased Assets are being purchased by the Purchaser on an “as is, where is” basis as of the Closing Date and without any representation or warranty, whether expressed or implied by this Agreement or at law, by the Vendor of any nature or kind whatsoever respecting any of the Purchased Assets or any matter relating thereto, except for the representations and warranties of the Vendor set out in Section 7.1 or in the Closing Documents;
- (c) except for the representations and warranties of the Vendor set out in Section 7.1 or in the Closing Documents, the Vendor makes no representations or warranties concerning any statements made or information delivered or made available to the Purchaser (whether by the Vendor, the Vendor's Solicitors or any other agents, representatives or advisors of the Vendor or any of their respective affiliates, or any other person) with respect to the Purchased Assets, whether included as part of any due diligence matters or any other information disclosed to the Purchaser or otherwise; and
- (d) except as otherwise expressly provided for in this Agreement or in the Closing Documents, the Vendor shall have no obligations or responsibility to the Purchaser after the Closing Date with respect to any matter relating to the Purchased Assets or the condition thereof.

The provisions of this Section shall survive closing or the termination of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 8 – CONDITIONS PRECEDENT

8.1 Purchaser's Conditions. The Purchaser's obligation to complete the transactions contemplated by this Agreement is subject to the following conditions, all of which are for the sole benefit of the Purchaser:

- (a) on or before 5:00 p.m. (Vancouver time) on April 1, 2021, the Purchaser will have given written notice to the Vendor that:
 - (i) the Purchaser has obtained the Required Financing; and
 - (ii) the Purchaser has obtained the Construction Commitment;
- (b) on the Closing Date, the representations and warranties of the Vendor contained in Section 7.1 will be true and correct in all material respects with the same effect as though such representations and warranties had been made on and as of the Closing Date; and
- (c) on the Closing Date, all of the covenants and agreements of the Vendor to be performed on or before the Closing Date pursuant to this Agreement will have been duly performed in all material respects.

If the conditions set out in this Section have not been satisfied by notice in writing from the Purchaser to the Vendor, by the times specified in this Section, the Purchaser may by notice in writing to the Vendor waive satisfaction of such conditions, in whole or in part, without prejudice

to any of its other rights under this Agreement and complete the purchase of the Purchased Assets or elect not to complete.

8.2 Satisfaction and Waiver of Purchaser's Conditions. The parties agree that if the Purchaser does not give notice to the Vendor by the time limited in Section 8.1(a) that the conditions in that Section are satisfied or waived, then this Agreement will automatically be null and void upon the expiry of such time and the Deposit shall be returned to the Purchaser with interest (if any).

8.3 Consideration for and Nature of Conditions. A portion of the Deposit in the amount of \$10.00 represents non-refundable consideration paid by the Purchaser for its right to satisfy or waive the conditions set out in Section 8.1 and Section 8.4 and the Vendor acknowledges the sufficiency in all respects of such consideration. Although the Purchaser's obligation to complete the transaction contemplated by this Agreement is subject to satisfaction or waiver of conditions, those conditions are not conditions to there being a binding agreement of purchase and sale between the parties respecting the Purchased Assets and until the time limited for the satisfaction or waiver of such conditions has expired, this Agreement is not void, voidable, revocable or, except for default, otherwise capable of being terminated by either of the parties.

8.4 Mutual Conditions. The obligation of each of the parties to complete the transactions contemplated by this Agreement is subject to the following mutual conditions, all of which are for the benefit of both the Vendor and the Purchaser:

- (a) the Vendor has obtained an Order in form and content satisfactory to the Vendor and the Purchaser, acting reasonably, approving, authorizing and directing the Vendor to enter into this Agreement (the "**Preliminary Order**"). The Vendor shall use all commercially reasonable efforts to obtain a Preliminary Order on or before 5:00 p.m. (Vancouver time) on the date that is 15 days after the Condition Date;
- (b) on or before 5:00 p.m. (Vancouver time) on the date that is 15 Business Days after the date that the condition precedent set out in Section 8.6(a) has been satisfied or waived, the Vendor has obtained (at the sole cost of the Vendor) an Order or Orders (the "**Final Order**") either:
 - (i) (A) adding ShellCo as a debtor to the CCAA Proceedings; (B) replacing the GP as the general partner of the Limited Partnership with ShellCo; (C) transferring and assigning all of the Excluded Assets to ShellCo; (D) vesting title to the Purchased Assets (including, without limitation, the Shares) in and to the Purchaser, free and clear of all Encumbrances except the Permitted Encumbrances; and (E) approving this Agreement and implementing the transactions contemplated herein in accordance with its terms (the "**Reverse Vesting Order**"); or
 - (ii) (A) vesting title to the Purchased Assets (which, for certainty, do not include any shares of the GP) in and to the Purchaser, free and clear of all Encumbrances except the Permitted Encumbrances and in a form registrable in the Land Title Office; and (B) approving this Agreement and implementing the transactions contemplated herein in accordance with its terms (the "**Approval and Vesting Order**").

8.5 Satisfaction of Mutual Conditions. The parties agree that if each of the Purchaser and the Vendor do not give notice to the other party by the time limited in Sections 8.4(a) and 8.4(b) that the conditions in those Sections are satisfied, then this Agreement will automatically be null and void upon the expiry of such time and the Deposit shall be returned to the Purchaser with interest (if any). For certainty, a failure to satisfy any of the conditions set out in Section 8.4 shall not constitute a default of either party.

8.6 Vendor's Conditions. The Vendor's obligation to complete the transactions contemplated by this Agreement is subject to the following conditions, all of which are for the sole benefit of the Vendor:

- (a) the Vendor does not receive a Superior Offer on or before 5:00 p.m. (Vancouver time) on the Final Offer Date;
- (b) on the Closing Date, the representations and warranties of the Purchaser contained in Section 7.3 will be true and correct in all material respects with the same effect as though such representations and warranties had been made on and as of the Closing Date; and
- (c) on the Closing Date, all of the covenants and agreements of the Purchaser to be performed on or before the Closing Date pursuant to this Agreement will have been duly performed in all material respects.

If the conditions set out in this Section have not been satisfied by notice in writing from the Vendor to the Purchaser, by the times specified in this Section, the Vendor may, with the written consent of the Monitor, by notice in writing to the Purchaser waive satisfaction of such conditions, in whole or in part, without prejudice to any of its other rights under this Agreement and complete the sale of the Purchased Assets or elect not to complete.

8.7 Satisfaction and Waiver of Vendor's Conditions. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary set out herein, from the date of issuance of the Preliminary Order until the Final Offer Date, the Vendor and its Authorized Parties may engage in further marketing of and negotiations in connection with the Purchased Assets for the purposes of soliciting Bona Fide Offers from prospective purchasers that are not party to this Agreement (each, a "**Prospective Purchaser**"). In the event that the Vendor receives one or more Bona Fide Offers from Prospective Purchasers which provide for a superior offer to that of the Purchaser under this Agreement (a "**Superior Offer**"), the Vendor shall notify the Purchaser, in writing, that a Superior Offer has been received. The parties agree that if the Vendor receives one or more Superior Offers on or before the time limited in Section 8.6(a), the Vendor accepts one of such Superior Offers and such Superior Offer becomes unconditional, then: (i) this Agreement will automatically be null and void upon the delivery of notice of the same by the Vendor to the Purchaser; (ii) the Deposit shall be returned to the Purchaser with interest (if any); (iii) the Vendor shall use all commercially reasonable efforts to cause the transaction contemplated under such Superior Offer to be completed; and (iv) the Vendor shall pay the Break Fee to the Purchaser within a reasonable period of time following the Vendor's receipt of the proceeds of sale from such Superior Offer. The Vendor acknowledges and agrees that in its marketing of the Purchased Assets to Prospective Purchasers, it shall keep the terms of this Agreement (including the Purchase Price) confidential and shall not disclose any such terms to any Prospective Purchasers.

8.8 Consideration for and Nature of Conditions. The Vendor hereby pays to the Purchaser the amount of \$10.00 representing non-refundable consideration paid by the Vendor for its right

to satisfy or waive the conditions set out in Sections 8.4 and 8.6 and the Purchaser acknowledges the sufficiency in all respects of such consideration. Although the Vendor's obligation to complete the transaction contemplated by this Agreement is subject to satisfaction or waiver of conditions, those conditions are not conditions to there being a binding agreement of purchase and sale between the parties respecting the Purchased Assets and until the time limited for the satisfaction or waiver of such conditions has expired, this Agreement is not void, voidable, revocable or, except for default, otherwise capable of being terminated by either of the parties.

8.9 CCAA Proceedings. The Purchaser shall support the application for the Final Order. Each of the parties agrees that the Vendor shall seek a Reverse Vesting Order from the Court as a first option and, failing that, the Vendor shall seek an Approval and Vesting Order from the Court. In the event any variation is sought or leave to appeal is sought, an appeal is taken or a stay pending appeal is requested with respect to the Final Order, the Vendor shall promptly notify the Purchaser of such application for leave to appeal, appeal or stay request and shall promptly provide to the Purchaser a copy of the related notice(s) or order(s).

8.10 Form of Order. The Vendor or its solicitors will provide the Purchaser and its solicitors with a draft copy of all Orders proposed to be obtained in connection with this Agreement for review and comment at least two (2) days prior to the date that the Vendor applies for such Order(s), and, provided that such amendments are consistent with the terms set out herein, the Vendor will incorporate any reasonable amendments requested by the Purchaser or its solicitors.

ARTICLE 9 – CLOSING

9.1 Closing. The closing of the purchase and sale of the Purchased Assets will commence at 10:00 a.m. (Vancouver time) on the Closing Date as a virtual closing with documents to be exchanged electronically, or at such other time on the Closing Date or in such other format as may be agreed in writing by the Vendor and the Purchaser.

9.2 Vendor's Closing Documents. On or before the Closing Date, the Vendor will deliver, or cause the Vendor's Solicitors to deliver, to the Purchaser's Solicitors in trust to be held in escrow as provided in this Agreement, the following duly executed as applicable and all in a form satisfactory to the Purchaser, acting reasonably:

- (a) Court certified copy of the Final Order and any other Orders as are necessary, all in a form registrable in all necessary offices required to effect the transfer of the Purchased Assets;
- (b) letters from legal counsel to the Vendor to the Land Title Survey Authority or other agency as may be required by the Final Order;
- (c) a beneficial transfer conveying the beneficial interest in the Property to the Purchaser;
- (d) an assignment and assumption of Approved Contracts, Plans, Permits and Approvals wherein the Purchaser assumes the rights and obligations under the Approved Contracts and Plans, Permits and Approvals as of the Closing Date and the Purchaser indemnifies the Vendor for all Liability under the Approved Contracts and Plans, Permits and Approvals arising after the completion of the transactions contemplated herein and the Vendor retains all Liability under the Approved Contracts and Plans, Permits and Approvals arising prior to the Closing Date and

indemnifies the Purchaser for all Liability under the Approved Contracts and Plans, Permits and Approvals arising prior to the completion of the transactions contemplated herein;

- (e) an assignment and assumption of Permitted Encumbrances and Title Contracts;
- (f) an assignment and assumption of the Vendor's right, title and interest, in and to:
 - (i) subject to such transfer being approved by the necessary parties in accordance with Section 3.1(c)(i), the Intellectual Property; (ii) all insurance and new home warranties obtained in connection with the Project; and (iii) all marketing materials prepared in connection with the Project;
- (g) a bill of sale conveying the Chattels to the Purchaser;
- (h) a statement of adjustments pursuant to Article 5;
- (i) an assignment of all of the Vendor's rights under any and all Warranties wherein the Purchaser acquires all rights under the Warranties whether arising prior to or after the Closing Date;
- (j) in the event that a Reverse Vesting Order is granted: (i) a transfer of the Shares together with all resolutions, certificates and acknowledgements of the Limited Partnership and the GP as may be reasonably required by the Purchaser to effectively transfer the Shares; and (ii) an amendment to the LP Agreement effecting the change in the general partner from the GP to ShellCo, together with all supporting resolutions, certificates and acknowledgements of the Limited Partnership and the GP as may be reasonably required by the Purchaser;
- (k) a certificate dated as of the Closing Date of a senior officer of the GP, in its own capacity and as general partner of the Limited Partnership, having knowledge of the facts certifying, on behalf of the GP and the Limited Partnership and without personal liability, that the representations and warranties set out in Section 7.1 are true and correct in all material respects as at the Closing Date and that the Vendor's covenants and agreements to be observed or performed on or before the Closing Date pursuant to the terms of this Agreement have been duly observed and performed in all material respects;
- (l) a notice from the Vendor to the other parties under the Approved Contracts giving notice of the sale of the Property;
- (m) keys to all units and facilities of the Property to the extent required by the Purchaser; and
- (n) such other documents and assurances as may be reasonably required by the Purchaser to give full effect to the intent and meaning of this Agreement.

9.3 Purchaser's Closing Documents. On or before the Closing Date, the Purchaser will deliver, or cause the Purchaser's Solicitors to deliver, to the Vendor's Solicitors in trust to be held in escrow as provided in this Agreement, the following duly executed as applicable:

- (a) an assignment and assumption of Approved Contracts, Plans, Permits and Approvals;
- (b) an assignment and assumption of Permitted Encumbrances and Title Contracts;
- (c) an assignment and assumption of the Vendor's right, title and interest, in and to:
 - (i) subject to such transfer being approved by the necessary parties in accordance with Section 3.1(c)(i), the Intellectual Property; (ii) all insurance and new home warranties obtained in connection with the Project; and (iii) all marketing materials prepared in connection with the Project;
- (d) the GST Certificate;
- (e) a certificate dated as of the Closing Date of a senior officer of the Purchaser having knowledge of the facts certifying, on behalf of the Purchaser and without personal liability, that the representations and warranties set out in Section 7.3 are true and correct in all material respects as at the Closing Date and that the Purchaser's covenants and agreements to be observed or performed on or before the Closing Date pursuant to the terms of this Agreement have been duly observed and performed in all material respects; and
- (f) such other documents and assurances as may be reasonably required by the Vendor to give full effect to the intent and meaning of this Agreement.

9.4 Preparation and Form of Documents. The closing documents contemplated in Sections 9.2 and 9.3 (collectively, the "**Closing Documents**"), other than the statement of adjustments in Article 5, the materials required in connection with a Reverse Vesting Order set out in Section 9.2(j), if applicable, and the Final Order, will be prepared by the Purchaser's Solicitors and delivered to the Vendor's Solicitors at least five (5) Business Days before the Closing Date. The Closing Documents (including the statement of adjustments in Article 5, the materials required in connection with a Reverse Vesting Order set out in Section 9.2(j), if applicable, and the Final Order) will be in a form and substance reasonably satisfactory to the parties. The Vendor shall provide the Purchaser with drafts of all materials to be filed with the Court no later than two (2) days prior to the date of any hearing of the Court regarding the Final Order.

9.5 Payment into Trust. On or before the Closing Date, the Purchaser will pay to the Purchaser's Solicitors in trust, by way of certified cheque, bank draft, or wire transfer, funds in an amount equal to the Balance, as adjusted, less any amount to be advanced to the Purchaser on the Closing Date under any mortgage financing arranged by the Purchaser, as further described in Section 9.9.

9.6 Registration. On the Closing Date, after receipt by the Purchaser's Solicitors of the Closing Documents set out in Section 9.2 and the funds as set out in Section 9.5, and after receipt by the Vendor's Solicitors of the Closing Documents set out in Section 9.3, the Purchaser will cause the Purchaser's Solicitors to file the Final Order in the Land Title Office and any security documents applicable to any mortgage financing arranged by the Purchaser, as further described in Section 9.9.

9.7 Closing Escrow. All Closing Documents, funds, and other items delivered by the parties, except the Final Order (which will be dealt with pursuant to Section 9.6), will be held in trust by

the Vendor's Solicitors and the Purchaser's Solicitors until completion of closing on the Closing Date in accordance with this Agreement. Promptly after the filings set out in Section 9.6 and a satisfactory post filing for registration search has been received by the Purchaser's Solicitors showing that title to the Property will be registered in the name of the Purchaser free and clear of all Encumbrances except for the Permitted Encumbrances or any Encumbrances granted by or claimed through the Purchaser, the Closing Documents will be released to the appropriate parties and the Purchaser will cause the Purchaser's Solicitors to pay the Purchase Price, as adjusted, to the Vendor's Solicitors by way of wire transfer.

9.8 Concurrent Requirements. It is a condition of the closing that all matters of payment, execution and delivery of documents by each party to the other and the filing of documents in the Land Title Office as set out in Section 9.6, all pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, will be deemed to be concurrent requirements and it is specifically agreed that nothing will be complete at the closing until everything required as a condition precedent at the closing has been paid, executed and delivered and all filings set out in Section 9.6 have been completed.

9.9 Purchaser's Financing. If the Purchaser is relying upon a new mortgage to finance the purchase of the Purchased Assets, the Purchaser, while still required to pay the Purchase Price on the Closing Date, may wait to pay the Purchase Price until after the Final Order and new mortgage documents have been filed in the Land Title Office and after receipt of the proceeds of such mortgage financing, but only if, before such filing, the Purchaser has:

- (a) made available for tender to the Vendor that portion of the Purchase Price not secured by the new mortgage;
- (b) fulfilled all the new mortgagee's conditions for funding except filing the mortgage for registration; and
- (c) made available to the Vendor, a lawyer's undertaking to pay the Purchase Price upon the filing of the Final Order and new mortgage documents and the advance by the mortgagee of the mortgage proceeds.

9.10 Payment by Wire Transfer. Notwithstanding anything else contained herein, provided the Purchaser's Solicitors have initiated the wire transfer for the balance of the Purchase Price, as adjusted, to the Vendor's Solicitors on the Closing Date, and provided the Vendor's Solicitors with written confirmation thereof, the Purchaser will be deemed to have paid the balance of the Purchase Price, as adjusted, due to the Vendor if such amount is credited to the Vendor's Solicitors account by 11:00 a.m. (Vancouver time) on the first Business Day following the Closing Date without interest or penalty. If such amount is not received by 11:00 a.m. (Vancouver time) on the first Business Day following the Closing Date, the Purchaser will pay to the Vendor interest at the rate of the prime rate of interest designated from time to time by Royal Bank of Canada plus 3% per annum on such amount until such time as it is received by the Vendor.

9.11 Termination.

- (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, if the transactions contemplated by this Agreement do not complete on or prior to July 30, 2021, other than as a result of the default of the Purchaser, then the Purchaser may terminate this Agreement with written notice delivered to the Vendor without any further liability and the Deposit and interest (if any) shall be returned to the Purchaser.

- (b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, if the transactions contemplated by this Agreement do not complete on or prior to July 30, 2021, other than as a result of the default of the Vendor, then the Vendor may terminate this Agreement with written notice delivered to the Purchaser without any further liability and the Deposit and interest (if any) shall be returned to the Purchaser.

ARTICLE 10 – TAXES

10.1 GST. The Purchaser represents and warrants to Vendor that it is and will be, as of the closing on the Closing Date, registered for the purposes of Part IX of the *Excise Tax Act* (Canada) (the “**ETA**”) in accordance with the requirements of Subdivision D of Division V of the ETA and will assume responsibility to account for, report and remit any goods and services tax and harmonized sales tax (collectively, the “**GST**”) payable under the ETA in connection with the transaction contemplated in this Agreement. On the Closing Date, the Purchaser will deliver to the Vendor a certificate (the “**GST Certificate**”) of a senior officer of the Purchaser certifying, on behalf of the Purchaser and without personal liability (a) that the Purchaser is registered under Part IX of the ETA as of the Closing Date; (b) its registration number; and (c) that the Purchaser will account for, report and remit any GST payable in respect of the purchase of the Purchased Assets in accordance with the ETA. If the Purchaser delivers such GST Certificate, then the Purchaser will not be required to pay to the Vendor, and the Vendor will not be required to collect from the Purchaser nor report or remit, any GST in connection with the transaction contemplated in this Agreement. The Purchaser shall indemnify and hold the Vendor and its directors, officers, employees, advisors and agents harmless from any liability under the ETA arising as a result of any breach of this Section, the GST Certificate or any declaration made therein and such indemnity shall survive the completion of the transactions contemplated herein.

10.2 Provincial Sales Tax. The Purchaser acknowledges that it may be liable to pay provincial sales tax in respect of some or all of the Chattels and, if required, it will report and remit as required by applicable law any such sales tax that is due directly to the applicable taxing authority. The Purchaser shall indemnify and hold the Vendor and its directors, officers, employees, advisors and agents harmless from any liability related to the Vendor’s failure to account for, report and remit such provincial sales tax and such indemnity shall survive the completion of the transactions contemplated herein.

10.3 Tax Elections. Notwithstanding the above, the Vendor will cooperate with the Purchaser to execute any election available under applicable law that may reduce or defer the amount or due date of any GST or other tax payable by the Purchaser provided such election will not result in any increased cost or tax liability for the Vendor.

10.4 Other Taxes. The Purchaser shall be responsible for all transfer taxes (subject to an adjustment to the Purchase Price in accordance with Section 5.4), fees and expenses in connection with the registration of the Final Order or transfer of the Purchased Assets.

10.5 Preparation of Tax Returns After Closing. In the event that a Reverse Vesting Order is granted by the Court and the Purchaser acquires the Shares (along with the balance of the Purchased Assets), the Vendor agrees that forthwith following closing on the Closing Date the Vendor will, in consultation with the Purchaser and the Purchaser’s professional advisors and accountants, cause income tax and other tax returns consequent to the closing to be prepared for the GP. The Purchaser will be responsible for all reasonable costs related to the preparation and filing of these returns along with the costs of the Purchaser’s own accountant and other consultants in reviewing the same. The Vendor will also provide reasonable assistance in

preparing and filing all financial statements, tax returns and other documents required by law in respect of any government charges or in respect of any federal, provincial, municipal or other taxing statute for fiscal periods of the GP ending for tax purposes on or before the Closing Date.

ARTICLE 11 – GENERAL

11.1 Further Assurances. Each of the parties will execute and deliver all such further documents and do such further acts and things as may be reasonably required from time to time to give effect to this Agreement.

11.2 No Merger. The execution and delivery of the Closing Documents is not intended to and will not in any way merge or otherwise restrict the terms, covenants, conditions, representations, warranties or provisions made or to be performed or observed by the parties contained in this Agreement other than the obligation to deliver the Closing Documents.

11.3 Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the Vendor and the Purchaser pertaining to the purchase and sale of the Purchased Assets and supersedes all prior agreements and undertakings, negotiations and discussions, whether oral or written, of the Vendor and the Purchaser, including, for certainty, the LOI, and there are no representations, warranties, covenants or agreements between the Vendor and Purchaser except as set out in this Agreement.

11.4 Amendment. Subject to Section 11.5, this Agreement may only be altered or amended by an agreement in writing executed by all of the parties.

11.5 Solicitors as Agents. Any notice, approval, waiver, agreement, instrument, document or communication permitted, required or contemplated in this Agreement may be given or delivered and accepted or received by the Purchaser's Solicitors, on behalf of the Purchaser, and by the Vendor's Solicitors, on behalf of the Vendor, and any tender of Closing Documents and the Purchase Price may be made upon the Vendor's Solicitors and the Purchaser's Solicitors, as the case may be.

11.6 Notices. Any notice, document or communication required or permitted to be given under this Agreement will be in writing and delivered by hand or electronic transmission as follows:

(a) if to the Purchaser:

Landa Global Acquisitions Ltd.
1550 – 200 Burrard Street
Vancouver, BC, V6C 3L6

Attention: Kevin Cheung
E-mail: kevin@landaglobal.com

with a further copy to the Purchaser's Solicitors:

Lawson Lundell LLP
Suite 1600 Cathedral Place
925 West Georgia Street
Vancouver, BC V6C 3L2

Attention: Maxwell P. Carroll
E-mail: mcarroll@lawsonlundell.com

(b) if to the Vendor:

Port Capital Development (EV) Inc. / Evergreen House Development Limited
Partnership
c/o Ernst & Young Inc.
700 West Georgia Street
Vancouver, BC V7Y 1C7

Attention: Mike Bell
E-mail: mike.bell@parthenon.ey.com

with a further copy to the Vendor's Solicitors:

Bennett Jones LLP
666 Burrard Street, Suite 2500
Vancouver, BC V6C 2X8

Attention: David Gruber and Mark Lewis
E-mail: gruberd@bennettjones.com; lewismv@bennettjones.com

with a further copy to the Monitor's Solicitors:

Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP
595 Burrard Street, P.O. Box 49314,
Suite 2600, Three Bentall Centre
Vancouver, BC V7X 1L3

Attention: Peter Rubin and Greg Umbach
E-mail: peter.rubin@blakes.com; greg.umbach@blakes.com

or to such other address in Canada as either party may in writing advise. Any notice, document or communication will be deemed to have been given on the Business Day when delivered by hand if delivered prior to 5 p.m. (Vancouver time), otherwise will be deemed to be delivered and received on the next Business Day; or, if made by email, shall be deemed to have been given on the Business Day when transmitted if it is so transmitted prior to 5 p.m. (Vancouver time) on the day of transmittal, otherwise will be deemed to be given and received on the next Business Day.

11.7 Fees. Each of the parties will pay its own legal fees and fees of its consultants. The Purchaser will pay all registration costs and property transfer tax payable in connection with its purchase of the Purchased Assets, subject to an adjustment to the Purchase Price in accordance with Section 5.4.

11.8 Real Estate Commissions. Each of the Vendor and the Purchaser represents and warrants that it has not made any agreement with any real estate agent or broker regarding payment of any commission in respect of the purchase and sale of the Purchased Assets.

11.9 Waiver of Site Disclosure Statement. The Purchaser waives any right it may have to be provided with, and any requirement for the Vendor to provide, a site disclosure statement for the Property under the *Environmental Management Act* (British Columbia) and the regulations under that act.

11.10 Time. Time is of the essence of this Agreement. If anything is required to be done under this Agreement on a day which is not a Business Day, the same shall be done on the next following Business Day.

11.11 Tender. Unless otherwise set out herein, any tender of documents or money may be made upon the party being tendered or upon its solicitors and money will be tendered by certified cheque, bank draft, or wire transfer.

11.12 Enurement. This Agreement will enure to the benefit of and be binding upon the parties and their respective successors and permitted assigns.

11.13 Force Majeure. If by reason of Excusable Delay, the Vendor or Purchaser is delayed in performing or observing a covenant or obligation hereunder which is to be performed or observed (the "**Specified Date**"), or if either the Purchaser or the Vendor is delayed in satisfying or waiving any of the conditions precedent set out in Sections 8.1, 8.4 or 8.6, the applicable Specified Date will be extended by a period of time equal to the duration of the Excusable Delay, provided that the Vendor or Purchaser, as applicable, notifies the other party in writing prior to the applicable Specified Date, and such notice sets out in detail the date of the commencement and nature of such circumstances (the "**Delay Notice**"), and provided further that the party giving the Delay Notice uses its commercially reasonable efforts to render performance in a timely manner utilizing to such end commercially reasonable and available resources required in the circumstances. If the duration of the Excusable Delay exceeds 60 days from the date of giving a Delay Notice, the party receiving such Delay Notice may terminate this Agreement forthwith, notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, by giving written notice of termination to the other party, in which event the parties shall have no further obligations to one another. In determining whether delay is excusable, the party giving the Delay Notice shall be held to a commercially reasonable standard and not to a best efforts standard.

11.14 Assignment. The Purchaser will be entitled to assign its rights and obligations under this Agreement on prior written notice to, but without the consent of the Vendor to an affiliate (within the meaning of the *Business Corporations Act* (British Columbia)) of the Purchaser or to a limited partnership in which the general partner is an affiliate (within the meaning of the *Business Corporations Act* (British Columbia)) of the Purchaser if: (i) the Purchaser delivers written notice of such assignment to the Vendor; (ii) the assignee enters into an agreement pursuant to which the assignee agrees to be bound by all of the obligations and Liability of the Purchaser under this Agreement as if it was the original Purchaser; (iii) the Purchaser is not released from its obligations and Liability under this Agreement until the completion of the transactions contemplated in this Agreement, at which time the assignor will be automatically released from all of its obligations and Liability under this Agreement without the need for any further deliveries or instruments of release; and (iv) such assignment is completed not less than ten (10) Business Days prior to the Closing Date. The Purchaser will not otherwise be entitled to assign its rights and obligations

under this Agreement except with the prior written consent of the Vendor, such consent may be arbitrarily withheld or delayed by the Vendor.

11.15 Governing Law. This Agreement will be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Province of British Columbia and the laws of Canada applicable in it.

11.16 Waiver. No waiver of any of the provisions of this Agreement will be deemed or will constitute a waiver of any other provision nor will any waiver constitute a continuing waiver unless otherwise expressed or provided.

11.17 Confidentiality. Except as may be required in the CCAA Proceedings, the parties will not disclose the existence of nor the contents of this Agreement to any third party, except their respective directors, officers, employees, agents or advisors, including lawyers, accountants, consultants, bankers and financial advisors (collectively, the “**Authorized Parties**”), without the prior written consent of the other party, not to be unreasonably withheld, provided that such consent is not required in the case of disclosure required by law or disclosure by either party to enforce any of its rights under this Agreement or to obtain necessary consents under this Agreement. The parties will instruct their respective Authorized Parties to comply with the provisions of this Section 11.17 and the parties will be responsible for any breach of the provisions of this Section 11.17 by their respective Authorized Parties. This Section 11.17 does not apply to public information or information in the public domain at the time that such information is obtained, information in the possession of a party not provided by the other party, or information received in good faith from a third party lawfully in possession of the information and not in breach of any confidentiality obligation. The obligations under this Section 11.17 shall terminate as of the second anniversary of the date of this Agreement. The provisions of this Section 11.17 shall supersede the confidentiality provisions of the LOI and any non-disclosure or confidentiality agreements entered into by the parties with respect to the Purchased Assets and the transactions contemplated in this Agreement.

11.18 Public Announcement. The parties agree that no disclosure or announcement, public or otherwise shall be made concerning this Agreement or the transactions contemplated hereunder without the prior consent of both parties, except as otherwise required by applicable law, regulation or regulatory authority or stock exchange rules or requirements. The parties shall consult and cooperate with each other with respect to any proposed announcement of the transactions contemplated hereunder.

11.19 No Registration. The Purchaser will not register this Agreement or notice of this Agreement against title to the Property.

11.20 Currency. All dollar amounts referred to are Canadian dollars.

11.21 Construction. The division and headings of this Agreement are for reference only and are not to affect construction or interpretation.

11.22 Counterparts and Execution. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts and delivered by electronic transmission including by PDF format, and each such counterpart will constitute an original and all such counterparts together will constitute one and the same agreement.

11.23 Schedules. The following schedules are attached to and form a part of this Agreement:

Schedule A – Legal Description and Permitted Encumbrances

[Signature pages follow]

The parties are signing this Agreement as of the date set out above.

**ERNST & YOUNG INC. in its capacity as the
Monitor of EVERGREEN HOUSE DEVELOPMENT
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, by its general partner,
PORT CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT (EV) INC., and
not in its personal capacity**

DocuSigned by:
By: Mike Bell
Name: Mike Bell
Title: Senior Vice President, Ernst & Young
Inc.

**ERNST & YOUNG INC. in its capacity as the
Monitor of PORT CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT (EV)
INC., and not in its personal capacity**

DocuSigned by:
By: Mike Bell
Name: Mike Bell
Title: Senior Vice President, Ernst & Young
Inc.

LANDA GLOBAL ACQUISITIONS LTD.

By: _____

Name: Kevin Cheung

Title: Authorized Signatory

By: _____

Name:

Title: Authorized Signatory

SCHEDULE A
LEGAL DESCRIPTION AND PERMITTED ENCUMBRANCES

Part 1 – Legal Description of Lands

PID: 006-721-397; LOT 18, EXCEPT THAT PART OF THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY AS DESCRIBED IN ABSOLUTE FEE PARCELS BOOK, VOLUME 9, FOLIO 317, NO. 1154C, AND EXCEPT THE SOUTH 7 FEET NOW ROAD, BLOCK 29 DISTRICT LOT 185 PLAN 92

Part 2 – Permitted Encumbrances

- (a) the reservations, limitations, provisions or conditions expressed in the original grants from the Crown of any of the Lands and the statutory exceptions to title currently applicable to the Lands;
- (b) a claim of right, title or jurisdiction which may be made or established by any aboriginal peoples by virtue of their status as aboriginal peoples to or over any Lands;
- (c) liens for taxes, assessments, rates, duties, charges or levies not at the time due, which relate to obligations or Liability assumed by the Purchaser; and
- (d) the Encumbrances listed below in respect of the Lands.

Legal Notations

- 1. Easement No. BP238635

Charges, Liens and Interests

- 1. Restrictive Covenant No. R18424
- 2. Easement and Indemnity Agreement No. J7909
- 3. Easement No. BP238634

Appendix B

In the matter of the CCAA of Port Capital Development (EV) Inc. and Evergreen House Development Limited Partnership
Weekly Cash Flow Projection for the Period April 3, 2021 to June 11, 2021
\$CAD

	Week Ending	1 9-Apr-21 Forecast	2 16-Apr-21 Forecast	3 23-Apr-21 Forecast	4 30-Apr-21 Forecast	5 7-May-21 Forecast	6 14-May-21 Forecast	7 21-May-21 Forecast	8 28-May-21 Forecast	9 4-Jun-21 Forecast	10 11-Jun-21 Forecast	Total
Receipts												
Refund from BC Hydro	1	218,335	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	218,335
GST Refund	2	-	-	-	-	34,139	-	-	-	-	-	34,139
		218,335	-	-	-	34,139	-	-	-	-	-	252,474
Disbursements												
Insurance	3	-	-	(76,470)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(76,470)
Site preservation	4	(2,054)	(6,233)	-	(10,731)	-	-	-	(10,731)	-	-	(29,749)
Glass storage costs	5	(6,549)	-	-	(6,549)	-	-	-	(6,549)	-	-	(19,647)
Consultants - city requirements	6	(1,486)	-	-	(2,235)	-	-	-	(2,235)	-	-	(5,956)
Crane lease	7	(8,085)	-	-	(8,085)	-	-	-	(8,085)	-	-	(24,255)
Permit costs	8	(1,476)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(1,476)
General, admin & miscellaneous expenses	9	(2,404)	(13,600)	(8,500)	(7,899)	(3,250)	(1,000)	(1,000)	(7,899)	(3,250)	(1,000)	(49,803)
Contingency	10	-	(7,500)	(7,500)	(7,500)	(7,500)	(7,500)	(7,500)	(7,500)	(7,500)	(7,500)	(67,500)
		(22,055)	(27,333)	(92,470)	(42,999)	(10,750)	(8,500)	(8,500)	(42,999)	(10,750)	(8,500)	(274,857)
Restructuring Disbursements												
Restructuring costs	11	-	(30,769)	(84,679)	(12,000)	(12,000)	(12,000)	(12,000)	(12,000)	(12,000)	(12,000)	(199,448)
Brokerage work fee	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	(30,769)	(84,679)	(12,000)	(12,000)	(12,000)	(12,000)	(12,000)	(12,000)	(12,000)	(199,448)
Net Cash Flow												
		196,280	(58,102)	(177,149)	(54,999)	11,389	(20,500)	(20,500)	(54,999)	(22,750)	(20,500)	(221,831)
Cash Balance												
Opening Available Cash Balance		27,219	223,498	165,396	88,247	33,248	44,637	24,137	110,637	55,637	32,887	27,219
Net Cash Flow		196,280	(58,102)	(177,149)	(54,999)	11,389	(20,500)	(20,500)	(54,999)	(22,750)	(20,500)	(221,831)
DIP Draw/(Payback)		-	-	100,000	-	-	-	107,000	-	-	-	207,000
Closing Available Cash Balance		223,498	165,396	88,247	33,248	44,637	24,137	110,637	55,637	32,887	12,387	12,387
DIP Balance												
Opening Balance		1,250,000	1,262,740	1,265,646	1,368,558	1,371,708	1,374,865	1,378,029	1,488,200	1,491,625	1,495,058	1,250,000
Draw/(Payback)		-	-	100,000	-	-	-	107,000	-	-	-	207,000
Legal Fees	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Commitment Fee		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DIP Interest	13	12,740	2,906	2,913	3,150	3,157	3,164	3,171	3,425	3,433	3,441	41,500
DIP Balance		1,262,740	1,265,646	1,368,558	1,371,708	1,374,865	1,378,029	1,488,200	1,491,625	1,495,058	1,498,499	1,498,500

In the Matter of CCAA of the Port Capital Development (EV) Inc. and Evergreen House Development Limited Partnership (the “Petitioners”)

Notes to the Unaudited Cash Flow Forecast of the Petitioners

Disclaimer:

In preparing this cash flow forecast (the “**Cash Flow Forecast**”), the Petitioners have relied upon unaudited financial information and the Petitioners have not attempted to further verify the accuracy or completeness of such information. The Cash Flow Forecast includes estimates concerning the operations of the Petitioners and additional assumptions discussed below with respect to the requirements and impact of a Companies’ Creditor Arrangement Act (“**CCAA**”) filing. Since the Cash Flow Forecast is based on assumptions about future events and conditions that are not ascertainable, the actual results achieved during the Cash Flow Forecast period will vary from the Cash Flow Forecast, even if the assumptions materialize, and such variation may be material. There is no representation, warranty or other assurance that any of the estimates, forecasts or projections will be realized.

The Cash Flow Forecast includes the receipts and disbursements of all the Petitioners during the Cash Flow Forecast Period (the “**Period**”). Ernst & Young Inc., in its capacity as the Monitor of the Petitioners (the “**Monitor**”), with the assistance of the Petitioners, have prepared the Cash Flow Forecast based primarily on estimated receipts and disbursements related to the CCAA proceedings and the ongoing construction project (Terrace House).

The Cash Flow Forecast assumes that the Petitioners obtain a stay of proceedings under the CCAA until June 11, 2021. The Cash Flow Forecast covers the period from April 3, 2021 to June 11, 2021 (the “**Period**”).

1. **Refund from BC Hydro:** an estimated refund for a deposit held by BC Hydro for design fees associated with a proposed electrical systems for the Terrace House Project.
2. **GST Refund:** The estimated refund for GST paid on disbursements incurred during these CCAA proceedings.
3. **Insurance:** Amount has been estimated for a renewal of site specific insurance policies based on historical run rates.
4. **Site Preservation:** Includes site security, scaffolding and fence rental and other items related to site preservation.
5. **Glass Storage Costs:** Costs associated with the storage of acquired glass and related materials.
6. **Consultants – City Requirements:** Represents management’s estimates of required cash outlay to meet basic city requirements.
7. **Crane Lease** – Costs associated with the lease for the crane that remains on site.
8. **Permit Costs** – Costs associated with City of Vancouver permitting required for site preservation.

- 9. General, Admin & Miscellaneous Expenses:** Includes equipment repairs & maintenance, office expenses, showroom lease costs and other miscellaneous items. These have been estimated based on historical run rates.
- 10. Contingency:** A small weekly contingency is built into the Cash Flow Forecast for unforeseen expenses.
- 11. Restructuring Costs:** Represents professional fee payments to counsel to the Petitioners, the Monitor and the Monitor's counsel.
- 12. Brokerage Fee:** Represents fees paid to a brokerage firm to market and solicit offers pursuant to the sale and investment solicitation process.
- 13. DIP Interest and Fees:** Interest, legal, and other fees associated with the DIP facility.



CANADA

CONSOLIDATION

CODIFICATION

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies

R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36

L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-36

Current to March 23, 2021

À jour au 23 mars 2021

Last amended on November 1, 2019

Dernière modification le 1 novembre 2019

available to any person specified in the order on any terms or conditions that the court considers appropriate.

R.S., 1985, c. C-36, s. 10; 2005, c. 47, s. 127.

General power of court

11 Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

R.S., 1985, c. C-36, s. 11; 1992, c. 27, s. 90; 1996, c. 6, s. 167; 1997, c. 12, s. 124; 2005, c. 47, s. 128.

Relief reasonably necessary

11.001 An order made under section 11 at the same time as an order made under subsection 11.02(1) or during the period referred to in an order made under that subsection with respect to an initial application shall be limited to relief that is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that period.

2019, c. 29, s. 136.

Rights of suppliers

11.01 No order made under section 11 or 11.02 has the effect of

(a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided after the order is made; or

(b) requiring the further advance of money or credit.

2005, c. 47, s. 128.

Stays, etc. — initial application

11.02 (1) A court may, on an initial application in respect of a debtor company, make an order on any terms that it may impose, effective for the period that the court considers necessary, which period may not be more than 10 days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*;

peut être communiqué, aux conditions qu'il estime indiquées, à la personne qu'il nomme.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-36, art. 10; 2005, ch. 47, art. 127.

Pouvoir général du tribunal

11 Malgré toute disposition de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* ou de la *Loi sur les liquidations et les restructurations*, le tribunal peut, dans le cas de toute demande sous le régime de la présente loi à l'égard d'une compagnie débitrice, rendre, sur demande d'un intéressé, mais sous réserve des restrictions prévues par la présente loi et avec ou sans avis, toute ordonnance qu'il estime indiquée.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-36, art. 11; 1992, ch. 27, art. 90; 1996, ch. 6, art. 167; 1997, ch. 12, art. 124; 2005, ch. 47, art. 128.

Redressements normalement nécessaires

11.001 L'ordonnance rendue au titre de l'article 11 en même temps que l'ordonnance rendue au titre du paragraphe 11.02(1) ou pendant la période visée dans l'ordonnance rendue au titre de ce paragraphe relativement à la demande initiale n'est limitée qu'aux redressements normalement nécessaires à la continuation de l'exploitation de la compagnie débitrice dans le cours ordinaire de ses affaires durant cette période.

2019, ch. 29, art. 136.

Droits des fournisseurs

11.01 L'ordonnance prévue aux articles 11 ou 11.02 ne peut avoir pour effet :

a) d'empêcher une personne d'exiger que soient effectués sans délai les paiements relatifs à la fourniture de marchandises ou de services, à l'utilisation de biens loués ou faisant l'objet d'une licence ou à la fourniture de toute autre contrepartie de valeur qui ont lieu après l'ordonnance;

b) d'exiger le versement de nouvelles avances de fonds ou de nouveaux crédits.

2005, ch. 47, art. 128.

Suspension : demande initiale

11.02 (1) Dans le cas d'une demande initiale visant une compagnie débitrice, le tribunal peut, par ordonnance, aux conditions qu'il peut imposer et pour la période maximale de dix jours qu'il estime nécessaire :

a) suspendre, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, toute procédure qui est ou pourrait être intentée contre la compagnie sous le régime de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* ou de la *Loi sur les liquidations et les restructurations*;

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

Stays, etc. — other than initial application

(2) A court may, on an application in respect of a debtor company other than an initial application, make an order, on any terms that it may impose,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for any period that the court considers necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in paragraph (1)(a);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

Burden of proof on application

(3) The court shall not make the order unless

(a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and

(b) in the case of an order under subsection (2), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

Restriction

(4) Orders doing anything referred to in subsection (1) or (2) may only be made under this section.

2005, c. 47, s. 128, 2007, c. 36, s. 62(F); 2019, c. 29, s. 137.

Stays — directors

11.03 (1) An order made under section 11.02 may provide that no person may commence or continue any action against a director of the company on any claim against directors that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relates to obligations of the company if directors are under any law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of those obligations, until a compromise or an arrangement in respect of the company, if one is filed, is sanctioned by the court or is refused by the creditors or the court.

(b) surseoir, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, à la continuation de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie;

(c) interdire, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, l'introduction de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie.

Suspension : demandes autres qu'initiales

(2) Dans le cas d'une demande, autre qu'une demande initiale, visant une compagnie débitrice, le tribunal peut, par ordonnance, aux conditions qu'il peut imposer et pour la période qu'il estime nécessaire :

(a) suspendre, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, toute procédure qui est ou pourrait être intentée contre la compagnie sous le régime des lois mentionnées à l'alinéa (1)a);

(b) surseoir, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, à la continuation de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie;

(c) interdire, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, l'introduction de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie.

Preuve

(3) Le tribunal ne rend l'ordonnance que si :

(a) le demandeur le convainc que la mesure est opportune;

(b) dans le cas de l'ordonnance visée au paragraphe (2), le demandeur le convainc en outre qu'il a agi et continue d'agir de bonne foi et avec la diligence voulue.

Restriction

(4) L'ordonnance qui prévoit l'une des mesures visées aux paragraphes (1) ou (2) ne peut être rendue qu'en vertu du présent article.

2005, ch. 47, art. 128, 2007, ch. 36, art. 62(F); 2019, ch. 29, art. 137.

Suspension — administrateurs

11.03 (1) L'ordonnance prévue à l'article 11.02 peut interdire l'introduction ou la continuation de toute action contre les administrateurs de la compagnie relativement aux réclamations qui sont antérieures aux procédures intentées sous le régime de la présente loi et visent des obligations de la compagnie dont ils peuvent être, ès qualités, responsables en droit, tant que la transaction ou l'arrangement, le cas échéant, n'a pas été homologué par le tribunal ou rejeté par celui-ci ou les créanciers.

Restriction on disposition of business assets

36 (1) A debtor company in respect of which an order has been made under this Act may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.

Notice to creditors

(2) A company that applies to the court for an authorization is to give notice of the application to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the proposed sale or disposition.

Factors to be considered

(3) In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other things,

- (a)** whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
- (b)** whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
- (c)** whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
- (d)** the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
- (e)** the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
- (f)** whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

Additional factors — related persons

(4) If the proposed sale or disposition is to a person who is related to the company, the court may, after considering the factors referred to in subsection (3), grant the authorization only if it is satisfied that

- (a)** good faith efforts were made to sell or otherwise dispose of the assets to persons who are not related to the company; and
- (b)** the consideration to be received is superior to the consideration that would be received under any other

Restriction à la disposition d'actifs

36 (1) Il est interdit à la compagnie débitrice à l'égard de laquelle une ordonnance a été rendue sous le régime de la présente loi de disposer, notamment par vente, d'actifs hors du cours ordinaire de ses affaires sans l'autorisation du tribunal. Le tribunal peut accorder l'autorisation sans qu'il soit nécessaire d'obtenir l'acquiescement des actionnaires, et ce malgré toute exigence à cet effet, notamment en vertu d'une règle de droit fédérale ou provinciale.

Avis aux créanciers

(2) La compagnie qui demande l'autorisation au tribunal en avise les créanciers garantis qui peuvent vraisemblablement être touchés par le projet de disposition.

Facteurs à prendre en considération

(3) Pour décider s'il accorde l'autorisation, le tribunal prend en considération, entre autres, les facteurs suivants :

- a)** la justification des circonstances ayant mené au projet de disposition;
- b)** l'acquiescement du contrôleur au processus ayant mené au projet de disposition, le cas échéant;
- c)** le dépôt par celui-ci d'un rapport précisant que, à son avis, la disposition sera plus avantageuse pour les créanciers que si elle était faite dans le cadre de la faillite;
- d)** la suffisance des consultations menées auprès des créanciers;
- e)** les effets du projet de disposition sur les droits de tout intéressé, notamment les créanciers;
- f)** le caractère juste et raisonnable de la contrepartie reçue pour les actifs compte tenu de leur valeur marchande.

Autres facteurs

(4) Si la compagnie projette de disposer d'actifs en faveur d'une personne à laquelle elle est liée, le tribunal, après avoir pris ces facteurs en considération, ne peut accorder l'autorisation que s'il est convaincu :

- a)** d'une part, que les efforts voulus ont été faits pour disposer des actifs en faveur d'une personne qui n'est pas liée à la compagnie;
- b)** d'autre part, que la contrepartie offerte pour les actifs est plus avantageuse que celle qui découlerait de

offer made in accordance with the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition.

Related persons

(5) For the purpose of subsection (4), a person who is related to the company includes

- (a)** a director or officer of the company;
- (b)** a person who has or has had, directly or indirectly, control in fact of the company; and
- (c)** a person who is related to a person described in paragraph (a) or (b).

Assets may be disposed of free and clear

(6) The court may authorize a sale or disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it shall also order that other assets of the company or the proceeds of the sale or disposition be subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by the order.

Restriction — employers

(7) The court may grant the authorization only if the court is satisfied that the company can and will make the payments that would have been required under paragraphs 6(5)(a) and (6)(a) if the court had sanctioned the compromise or arrangement.

Restriction — intellectual property

(8) If, on the day on which an order is made under this Act in respect of the company, the company is a party to an agreement that grants to another party a right to use intellectual property that is included in a sale or disposition authorized under subsection (6), that sale or disposition does not affect that other party's right to use the intellectual property — including the other party's right to enforce an exclusive use — during the term of the agreement, including any period for which the other party extends the agreement as of right, as long as the other party continues to perform its obligations under the agreement in relation to the use of the intellectual property.

2005, c. 47, s. 131; 2007, c. 36, s. 78; 2017, c. 26, s. 14; 2018, c. 27, s. 269.

toute autre offre reçue dans le cadre du projet de disposition.

Personnes liées

(5) Pour l'application du paragraphe (4), les personnes ci-après sont considérées comme liées à la compagnie :

- a)** le dirigeant ou l'administrateur de celle-ci;
- b)** la personne qui, directement ou indirectement, en a ou en a eu le contrôle de fait;
- c)** la personne liée à toute personne visée aux alinéas a) ou b).

Autorisation de disposer des actifs en les libérant de restrictions

(6) Le tribunal peut autoriser la disposition d'actifs de la compagnie, purgés de toute charge, sûreté ou autre restriction, et, le cas échéant, est tenu d'assujettir le produit de la disposition ou d'autres de ses actifs à une charge, sûreté ou autre restriction en faveur des créanciers touchés par la purge.

Restriction à l'égard des employeurs

(7) Il ne peut autoriser la disposition que s'il est convaincu que la compagnie est en mesure d'effectuer et effectuera les paiements qui auraient été exigés en vertu des alinéas 6(5)a) et (6)a) s'il avait homologué la transaction ou l'arrangement.

Restriction à l'égard de la propriété intellectuelle

(8) Si, à la date à laquelle une ordonnance est rendue à son égard sous le régime de la présente loi, la compagnie est partie à un contrat qui autorise une autre partie à utiliser un droit de propriété intellectuelle qui est compris dans la disposition d'actifs autorisée en vertu du paragraphe (6), cette disposition n'empêche pas l'autre partie d'utiliser le droit en question ni d'en faire respecter l'utilisation exclusive, à condition que cette autre partie respecte ses obligations contractuelles à l'égard de l'utilisation de ce droit, et ce, pour la période prévue au contrat et pour toute prolongation de celle-ci dont elle se prévaut de plein droit.

2005, ch. 47, art. 131; 2007, ch. 36, art. 78; 2017, ch. 26, art. 14; 2018, ch. 27, art. 269.

Preferences and Transfers at Undervalue

Application of sections 38 and 95 to 101 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*

36.1 (1) Sections 38 and 95 to 101 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* apply, with any modifications that the circumstances require, in respect of a compromise or arrangement unless the compromise or arrangement provides otherwise.

Interpretation

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a reference in sections 38 and 95 to 101 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*

(a) to “date of the bankruptcy” is to be read as a reference to “day on which proceedings commence under this Act”;

(b) to “trustee” is to be read as a reference to “monitor”; and

(c) to “bankrupt”, “insolvent person” or “debtor” is to be read as a reference to “debtor company”.

2005, c. 47, s. 131; 2007, c. 36, s. 78.

Her Majesty

Deemed trusts

37 (1) Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

Exceptions

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a “federal provision”), nor does it apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province if

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law

Traitements préférentiels et opérations sous-évaluées

Application des articles 38 et 95 à 101 de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*

36.1 (1) Les articles 38 et 95 à 101 de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* s'appliquent, avec les adaptations nécessaires, à la transaction ou à l'arrangement sauf disposition contraire de ceux-ci.

Interprétation

(2) Pour l'application du paragraphe (1), la mention, aux articles 38 et 95 à 101 de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*, de la date de la faillite vaut mention de la date à laquelle une procédure a été intentée sous le régime de la présente loi, celle du syndic vaut mention du contrôleur et celle du failli, de la personne insolvable ou du débiteur vaut mention de la compagnie débitrice.

2005, ch. 47, art. 131; 2007, ch. 36, art. 78.

Sa Majesté

Fiducies présumées

37 (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2) et par dérogation à toute disposition législative fédérale ou provinciale ayant pour effet d'assimiler certains biens à des biens détenus en fiducie pour Sa Majesté, aucun des biens de la compagnie débitrice ne peut être considéré comme tel par le seul effet d'une telle disposition.

Exceptions

(2) Le paragraphe (1) ne s'applique pas à l'égard des sommes réputées détenues en fiducie aux termes des paragraphes 227(4) ou (4.1) de la *Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu*, des paragraphes 23(3) ou (4) du *Régime de pensions du Canada* ou des paragraphes 86(2) ou (2.1) de la *Loi sur l'assurance-emploi* (chacun étant appelé « disposition fédérale » au présent paragraphe) ou à l'égard des sommes réputées détenues en fiducie aux termes de toute loi d'une province créant une fiducie présumée dans le seul but d'assurer à Sa Majesté du chef de cette province la remise de sommes déduites ou retenues aux termes d'une loi de cette province, si, dans ce dernier cas, se réalise l'une des conditions suivantes :

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Citation: *Quest University Canada (Re)*,
2020 BCSC 1845

Date: 20201126
Docket: S200586
Registry: Vancouver

In the Matter of the **COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C.**
1985, c. C-36, as amended

- and -

In the Matter of the **SEA TO SKY UNIVERSITY ACT, S.B.C. 2002, c. 54**

- and -

In the Matter of A **PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT OF QUEST**
UNIVERSITY CANADA

Petitioner

Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Fitzpatrick

Reasons for Judgment (Claims Process / Meeting Orders / Break Up Fee)

Counsel for the Petitioner:	J.R. Sandrelli T. Jeffries
Counsel for the Monitor PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc.:	V.L. Tickle
Counsel for Primacorp Ventures Inc.:	P. Rubin G. Umbach
Counsel for RCM Capital Management Ltd. and SESA-BC Holdings Ltd.:	K. Jackson
Counsel for Southern Star Developments Ltd.:	P. Reardon K. Strong
Counsel for Vanchorverve Foundation:	C.D. Brousson
Counsel for Halladay Education Group:	D. Lawrenson

Counsel for Capilano University:	K. Mak
Counsel for Confidential Party (Development Partner #1):	G. Barr R. McKenna
Counsel for Quest University Faculty Union:	J. Sanders
Counsel for Bank of Montreal:	S.A. Poisson
Counsel for Her Majesty The Queen In Right of Province of British Columbia and the Ministry of Advanced Education Skills and Training:	A. Welch
Counsel for 1114586 B.C. Ltd.:	K.E. Siddall
Counsel for Association for the Advancement of Scholarship:	L. Hiebert
Place and Date of Hearing:	Vancouver, B.C. November 3, 2020
Place and Date of Decision with Written Reasons to Follow:	Vancouver, B.C. November 3, 2020
Place and Date of Written Reasons:	Vancouver, B.C. November 26, 2020

INTRODUCTION

[1] The petitioner, Quest University Canada (“Quest”), seeks a number of orders on this application, all steps toward what it considers will be a successful restructuring of its affairs under the *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-36 (the “CCAA”).

[2] Quest seeks: a Claims Process Order, to identify and determine claims against it; a Meeting Order, to allow Quest to present a plan of arrangement to its creditors; and, a Transaction Approval and Vesting Order (“TAVO”) to approve the proposed purchase and sale transaction between it and Primacorp Ventures Inc. (“Primacorp”).

[3] There is minor opposition to the granting of the Claims Process Order and Meeting Order.

[4] There is substantial opposition to the granting of the TAVO. To allow the opposing parties further time to develop their materials, the Court adjourned that aspect of the application to November 12–13, 2020. In the meantime, however, Quest seeks approval of its agreement to pay Primacorp a Break Up Fee and that the Court grant a Break Up Fee Charge to secure those amounts. Various parties oppose this relief.

[5] At the conclusion of this hearing, I granted the Claims Process Order and the Meeting Order. I also approved Quest’s agreement to pay the Break Up Fee and granted the Break Up Fee Charge. These are my reasons for those orders.

BACKGROUND FACTS

[6] On January 16, 2020, these proceedings began with the granting of the Initial Order.

[7] Quest’s restructuring has been unique in many respects. Quest is a not-for-profit post-secondary educational institution, a status that bears on its options in this proceeding. Quest has never really been self-sustaining financially; rather, it has

historically relied on donations, secured loans and land sales to supplement its revenue.

[8] Quest's asset holdings are complex. The campus, which includes the main buildings and residences, is located in Squamish, BC. Initially, Quest held substantial development lands that surrounded the campus lands; however, over the years, Quest sold some of those lands to generate revenue. Even so, a significant amount of development land remains.

[9] Given Quest's history, its debt structure is also complex. There are many secured creditors, including Vanchorverve Foundation and Capilano University ("CapU"), with the latter holding a right of first refusal over certain lands. In addition, I approved Quest obtaining secured interim financing to assist its refinancing efforts in these CCAA proceedings: *Quest University Canada (Re)*, 2020 BCSC 318 and *Quest University Canada (Re)*, 2020 BCSC 860.

[10] Quest also has complex financial agreements concerning four residence buildings on the campus, as discussed in *Quest University Canada (Re)*, 2020 BCSC 921 (the "Rent Deferral Reasons"). Other agreements entered into by Quest, such as leases and naming rights agreements, potentially affect any disposition of its assets.

[11] Quest has faced numerous challenges in these proceedings in continuing its educational endeavours, particularly arising from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic beginning in March 2020. Nevertheless, Quest has continued throughout these proceedings to pursue some form of partnership, including an academic partnership that would see a continuation of its education services. Quest has also engaged with various development partners to determine if that option would resolve its financial difficulties, either alone or in conjunction with a transaction with an academic partner.

[12] Quest has been disappointed along the way. In March 2020, a development partner withdrew from the process after submitting a bid. On May 28, 2020, I granted

an order extending the stay until August 10, 2020, to allow Quest to pursue an agreement with the party identified as “Academic Partner”. Unfortunately, a transaction with the Academic Partner did not materialize by June 2020: Rent Deferral Reasons at paras. 20–22.

[13] On August 7, 2020, I granted an order extending the stay to December 24, 2020 to allow Quest to pursue another transaction over that time, while also offering an uninterrupted fall term to its students. Over this last extension period, Quest has chosen to enter into a transaction with Primacorp.

[14] It is a condition precedent of the Primacorp transaction that the Court grant the TAVO and that Quest obtain creditor and this Court’s approval of a plan of arrangement. Other conditions precedent also arise. Quest is required to disclaim subleases held by Southern Star Developments Ltd. (“Southern Star”). Quest has already delivered those disclaimers. As a result, Southern Star is opposing the granting of the TAVO and challenging the disclaimers, with both matters to be addressed at the later hearing. Other conditions precedent relate to various agreements and charges and litigation claims relating to Quest’s assets, including its lands.

[15] Having reached this stage in the sales process, Quest now seeks the Claims Process Order and the Meeting Order, and will shortly seek the TAVO, as the first steps toward a conclusion to these proceedings. Quest takes the position that the Primacorp transaction maximizes the value of its assets and offers the greatest benefit to its stakeholders.

[16] It is not necessary at this stage to consider the sales process in detail, since that will be relevant to Quest’s later application for the TAVO. Having said that, it is of note that the Monitor, in its Fourth Report dated November 2, 2020, describes that process as “thorough”. In that Report, the Monitor also supports the Primacorp transaction as the one most beneficial to Quest’s creditors.

[17] Writ large, the Primacorp transaction, or more accurately described as a series of transactions, provides for:

- a) Sufficient funds to pay all Quest's secured creditors' claims, including claims secured by the CCAA charges;
- b) Funding for a plan of arrangement to be voted on by Quest's unsecured creditors;
- c) Funds for these insolvency proceedings; and
- d) A working capital facility, and marketing and recruiting support to permit Quest to become self-sustaining as a post-secondary institution.

[18] The main and subsidiary agreements executed between Quest and Primacorp in September/October 2020 are complex. They include, as defined in the Monitor's Fourth Report, the Primacorp Purchase and Sale Agreement (the "Primacorp PSA"), the Campus Lease, an Operating Loan Agreement and an Operating Agreement. Significant terms include that Primacorp will:

- a) Purchase substantially all of Quest's lands and related assets, including the Campus Lands, the Development Lands, the Residence Lands, chattels and vehicles;
- b) Lease specific Campus Lands back to Quest under a long-term lease arrangement;
- c) Provide marketing and recruiting expertise and sufficient working capital to allow Quest to continue as a university;
- d) Fund sufficient monies to pay the lesser of the Unsecured Creditor Claims and \$1.35 million under a plan of arrangement. In addition, the Purchase Price will satisfy all of Quest's secured lenders and any commissions on sales; and

- e) Provide Quest with a \$20 million secured credit facility.

[19] All of the transaction documents are in settled form and the signed documents are in escrow. Primacorp and Quest are working towards a closing date in late December 2020.

CLAIMS PROCESS

[20] The remedial objective of the CCAA is to facilitate a restructuring of a debtor company. Section 11 of the CCAA imbues the supervising judge with a broad statutory authority to make such orders as are appropriate toward achieving that objective: *Bul River Mineral Corporation (Re)*, 2014 BCSC 1732 at para. 29 (“*Bul River #2*”).

[21] Establishing a claims process toward determining claims to be advanced under the CCAA is a recognized step in proceedings across Canada: *ScoZinc Ltd. (Re)*, 2009 NSSC 136 at para. 23; and *Bul River #2* at paras. 31-32.

[22] In *Timminco Limited (Re)*, 2014 ONSC 3393 at paras. 41–44, Regional Senior Justice Morawetz (as he then was) discussed “first principles” from the CCAA in relation to claims process orders and the establishment of a claims bar date. He stated:

[41] It is also necessary to return to first principles with respect to claims-bar orders. The CCAA is intended to facilitate a compromise or arrangement between a debtor company and its creditors and shareholders. For a debtor company engaged in restructuring under the CCAA, which may include a liquidation of its assets, it is of fundamental importance to determine the quantum of liabilities to which the debtor and, in certain circumstances, third parties are subject. It is this desire for certainty that led to the development of the practice by which debtors apply to court for orders which establish a deadline for filing claims.

[23] Quest submits that a claims process is necessary to enable it to implement a plan and close the Primacorp transaction.

[24] Quest indicates that there are five secured creditors holding approximately \$30.7 million in debt. Quest estimates that there are 446 unsecured creditors holding

approximately \$2 million in debt. If the Court upholds the Southern Star disclaimers, Southern Star will also be entitled to advance a claim against Quest as an unsecured creditor.

[25] Quest developed the proposed claims process with input and support from the Monitor. The features of the proposed claims process are:

- a) The claims process will not address claims arising post-filing, save for a Restructuring Claim and amounts secured by CCAA Charges;
- b) The claims process addresses claims against Governors and Officers in relation to a pre-filing claim or Restructuring Claims;
- c) The claims process requires that secured creditors prove their claims;
- d) The claims bar date for claims is November 24, 2020; the claims bar date for Restructuring Claims is the later of November 24, 2020 and ten days after the date on which a Creditor receives a Notice of Disclaimer or Resiliation;
- e) To facilitate creditor participation in the Claims Process, Quest designed a negative claims process for almost all vendors, students and employees. As such, after receipt of a claims package indicating Quest's determination of the claim, that creditor need only respond if there is disagreement as to the amount of its claim set out in the notice; and
- f) Disputes will be handled in the usual fashion, but by the Monitor. After consultation with Quest, the Monitor will deliver any Notices of Revision or Disallowance. Creditors may then deliver a Notice of Dispute to the Monitor. Failing settlement of a dispute, the Monitor may refer the matter to the Court for a determination after a hearing *de novo*.

[26] I agree that the timeline set for the claims process is ambitious. As noted by the Monitor, it is relatively short. However, in my view, the negative claims process in relation to many of the unsecured creditors ameliorates any concerns. In addition, the secured creditors have been aware of these proceedings since the outset; those secured creditors who might have more complicated claims have been actively involved. I can only presume that the secured creditors are well aware of their own claims. The requirement that secured creditors file proof of claims will flush out any issues well ahead of the intended closing of the Primacorp transaction later this year, if approved.

[27] The Quest University Faculty Union (the “Union”) was the only party who objected to the granting of the Claims Process Order. In October 2019, the Union was certified as the bargaining agent of Quest employees although no bargaining has yet occurred. The Union indicates that the employees are entitled to compensation in relation to accrued credits. The Union is uncertain as to whether this is a pre- or post-filing claim, with only the former giving rise to the need to file a proof of claim.

[28] I agree with Quest that this uncertainty is not an appropriate basis upon which to delay this relief. Clearly, the Union can engage with Quest toward clarifying this issue as to whether or not the Union needs to file a proof of claim. Under the Primacorp transaction, Quest intends to continue to operate as an entity and will, presumably, retain most, if not all, current employees.

[29] I agree that approval of a claims process is an important step forward allowing Quest to identify and quantify claims against it and members of its Board of Governors and Officers. Whether or not this Court ultimately approves the TAVO, this process will assist in the implementation of any later plan and any distributions to creditors.

THE MEETING ORDER

[30] Quest has developed a plan of compromise and arrangement dated November 1, 2020 (the “Plan”). It is a requirement of the Primacorp transaction that

Quest do so and that Quest seek and obtain approval of the Plan by its creditors and this Court.

[31] The CCAA expressly allows the court to order a meeting of the secured and unsecured creditors to consider a plan of arrangement:

Compromise with unsecured creditors

4. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company, of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

Compromise with secured creditors

5. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company, or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

[32] It is not the role of the Court at this stage to consider or rule on the fairness or reasonableness of the Plan. Rather, I adopt the discussion in *ScoZinc Ltd. (Re)*, 2009 NSSC 163 at para. 7; namely, that I should only exercise my discretion to refuse to refer the Plan to the creditors if the plan is doomed to fail at either the creditor or court approval stage.

[33] The Plan provides for one class of creditors for the purposes of voting, namely the Affected Creditor Class. The Plan provides for payment in full of Convenience Creditors (Creditors with Affected Claims that are less than or equal to \$1,000). The Plan also allows Affected Creditors with a Proven Claim greater than \$1,000 to make a Cash Election to receive \$1,000 in satisfaction of their Claim. These latter provisions will significantly affect approximately 250 students who have claims within these limits.

[34] All Convenience Creditors and Cash Election Creditors are deemed to vote in favour of the Plan.

[35] Affected Creditors who are not Convenience Creditors or Cash Election Creditors (the “Remaining Creditors”) shall receive fifty cents (\$0.50) for every dollar of their Affected Claim, up to a maximum total disbursement of \$1.35 million for Convenience Claims, Cash Election Claims and the Affected Claims of Remaining Creditors (the “Maximum Claim Pool”). In the event the Affected Claims exceed the Maximum Claim Pool, Convenience Creditors will receive the lesser of their Affected Claim and \$1,000; Cash Election Creditors will receive the sum of \$1,000; and, the Remaining Creditors will receive their *pro rata* share of the Maximum Claim Pool after deduction of the amounts payable to Convenience Creditors and Cash Election Creditors.

[36] The Plan is premised on payment in full of all secured creditors to the extent of their claims, upon closing of the Primacorp transaction. The Plan provides for the payment of such amounts owed to Her Majesty in Right of Canada and employees, as required by the CCAA.

[37] The Plan will not compromise Unaffected Claims that include: post-filing claims (other than certain Restructuring and Governor/Officer Claims); secured claims; claims secured by CCAA Charges; claims against any Governor and Officer that cannot be compromised pursuant to the CCAA; and, claims in respect of payments referred to in s. 6 of the CCAA.

[38] The Monitor assisted in the development of the Plan and it supports the Plan. The Monitor’s Fourth Report indicates that the Monitor considers the Plan fair and reasonable.

[39] The Meeting Order authorizes Quest to convene a meeting on December 2, 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Monitor has arranged to hold the Creditors’ Meeting virtually in accordance with the Electronic Meeting Protocol.

[40] Another matter for consideration is whether the Plan has properly established the classes of creditors for voting at the proposed meeting. The Plan provides that all Affected Creditors will be placed into one creditor class at the meeting.

[41] Section 22(1) of the CCAA provides:

A debtor company may divide its creditors into classes for the purpose of a meeting to be held under section 4 or 5 in respect of a compromise or arrangement relating to the company and, if it does so, it is to apply to the court for approval of the division before the meeting is held.

[42] Section 22(2) of the CCAA lists the factors to be considered when taking into account placing all the creditors in the same class:

- 22(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), creditors may be included in the same class if their interests or rights are sufficiently similar to give them a commonality of interest, taking into account
- a) the nature of the debts, liabilities or obligations giving rise to their claims;
 - b) the nature and rank of any security in respect of their claims;
 - c) the remedies available to the creditors in the absence of the compromise or arrangement being sanctioned, and the extent to which the creditors would recover their claims by exercising those remedies; and
 - d) any further criteria, consistent with those set out in paragraphs (a) to (c), that are prescribed.

[43] The test to determine the classification of creditors is known as the “commonality of interests” test: *Canadian Airlines Corp. (Re)*, [2000] A.J. No. 1693 (Q.B.) at paras. 17–19.

[44] No stakeholder objects to the classification of the creditors under the Plan.

[45] I agree that the Plan properly classifies the creditors—namely, the Affected Creditors—in one class for voting purposes. They all hold unsecured claims against Quest and they all rank the same in priority. While the Convenience and Cash Election Creditors will be treated slightly differently, practical reasons justify this approach, and they are common in CCAA plans: *Nelson Financial Group Ltd. (Re)*, 2011 ONSC 2750 at para. 14 and *Angiotech Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Re)*, 2011 BCSC 450 at para. 6.

[46] The classification of the creditors under the Plan is appropriate in the circumstances. I concur with the Monitor that Quest has a reasonable chance of

obtaining approval of the Plan from the creditors and the Court. Quest's Plan meets the low threshold at this stage. The Plan should be put before the creditors, and if approved, before the Court.

THE BREAK UP FEE / CHARGE

[47] The Primacorp PSA executed by Quest requires, as a condition precedent, that Quest obtain court approval of its agreement to pay Primacorp what is defined as a "Break Up Fee". In addition, the Primacorp PSA requires that Quest obtain a court ordered charge (the "Break Up Fee Charge" or "Charge") against Quest's assets to secure the Break Up Fee, ranking only behind the Administration Charge, the Interim Lender's Charge and Directors and Officers Charge ("D&O") (as defined in the Amended and Restated Initial Order ("ARIO")).

[48] The Primacorp PSA provides:

10.13 Expense Reimbursement. In consideration of [Primacorp] having expended considerable time and expense in connection with this Agreement and the negotiation thereof, and the identification and quantification of assets to be included in the Purchased Assets, if the transactions do not close . . . [Quest] shall pay to [Primacorp] . . . an amount equal to [Primacorp's] actual out of pocket fees incurred in connection with the transactions contemplated by this Agreement together with the preparation, negotiation and execution of delivery of this Agreement . . . (the "Break Up Fee"). . . .

[Emphasis added.]

[49] The agreed upon Break Up Fee was initially limited to \$500,000 to a certain stage of the negotiations. At this point, that limit no longer applies.

[50] Quest's obligation to pay the Break Up Fee is engaged where the Primacorp transaction fails to close as a result of (i) Quest materially breaching the Primacorp PSA; (ii) Quest refusing to work in good faith towards negotiating, execution or delivery of the required closing documents; or (iii) Quest executing and delivering a letter of intent or purchase agreement with another person that is inconsistent with and prevents the completion of the Primacorp transaction.

[51] Quest is not be obligated to pay the Break Up Fee if this Court does not approve the Primacorp transaction in accordance with the application for the TAVO to be heard next week.

[52] Quest submits that the Break Up Fee is commercially reasonable in the circumstances, consistent with other transactions that have been approved in CCAA proceedings. Quest's request for approval of the Break Up Fee and Charge is supported by the Monitor.

[53] Section 11 of the CCAA allows this Court to exercise its discretion to grant orders as are appropriate toward achieving the broad statutory and policy objectives under the CCAA. In *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2010 SCC 60, the Court stated:

[70] The general language of the CCAA should not be read as being restricted by the availability of more specific orders. However, the requirements of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence are baseline considerations that a court should always bear in mind when exercising CCAA authority. Appropriateness under the CCAA is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the CCAA. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the CCAA — avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company. I would add that appropriateness extends not only to the purpose of the order, but also to the means it employs. Courts should be mindful that chances for successful reorganizations are enhanced where participants achieve common ground and all stakeholders are treated as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit.

[Emphasis added.]

[54] Quest has also referred to s. 11.2 of the CCAA that provides the court with specific authority to grant a charge in favour of a person who is lending money to the debtor company. That provision does not apply since Primacorp is not lending Quest any monies; however, I have found the s. 11.2(4) factors to be useful in my analysis.

[55] In “Rights of First Refusal and Options to Purchase in Insolvency Proceedings” (2019) 8 J.I.I.C. 103, the authors Virginie Gauthier, David Sieradzki and Hugo Margoc discussed the rationale for break fees at 125–126:

It is well established convention in both Canadian and U.S. insolvency proceedings that a party willing to incur the time and expense to perform the level of diligence required to submit an unconditional "stalking horse" offer prior to the commencement of a sale process should be entitled to bid protections. Those bid protections typically include a "break fee" and "expense reimbursement" mechanism. The overriding rationale for these types of bid protections is to compensate the stalking horse bidder for its substantial time and expense to the extent it is ultimately not the successful bidder at the conclusion of the sale process.

[56] As noted by the authors of the above article, numerous Canadian courts have considered break fees or break up fees with or without an accompanying charge. These can arise in CCAA proceedings, proposal proceedings, receiverships and foreclosures.

[57] In the CCAA context, cases include *Mosaic Group Inc. (Re)*, [2004] O.J. No. 2323 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) at para. 16; *Tiger Brand Knitting Co. (Re)*, [2005] O.J. No. 1259 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) at paras. 13 and 37 (described as a "stay fee"); *Stelco Inc. (Re)*, [2005] O.J. No. 4733 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 20; *Boutique Euphoria inc. (Re)*, 2007 QCCS 7129 at paras. 63-72; *Nortel Networks Corp. (Re)*, [2009] O.J. No. 3169 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) at para. 56 and [2009] O.J. No. 4487 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) at para. 10; *Brainhunter Inc. (Re)* (2009), 62 C.B.R. (5th) 41 at para. 10 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); *Bul River Mineral Corporation (Re)*, 2014 BCSC 645 at paras. 110–111; and, *Green Growth Brands Inc. (Re)*, 2020 ONSC 3565 at para. 52.

[58] There is no doubt that some break fees and related charges may be seen as unfairly and unreasonably extracting value from the estate with little or no benefit to the stakeholders. As in many exercises of its discretion under the CCAA, the court must be mindful of such concerns. Each situation must be considered in the context of its own unique circumstances, including the present state of affairs faced by the debtor company and its stakeholders.

[59] If a break fee is fair and reasonable in all of the circumstances in the sense that it provides a corresponding or greater benefit to the estate, court approval of such a fee and a related charge may be warranted. Relevant factors that may be

considered by the court when asked to approve a break fee and grant a charge include:

- a) Was the agreement reached as a result of arm's length negotiations?;
- b) Has the agreement been approved by the debtor company's board or specifically constituted committees who are conducting the sales process?;
- c) Is the relief supported by the major creditors?;
- d) What may be the effect of such a fee/charge? Will it have a chilling effect on the market, or will it facilitate the sales process?;
- e) Is the amount of the fee reasonable? In relation to expenses anticipated to be covered, is the amount reasonable given the bidder's time, resources and risk in the process?;
- f) Will the fee and charge enhance the realization of the debtor's assets?;
- g) Will the fee and charge enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company?; and
- h) Does the monitor support the relief?

[60] The Primacorp transaction is not a true stalking horse bid in the sense that Quest seeks approval of the transaction with the Break Up Fee and with the expectation that Quest will then use that bid to entice other proposals. Quest is seeking approval of the Primacorp transaction now; however, it remains the case that other persons remain interested in Quest's assets and they may later seek approval of another bid.

[61] Quest is pursuing the Primacorp transaction at this time on a tight timeline given Quest's need to achieve a speedy resolution in order to provide assurances to its students and other stakeholders for the 2021 academic school calendar. In

addition, Quest has been facing increasing pressure from its secured creditors to move to a resolution of the matter after almost ten months in this proceeding.

[62] All of the relevant circumstances were considered by the Monitor who has indicated its support of the Break Up Fee and Break Up Fee Charge (the s. 11.2(4)(g) factor). In its Fourth Report, the Monitor states:

5.17 . . . Quest's agreement to the Break Up Fee was instrumental in encouraging Primacorp to expend time and expense engaging in extensive discussions with Quest to reach a definitive agreement at a time when no other proposals were forthcoming. Quest benefited from this commitment as it resulted in the Primacorp Agreement as well as the advancement of other potential proposals thereby giving Quest the confidence that Primacorp was the superior partner. The quantum of the Break Fee is calculated on an expense recovery basis and the Monitor considered it to be reasonable in light of the value of the transaction.

[63] I agree with Quest and the Monitor that the Break Up Fee and Charge is appropriate in these circumstances, particularly given the following factors:

- a) The Break Up Fee has been approved by Quest's board of directors and Quest's Restructuring Committee, both having integral knowledge of Quest's options at this stage of the proceedings;
- b) The Break Up Fee is not akin to a "fee" that one sees in many stalking horse bids, including those approved by Canadian courts, that is driven by the purchase price. Rather, the Break Up Fee is limited to Primacorp's actual out-of-pocket fees incurred in connection with the transaction. It is evident from the materials before the Court that the negotiations leading to the transaction were extensive and that Primacorp has already expended significant resources engaging in that process and doing its necessary due diligence;
- c) The Break Up Fee and Break Up Fee Charge is only expected to be material for a short period of time. It will become irrelevant if the Primacorp transaction is approved under the TAVO;

- d) The Break Up Fee is only payable if the Transaction does not close due to Quest's breach of its obligations in respect of the transaction or Quest takes steps to pursue a transaction that makes it impossible to close the Primacorp transaction;
- e) Quest's management has remained intact throughout the proceedings and the Monitor continues to be of the view that Quest is acting with good faith and due diligence;
- f) The major secured creditors Vanchorverve Foundation, and the Interim Lender have been kept apprised of Quest's consideration of its options and, in particular, the Primacorp transaction, which includes the requirement for the Break Up Fee and Charge. They remain supportive of this relief;
- g) The Break Up Fee and Charge will enhance Quest's ability to put forward the Plan and obtain creditor approval of the Plan, which will provide for the funds to satisfy Quest's creditors' claims and allow Quest to continue as a viable post-secondary institution;
- h) The value of Quest's assets and property is substantial and there is every indication that there is sufficient value to repay all the secured creditor's claims and the Break Up Fee; and
- i) No creditor will be materially prejudiced by the Break Up Fee and Charge. The only creditor who registered an objection to this relief was CapU, a secured creditor. CapU submitted that the Court should adjourn this relief and address it at the later application for the TAVO. However, CapU stands to recover its secured loan under this transaction or any alternate transaction. CapU also holds a right of first refusal but has failed to identify any prejudice in that respect arising from this relief referring only vaguely to the possibility of its rights being affected.

[64] The only other person objecting to the approval of the Break Up Fee and Charge was Development Partner #1, who asserted that it was premature to grant that relief. I decline to address these submissions as they come from a potential competing bidder whose future involvement is unclear and who presently has no standing in this proceeding.

CONCLUSION

[65] I grant the relief sought by Quest at this preliminary stage, including granting the Claims Process Order and the Meeting Order. I also approve the Break Up Fee and grant the Break Up Fee Charge.

“Fitzpatrick J.”

**Atomic Energy of Canada
Limited** *Appellant*

v.

Sierra Club of Canada *Respondent*

and

**The Minister of Finance of Canada, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada,
the Minister of International Trade of
Canada and the Attorney General of
Canada** *Respondents*

**INDEXED AS: SIERRA CLUB OF CANADA v. CANADA
(MINISTER OF FINANCE)**

Neutral citation: 2002 SCC 41.

File No.: 28020.

2001: November 6; 2002: April 26.

Present: McLachlin C.J. and Gonthier, Iacobucci,
Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.

**ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF
APPEAL**

*Practice — Federal Court of Canada — Filing of
confidential material — Environmental organization
seeking judicial review of federal government's decision
to provide financial assistance to Crown corporation
for construction and sale of nuclear reactors — Crown
corporation requesting confidentiality order in respect of
certain documents — Proper analytical approach to be
applied to exercise of judicial discretion where litigant
seeks confidentiality order — Whether confidentiality
order should be granted — Federal Court Rules, 1998,
SOR/98-106, r. 151.*

Sierra Club is an environmental organization seeking judicial review of the federal government's decision to provide financial assistance to Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. ("AECL"), a Crown corporation, for the construction and sale to China of two CANDU reactors. The reactors are currently under construction in China, where AECL is the main contractor and project manager. Sierra Club maintains that the authorization of financial assistance

**Énergie atomique du Canada
Limitée** *Appelante*

c.

Sierra Club du Canada *Intimé*

et

**Le ministre des Finances du Canada, le
ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada,
le ministre du Commerce international
du Canada et le procureur général du
Canada** *Intimés*

**RÉPERTORIÉ : SIERRA CLUB DU CANADA c. CANADA
(MINISTRE DES FINANCES)**

Référence neutre : 2002 CSC 41.

N° du greffe : 28020.

2001 : 6 novembre; 2002 : 26 avril.

Présents : Le juge en chef McLachlin et les juges
Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour et
LeBel.

EN APPEL DE LA COUR D'APPEL FÉDÉRALE

*Pratique — Cour fédérale du Canada — Production
de documents confidentiels — Contrôle judiciaire
demandé par un organisme environnemental de la
décision du gouvernement fédéral de donner une aide
financière à une société d'État pour la construction
et la vente de réacteurs nucléaires — Ordonnance de
confidentialité demandée par la société d'État pour
certains documents — Analyse applicable à l'exercice
du pouvoir discrétionnaire judiciaire sur une demande
d'ordonnance de confidentialité — Faut-il accorder
l'ordonnance? — Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998),
DORS/98-106, règle 151.*

Un organisme environnemental, Sierra Club, demande le contrôle judiciaire de la décision du gouvernement fédéral de fournir une aide financière à Énergie atomique du Canada Ltée (« ÉACL »), une société de la Couronne, pour la construction et la vente à la Chine de deux réacteurs CANDU. Les réacteurs sont actuellement en construction en Chine, où ÉACL est l'entrepreneur principal et le gestionnaire de projet. Sierra Club soutient que

by the government triggered s. 5(1)(b) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act* (“CEAA”), requiring an environmental assessment as a condition of the financial assistance, and that the failure to comply compels a cancellation of the financial arrangements. AECL filed an affidavit in the proceedings which summarized confidential documents containing thousands of pages of technical information concerning the ongoing environmental assessment of the construction site by the Chinese authorities. AECL resisted Sierra Club’s application for production of the confidential documents on the ground, *inter alia*, that the documents were the property of the Chinese authorities and that it did not have the authority to disclose them. The Chinese authorities authorized disclosure of the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, under which they would only be made available to the parties and the court, but with no restriction on public access to the judicial proceedings. AECL’s application for a confidentiality order was rejected by the Federal Court, Trial Division. The Federal Court of Appeal upheld that decision.

Held: The appeal should be allowed and the confidentiality order granted on the terms requested by AECL.

In light of the established link between open courts and freedom of expression, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a confidentiality order is whether the right to freedom of expression should be compromised in the circumstances. The court must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles because a confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression. A confidentiality order should only be granted when (1) such an order is necessary to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (2) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings. Three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of the test. First, the risk must be real and substantial, well grounded in evidence, posing a serious threat to the commercial interest in question. Second, the important commercial interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality, where there is a general principle at stake. Finally, the judge is required to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available to such an order but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

l’autorisation d’aide financière du gouvernement déclenche l’application de l’al. 5(1)b) de la *Loi canadienne sur l’évaluation environnementale* (« LCÉE ») exigeant une évaluation environnementale comme condition de l’aide financière, et que le défaut d’évaluation entraîne l’annulation des ententes financières. ÉACL dépose un affidavit qui résume des documents confidentiels contenant des milliers de pages d’information technique concernant l’évaluation environnementale du site de construction qui est faite par les autorités chinoises. ÉACL s’oppose à la communication des documents demandée par Sierra Club pour la raison notamment qu’ils sont la propriété des autorités chinoises et qu’elle n’est pas autorisée à les divulguer. Les autorités chinoises donnent l’autorisation de les communiquer à la condition qu’ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité n’y donnant accès qu’aux parties et à la cour, mais n’imposant aucune restriction à l’accès du public aux débats. La demande d’ordonnance de confidentialité est rejetée par la Section de première instance de la Cour fédérale. La Cour d’appel fédérale confirme cette décision.

Arrêt : L’appel est accueilli et l’ordonnance demandée par ÉACL est accordée.

Vu le lien existant entre la publicité des débats judiciaires et la liberté d’expression, la question fondamentale pour la cour saisie d’une demande d’ordonnance de confidentialité est de savoir si, dans les circonstances, il y a lieu de restreindre le droit à la liberté d’expression. La cour doit s’assurer que l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire de l’accorder est conforme aux principes de la *Charte* parce qu’une ordonnance de confidentialité a des effets préjudiciables sur la liberté d’expression garantie à l’al. 2b). On ne doit l’accorder que (1) lorsqu’elle est nécessaire pour écarter un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le contexte d’un litige, en l’absence d’autres options raisonnables pour écarter ce risque, et (2) lorsque ses effets bénéfiques, y compris ses effets sur le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable, l’emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, y compris ses effets sur la liberté d’expression qui, dans ce contexte, comprend l’intérêt du public dans la publicité des débats judiciaires. Trois éléments importants sont subsumés sous le premier volet de l’analyse. Premièrement, le risque en cause doit être réel et important, être bien étayé par la preuve et menacer gravement l’intérêt commercial en question. Deuxièmement, l’intérêt doit pouvoir se définir en termes d’intérêt public à la confidentialité, mettant en jeu un principe général. Enfin le juge doit non seulement déterminer s’il existe d’autres options raisonnables, il doit aussi restreindre l’ordonnance autant qu’il est raisonnablement possible de le faire tout en préservant l’intérêt commercial en question.

Applying the test to the present circumstances, the commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality, which is sufficiently important to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met. The information must have been treated as confidential at all relevant times; on a balance of probabilities, proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by disclosure of the information; and the information must have been accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential. These requirements have been met in this case. Disclosure of the confidential documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of AECL, and there are no reasonably alternative measures to granting the order.

Under the second branch of the test, the confidentiality order would have significant salutary effects on AECL's right to a fair trial. Disclosure of the confidential documents would cause AECL to breach its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. If a confidentiality order is denied, AECL will be forced to withhold the documents in order to protect its commercial interests, and since that information is relevant to defences available under the *CEAA*, the inability to present this information hinders AECL's capacity to make full answer and defence. Although in the context of a civil proceeding, this does not engage a *Charter* right, the right to a fair trial is a fundamental principle of justice. Further, the confidentiality order would allow all parties and the court access to the confidential documents, and permit cross-examination based on their contents, assisting in the search for truth, a core value underlying freedom of expression. Finally, given the technical nature of the information, there may be a substantial public security interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.

The deleterious effects of granting a confidentiality order include a negative effect on the open court principle, and therefore on the right to freedom of expression. The more detrimental the confidentiality order would be to the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good, (2) promoting self-fulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit, and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons, the harder it will be to justify the confidentiality order. In the hands of the parties and their experts, the confidential documents may be of great assistance in probing the truth of the Chinese environmental assessment process, which would assist the court in reaching accurate factual conclusions. Given the highly technical nature of the documents, the important value of the search for the truth which underlies

En l'espèce, l'intérêt commercial en jeu, la préservation d'obligations contractuelles de confidentialité, est suffisamment important pour satisfaire au premier volet de l'analyse, pourvu que certaines conditions soient remplies : les renseignements ont toujours été traités comme des renseignements confidentiels; il est raisonnable de penser que, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, leur divulgation compromettrait des droits exclusifs, commerciaux et scientifiques; et les renseignements ont été recueillis dans l'expectative raisonnable qu'ils resteraient confidentiels. Ces conditions sont réunies en l'espèce. La divulgation des documents confidentiels ferait courir un risque sérieux à un intérêt commercial important de ÉACL et il n'existe pas d'options raisonnables autres que l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

À la deuxième étape de l'analyse, l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de ÉACL à un procès équitable. Si ÉACL divulguait les documents confidentiels, elle manquerait à ses obligations contractuelles et s'exposerait à une détérioration de sa position concurrentielle. Le refus de l'ordonnance obligerait ÉACL à retenir les documents pour protéger ses intérêts commerciaux et comme ils sont pertinents pour l'exercice des moyens de défense prévus par la *LCÉE*, l'impossibilité de les produire empêcherait ÉACL de présenter une défense pleine et entière. Même si en matière civile cela n'engage pas de droit protégé par la *Charte*, le droit à un procès équitable est un principe de justice fondamentale. L'ordonnance permettrait aux parties et au tribunal d'avoir accès aux documents confidentiels, et permettrait la tenue d'un contre-interrogatoire fondé sur leur contenu, favorisant ainsi la recherche de la vérité, une valeur fondamentale sous-tendant la liberté d'expression. Il peut enfin y avoir un important intérêt de sécurité publique à préserver la confidentialité de ce type de renseignements techniques.

Une ordonnance de confidentialité aurait un effet préjudiciable sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et donc sur la liberté d'expression. Plus l'ordonnance porte atteinte aux valeurs fondamentales que sont (1) la recherche de la vérité et du bien commun, (2) l'épanouissement personnel par le libre développement des pensées et des idées et (3) la participation de tous au processus politique, plus il est difficile de justifier l'ordonnance. Dans les mains des parties et de leurs experts, les documents peuvent être très utiles pour apprécier la conformité du processus d'évaluation environnementale chinois, et donc pour aider la cour à parvenir à des conclusions de fait exactes. Compte tenu de leur nature hautement technique, la production des documents confidentiels en vertu de l'ordonnance demandée favoriserait mieux l'importante valeur de la recherche de la vérité, qui

both freedom of expression and open justice would be promoted to a greater extent by submitting the confidential documents under the order sought than it would by denying the order.

Under the terms of the order sought, the only restrictions relate to the public distribution of the documents, which is a fairly minimal intrusion into the open court rule. Although the confidentiality order would restrict individual access to certain information which may be of interest to that individual, the second core value of promoting individual self-fulfilment would not be significantly affected by the confidentiality order. The third core value figures prominently in this appeal as open justice is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society. By their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental issues will generally attract a high degree of protection, so that the public interest is engaged here more than if this were an action between private parties involving private interests. However, the narrow scope of the order coupled with the highly technical nature of the confidential documents significantly temper the deleterious effects the confidentiality order would have on the public interest in open courts. The core freedom of expression values of seeking the truth and promoting an open political process are most closely linked to the principle of open courts, and most affected by an order restricting that openness. However, in the context of this case, the confidentiality order would only marginally impede, and in some respects would even promote, the pursuit of these values. The salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects and the order should be granted. A balancing of the various rights and obligations engaged indicates that the confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on AECL's right to a fair trial and freedom of expression, while the deleterious effects on the principle of open courts and freedom of expression would be minimal.

Cases Cited

Applied: *Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326; *Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480; *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835; *R. v. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 2001 SCC 76; *M. (A.) v. Ryan*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157; *Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General)*, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; *R. v. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; **referred to:** *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and*

sous-tend à la fois la liberté d'expression et la publicité des débats judiciaires, que ne le ferait le refus de l'ordonnance.

Aux termes de l'ordonnance demandée, les seules restrictions ont trait à la distribution publique des documents, une atteinte relativement minime à la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Même si l'ordonnance de confidentialité devait restreindre l'accès individuel à certains renseignements susceptibles d'intéresser quelqu'un, la deuxième valeur fondamentale, l'épanouissement personnel, ne serait pas touchée de manière significative. La troisième valeur joue un rôle primordial dans le pourvoi puisque la publicité des débats judiciaires est un aspect fondamental de la société démocratique. Par leur nature même, les questions environnementales ont une portée publique considérable, et la transparence des débats judiciaires sur les questions environnementales mérite généralement un degré élevé de protection, de sorte que l'intérêt public est en l'espèce plus engagé que s'il s'agissait d'un litige entre personnes privées à l'égard d'intérêts purement privés. Toutefois la portée étroite de l'ordonnance associée à la nature hautement technique des documents confidentiels tempère considérablement les effets préjudiciables que l'ordonnance de confidentialité pourrait avoir sur l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires. Les valeurs centrales de la liberté d'expression que sont la recherche de la vérité et la promotion d'un processus politique ouvert sont très étroitement liées au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, et sont les plus touchées par une ordonnance limitant cette publicité. Toutefois, en l'espèce, l'ordonnance de confidentialité n'entraverait que légèrement la poursuite de ces valeurs, et pourrait même les favoriser à certains égards. Ses effets bénéfiques l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, et il y a lieu de l'accorder. Selon la pondération des divers droits et intérêts en jeu, l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques importants sur le droit de ÉACL à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression, et ses effets préjudiciables sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et la liberté d'expression seraient minimes.

Jurisprudence

Arrêts appliqués : *Edmonton Journal c. Alberta (Procureur général)*, [1989] 2 R.C.S. 1326; *Société Radio-Canada c. Nouveau-Brunswick (Procureur général)*, [1996] 3 R.C.S. 480; *Dagenais c. Société Radio-Canada*, [1994] 3 R.C.S. 835; *R. c. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 442, 2001 CSC 76; *M. (A.) c. Ryan*, [1997] 1 R.C.S. 157; *Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général)*, [1989] 1 R.C.S. 927; *R. c. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 R.C.S. 697; **arrêts mentionnés :** *AB Hassle c.*

Welfare), [2000] 3 F.C. 360, aff'g (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428; *Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278; *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; *R. v. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478, 2001 SCC 77; *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35; *Eli Lilly and Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437.

Statutes and Regulations Cited

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 2(b).
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, ss. 5(1)(b), 8, 54, 54(2)(b).
Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, rr. 151, 312.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732 (QL), affirming a decision of the Trial Division, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 178 F.T.R. 283, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1633 (QL). Appeal allowed.

J. Brett Ledger and Peter Chapin, for the appellant.

Timothy J. Howard and Franklin S. Gertler, for the respondent Sierra Club of Canada.

Graham Garton, Q.C., and *J. Sanderson Graham*, for the respondents the Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

IACOBUCCI J. —

I. Introduction

In our country, courts are the institutions generally chosen to resolve legal disputes as best they can through the application of legal principles to the facts of the case involved. One of the underlying principles of the judicial process is public openness, both in the proceedings of the dispute, and in the material that is relevant to its resolution. However, some material can be made the subject of a confidentiality order. This appeal raises the important

Canada (Ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social), [2000] 3 C.F. 360, conf. [1998] A.C.F. n° 1850 (QL); *Ethyl Canada Inc. c. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278; *R. c. Oakes*, [1986] 1 R.C.S. 103; *R. c. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 478, 2001 CSC 77; *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 R.C.S. 880, 2000 CSC 35; *Eli Lilly and Co. c. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437.

Lois et règlements cités

Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, art. 1, 2b).
Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, ch. 37, art. 5(1)b), 8, 54, 54(2) [abr. & rempl. 1993, ch. 34, art. 37].
Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998), DORS/98-106, règles 151, 312.

POURVOI contre un arrêt de la Cour d'appel fédérale, [2000] 4 C.F. 426, 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] A.C.F. n° 732 (QL), qui a confirmé une décision de la Section de première instance, [2000] 2 C.F. 400, 178 F.T.R. 283, [1999] A.C.F. n° 1633 (QL). Pourvoi accueilli.

J. Brett Ledger et Peter Chapin, pour l'appelante.

Timothy J. Howard et Franklin S. Gertler, pour l'intimé Sierra Club du Canada.

Graham Garton, c.r., et *J. Sanderson Graham*, pour les intimés le ministre des Finances du Canada, le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada, le ministre du Commerce international du Canada et le procureur général du Canada.

Version française du jugement de la Cour rendu par

LE JUGE IACOBUCCI —

I. Introduction

Dans notre pays, les tribunaux sont les institutions généralement choisies pour résoudre au mieux les différends juridiques par l'application de principes juridiques aux faits de chaque espèce. Un des principes sous-jacents au processus judiciaire est la transparence, tant dans la procédure suivie que dans les éléments pertinents à la solution du litige. Certains de ces éléments peuvent toutefois faire l'objet d'une ordonnance de confidentialité. Le

issues of when, and under what circumstances, a confidentiality order should be granted.

For the following reasons, I would issue the confidentiality order sought and accordingly would allow the appeal.

II. Facts

The appellant, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (“AECL”) is a Crown corporation that owns and markets CANDU nuclear technology, and is an intervenor with the rights of a party in the application for judicial review by the respondent, the Sierra Club of Canada (“Sierra Club”). Sierra Club is an environmental organization seeking judicial review of the federal government’s decision to provide financial assistance in the form of a \$1.5 billion guaranteed loan relating to the construction and sale of two CANDU nuclear reactors to China by the appellant. The reactors are currently under construction in China, where the appellant is the main contractor and project manager.

The respondent maintains that the authorization of financial assistance by the government triggered s. 5(1)(b) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, S.C. 1992, c. 37 (“CEAA”), which requires that an environmental assessment be undertaken before a federal authority grants financial assistance to a project. Failure to undertake such an assessment compels cancellation of the financial arrangements.

The appellant and the respondent Ministers argue that the CEAA does not apply to the loan transaction, and that if it does, the statutory defences available under ss. 8 and 54 apply. Section 8 describes the circumstances where Crown corporations are required to conduct environmental assessments. Section 54(2)(b) recognizes the validity of an environmental assessment carried out by a foreign authority provided that it is consistent with the provisions of the CEAA.

In the course of the application by Sierra Club to set aside the funding arrangements, the appellant

pourvoi soulève les importantes questions de savoir à quel moment et dans quelles circonstances il y a lieu de rendre une ordonnance de confidentialité.

Pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d’avis de rendre l’ordonnance de confidentialité demandée et par conséquent d’accueillir le pourvoi.

II. Les faits

L’appelante, Énergie atomique du Canada Limitée (« ÉACL »), société d’État propriétaire et vendeuse de la technologie nucléaire CANDU, est une intervenante ayant reçu les droits de partie dans la demande de contrôle judiciaire présentée par l’intimé, Sierra Club du Canada (« Sierra Club »), un organisme environnemental. Sierra Club demande le contrôle judiciaire de la décision du gouvernement fédéral de fournir une aide financière, sous forme de garantie d’emprunt de 1,5 milliard de dollars, pour la construction et la vente à la Chine de deux réacteurs nucléaires CANDU par l’appelante. Les réacteurs sont actuellement en construction en Chine, où l’appelante est entrepreneur principal et gestionnaire de projet.

L’intimé soutient que l’autorisation d’aide financière du gouvernement déclenche l’application de l’al. 5(1)(b) de la *Loi canadienne sur l’évaluation environnementale*, L.C. 1992, ch. 37 (« LCÉE »), qui exige une évaluation environnementale avant qu’une autorité fédérale puisse fournir une aide financière à un projet. Le défaut d’évaluation entraîne l’annulation des ententes financières.

Selon l’appelante et les ministres intimés, la LCÉE ne s’applique pas à la convention de prêt et si elle s’y applique, ils peuvent invoquer les défenses prévues aux art. 8 et 54 de cette loi. L’article 8 prévoit les circonstances dans lesquelles les sociétés d’État sont tenues de procéder à des évaluations environnementales. Le paragraphe 54(2) reconnaît la validité des évaluations environnementales effectuées par des autorités étrangères pourvu qu’elles soient compatibles avec les dispositions de la LCÉE.

Dans le cadre de la requête de Sierra Club en annulation des ententes financières, l’appelante a

filed an affidavit of Dr. Simon Pang, a senior manager of the appellant. In the affidavit, Dr. Pang referred to and summarized certain documents (the “Confidential Documents”). The Confidential Documents are also referred to in an affidavit prepared by Mr. Feng, one of AECL’s experts. Prior to cross-examining Dr. Pang on his affidavit, Sierra Club made an application for the production of the Confidential Documents, arguing that it could not test Dr. Pang’s evidence without access to the underlying documents. The appellant resisted production on various grounds, including the fact that the documents were the property of the Chinese authorities and that it did not have authority to disclose them. After receiving authorization by the Chinese authorities to disclose the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, the appellant sought to introduce the Confidential Documents under Rule 312 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*, SOR/98-106, and requested a confidentiality order in respect of the documents.

7 Under the terms of the order requested, the Confidential Documents would only be made available to the parties and the court; however, there would be no restriction on public access to the proceedings. In essence, what is being sought is an order preventing the dissemination of the Confidential Documents to the public.

8 The Confidential Documents comprise two Environmental Impact Reports on Siting and Construction Design (the “EIRs”), a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (the “PSAR”), and the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang which summarizes the contents of the EIRs and the PSAR. If admitted, the EIRs and the PSAR would be attached as exhibits to the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang. The EIRs were prepared by the Chinese authorities in the Chinese language, and the PSAR was prepared by the appellant with assistance from the Chinese participants in the project. The documents contain a mass of technical information and comprise thousands of pages. They describe the ongoing environmental assessment of the construction site by the Chinese authorities under Chinese law.

déposé un affidavit de M. Simon Pang, un de ses cadres supérieurs. Dans l’affidavit, M. Pang mentionne et résume certains documents (les « documents confidentiels ») qui sont également mentionnés dans un affidavit de M. Feng, un expert d’ÉACL. Avant de contre-interroger M. Pang sur son affidavit, Sierra Club a demandé par requête la production des documents confidentiels, au motif qu’il ne pouvait vérifier la validité de sa déposition sans consulter les documents de base. L’appelante s’oppose pour plusieurs raisons à la production des documents, dont le fait qu’ils sont la propriété des autorités chinoises et qu’elle n’est pas autorisée à les divulguer. Après avoir obtenu des autorités chinoises l’autorisation de communiquer les documents à la condition qu’ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité, l’appelante a cherché à les produire en invoquant la règle 312 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998)*, DORS/98-106, et a demandé une ordonnance de confidentialité à leur égard.

Aux termes de l’ordonnance demandée, seules les parties et la cour auraient accès aux documents confidentiels. Aucune restriction ne serait imposée à l’accès du public aux débats. On demande essentiellement d’empêcher la diffusion des documents confidentiels au public.

Les documents confidentiels comprennent deux Rapports d’impact environnemental (« RIE ») sur le site et la construction, un Rapport préliminaire d’analyse sur la sécurité (« RPAS ») ainsi que l’affidavit supplémentaire de M. Pang qui résume le contenu des RIE et du RPAS. S’ils étaient admis, les rapports seraient joints en annexe de l’affidavit supplémentaire de M. Pang. Les RIE ont été préparés en chinois par les autorités chinoises, et le RPAS a été préparé par l’appelante en collaboration avec les responsables chinois du projet. Les documents contiennent une quantité considérable de renseignements techniques et comprennent des milliers de pages. Ils décrivent l’évaluation environnementale du site de construction qui est faite par les autorités chinoises en vertu des lois chinoises.

As noted, the appellant argues that it cannot introduce the Confidential Documents into evidence without a confidentiality order, otherwise it would be in breach of its obligations to the Chinese authorities. The respondent's position is that its right to cross-examine Dr. Pang and Mr. Feng on their affidavits would be effectively rendered nugatory in the absence of the supporting documents to which the affidavits referred. Sierra Club proposes to take the position that the affidavits should therefore be afforded very little weight by the judge hearing the application for judicial review.

The Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division refused to grant the confidentiality order and the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In his dissenting opinion, Robertson J.A. would have granted the confidentiality order.

III. Relevant Statutory Provisions

Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106

151. (1) On motion, the Court may order that material to be filed shall be treated as confidential.

(2) Before making an order under subsection (1), the Court must be satisfied that the material should be treated as confidential, notwithstanding the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

IV. Judgments Below

A. *Federal Court, Trial Division, [2000] 2 F.C. 400*

Pelletier J. first considered whether leave should be granted pursuant to Rule 312 to introduce the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang to which the Confidential Documents were filed as exhibits. In his view, the underlying question was that of relevance, and he concluded that the documents were relevant to the issue of the appropriate remedy. Thus, in the absence of prejudice to the respondent, the affidavit should be permitted to be served and filed. He noted that the respondent would be prejudiced by delay, but since both parties had brought

Comme je le note plus haut, l'appelante prétend ne pas pouvoir produire les documents confidentiels en preuve sans qu'ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité, parce que ce serait un manquement à ses obligations envers les autorités chinoises. L'intimé soutient pour sa part que son droit de contre-interroger M. Pang et M. Feng sur leurs affidavits serait pratiquement futile en l'absence des documents auxquels ils se réfèrent. Sierra Club entend soutenir que le juge saisi de la demande de contrôle judiciaire devrait donc leur accorder peu de poids.

La Section de première instance de la Cour fédérale du Canada a rejeté la demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité et la Cour d'appel fédérale, à la majorité, a rejeté l'appel. Le juge Robertson, dissident, était d'avis d'accorder l'ordonnance.

III. Dispositions législatives

Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998), DORS/98-106

151. (1) La Cour peut, sur requête, ordonner que des documents ou éléments matériels qui seront déposés soient considérés comme confidentiels.

(2) Avant de rendre une ordonnance en application du paragraphe (1), la Cour doit être convaincue de la nécessité de considérer les documents ou éléments matériels comme confidentiels, étant donné l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires.

IV. Les décisions antérieures

A. *Cour fédérale, Section de première instance, [2000] 2 C.F. 400*

Le juge Pelletier examine d'abord s'il y a lieu, en vertu de la règle 312, d'autoriser la production de l'affidavit supplémentaire de M. Pang auquel sont annexés les documents confidentiels. À son avis, il s'agit d'une question de pertinence et il conclut que les documents se rapportent à la question de la réparation. En l'absence de préjudice pour l'intimé, il y a donc lieu d'autoriser la signification et le dépôt de l'affidavit. Il note que des retards seraient préjudiciables à l'intimé mais que, puisque les deux parties ont présenté des requêtes

9

10

11

12

interlocutory motions which had contributed to the delay, the desirability of having the entire record before the court outweighed the prejudice arising from the delay associated with the introduction of the documents.

interlocutoires qui ont entraîné les délais, les avantages de soumettre le dossier au complet à la cour compensent l'inconvénient du retard causé par la présentation de ces documents.

13 On the issue of confidentiality, Pelletier J. concluded that he must be satisfied that the need for confidentiality was greater than the public interest in open court proceedings, and observed that the argument for open proceedings in this case was significant given the public interest in Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology. As well, he noted that a confidentiality order was an exception to the rule of open access to the courts, and that such an order should be granted only where absolutely necessary.

Sur la confidentialité, le juge Pelletier conclut qu'il doit être convaincu que la nécessité de protéger la confidentialité l'emporte sur l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires. Il note que les arguments en faveur de la publicité des débats judiciaires en l'espèce sont importants vu l'intérêt du public envers le rôle du Canada comme vendeur de technologie nucléaire. Il fait aussi remarquer que les ordonnances de confidentialité sont une exception au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et ne devraient être accordées que dans des cas de nécessité absolue.

14 Pelletier J. applied the same test as that used in patent litigation for the issue of a protective order, which is essentially a confidentiality order. The granting of such an order requires the appellant to show a subjective belief that the information is confidential and that its interests would be harmed by disclosure. In addition, if the order is challenged, then the person claiming the benefit of the order must demonstrate objectively that the order is required. This objective element requires the party to show that the information has been treated as confidential, and that it is reasonable to believe that its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could be harmed by the disclosure of the information.

Le juge Pelletier applique le même critère que pour une ordonnance conservatoire en matière de brevets, qui est essentiellement une ordonnance de confidentialité. Pour obtenir l'ordonnance, le requérant doit démontrer qu'il croit subjectivement que les renseignements sont confidentiels et que leur divulgation nuirait à ses intérêts. De plus, si l'ordonnance est contestée, le requérant doit démontrer objectivement qu'elle est nécessaire. Cet élément objectif l'oblige à démontrer que les renseignements ont toujours été traités comme étant confidentiels et qu'il est raisonnable de croire que leur divulgation risque de compromettre ses droits exclusifs, commerciaux et scientifiques.

15 Concluding that both the subjective part and both elements of the objective part of the test had been satisfied, he nevertheless stated: "However, I am also of the view that in public law cases, the objective test has, or should have, a third component which is whether the public interest in disclosure exceeds the risk of harm to a party arising from disclosure" (para. 23).

Ayant conclu qu'il est satisfait à l'élément subjectif et aux deux volets de l'élément objectif du critère, il ajoute : « J'estime toutefois aussi que, dans les affaires de droit public, le critère objectif comporte, ou devrait comporter, un troisième volet, en l'occurrence la question de savoir si l'intérêt du public à l'égard de la divulgation l'emporte sur le préjudice que la divulgation risque de causer à une personne » (par. 23).

16 A very significant factor, in his view, was the fact that mandatory production of documents was not in issue here. The fact that the application involved a voluntary tendering of documents to advance the

Il estime très important le fait qu'il ne s'agit pas en l'espèce de production obligatoire de documents. Le fait que la demande vise le dépôt volontaire de documents en vue d'étayer la thèse de l'appelante,

appellant's own cause as opposed to mandatory production weighed against granting the confidentiality order.

In weighing the public interest in disclosure against the risk of harm to AECL arising from disclosure, Pelletier J. noted that the documents the appellant wished to put before the court were prepared by others for other purposes, and recognized that the appellant was bound to protect the confidentiality of the information. At this stage, he again considered the issue of materiality. If the documents were shown to be very material to a critical issue, "the requirements of justice militate in favour of a confidentiality order. If the documents are marginally relevant, then the voluntary nature of the production argues against a confidentiality order" (para. 29). He then decided that the documents were material to a question of the appropriate remedy, a significant issue in the event that the appellant failed on the main issue.

Pelletier J. also considered the context of the case and held that since the issue of Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology was one of significant public interest, the burden of justifying a confidentiality order was very onerous. He found that AECL could expunge the sensitive material from the documents, or put the evidence before the court in some other form, and thus maintain its full right of defence while preserving the open access to court proceedings.

Pelletier J. observed that his order was being made without having perused the Confidential Documents because they had not been put before him. Although he noted the line of cases which holds that a judge ought not to deal with the issue of a confidentiality order without reviewing the documents themselves, in his view, given their voluminous nature and technical content as well as his lack of information as to what information was already in the public domain, he found that an examination of these documents would not have been useful.

par opposition à une production obligatoire, joue contre l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

En soupesant l'intérêt du public dans la divulgation et le préjudice que la divulgation risque de causer à ÉACL, le juge Pelletier note que les documents que l'appelante veut soumettre à la cour ont été rédigés par d'autres personnes à d'autres fins, et il reconnaît que l'appelante est tenue de protéger la confidentialité des renseignements. À cette étape, il examine de nouveau la question de la pertinence. Si on réussit à démontrer que les documents sont très importants sur une question cruciale, « les exigences de la justice militent en faveur du prononcé d'une ordonnance de confidentialité. Si les documents ne sont pertinents que d'une façon accessoire, le caractère facultatif de la production milite contre le prononcé de l'ordonnance de confidentialité » (par. 29). Il conclut alors que les documents sont importants pour résoudre la question de la réparation à accorder, elle-même un point important si l'appelante échoue sur la question principale.

Le juge Pelletier considère aussi le contexte de l'affaire et conclut que, puisque la question du rôle du Canada comme vendeur de technologies nucléaires est une importante question d'intérêt public, la charge de justifier une ordonnance de confidentialité est très onéreuse. Il conclut qu'ÉACL pourrait retrancher les éléments délicats des documents ou soumettre à la cour la même preuve sous une autre forme, et maintenir ainsi son droit à une défense complète tout en préservant la publicité des débats judiciaires.

Le juge Pelletier signale qu'il prononce l'ordonnance sans avoir examiné les documents confidentiels puisqu'ils n'ont pas été portés à sa connaissance. Bien qu'il mentionne la jurisprudence indiquant qu'un juge ne devrait pas se prononcer sur une demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité sans avoir examiné les documents eux-mêmes, il estime qu'il n'aurait pas été utile d'examiner les documents, vu leur volume et leur caractère technique, et sans savoir quelle part d'information était déjà dans le domaine public.

17

18

19

20 Pelletier J. ordered that the appellant could file the documents in current form, or in an edited version if it chose to do so. He also granted leave to file material dealing with the Chinese regulatory process in general and as applied to this project, provided it did so within 60 days.

B. *Federal Court of Appeal*, [2000] 4 F.C. 426

(1) Evans J.A. (Sharlow J.A. concurring)

21 At the Federal Court of Appeal, AECL appealed the ruling under Rule 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*, and Sierra Club cross-appealed the ruling under Rule 312.

22 With respect to Rule 312, Evans J.A. held that the documents were clearly relevant to a defence under s. 54(2)(b) which the appellant proposed to raise if s. 5(1)(b) of the *CEAA* was held to apply, and were also potentially relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion to refuse a remedy even if the Ministers were in breach of the *CEAA*. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the benefit to the appellant and the court of being granted leave to file the documents outweighed any prejudice to the respondent owing to delay and thus concluded that the motions judge was correct in granting leave under Rule 312.

23 On the issue of the confidentiality order, Evans J.A. considered Rule 151, and all the factors that the motions judge had weighed, including the commercial sensitivity of the documents, the fact that the appellant had received them in confidence from the Chinese authorities, and the appellant's argument that without the documents it could not mount a full answer and defence to the application. These factors had to be weighed against the principle of open access to court documents. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the weight to be attached to the public interest in open proceedings varied with context and held that, where a case raises issues of public significance, the principle of openness of judicial process carries greater weight as a factor in

Dans son ordonnance, le juge Pelletier autorise l'appelante à déposer les documents sous leur forme actuelle ou sous une version révisée, à son gré. Il autorise aussi l'appelante à déposer des documents concernant le processus réglementaire chinois en général et son application au projet, à condition qu'elle le fasse sous 60 jours.

B. *Cour d'appel fédérale*, [2000] 4 C.F. 426

(1) Le juge Evans (avec l'appui du juge Sharlow)

ÉACL fait appel en Cour d'appel fédérale, en vertu de la règle 151 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998)*, et Sierra Club forme un appel incident en vertu de la règle 312.

Sur la règle 312, le juge Evans conclut que les documents en cause sont clairement pertinents dans une défense que l'appelante a l'intention d'invoquer en vertu du par. 54(2) si la cour conclut que l'al. 5(1)(b) de la *LCÉE* doit s'appliquer, et pourraient l'être aussi pour l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire de la cour de refuser d'accorder une réparation dans le cas où les ministres auraient enfreint la *LCÉE*. Comme le juge Pelletier, le juge Evans est d'avis que l'avantage pour l'appelante et pour la cour d'une autorisation de déposer les documents l'emporte sur tout préjudice que le retard pourrait causer à l'intimé, et conclut par conséquent que le juge des requêtes a eu raison d'accorder l'autorisation en vertu de la règle 312.

Sur l'ordonnance de confidentialité, le juge Evans examine la règle 151 et tous les facteurs que le juge des requêtes a appréciés, y compris le secret commercial attaché aux documents, le fait que l'appelante les a reçus à titre confidentiel des autorités chinoises, et l'argument de l'appelante selon lequel, sans les documents, elle ne pourrait assurer effectivement sa défense. Ces facteurs doivent être pondérés avec le principe de la publicité des documents soumis aux tribunaux. Le juge Evans convient avec le juge Pelletier que le poids à accorder à l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats varie selon le contexte, et il conclut que lorsqu'une affaire soulève des questions de grande importance pour le public, le principe de la publicité des débats a plus de poids

the balancing process. Evans J.A. noted the public interest in the subject matter of the litigation, as well as the considerable media attention it had attracted.

In support of his conclusion that the weight assigned to the principle of openness may vary with context, Evans J.A. relied upon the decisions in *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare)*, [2000] 3 F.C. 360 (C.A.), where the court took into consideration the relatively small public interest at stake, and *Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), at p. 283, where the court ordered disclosure after determining that the case was a significant constitutional case where it was important for the public to understand the issues at stake. Evans J.A. observed that openness and public participation in the assessment process are fundamental to the *CEAA*, and concluded that the motions judge could not be said to have given the principle of openness undue weight even though confidentiality was claimed for a relatively small number of highly technical documents.

Evans J.A. held that the motions judge had placed undue emphasis on the fact that the introduction of the documents was voluntary; however, it did not follow that his decision on the confidentiality order must therefore be set aside. Evans J.A. was of the view that this error did not affect the ultimate conclusion for three reasons. First, like the motions judge, he attached great weight to the principle of openness. Secondly, he held that the inclusion in the affidavits of a summary of the reports could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals, should the appellant choose not to put them in without a confidentiality order. Finally, if AECL submitted the documents in an expunged fashion, the claim for confidentiality would rest upon a relatively unimportant factor, i.e., the appellant's claim that it would suffer a loss of business if it breached its undertaking with the Chinese authorities.

Evans J.A. rejected the argument that the motions judge had erred in deciding the motion without

comme facteur à prendre en compte dans le processus de pondération. Le juge Evans note l'intérêt du public à l'égard de la question en litige ainsi que la couverture médiatique considérable qu'elle a suscitée.

À l'appui de sa conclusion que le poids accordé au principe de la publicité des débats peut varier selon le contexte, le juge Evans invoque les décisions *AB Hassle c. Canada (Ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social)*, [2000] 3 C.F. 360 (C.A.), où la cour a tenu compte du peu d'intérêt du public, et *Ethyl Canada Inc. c. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278 (C. Ont. (Div. gén.)), p. 283, où la cour a ordonné la divulgation après avoir déterminé qu'il s'agissait d'une affaire constitutionnelle importante et qu'il importait que le public comprenne ce qui était en cause. Le juge Evans fait remarquer que la transparence du processus d'évaluation et la participation du public ont une importance fondamentale pour la *LCÉE*, et il conclut qu'on ne peut prétendre que le juge des requêtes a accordé trop de poids au principe de la publicité des débats, même si la confidentialité n'est demandée que pour un nombre relativement restreint de documents hautement techniques.

Le juge Evans conclut que le juge des requêtes a donné trop de poids au fait que la production des documents était volontaire mais qu'il ne s'ensuit pas que sa décision au sujet de la confidentialité doive être écartée. Le juge Evans est d'avis que l'erreur n'entache pas sa conclusion finale, pour trois motifs. Premièrement, comme le juge des requêtes, il attache une grande importance à la publicité du débat judiciaire. Deuxièmement, il conclut que l'inclusion dans les affidavits d'un résumé des rapports peut, dans une large mesure, compenser l'absence des rapports, si l'appelante décide de ne pas les déposer sans ordonnance de confidentialité. Enfin, si ÉACL déposait une version modifiée des documents, la demande de confidentialité reposerait sur un facteur relativement peu important, savoir l'argument que l'appelante perdrait des occasions d'affaires si elle violait son engagement envers les autorités chinoises.

Le juge Evans rejette l'argument selon lequel le juge des requêtes a commis une erreur en statuant

24

25

26

reference to the actual documents, stating that it was not necessary for him to inspect them, given that summaries were available and that the documents were highly technical and incompletely translated. Thus the appeal and cross-appeal were both dismissed.

(2) Robertson J.A. (dissenting)

27 Robertson J.A. disagreed with the majority for three reasons. First, in his view, the level of public interest in the case, the degree of media coverage, and the identities of the parties should not be taken into consideration in assessing an application for a confidentiality order. Instead, he held that it was the nature of the evidence for which the order is sought that must be examined.

28 In addition, he found that without a confidentiality order, the appellant had to choose between two unacceptable options: either suffering irreparable financial harm if the confidential information was introduced into evidence, or being denied the right to a fair trial because it could not mount a full defence if the evidence was not introduced.

29 Finally, he stated that the analytical framework employed by the majority in reaching its decision was fundamentally flawed as it was based largely on the subjective views of the motions judge. He rejected the contextual approach to the question of whether a confidentiality order should issue, emphasizing the need for an objective framework to combat the perception that justice is a relative concept, and to promote consistency and certainty in the law.

30 To establish this more objective framework for regulating the issuance of confidentiality orders pertaining to commercial and scientific information, he turned to the legal rationale underlying the commitment to the principle of open justice, referring to *Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326. There, the Supreme Court of Canada held that open proceedings foster the search for the truth, and reflect the importance of public scrutiny of the courts.

sans avoir examiné les documents réels, affirmant que cela n'était pas nécessaire puisqu'il y avait des précis et que la documentation était hautement technique et partiellement traduite. L'appel et l'appel incident sont donc rejetés.

(2) Le juge Robertson (dissident)

Le juge Robertson se dissocie de la majorité pour trois raisons. En premier lieu, il estime que le degré d'intérêt du public dans une affaire, l'importance de la couverture médiatique et l'identité des parties ne devraient pas être pris en considération pour statuer sur une demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité. Selon lui, il faut plutôt examiner la nature de la preuve que protégerait l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

Il estime aussi qu'à défaut d'ordonnance de confidentialité, l'appelante doit choisir entre deux options inacceptables : subir un préjudice financier irréparable si les renseignements confidentiels sont produits en preuve, ou être privée de son droit à un procès équitable parce qu'elle ne peut se défendre pleinement si la preuve n'est pas produite.

Finalement, il dit que le cadre analytique utilisé par les juges majoritaires pour arriver à leur décision est fondamentalement défectueux en ce qu'il est fondé en grande partie sur le point de vue subjectif du juge des requêtes. Il rejette l'approche contextuelle sur la question de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, soulignant la nécessité d'un cadre d'analyse objectif pour combattre la perception que la justice est un concept relatif et pour promouvoir la cohérence et la certitude en droit.

Pour établir ce cadre plus objectif appelé à régir la délivrance d'ordonnances de confidentialité en matière de renseignements commerciaux et scientifiques, il examine le fondement juridique du principe de la publicité du processus judiciaire, en citant l'arrêt de notre Cour, *Edmonton Journal c. Alberta (Procureur général)*, [1989] 2 R.C.S. 1326, qui conclut que la publicité des débats favorise la recherche de la vérité et témoigne de l'importance de soumettre le travail des tribunaux à l'examen public.

Robertson J.A. stated that although the principle of open justice is a reflection of the basic democratic value of accountability in the exercise of judicial power, in his view, the principle that justice itself must be secured is paramount. He concluded that justice as an overarching principle means that exceptions occasionally must be made to rules or principles.

He observed that, in the area of commercial law, when the information sought to be protected concerns “trade secrets”, this information will not be disclosed during a trial if to do so would destroy the owner’s proprietary rights and expose him or her to irreparable harm in the form of financial loss. Although the case before him did not involve a trade secret, he nevertheless held that the same treatment could be extended to commercial or scientific information which was acquired on a confidential basis and attached the following criteria as conditions precedent to the issuance of a confidentiality order (at para. 13):

(1) the information is of a confidential nature as opposed to facts which one would like to keep confidential; (2) the information for which confidentiality is sought is not already in the public domain; (3) on a balance of probabilities the party seeking the confidentiality order would suffer irreparable harm if the information were made public; (4) the information is relevant to the legal issues raised in the case; (5) correlatively, the information is “necessary” to the resolution of those issues; (6) the granting of a confidentiality order does not unduly prejudice the opposing party; and (7) the public interest in open court proceedings does not override the private interests of the party seeking the confidentiality order. The onus in establishing that criteria one to six are met is on the party seeking the confidentiality order. Under the seventh criterion, it is for the opposing party to show that a *prima facie* right to a protective order has been overtaken by the need to preserve the openness of the court proceedings. In addressing these criteria one must bear in mind two of the threads woven into the fabric of the principle of open justice: the search for truth and the preservation of the rule of law. As stated at the outset, I do not believe that the perceived degree of public importance of a case is a relevant consideration.

Selon le juge Robertson, même si le principe de la publicité du processus judiciaire reflète la valeur fondamentale que constitue dans une démocratie l’imputabilité dans l’exercice du pouvoir judiciaire, le principe selon lequel il faut que justice soit faite doit, à son avis, l’emporter. Il conclut que la justice vue comme principe universel signifie que les règles ou les principes doivent parfois souffrir des exceptions.

Il fait observer qu’en droit commercial, lorsque les renseignements qu’on cherche à protéger ont trait à des « secrets industriels », ils ne sont pas divulgués au procès lorsque cela aurait pour effet d’annihiler les droits du propriétaire et l’exposerait à un préjudice financier irréparable. Il conclut que, même si l’espèce ne porte pas sur des secrets industriels, on peut traiter de la même façon des renseignements commerciaux et scientifiques acquis sur une base confidentielle, et il établit les critères suivants comme conditions à la délivrance d’une ordonnance de confidentialité (au par. 13) :

1) les renseignements sont de nature confidentielle et non seulement des faits qu’une personne désire ne pas divulguer; 2) les renseignements qu’on veut protéger ne sont pas du domaine public; 3) selon la prépondérance des probabilités, la partie qui veut obtenir une ordonnance de confidentialité subirait un préjudice irréparable si les renseignements étaient rendus publics; 4) les renseignements sont pertinents dans le cadre de la résolution des questions juridiques soulevées dans le litige; 5) en même temps, les renseignements sont « nécessaires » à la résolution de ces questions; 6) l’octroi d’une ordonnance de confidentialité ne cause pas un préjudice grave à la partie adverse; 7) l’intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires ne prime pas les intérêts privés de la partie qui sollicite l’ordonnance de confidentialité. Le fardeau de démontrer que les critères un à six sont respectés incombe à la partie qui cherche à obtenir l’ordonnance de confidentialité. Pour le septième critère, c’est la partie adverse qui doit démontrer que le droit *prima facie* à une ordonnance de non-divulgaration doit céder le pas au besoin de maintenir la publicité des débats judiciaires. En utilisant ces critères, il y a lieu de tenir compte de deux des fils conducteurs qui sous-tendent le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires : la recherche de la vérité et la sauvegarde de la primauté du droit. Comme je l’ai dit au tout début, je ne crois pas que le degré d’importance qu’on croit que le public accorde à une affaire soit une considération pertinente.

33 In applying these criteria to the circumstances of the case, Robertson J.A. concluded that the confidentiality order should be granted. In his view, the public interest in open court proceedings did not override the interests of AECL in maintaining the confidentiality of these highly technical documents.

34 Robertson J.A. also considered the public interest in the need to ensure that site plans for nuclear installations were not, for example, posted on a Web site. He concluded that a confidentiality order would not undermine the two primary objectives underlying the principle of open justice: truth and the rule of law. As such, he would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal.

V. Issues

- 35 A. What is the proper analytical approach to be applied to the exercise of judicial discretion where a litigant seeks a confidentiality order under Rule 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*?
- B. Should the confidentiality order be granted in this case?

VI. Analysis

A. *The Analytical Approach to the Granting of a Confidentiality Order*

(1) The General Framework: Herein the Dagenais Principles

36 The link between openness in judicial proceedings and freedom of expression has been firmly established by this Court. In *Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, at para. 23, La Forest J. expressed the relationship as follows:

The principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the rights guaranteed by s. 2(b). Openness permits public access to information about the courts, which in turn permits the public to discuss and put forward opinions and criticisms of court practices and proceedings. While the freedom to express ideas and opinions about the operation of the courts is clearly within the ambit of the

Appliquant ces critères aux circonstances de l'espèce, le juge Robertson conclut qu'il y a lieu de rendre l'ordonnance de confidentialité. Selon lui, l'intérêt du public dans la publicité des débats judiciaires ne prime pas l'intérêt de ÉACL à préserver le caractère confidentiel de ces documents hautement techniques.

Le juge Robertson traite aussi de l'intérêt du public à ce qu'il soit garanti que les plans de site d'installations nucléaires ne seront pas, par exemple, affichés sur un site Web. Il conclut qu'une ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait aucun impact négatif sur les deux objectifs primordiaux du principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, savoir la vérité et la primauté du droit. Il aurait par conséquent accueilli l'appel et rejeté l'appel incident.

V. Questions en litige

- A. Quelle méthode d'analyse faut-il appliquer à l'exercice du pouvoir judiciaire discrétionnaire lorsqu'une partie demande une ordonnance de confidentialité en vertu de la règle 151 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998)*?
- B. Y a-t-il lieu d'accorder l'ordonnance de confidentialité en l'espèce?

VI. Analyse

A. *Méthode d'analyse applicable aux ordonnances de confidentialité*

(1) Le cadre général : les principes de l'arrêt Dagenais

Le lien entre la publicité des procédures judiciaires et la liberté d'expression est solidement établi dans *Société Radio-Canada c. Nouveau-Brunswick (Procureur général)*, [1996] 3 R.C.S. 480. Le juge La Forest l'exprime en ces termes au par. 23 :

Le principe de la publicité des débats en justice est inextricablement lié aux droits garantis à l'al. 2b). Grâce à ce principe, le public a accès à l'information concernant les tribunaux, ce qui lui permet ensuite de discuter des pratiques des tribunaux et des procédures qui s'y déroulent, et d'émettre des opinions et des critiques à cet égard. La liberté d'exprimer des idées et des opinions sur

freedom guaranteed by s. 2(b), so too is the right of members of the public to obtain information about the courts in the first place.

Under the order sought, public access and public scrutiny of the Confidential Documents would be restricted; this would clearly infringe the public's freedom of expression guarantee.

A discussion of the general approach to be taken in the exercise of judicial discretion to grant a confidentiality order should begin with the principles set out by this Court in *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835. Although that case dealt with the common law jurisdiction of the court to order a publication ban in the criminal law context, there are strong similarities between publication bans and confidentiality orders in the context of judicial proceedings. In both cases a restriction on freedom of expression is sought in order to preserve or promote an interest engaged by those proceedings. As such, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a publication ban or a confidentiality order is whether, in the circumstances, the right to freedom of expression should be compromised.

Although in each case freedom of expression will be engaged in a different context, the *Dagenais* framework utilizes overarching *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* principles in order to balance freedom of expression with other rights and interests, and thus can be adapted and applied to various circumstances. As a result, the analytical approach to the exercise of discretion under Rule 151 should echo the underlying principles laid out in *Dagenais*, although it must be tailored to the specific rights and interests engaged in this case.

Dagenais dealt with an application by four accused persons under the court's common law jurisdiction requesting an order prohibiting the broadcast of a television programme dealing with the physical and sexual abuse of young boys at

le fonctionnement des tribunaux relève clairement de la liberté garantie à l'al. 2b), mais en relève également le droit du public d'obtenir au préalable de l'information sur les tribunaux.

L'ordonnance sollicitée aurait pour effet de limiter l'accès du public aux documents confidentiels et leur examen public; cela porterait clairement atteinte à la garantie de la liberté d'expression du public.

L'examen de la méthode générale à suivre dans l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire d'accorder une ordonnance de confidentialité devrait commencer par les principes établis par la Cour dans *Dagenais c. Société Radio-Canada*, [1994] 3 R.C.S. 835. Cette affaire portait sur le pouvoir discrétionnaire judiciaire, issu de la common law, de rendre des ordonnances de non-publication dans le cadre de procédures criminelles, mais il y a de fortes ressemblances entre les interdictions de publication et les ordonnances de confidentialité dans le contexte des procédures judiciaires. Dans les deux cas, on cherche à restreindre la liberté d'expression afin de préserver ou de promouvoir un intérêt en jeu dans les procédures. En ce sens, la question fondamentale que doit résoudre le tribunal auquel on demande une interdiction de publication ou une ordonnance de confidentialité est de savoir si, dans les circonstances, il y a lieu de restreindre le droit à la liberté d'expression.

Même si, dans chaque cas, la liberté d'expression entre en jeu dans un contexte différent, le cadre établi dans *Dagenais* fait appel aux principes déterminants de la *Charte canadienne des droits et libertés* afin de pondérer la liberté d'expression avec d'autres droits et intérêts, et peut donc être adapté et appliqué à diverses circonstances. L'analyse de l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire sous le régime de la règle 151 devrait par conséquent refléter les principes sous-jacents établis par *Dagenais*, même s'il faut pour cela l'ajuster aux droits et intérêts précis qui sont en jeu en l'espèce.

L'affaire *Dagenais* porte sur une requête par laquelle quatre accusés demandaient à la cour de rendre, en vertu de sa compétence de common law, une ordonnance interdisant la diffusion d'une émission de télévision décrivant des abus physiques et

37

38

39

religious institutions. The applicants argued that because the factual circumstances of the programme were very similar to the facts at issue in their trials, the ban was necessary to preserve the accused's right to a fair trial.

sexuels infligés à de jeunes garçons dans des établissements religieux. Les requérants soutenaient que l'interdiction était nécessaire pour préserver leur droit à un procès équitable, parce que les faits racontés dans l'émission ressemblaient beaucoup aux faits en cause dans leurs procès.

40 Lamer C.J. found that the common law discretion to order a publication ban must be exercised within the boundaries set by the principles of the *Charter*. Since publication bans necessarily curtail the freedom of expression of third parties, he adapted the pre-*Charter* common law rule such that it balanced the right to freedom of expression with the right to a fair trial of the accused in a way which reflected the substance of the test from *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. At p. 878 of *Dagenais*, Lamer C.J. set out his reformulated test:

Le juge en chef Lamer conclut que le pouvoir discrétionnaire de common law d'ordonner l'interdiction de publication doit être exercé dans les limites prescrites par les principes de la *Charte*. Puisque les ordonnances de non-publication restreignent nécessairement la liberté d'expression de tiers, il adapte la règle de common law qui s'appliquait avant l'entrée en vigueur de la *Charte* de façon à établir un juste équilibre entre le droit à la liberté d'expression et le droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable, d'une façon qui reflète l'essence du critère énoncé dans *R. c. Oakes*, [1986] 1 R.C.S. 103. À la page 878 de *Dagenais*, le juge en chef Lamer énonce le critère reformulé :

A publication ban should only be ordered when:

Une ordonnance de non-publication ne doit être rendue que si :

(a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

a) elle est nécessaire pour écarter le risque réel et important que le procès soit inéquitable, vu l'absence d'autres mesures raisonnables pouvant écarter ce risque;

(b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban. [Emphasis in original.]

b) ses effets bénéfiques sont plus importants que ses effets préjudiciables sur la libre expression de ceux qui sont touchés par l'ordonnance. [Souligné dans l'original.]

41 In *New Brunswick*, *supra*, this Court modified the *Dagenais* test in the context of the related issue of how the discretionary power under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to exclude the public from a trial should be exercised. That case dealt with an appeal from the trial judge's order excluding the public from the portion of a sentencing proceeding for sexual assault and sexual interference dealing with the specific acts committed by the accused on the basis that it would avoid "undue hardship" to both the victims and the accused.

Dans *Nouveau-Brunswick*, précité, la Cour modifie le critère de l'arrêt *Dagenais* dans le contexte de la question voisine de l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire d'ordonner l'exclusion du public d'un procès en vertu du par. 486(1) du *Code criminel*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. C-46. Il s'agissait d'un appel d'une décision du juge du procès d'ordonner l'exclusion du public de la partie des procédures de détermination de la peine pour agression sexuelle et contacts sexuels portant sur les actes précis commis par l'accusé, au motif que cela éviterait un « préjudice indu » aux victimes et à l'accusé.

42 La Forest J. found that s. 486(1) was a restriction on the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression in that it provided a "discretionary bar on public and media access to the courts": *New Brunswick*, at para. 33;

Le juge La Forest conclut que le par. 486(1) limite la liberté d'expression garantie à l'al. 2b) en créant un « pouvoir discrétionnaire permettant d'interdire au public et aux médias l'accès aux

however he found this infringement to be justified under s. 1 provided that the discretion was exercised in accordance with the *Charter*. Thus, the approach taken by La Forest J. at para. 69 to the exercise of discretion under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code*, closely mirrors the *Dagenais* common law test:

(a) the judge must consider the available options and consider whether there are any other reasonable and effective alternatives available;

(b) the judge must consider whether the order is limited as much as possible; and

(c) the judge must weigh the importance of the objectives of the particular order and its probable effects against the importance of openness and the particular expression that will be limited in order to ensure that the positive and negative effects of the order are proportionate.

In applying this test to the facts of the case, La Forest J. found that the evidence of the potential undue hardship consisted mainly in the Crown's submission that the evidence was of a "delicate nature" and that this was insufficient to override the infringement on freedom of expression.

This Court has recently revisited the granting of a publication ban under the court's common law jurisdiction in *R. v. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 2001 SCC 76, and its companion case *R. v. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478, 2001 SCC 77. In *Mentuck*, the Crown moved for a publication ban to protect the identity of undercover police officers and operational methods employed by the officers in their investigation of the accused. The accused opposed the motion as an infringement of his right to a fair and public hearing under s. 11(d) of the *Charter*. The order was also opposed by two intervening newspapers as an infringement of their right to freedom of expression.

The Court noted that, while *Dagenais* dealt with the balancing of freedom of expression on the one hand, and the right to a fair trial of the accused on the other, in the case before it, both the right of the

tribunaux » (*Nouveau-Brunswick*, par. 33). Il considère toutefois que l'atteinte peut être justifiée en vertu de l'article premier pourvu que le pouvoir discrétionnaire soit exercé conformément à la *Charte*. Donc l'analyse de l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire en vertu du par. 486(1) du *Code criminel*, décrite par le juge La Forest au par. 69, concorde étroitement avec le critère de common law établi par *Dagenais* :

a) le juge doit envisager les solutions disponibles et se demander s'il existe d'autres mesures de rechange raisonnables et efficaces;

b) il doit se demander si l'ordonnance a une portée aussi limitée que possible; et

c) il doit comparer l'importance des objectifs de l'ordonnance et de ses effets probables avec l'importance de la publicité des procédures et l'activité d'expression qui sera restreinte, afin de veiller à ce que les effets positifs et négatifs de l'ordonnance soient proportionnels.

Appliquant cette analyse aux faits de l'espèce, le juge La Forest conclut que la preuve du risque de préjudice indu consiste principalement en la prétention de l'avocat du ministère public quant à la « nature délicate » des faits relatifs aux infractions et que cela ne suffit pas pour justifier l'atteinte à la liberté d'expression.

La Cour a récemment réexaminé la question des interdictions de publication prononcées par un tribunal en vertu de sa compétence de common law dans *R. c. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 442, 2001 CSC 76, et l'arrêt connexe *R. c. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 478, 2001 CSC 77. Dans *Mentuck*, le ministère public demandait l'interdiction de publication en vue de protéger l'identité de policiers banalisés et leurs méthodes d'enquête. L'accusé s'opposait à la demande en soutenant que l'interdiction porterait atteinte à son droit à un procès public et équitable protégé par l'al. 11d) de la *Charte*. Deux journaux intervenants s'opposaient aussi à la requête, en faisant valoir qu'elle porterait atteinte à leur droit à la liberté d'expression.

La Cour fait remarquer que *Dagenais* traite de la pondération de la liberté d'expression, d'une part, et du droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable, d'autre part, tandis que dans l'affaire dont elle est saisie, le

accused to a fair and public hearing, and freedom of expression weighed in favour of denying the publication ban. These rights were balanced against interests relating to the proper administration of justice, in particular, protecting the safety of police officers and preserving the efficacy of undercover police operations.

45

In spite of this distinction, the Court noted that underlying the approach taken in both *Dagenais* and *New Brunswick* was the goal of ensuring that the judicial discretion to order publication bans is subject to no lower a standard of compliance with the *Charter* than legislative enactment. This goal is furthered by incorporating the essence of s. 1 of the *Charter* and the *Oakes* test into the publication ban test. Since this same goal applied in the case before it, the Court adopted a similar approach to that taken in *Dagenais*, but broadened the *Dagenais* test (which dealt specifically with the right of an accused to a fair trial) such that it could guide the exercise of judicial discretion where a publication ban is requested in order to preserve any important aspect of the proper administration of justice. At para. 32, the Court reformulated the test as follows:

A publication ban should only be ordered when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

(b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.

46

The Court emphasized that under the first branch of the test, three important elements were subsumed under the “necessity” branch. First, the risk in question must be a serious risk well grounded in the evidence. Second, the phrase “proper administration of justice” must be carefully interpreted so as not to

droit de l’accusé à un procès public et équitable tout autant que la liberté d’expression militent en faveur du rejet de la requête en interdiction de publication. Ces droits ont été soupesés avec l’intérêt de la bonne administration de la justice, en particulier la protection de la sécurité des policiers et le maintien de l’efficacité des opérations policières secrètes.

Malgré cette distinction, la Cour note que la méthode retenue dans *Dagenais* et *Nouveau-Brunswick* a pour objectif de garantir que le pouvoir discrétionnaire des tribunaux d’ordonner des interdictions de publication n’est pas assujéti à une norme de conformité à la *Charte* moins exigeante que la norme applicable aux dispositions législatives. Elle vise cet objectif en incorporant l’essence de l’article premier de la *Charte* et le critère *Oakes* dans l’analyse applicable aux interdictions de publication. Comme le même objectif s’applique à l’affaire dont elle est saisie, la Cour adopte une méthode semblable à celle de *Dagenais*, mais en élargissant le critère énoncé dans cet arrêt (qui portait spécifiquement sur le droit de l’accusé à un procès équitable) de manière à fournir un guide à l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire des tribunaux dans les requêtes en interdiction de publication, afin de protéger tout aspect important de la bonne administration de la justice. La Cour reformule le critère en ces termes (au par. 32) :

Une ordonnance de non-publication ne doit être rendue que si :

a) elle est nécessaire pour écarter le risque sérieux pour la bonne administration de la justice, vu l’absence d’autres mesures raisonnables pouvant écarter ce risque;

b) ses effets bénéfiques sont plus importants que ses effets préjudiciables sur les droits et les intérêts des parties et du public, notamment ses effets sur le droit à la libre expression, sur le droit de l’accusé à un procès public et équitable, et sur l’efficacité de l’administration de la justice.

La Cour souligne que dans le premier volet de l’analyse, trois éléments importants sont subsumés sous la notion de « nécessité ». En premier lieu, le risque en question doit être sérieux et bien étayé par la preuve. En deuxième lieu, l’expression « bonne administration de la justice » doit être interprétée

allow the concealment of an excessive amount of information. Third, the test requires the judge ordering the ban to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available, but also to restrict the ban as far as possible without sacrificing the prevention of the risk.

At para. 31, the Court also made the important observation that the proper administration of justice will not necessarily involve *Charter* rights, and that the ability to invoke the *Charter* is not a necessary condition for a publication ban to be granted:

The [common law publication ban] rule can accommodate orders that must occasionally be made in the interests of the administration of justice, which encompass more than fair trial rights. As the test is intended to “reflec[t] the substance of the *Oakes* test”, we cannot require that *Charter* rights be the only legitimate objective of such orders any more than we require that government action or legislation in violation of the *Charter* be justified exclusively by the pursuit of another *Charter* right. [Emphasis added.]

The Court also anticipated that, in appropriate circumstances, the *Dagenais* framework could be expanded even further in order to address requests for publication bans where interests other than the administration of justice were involved.

Mentuck is illustrative of the flexibility of the *Dagenais* approach. Since its basic purpose is to ensure that the judicial discretion to deny public access to the courts is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles, in my view, the *Dagenais* model can and should be adapted to the situation in the case at bar where the central issue is whether judicial discretion should be exercised so as to exclude confidential information from a public proceeding. As in *Dagenais*, *New Brunswick* and *Mentuck*, granting the confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the *Charter* right to freedom of expression, as well as the principle of open and accessible court proceedings, and, as in those cases, courts must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles.

judicieusement de façon à ne pas empêcher la divulgation d'un nombre excessif de renseignements. En troisième lieu, le critère exige non seulement que le juge qui prononce l'ordonnance détermine s'il existe des mesures de rechange raisonnables, mais aussi qu'il limite l'ordonnance autant que possible sans pour autant sacrifier la prévention du risque.

Au paragraphe 31, la Cour fait aussi l'importante observation que la bonne administration de la justice n'implique pas nécessairement des droits protégés par la *Charte*, et que la possibilité d'invoquer la *Charte* n'est pas une condition nécessaire à l'obtention d'une interdiction de publication :

Elle [la règle de common law] peut s'appliquer aux ordonnances qui doivent parfois être rendues dans l'intérêt de l'administration de la justice, qui englobe davantage que le droit à un procès équitable. Comme on veut que le critère « reflète [...] l'essence du critère énoncé dans l'arrêt *Oakes* », nous ne pouvons pas exiger que ces ordonnances aient pour seul objectif légitime les droits garantis par la *Charte*, pas plus que nous exigeons que les actes gouvernementaux et les dispositions législatives contrevenant à la *Charte* soient justifiés exclusivement par la recherche d'un autre droit garanti par la *Charte*. [Je souligne.]

La Cour prévoit aussi que, dans les cas voulus, le critère de *Dagenais* pourrait être élargi encore davantage pour régir des requêtes en interdiction de publication mettant en jeu des questions autres que l'administration de la justice.

Mentuck illustre bien la souplesse de la méthode *Dagenais*. Comme elle a pour objet fondamental de garantir que le pouvoir discrétionnaire d'interdire l'accès du public aux tribunaux est exercé conformément aux principes de la *Charte*, à mon avis, le modèle *Dagenais* peut et devrait être adapté à la situation de la présente espèce, où la question centrale est l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire du tribunal d'exclure des renseignements confidentiels au cours d'une procédure publique. Comme dans *Dagenais*, *Nouveau-Brunswick* et *Mentuck*, une ordonnance de confidentialité aura un effet négatif sur le droit à la liberté d'expression garanti par la *Charte*, de même que sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et, comme dans ces affaires, les tribunaux doivent veiller à ce que le

However, in order to adapt the test to the context of this case, it is first necessary to determine the particular rights and interests engaged by this application.

(2) The Rights and Interests of the Parties

49

The immediate purpose for AECL's confidentiality request relates to its commercial interests. The information in question is the property of the Chinese authorities. If the appellant were to disclose the Confidential Documents, it would be in breach of its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. This is clear from the findings of fact of the motions judge that AECL was bound by its commercial interests and its customer's property rights not to disclose the information (para. 27), and that such disclosure could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23).

50

Aside from this direct commercial interest, if the confidentiality order is denied, then in order to protect its commercial interests, the appellant will have to withhold the documents. This raises the important matter of the litigation context in which the order is sought. As both the motions judge and the Federal Court of Appeal found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to defences available under the *CEAA*, the inability to present this information hinders the appellant's capacity to make full answer and defence, or, expressed more generally, the appellant's right, as a civil litigant, to present its case. In that sense, preventing the appellant from disclosing these documents on a confidential basis infringes its right to a fair trial. Although in the context of a civil proceeding this does not engage a *Charter* right, the right to a fair trial generally can be viewed as a fundamental principle of justice: *M. (A.) v. Ryan*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, at para. 84, *per* L'Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting, but not on that point). Although this fair trial right is directly relevant to the appellant, there is also a general public interest in protecting the right to a fair trial. Indeed, as a general proposition, all disputes in the courts should be decided under a fair trial standard. The legitimacy of the judicial process alone

pouvoir discrétionnaire d'accorder l'ordonnance soit exercé conformément aux principes de la *Charte*. Toutefois, pour adapter le critère au contexte de la présente espèce, il faut d'abord définir les droits et intérêts particuliers qui entrent en jeu.

(2) Les droits et les intérêts des parties

L'objet immédiat de la demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité d'ÉACL a trait à ses intérêts commerciaux. Les renseignements en question appartiennent aux autorités chinoises. Si l'appelante divulguait les documents confidentiels, elle manquerait à ses obligations contractuelles et s'exposerait à une détérioration de sa position concurrentielle. Il ressort clairement des conclusions de fait du juge des requêtes qu'ÉACL est tenue, par ses intérêts commerciaux et par les droits de propriété de son client, de ne pas divulguer ces renseignements (par. 27), et que leur divulgation risque de nuire aux intérêts commerciaux de l'appelante (par. 23).

Indépendamment de cet intérêt commercial direct, en cas de refus de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, l'appelante devra, pour protéger ses intérêts commerciaux, s'abstenir de produire les documents. Cela soulève l'importante question du contexte de la présentation de la demande. Comme le juge des requêtes et la Cour d'appel fédérale concluent tous deux que l'information contenue dans les documents confidentiels est pertinente pour les moyens de défense prévus par la *LCÉE*, le fait de ne pouvoir la produire nuit à la capacité de l'appelante de présenter une défense pleine et entière ou, plus généralement, au droit de l'appelante, en sa qualité de justiciable civile, de défendre sa cause. En ce sens, empêcher l'appelante de divulguer ces documents pour des raisons de confidentialité porte atteinte à son droit à un procès équitable. Même si en matière civile cela n'engage pas de droit protégé par la *Charte*, le droit à un procès équitable peut généralement être considéré comme un principe de justice fondamentale : *M. (A.) c. Ryan*, [1997] 1 R.C.S. 157, par. 84, le juge L'Heureux-Dubé (dissidente, mais non sur ce point). Le droit à un procès équitable intéresse directement l'appelante, mais le public a aussi un intérêt général à la protection du droit à un procès équitable. À vrai dire, le principe

demands as much. Similarly, courts have an interest in having all relevant evidence before them in order to ensure that justice is done.

Thus, the interests which would be promoted by a confidentiality order are the preservation of commercial and contractual relations, as well as the right of civil litigants to a fair trial. Related to the latter are the public and judicial interests in seeking the truth and achieving a just result in civil proceedings.

In opposition to the confidentiality order lies the fundamental principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This principle is inextricably tied to freedom of expression enshrined in s. 2(b) of the *Charter: New Brunswick, supra*, at para. 23. The importance of public and media access to the courts cannot be understated, as this access is the method by which the judicial process is scrutinized and criticized. Because it is essential to the administration of justice that justice is done and is seen to be done, such public scrutiny is fundamental. The open court principle has been described as “the very soul of justice”, guaranteeing that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner: *New Brunswick*, at para. 22.

(3) Adapting the *Dagenais* Test to the Rights and Interests of the Parties

Applying the rights and interests engaged in this case to the analytical framework of *Dagenais* and subsequent cases discussed above, the test for whether a confidentiality order ought to be granted in a case such as this one should be framed as follows:

A confidentiality order under Rule 151 should only be granted when:

- (a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

général est que tout litige porté devant les tribunaux doit être tranché selon la norme du procès équitable. La légitimité du processus judiciaire n'exige pas moins. De même, les tribunaux ont intérêt à ce que toutes les preuves pertinentes leur soient présentées pour veiller à ce que justice soit faite.

Ainsi, les intérêts que favoriserait l'ordonnance de confidentialité seraient le maintien de relations commerciales et contractuelles, de même que le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable. Est lié à ce dernier droit l'intérêt du public et du judiciaire dans la recherche de la vérité et la solution juste des litiges civils.

Milite contre l'ordonnance de confidentialité le principe fondamental de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Ce principe est inextricablement lié à la liberté d'expression constitutionnalisée à l'al. 2b) de la *Charte : Nouveau-Brunswick*, précité, par. 23. L'importance de l'accès du public et des médias aux tribunaux ne peut être sous-estimée puisque l'accès est le moyen grâce auquel le processus judiciaire est soumis à l'examen et à la critique. Comme il est essentiel à l'administration de la justice que justice soit faite et soit perçue comme l'étant, cet examen public est fondamental. Le principe de la publicité des procédures judiciaires a été décrit comme le « souffle même de la justice », la garantie de l'absence d'arbitraire dans l'administration de la justice : *Nouveau-Brunswick*, par. 22.

(3) Adaptation de l'analyse de *Dagenais* aux droits et intérêts des parties

Pour appliquer aux droits et intérêts en jeu en l'espèce l'analyse de *Dagenais* et des arrêts subséquents précités, il convient d'énoncer de la façon suivante les conditions applicables à une ordonnance de confidentialité dans un cas comme l'espèce :

Une ordonnance de confidentialité en vertu de la règle 151 ne doit être rendue que si :

- a) elle est nécessaire pour écarter un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le contexte d'un litige, en l'absence d'autres options raisonnables pour écarter ce risque;

51

52

53

(b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

b) ses effets bénéfiques, y compris ses effets sur le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable, l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, y compris ses effets sur la liberté d'expression qui, dans ce contexte, comprend l'intérêt du public dans la publicité des débats judiciaires.

54 As in *Mentuck*, I would add that three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of this test. First, the risk in question must be real and substantial, in that the risk is well grounded in the evidence, and poses a serious threat to the commercial interest in question.

Comme dans *Mentuck*, j'ajouterais que trois éléments importants sont subsumés sous le premier volet de l'analyse. En premier lieu, le risque en cause doit être réel et important, en ce qu'il est bien étayé par la preuve et menace gravement l'intérêt commercial en question.

55 In addition, the phrase "important commercial interest" is in need of some clarification. In order to qualify as an "important commercial interest", the interest in question cannot merely be specific to the party requesting the order; the interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality. For example, a private company could not argue simply that the existence of a particular contract should not be made public because to do so would cause the company to lose business, thus harming its commercial interests. However, if, as in this case, exposure of information would cause a breach of a confidentiality agreement, then the commercial interest affected can be characterized more broadly as the general commercial interest of preserving confidential information. Simply put, if there is no general principle at stake, there can be no "important commercial interest" for the purposes of this test. Or, in the words of Binnie J. in *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35, at para. 10, the open court rule only yields "where the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness" (emphasis added).

De plus, l'expression « intérêt commercial important » exige une clarification. Pour être qualifié d'« intérêt commercial important », l'intérêt en question ne doit pas se rapporter uniquement et spécifiquement à la partie qui demande l'ordonnance de confidentialité; il doit s'agir d'un intérêt qui peut se définir en termes d'intérêt public à la confidentialité. Par exemple, une entreprise privée ne pourrait simplement prétendre que l'existence d'un contrat donné ne devrait pas être divulguée parce que cela lui ferait perdre des occasions d'affaires, et que cela nuirait à ses intérêts commerciaux. Si toutefois, comme en l'espèce, la divulgation de renseignements doit entraîner un manquement à une entente de non-divulgence, on peut alors parler plus largement de l'intérêt commercial général dans la protection des renseignements confidentiels. Simplement, si aucun principe général n'entre en jeu, il ne peut y avoir d'« intérêt commercial important » pour les besoins de l'analyse. Ou, pour citer le juge Binnie dans *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 R.C.S. 880, 2000 CSC 35, par. 10, la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires ne cède le pas que « dans les cas où le droit du public à la confidentialité l'emporte sur le droit du public à l'accessibilité » (je souligne).

56 In addition to the above requirement, courts must be cautious in determining what constitutes an "important commercial interest". It must be remembered that a confidentiality order involves an infringement on freedom of expression. Although the balancing of the commercial interest with freedom of expression takes place under the second

Outre l'exigence susmentionnée, les tribunaux doivent déterminer avec prudence ce qui constitue un « intérêt commercial important ». Il faut rappeler qu'une ordonnance de confidentialité implique une atteinte à la liberté d'expression. Même si la pondération de l'intérêt commercial et de la liberté d'expression intervient à la deuxième étape

branch of the test, courts must be alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule. See generally Muldoon J. in *Eli Lilly and Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437 (F.C.T.D.), at p. 439.

Finally, the phrase “reasonably alternative measures” requires the judge to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives to a confidentiality order are available, but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

B. *Application of the Test to this Appeal*

(1) Necessity

At this stage, it must be determined whether disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and whether there are reasonable alternatives, either to the order itself, or to its terms.

The commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality. The appellant argues that it will suffer irreparable harm to its commercial interests if the Confidential Documents are disclosed. In my view, the preservation of confidential information constitutes a sufficiently important commercial interest to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met.

Pelletier J. noted that the order sought in this case was similar in nature to an application for a protective order which arises in the context of patent litigation. Such an order requires the applicant to demonstrate that the information in question has been treated at all relevant times as confidential and that on a balance of probabilities its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by the disclosure of the information: *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare)* (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428 (F.C.T.D.), at p. 434. To this I would add the requirement proposed

de l’analyse, les tribunaux doivent avoir pleinement conscience de l’importance fondamentale de la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Voir généralement *Eli Lilly and Co. c. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437 (C.F. 1^{re} inst.), p. 439, le juge Muldoon.

Enfin, l’expression « autres options raisonnables » oblige le juge non seulement à se demander s’il existe des mesures raisonnables autres que l’ordonnance de confidentialité, mais aussi à restreindre l’ordonnance autant qu’il est raisonnablement possible de le faire tout en préservant l’intérêt commercial en question.

B. *Application de l’analyse en l’espèce*

(1) Nécessité

À cette étape, il faut déterminer si la divulgation des documents confidentiels ferait courir un risque sérieux à un intérêt commercial important de l’appelante, et s’il existe d’autres solutions raisonnables que l’ordonnance elle-même, ou ses modalités.

L’intérêt commercial en jeu en l’espèce a trait à la préservation d’obligations contractuelles de confidentialité. L’appelante fait valoir qu’un préjudice irréparable sera causé à ses intérêts commerciaux si les documents confidentiels sont divulgués. À mon avis, la préservation de renseignements confidentiels est un intérêt commercial suffisamment important pour satisfaire au premier volet de l’analyse dès lors que certaines conditions relatives aux renseignements sont réunies.

Le juge Pelletier souligne que l’ordonnance sollicitée en l’espèce s’apparente à une ordonnance conservatoire en matière de brevets. Pour l’obtenir, le requérant doit démontrer que les renseignements en question ont toujours été traités comme des renseignements confidentiels et que, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, il est raisonnable de penser que leur divulgation risquerait de compromettre ses droits exclusifs, commerciaux et scientifiques : *AB Hassle c. Canada (Ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social)*, [1998] A.C.F. n° 1850 (QL) (C.F. 1^{re} inst.), par. 29-30. J’ajouterais à cela

57

58

59

60

by Robertson J.A. that the information in question must be of a “confidential nature” in that it has been “accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential” as opposed to “facts which a litigant would like to keep confidential by having the courtroom doors closed” (para. 14).

l’exigence proposée par le juge Robertson que les renseignements soient « de nature confidentielle » en ce qu’ils ont été « recueillis dans l’expectative raisonnable qu’ils resteront confidentiels », par opposition à « des faits qu’une partie à un litige voudrait garder confidentiels en obtenant le huis clos » (par. 14).

61 Pelletier J. found as a fact that the *AB Hassle* test had been satisfied in that the information had clearly been treated as confidential both by the appellant and by the Chinese authorities, and that, on a balance of probabilities, disclosure of the information could harm the appellant’s commercial interests (para. 23). As well, Robertson J.A. found that the information in question was clearly of a confidential nature as it was commercial information, consistently treated and regarded as confidential, that would be of interest to AECL’s competitors (para. 16). Thus, the order is sought to prevent a serious risk to an important commercial interest.

Le juge Pelletier constate que le critère établi dans *AB Hassle* est respecté puisque tant l’appelante que les autorités chinoises ont toujours considéré les renseignements comme confidentiels et que, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, leur divulgation risque de nuire aux intérêts commerciaux de l’appelante (par. 23). Le juge Robertson conclut lui aussi que les renseignements en question sont clairement confidentiels puisqu’il s’agit de renseignements commerciaux, uniformément reconnus comme étant confidentiels, qui présentent un intérêt pour les concurrents d’ÉACL (par. 16). Par conséquent, l’ordonnance est demandée afin de prévenir un risque sérieux de préjudice à un intérêt commercial important.

62 The first branch of the test also requires the consideration of alternative measures to the confidentiality order, as well as an examination of the scope of the order to ensure that it is not overly broad. Both courts below found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to potential defences available to the appellant under the *CEAA* and this finding was not appealed at this Court. Further, I agree with the Court of Appeal’s assertion (at para. 99) that, given the importance of the documents to the right to make full answer and defence, the appellant is, practically speaking, compelled to produce the documents. Given that the information is necessary to the appellant’s case, it remains only to determine whether there are reasonably alternative means by which the necessary information can be adduced without disclosing the confidential information.

Le premier volet de l’analyse exige aussi l’examen d’options raisonnables autres que l’ordonnance de confidentialité, et de la portée de l’ordonnance pour s’assurer qu’elle n’est pas trop vaste. Les deux jugements antérieurs en l’espèce concluent que les renseignements figurant dans les documents confidentiels sont pertinents pour les moyens de défense offerts à l’appelante en vertu de la *LCÉE*, et cette conclusion n’est pas portée en appel devant notre Cour. De plus, je suis d’accord avec la Cour d’appel lorsqu’elle affirme (au par. 99) que vu l’importance des documents pour le droit de présenter une défense pleine et entière, l’appelante est pratiquement forcée de les produire. Comme les renseignements sont nécessaires à la cause de l’appelante, il ne reste qu’à déterminer s’il existe d’autres options raisonnables pour communiquer les renseignements nécessaires sans divulguer de renseignements confidentiels.

63 Two alternatives to the confidentiality order were put forward by the courts below. The motions judge suggested that the Confidential Documents could be expunged of their commercially sensitive contents, and edited versions of the documents could be

Deux options autres que l’ordonnance de confidentialité sont mentionnées dans les décisions antérieures. Le juge des requêtes suggère de retrancher des documents les passages commercialement délicats et de produire les versions ainsi modifiées.

filed. As well, the majority of the Court of Appeal, in addition to accepting the possibility of expungement, was of the opinion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals. If either of these options is a reasonable alternative to submitting the Confidential Documents under a confidentiality order, then the order is not necessary, and the application does not pass the first branch of the test.

There are two possible options with respect to expungement, and in my view, there are problems with both of these. The first option would be for AECL to expunge the confidential information without disclosing the expunged material to the parties and the court. However, in this situation the filed material would still differ from the material used by the affiants. It must not be forgotten that this motion arose as a result of Sierra Club's position that the summaries contained in the affidavits should be accorded little or no weight without the presence of the underlying documents. Even if the relevant information and the confidential information were mutually exclusive, which would allow for the disclosure of all the information relied on in the affidavits, this relevancy determination could not be tested on cross-examination because the expunged material would not be available. Thus, even in the best case scenario, where only irrelevant information needed to be expunged, the parties would be put in essentially the same position as that which initially generated this appeal, in the sense that, at least some of the material relied on to prepare the affidavits in question would not be available to Sierra Club.

Further, I agree with Robertson J.A. that this best case scenario, where the relevant and the confidential information do not overlap, is an untested assumption (para. 28). Although the documents themselves were not put before the courts on this motion, given that they comprise thousands of pages of detailed information, this assumption is at best optimistic. The expungement alternative would be further complicated by the fact that the Chinese

La majorité en Cour d'appel estime que, outre cette possibilité d'épuration des documents, l'inclusion dans les affidavits d'un résumé des documents confidentiels pourrait, dans une large mesure, compenser l'absence des originaux. Si l'une ou l'autre de ces deux options peut raisonnablement se substituer au dépôt des documents confidentiels aux termes d'une ordonnance de confidentialité, alors l'ordonnance n'est pas nécessaire et la requête ne franchit pas la première étape de l'analyse.

Il existe deux possibilités pour l'épuration des documents et, selon moi, elles comportent toutes deux des problèmes. La première serait que ÉACL retranche les renseignements confidentiels sans divulguer les éléments retranchés ni aux parties ni au tribunal. Toutefois, dans cette situation, la documentation déposée serait encore différente de celle utilisée pour les affidavits. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue que la requête découle de l'argument de Sierra Club selon lequel le tribunal ne devrait accorder que peu ou pas de poids aux résumés sans la présence des documents de base. Même si on pouvait totalement séparer les renseignements pertinents et les renseignements confidentiels, ce qui permettrait la divulgation de tous les renseignements sur lesquels se fondent les affidavits, l'appréciation de leur pertinence ne pourrait pas être mise à l'épreuve en contre-interrogatoire puisque la documentation retranchée ne serait pas disponible. Par conséquent, même dans le meilleur cas de figure, où l'on n'aurait qu'à retrancher les renseignements non pertinents, les parties se retrouveraient essentiellement dans la même situation que celle qui a donné lieu au pourvoi, en ce sens qu'au moins une partie des documents ayant servi à la préparation des affidavits en question ne serait pas mise à la disposition de Sierra Club.

De plus, je partage l'opinion du juge Robertson que ce meilleur cas de figure, où les renseignements pertinents et les renseignements confidentiels ne se recoupent pas, est une hypothèse non confirmée (par. 28). Même si les documents eux-mêmes n'ont pas été produits devant les tribunaux dans le cadre de la présente requête, parce qu'ils comprennent des milliers de pages de renseignements détaillés, cette hypothèse est au mieux optimiste. L'option de

authorities require prior approval for any request by AECL to disclose information.

l'épuration serait en outre compliquée par le fait que les autorités chinoises exigent l'approbation préalable de toute demande de divulgation de renseignements de la part d'ÉACL.

66 The second option is that the expunged material be made available to the court and the parties under a more narrowly drawn confidentiality order. Although this option would allow for slightly broader public access than the current confidentiality request, in my view, this minor restriction to the current confidentiality request is not a viable alternative given the difficulties associated with expungement in these circumstances. The test asks whether there are reasonably alternative measures; it does not require the adoption of the absolutely least restrictive option. With respect, in my view, expungement of the Confidential Documents would be a virtually unworkable and ineffective solution that is not reasonable in the circumstances.

La deuxième possibilité serait de mettre les documents supprimés à la disposition du tribunal et des parties en vertu d'une ordonnance de confidentialité plus restreinte. Bien que cela permettrait un accès public un peu plus large que ne le ferait l'ordonnance de confidentialité sollicitée, selon moi, cette restriction mineure à la requête n'est pas une option viable étant donné les difficultés liées à l'épuration dans les circonstances. Il s'agit de savoir s'il y a d'autres options raisonnables et non d'adopter l'option qui soit absolument la moins restrictive. Avec égards, j'estime que l'épuration des documents confidentiels serait une solution virtuellement impraticable et inefficace qui n'est pas raisonnable dans les circonstances.

67 A second alternative to a confidentiality order was Evans J.A.'s suggestion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits "may well go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals" (para. 103). However, he appeared to take this fact into account merely as a factor to be considered when balancing the various interests at stake. I would agree that at this threshold stage to rely on the summaries alone, in light of the intention of Sierra Club to argue that they should be accorded little or no weight, does not appear to be a "reasonably alternative measure" to having the underlying documents available to the parties.

Une deuxième option autre que l'ordonnance de confidentialité serait, selon le juge Evans, l'inclusion dans les affidavits d'un résumé des documents confidentiels pour « dans une large mesure, compenser [leur] absence » (par. 103). Il ne semble toutefois envisager ce fait qu'à titre de facteur à considérer dans la pondération des divers intérêts en cause. Je conviens qu'à cette étape liminaire, se fonder uniquement sur les résumés en connaissant l'intention de Sierra Club de plaider leur faiblesse ou l'absence de valeur probante, ne semble pas être une « autre option raisonnable » à la communication aux parties des documents de base.

68 With the above considerations in mind, I find the confidentiality order necessary in that disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and that there are no reasonably alternative measures to granting the order.

Vu les facteurs susmentionnés, je conclus que l'ordonnance de confidentialité est nécessaire en ce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels ferait courir un risque sérieux à un intérêt commercial important de l'appelante, et qu'il n'existe pas d'autres options raisonnables.

(2) The Proportionality Stage

(2) L'étape de la proportionnalité

69 As stated above, at this stage, the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, must be weighed against the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right to free

Comme on le mentionne plus haut, à cette étape, les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, y compris ses effets sur le droit de l'appelante à un procès équitable, doivent être pondérés avec ses effets préjudiciables, y compris ses effets sur le droit

expression, which in turn is connected to the principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This balancing will ultimately determine whether the confidentiality order ought to be granted.

(a) *Salutary Effects of the Confidentiality Order*

As discussed above, the primary interest that would be promoted by the confidentiality order is the public interest in the right of a civil litigant to present its case, or, more generally, the fair trial right. Because the fair trial right is being invoked in this case in order to protect commercial, not liberty, interests of the appellant, the right to a fair trial in this context is not a *Charter* right; however, a fair trial for all litigants has been recognized as a fundamental principle of justice: *Ryan, supra*, at para. 84. It bears repeating that there are circumstances where, in the absence of an affected *Charter* right, the proper administration of justice calls for a confidentiality order: *Mentuck, supra*, at para. 31. In this case, the salutary effects that such an order would have on the administration of justice relate to the ability of the appellant to present its case, as encompassed by the broader fair trial right.

The Confidential Documents have been found to be relevant to defences that will be available to the appellant in the event that the *CEAA* is found to apply to the impugned transaction and, as discussed above, the appellant cannot disclose the documents without putting its commercial interests at serious risk of harm. As such, there is a very real risk that, without the confidentiality order, the ability of the appellant to mount a successful defence will be seriously curtailed. I conclude, therefore, that the confidentiality order would have significant salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial.

Aside from the salutary effects on the fair trial interest, the confidentiality order would also have a beneficial impact on other important rights and interests. First, as I discuss in more detail below, the confidentiality order would allow all parties and the court access to the Confidential Documents, and

à la liberté d'expression, qui à son tour est lié au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Cette pondération déterminera finalement s'il y a lieu d'accorder l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

a) *Les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance de confidentialité*

Comme nous l'avons vu, le principal intérêt qui serait promu par l'ordonnance de confidentialité est l'intérêt du public à la protection du droit du justiciable civil de faire valoir sa cause ou, de façon plus générale, du droit à un procès équitable. Puisque l'appelante l'invoque en l'espèce pour protéger ses intérêts commerciaux et non son droit à la liberté, le droit à un procès équitable dans ce contexte n'est pas un droit visé par la *Charte*; toutefois, le droit à un procès équitable pour tous les justiciables a été reconnu comme un principe de justice fondamentale : *Ryan*, précité, par. 84. Il y a lieu de rappeler qu'il y a des circonstances où, en l'absence de violation d'un droit garanti par la *Charte*, la bonne administration de la justice exige une ordonnance de confidentialité : *Mentuck*, précité, par. 31. En l'espèce, les effets bénéfiques d'une telle ordonnance sur l'administration de la justice tiennent à la capacité de l'appelante de soutenir sa cause, dans le cadre du droit plus large à un procès équitable.

Les documents confidentiels ont été jugés pertinents en ce qui a trait aux moyens de défense que l'appelante pourrait invoquer s'il est jugé que la *LCÉE* s'applique à l'opération attaquée et, comme nous l'avons vu, l'appelante ne peut communiquer les documents sans risque sérieux pour ses intérêts commerciaux. De ce fait, il existe un risque bien réel que, sans l'ordonnance de confidentialité, la capacité de l'appelante à mener à bien sa défense soit gravement réduite. Je conclus par conséquent que l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait d'importants effets bénéfiques pour le droit de l'appelante à un procès équitable.

En plus des effets bénéfiques pour le droit à un procès équitable, l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait aussi des incidences favorables sur d'autres droits et intérêts importants. En premier lieu, comme je l'exposerai plus en détail ci-après, l'ordonnance de confidentialité permettrait aux parties ainsi qu'au

70

71

72

permit cross-examination based on their contents. By facilitating access to relevant documents in a judicial proceeding, the order sought would assist in the search for truth, a core value underlying freedom of expression.

tribunal d'avoir accès aux documents confidentiels, et permettrait la tenue d'un contre-interrogatoire fondé sur leur contenu. En facilitant l'accès aux documents pertinents dans une procédure judiciaire, l'ordonnance sollicitée favoriserait la recherche de la vérité, qui est une valeur fondamentale sous-tendant la liberté d'expression.

73 Second, I agree with the observation of Robertson J.A. that, as the Confidential Documents contain detailed technical information pertaining to the construction and design of a nuclear installation, it may be in keeping with the public interest to prevent this information from entering the public domain (para. 44). Although the exact contents of the documents remain a mystery, it is apparent that they contain technical details of a nuclear installation, and there may well be a substantial public security interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.

En deuxième lieu, je suis d'accord avec l'observation du juge Robertson selon laquelle puisque les documents confidentiels contiennent des renseignements techniques détaillés touchant la construction et la conception d'une installation nucléaire, il peut être nécessaire, dans l'intérêt public, d'empêcher que ces renseignements tombent dans le domaine public (par. 44). Même si le contenu exact des documents demeure un mystère, il est évident qu'ils comprennent des détails techniques d'une installation nucléaire et il peut bien y avoir un important intérêt de sécurité publique à préserver la confidentialité de ces renseignements.

(b) *Deleterious Effects of the Confidentiality Order*

b) *Les effets préjudiciables de l'ordonnance de confidentialité*

74 Granting the confidentiality order would have a negative effect on the open court principle, as the public would be denied access to the contents of the Confidential Documents. As stated above, the principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the s. 2(b) *Charter* right to freedom of expression, and public scrutiny of the courts is a fundamental aspect of the administration of justice: *New Brunswick, supra*, at paras. 22-23. Although as a general principle, the importance of open courts cannot be overstated, it is necessary to examine, in the context of this case, the particular deleterious effects on freedom of expression that the confidentiality order would have.

Une ordonnance de confidentialité aurait un effet préjudiciable sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, puisqu'elle priverait le public de l'accès au contenu des documents confidentiels. Comme on le dit plus haut, le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires est inextricablement lié au droit à la liberté d'expression protégé par l'al. 2b) de la *Charte*, et la vigilance du public envers les tribunaux est un aspect fondamental de l'administration de la justice : *Nouveau-Brunswick*, précité, par. 22-23. Même si, à titre de principe général, l'importance de la publicité des débats judiciaires ne peut être sous-estimée, il faut examiner, dans le contexte de l'espèce, les effets préjudiciables particuliers que l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait sur la liberté d'expression.

75 Underlying freedom of expression are the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good; (2) promoting self-fulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit; and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons: *Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General)*, [1989] 1 S.C.R.

Les valeurs fondamentales qui sous-tendent la liberté d'expression sont (1) la recherche de la vérité et du bien commun; (2) l'épanouissement personnel par le libre développement des pensées et des idées; et (3) la participation de tous au processus politique : *Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général)*, [1989] 1 R.C.S. 927, p. 976; *R. c. Keegstra*, [1990]

927, at p. 976; *R. v. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at pp. 762-64, *per* Dickson C.J. *Charter* jurisprudence has established that the closer the speech in question lies to these core values, the harder it will be to justify a s. 2(b) infringement of that speech under s. 1 of the *Charter*: *Keegstra*, at pp. 760-61. Since the main goal in this case is to exercise judicial discretion in a way which conforms to *Charter* principles, a discussion of the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on freedom of expression should include an assessment of the effects such an order would have on the three core values. The more detrimental the order would be to these values, the more difficult it will be to justify the confidentiality order. Similarly, minor effects of the order on the core values will make the confidentiality order easier to justify.

Seeking the truth is not only at the core of freedom of expression, but it has also been recognized as a fundamental purpose behind the open court rule, as the open examination of witnesses promotes an effective evidentiary process: *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, at pp. 1357-58, *per* Wilson J. Clearly the confidentiality order, by denying public and media access to documents relied on in the proceedings, would impede the search for truth to some extent. Although the order would not exclude the public from the courtroom, the public and the media would be denied access to documents relevant to the evidentiary process.

However, as mentioned above, to some extent the search for truth may actually be promoted by the confidentiality order. This motion arises as a result of Sierra Club's argument that it must have access to the Confidential Documents in order to test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence. If the order is denied, then the most likely scenario is that the appellant will not submit the documents with the unfortunate result that evidence which may be relevant to the proceedings will not be available to Sierra Club or the court. As a result, Sierra Club will not be able to fully test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence on cross-examination. In addition, the court will not have the benefit of this cross-examination or

3 R.C.S. 697, p. 762-764, le juge en chef Dickson. La jurisprudence de la *Charte* établit que plus l'expression en cause est au cœur de ces valeurs fondamentales, plus il est difficile de justifier, en vertu de l'article premier de la *Charte*, une atteinte à l'al. 2b) à son égard : *Keegstra*, p. 760-761. Comme l'objectif principal en l'espèce est d'exercer un pouvoir discrétionnaire dans le respect des principes de la *Charte*, l'examen des effets préjudiciables de l'ordonnance de confidentialité sur la liberté d'expression devrait comprendre une appréciation des effets qu'elle aurait sur les trois valeurs fondamentales. Plus l'ordonnance de confidentialité porte préjudice à ces valeurs, plus il est difficile de la justifier. Inversement, des effets mineurs sur les valeurs fondamentales rendent l'ordonnance de confidentialité plus facile à justifier.

La recherche de la vérité est non seulement au cœur de la liberté d'expression, elle est aussi reconnue comme un objectif fondamental de la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires, puisque l'examen public des témoins favorise l'efficacité du processus de présentation de la preuve : *Edmonton Journal*, précité, p. 1357-1358, le juge Wilson. À l'évidence, en enlevant au public et aux médias l'accès aux documents invoqués dans les procédures, l'ordonnance de confidentialité nuirait jusqu'à un certain point à la recherche de la vérité. L'ordonnance n'exclurait pas le public de la salle d'audience, mais le public et les médias n'auraient pas accès aux documents pertinents quant à la présentation de la preuve.

Toutefois, comme nous l'avons vu plus haut, la recherche de la vérité peut jusqu'à un certain point être favorisée par l'ordonnance de confidentialité. La présente requête résulte de l'argument de Sierra Club selon lequel il doit avoir accès aux documents confidentiels pour vérifier l'exactitude de la déposition de M. Pang. Si l'ordonnance est refusée, le scénario le plus probable est que l'appellante s'abstiendra de déposer les documents, avec la conséquence fâcheuse que des preuves qui peuvent être pertinentes ne seront pas portées à la connaissance de Sierra Club ou du tribunal. Par conséquent, Sierra Club ne sera pas en mesure de vérifier complètement l'exactitude de la preuve de M. Pang en contre-

documentary evidence, and will be required to draw conclusions based on an incomplete evidentiary record. This would clearly impede the search for truth in this case.

78

As well, it is important to remember that the confidentiality order would restrict access to a relatively small number of highly technical documents. The nature of these documents is such that the general public would be unlikely to understand their contents, and thus they would contribute little to the public interest in the search for truth in this case. However, in the hands of the parties and their respective experts, the documents may be of great assistance in probing the truth of the Chinese environmental assessment process, which would in turn assist the court in reaching accurate factual conclusions. Given the nature of the documents, in my view, the important value of the search for truth which underlies both freedom of expression and open justice would be promoted to a greater extent by submitting the Confidential Documents under the order sought than it would by denying the order, and thereby preventing the parties and the court from relying on the documents in the course of the litigation.

79

In addition, under the terms of the order sought, the only restrictions on these documents relate to their public distribution. The Confidential Documents would be available to the court and the parties, and public access to the proceedings would not be impeded. As such, the order represents a fairly minimal intrusion into the open court rule, and thus would not have significant deleterious effects on this principle.

80

The second core value underlying freedom of speech, namely, the promotion of individual self-fulfilment by allowing open development of thoughts and ideas, focusses on individual expression, and thus does not closely relate to the open court principle which involves institutional expression. Although the confidentiality order would

interrogatoire. De plus, le tribunal ne bénéficiera pas du contre-interrogatoire ou de cette preuve documentaire, et il lui faudra tirer des conclusions fondées sur un dossier de preuve incomplet. Cela nuira manifestement à la recherche de la vérité en l'espèce.

De plus, il importe de rappeler que l'ordonnance de confidentialité ne restreindrait l'accès qu'à un nombre relativement peu élevé de documents hautement techniques. La nature de ces documents est telle que le public en général est peu susceptible d'en comprendre le contenu, de sorte qu'ils contribueraient peu à l'intérêt du public à la recherche de la vérité en l'espèce. Toutefois, dans les mains des parties et de leurs experts respectifs, les documents peuvent être très utiles pour apprécier la conformité du processus d'évaluation environnementale chinois, ce qui devrait aussi aider le tribunal à tirer des conclusions de fait exactes. À mon avis, compte tenu de leur nature, la production des documents confidentiels en vertu de l'ordonnance de confidentialité sollicitée favoriserait mieux l'importante valeur de la recherche de la vérité, qui sous-tend à la fois la liberté d'expression et la publicité des débats judiciaires, que ne le ferait le rejet de la demande qui aurait pour effet d'empêcher les parties et le tribunal de se fonder sur les documents au cours de l'instance.

De plus, aux termes de l'ordonnance demandée, les seules restrictions imposées à l'égard de ces documents ont trait à leur distribution publique. Les documents confidentiels seraient mis à la disposition du tribunal et des parties, et il n'y aurait pas d'entrave à l'accès du public aux procédures. À ce titre, l'ordonnance représente une atteinte relativement minime à la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires et elle n'aurait donc pas d'effets préjudiciables importants sur ce principe.

La deuxième valeur fondamentale sous-jacente à la liberté d'expression, la promotion de l'épanouissement personnel par le libre développement de la pensée et des idées, est centrée sur l'expression individuelle et n'est donc pas étroitement liée au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires qui concerne l'expression institutionnelle. Même

restrict individual access to certain information which may be of interest to that individual, I find that this value would not be significantly affected by the confidentiality order.

The third core value, open participation in the political process, figures prominently in this appeal, as open justice is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society. This connection was pointed out by Cory J. in *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, at p. 1339:

It can be seen that freedom of expression is of fundamental importance to a democratic society. It is also essential to a democracy and crucial to the rule of law that the courts are seen to function openly. The press must be free to comment upon court proceedings to ensure that the courts are, in fact, seen by all to operate openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny.

Although there is no doubt as to the importance of open judicial proceedings to a democratic society, there was disagreement in the courts below as to whether the weight to be assigned to the open court principle should vary depending on the nature of the proceeding.

On this issue, Robertson J.A. was of the view that the nature of the case and the level of media interest were irrelevant considerations. On the other hand, Evans J.A. held that the motions judge was correct in taking into account that this judicial review application was one of significant public and media interest. In my view, although the public nature of the case may be a factor which strengthens the importance of open justice in a particular case, the level of media interest should not be taken into account as an independent consideration.

Since cases involving public institutions will generally relate more closely to the core value of public participation in the political process, the public nature of a proceeding should be taken into consideration when assessing the merits of a confidentiality order. It is important to note that this core value will always be engaged where the open court

si l'ordonnance de confidentialité devait restreindre l'accès individuel à certains renseignements susceptibles d'intéresser quelqu'un, j'estime que cette valeur ne serait pas touchée de manière significative.

La troisième valeur fondamentale, la libre participation au processus politique, joue un rôle primordial dans le pourvoi puisque la publicité des débats judiciaires est un aspect fondamental de la société démocratique. Ce lien est souligné par le juge Cory dans *Edmonton Journal*, précité, p. 1339 :

On voit que la liberté d'expression est d'une importance fondamentale dans une société démocratique. Il est également essentiel dans une démocratie et fondamental pour la primauté du droit que la transparence du fonctionnement des tribunaux soit perçue comme telle. La presse doit être libre de commenter les procédures judiciaires pour que, dans les faits, chacun puisse constater que les tribunaux fonctionnent publiquement sous les regards pénétrants du public.

Même si on ne peut douter de l'importance de la publicité des débats judiciaires dans une société démocratique, les décisions antérieures divergent sur la question de savoir si le poids à accorder au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires devrait varier en fonction de la nature de la procédure.

Sur ce point, le juge Robertson estime que la nature de l'affaire et le degré d'intérêt des médias sont des considérations dénuées de pertinence. Le juge Evans estime quant à lui que le juge des requêtes a eu raison de tenir compte du fait que la demande de contrôle judiciaire suscite beaucoup d'intérêt de la part du public et des médias. À mon avis, même si la nature publique de l'affaire peut être un facteur susceptible de renforcer l'importance de la publicité des débats judiciaires dans une espèce particulière, le degré d'intérêt des médias ne devrait pas être considéré comme facteur indépendant.

Puisque les affaires concernant des institutions publiques ont généralement un lien plus étroit avec la valeur fondamentale de la participation du public au processus politique, la nature publique d'une instance devrait être prise en considération dans l'évaluation du bien-fondé d'une ordonnance de confidentialité. Il importe de noter que cette valeur

81

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

82

83

principle is engaged owing to the importance of open justice to a democratic society. However, where the political process is also engaged by the substance of the proceedings, the connection between open proceedings and public participation in the political process will increase. As such, I agree with Evans J.A. in the court below where he stated, at para. 87:

While all litigation is important to the parties, and there is a public interest in ensuring the fair and appropriate adjudication of all litigation that comes before the courts, some cases raise issues that transcend the immediate interests of the parties and the general public interest in the due administration of justice, and have a much wider public interest significance.

84

This motion relates to an application for judicial review of a decision by the government to fund a nuclear energy project. Such an application is clearly of a public nature, as it relates to the distribution of public funds in relation to an issue of demonstrated public interest. Moreover, as pointed out by Evans J.A., openness and public participation are of fundamental importance under the *CEAA*. Indeed, by their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental issues will generally attract a high degree of protection. In this regard, I agree with Evans J.A. that the public interest is engaged here more than it would be if this were an action between private parties relating to purely private interests.

85

However, with respect, to the extent that Evans J.A. relied on media interest as an indicium of public interest, this was an error. In my view, it is important to distinguish public interest, from media interest, and I agree with Robertson J.A. that media exposure cannot be viewed as an impartial measure of public interest. It is the public nature of the proceedings which increases the need for openness, and this public nature is not necessarily reflected by the media desire to probe the facts of the case.

fondamentale sera toujours engagée lorsque sera mis en cause le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, vu l'importance de la transparence judiciaire dans une société démocratique. Toutefois, le lien entre la publicité des débats judiciaires et la participation du public dans le processus politique s'accroît lorsque le processus politique est également engagé par la substance de la procédure. Sous ce rapport, je suis d'accord avec ce que dit le juge Evans (au par. 87) :

Bien que tous les litiges soient importants pour les parties, et qu'il en va de l'intérêt du public que les affaires soumises aux tribunaux soient traitées de façon équitable et appropriée, certaines affaires soulèvent des questions qui transcendent les intérêts immédiats des parties ainsi que l'intérêt du public en général dans la bonne administration de la justice, et qui ont une signification beaucoup plus grande pour le public.

La requête est liée à une demande de contrôle judiciaire d'une décision du gouvernement de financer un projet d'énergie nucléaire. La demande est clairement de nature publique, puisqu'elle a trait à la distribution de fonds publics en rapport avec une question dont l'intérêt public a été démontré. De plus, comme le souligne le juge Evans, la transparence du processus et la participation du public ont une importance fondamentale sous le régime de la *LCÉE*. En effet, par leur nature même, les questions environnementales ont une portée publique considérable, et la transparence des débats judiciaires sur les questions environnementales mérite généralement un degré élevé de protection. À cet égard, je suis d'accord avec le juge Evans pour conclure que l'intérêt public est en l'espèce plus engagé que s'il s'agissait d'un litige entre personnes privées à l'égard d'intérêts purement privés.

J'estime toutefois avec égards que, dans la mesure où il se fonde sur l'intérêt des médias comme indice de l'intérêt du public, le juge Evans fait erreur. À mon avis, il est important d'établir une distinction entre l'intérêt du public et l'intérêt des médias et, comme le juge Robertson, je note que la couverture médiatique ne peut être considérée comme une mesure impartiale de l'intérêt public. C'est la nature publique de l'instance qui accroît le besoin de transparence, et cette nature publique ne se reflète

I reiterate the caution given by Dickson C.J. in *Keegstra*, *supra*, at p. 760, where he stated that, while the speech in question must be examined in light of its relation to the core values, “we must guard carefully against judging expression according to its popularity”.

Although the public interest in open access to the judicial review application as a whole is substantial, in my view, it is also important to bear in mind the nature and scope of the information for which the order is sought in assigning weight to the public interest. With respect, the motions judge erred in failing to consider the narrow scope of the order when he considered the public interest in disclosure, and consequently attached excessive weight to this factor. In this connection, I respectfully disagree with the following conclusion of Evans J.A., at para. 97:

Thus, having considered the nature of this litigation, and having assessed the extent of public interest in the openness of the proceedings in the case before him, the Motions Judge cannot be said in all the circumstances to have given this factor undue weight, even though confidentiality is claimed for only three documents among the small mountain of paper filed in this case, and their content is likely to be beyond the comprehension of all but those equipped with the necessary technical expertise.

Open justice is a fundamentally important principle, particularly when the substance of the proceedings is public in nature. However, this does not detract from the duty to attach weight to this principle in accordance with the specific limitations on openness that the confidentiality order would have. As Wilson J. observed in *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, at pp. 1353-54:

One thing seems clear and that is that one should not balance one value at large and the conflicting value in its context. To do so could well be to pre-judge the issue by placing more weight on the value developed at large than is appropriate in the context of the case.

pas nécessairement dans le désir des médias d’examiner les faits de l’affaire. Je réitère l’avertissement donné par le juge en chef Dickson dans *Keegstra*, précité, p. 760, où il dit que même si l’expression en cause doit être examinée dans ses rapports avec les valeurs fondamentales, « nous devons veiller à ne pas juger l’expression en fonction de sa popularité ».

Même si l’intérêt du public à la publicité de la demande de contrôle judiciaire dans son ensemble est important, à mon avis, il importe tout autant de prendre en compte la nature et la portée des renseignements visés par l’ordonnance demandée, lorsqu’il s’agit d’apprécier le poids de l’intérêt public. Avec égards, le juge des requêtes a commis une erreur en ne tenant pas compte de la portée limitée de l’ordonnance dans son appréciation de l’intérêt du public à la communication et en accordant donc un poids excessif à ce facteur. Sous ce rapport, je ne partage pas la conclusion suivante du juge Evans (au par. 97) :

Par conséquent, on ne peut dire qu’après que le juge des requêtes eut examiné la nature de ce litige et évalué l’importance de l’intérêt du public à la publicité des procédures, il aurait dans les circonstances accordé trop d’importance à ce facteur, même si la confidentialité n’est demandée que pour trois documents parmi la montagne de documents déposés en l’instance et que leur contenu dépasse probablement les connaissances de ceux qui n’ont pas l’expertise technique nécessaire.

La publicité des débats judiciaires est un principe fondamentalement important, surtout lorsque la substance de la procédure est de nature publique. Cela ne libère toutefois aucunement de l’obligation d’apprécier le poids à accorder à ce principe en fonction des limites particulières qu’imposerait l’ordonnance de confidentialité à la publicité des débats. Comme le dit le juge Wilson dans *Edmonton Journal*, précité, p. 1353-1354 :

Une chose semble claire et c’est qu’il ne faut pas évaluer une valeur selon la méthode générale et l’autre valeur en conflit avec elle selon la méthode contextuelle. Agir ainsi pourrait fort bien revenir à préjuger de l’issue du litige en donnant à la valeur examinée de manière générale plus d’importance que ne l’exige le contexte de l’affaire.

87

In my view, it is important that, although there is significant public interest in these proceedings, open access to the judicial review application would be only slightly impeded by the order sought. The narrow scope of the order coupled with the highly technical nature of the Confidential Documents significantly temper the deleterious effects the confidentiality order would have on the public interest in open courts.

88

In addressing the effects that the confidentiality order would have on freedom of expression, it should also be borne in mind that the appellant may not have to raise defences under the *CEAA*, in which case the Confidential Documents would be irrelevant to the proceedings, with the result that freedom of expression would be unaffected by the order. However, since the necessity of the Confidential Documents will not be determined for some time, in the absence of a confidentiality order, the appellant would be left with the choice of either submitting the documents in breach of its obligations, or withholding the documents in the hopes that either it will not have to present a defence under the *CEAA*, or that it will be able to mount a successful defence in the absence of these relevant documents. If it chooses the former option, and the defences under the *CEAA* are later found not to apply, then the appellant will have suffered the prejudice of having its confidential and sensitive information released into the public domain, with no corresponding benefit to the public. Although this scenario is far from certain, the possibility of such an occurrence also weighs in favour of granting the order sought.

89

In coming to this conclusion, I note that if the appellant is not required to invoke the relevant defences under the *CEAA*, it is also true that the appellant's fair trial right will not be impeded, even if the confidentiality order is not granted. However, I do not take this into account as a factor which weighs in favour of denying the order because, if the order is granted and the Confidential Documents are not required, there will be no deleterious effects on either the public interest in freedom of expression or the appellant's commercial interests or fair trial right. This neutral result is in contrast with the

À mon avis, il importe de reconnaître que, malgré l'intérêt significatif que porte le public à ces procédures, l'ordonnance demandée n'entraverait que légèrement la publicité de la demande de contrôle judiciaire. La portée étroite de l'ordonnance associée à la nature hautement technique des documents confidentiels tempère considérablement les effets préjudiciables que l'ordonnance de confidentialité pourrait avoir sur l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires.

Pour traiter des effets qu'aurait l'ordonnance de confidentialité sur la liberté d'expression, il faut aussi se rappeler qu'il se peut que l'appelante n'ait pas à soulever de moyens de défense visés par la *LCÉE*, auquel cas les documents confidentiels perdraient leur pertinence et la liberté d'expression ne serait pas touchée par l'ordonnance. Toutefois, puisque l'utilité des documents confidentiels ne sera pas déterminée avant un certain temps, l'appelante n'aurait plus, en l'absence d'ordonnance de confidentialité, que le choix entre soit produire les documents en violation de ses obligations, soit les retenir dans l'espoir de ne pas avoir à présenter de défense en vertu de la *LCÉE* ou de pouvoir assurer effectivement sa défense sans les documents pertinents. Si elle opte pour le premier choix et que le tribunal conclut par la suite que les moyens de défense visés par la *LCÉE* ne sont pas applicables, l'appelante aura subi le préjudice de voir ses renseignements confidentiels et délicats tomber dans le domaine public sans que le public n'en tire d'avantage correspondant. Même si sa réalisation est loin d'être certaine, la possibilité d'un tel scénario milite également en faveur de l'ordonnance sollicitée.

En arrivant à cette conclusion, je note que si l'appelante n'a pas à invoquer les moyens de défense pertinents en vertu de la *LCÉE*, il est également vrai que son droit à un procès équitable ne sera pas entravé même en cas de refus de l'ordonnance de confidentialité. Je ne retiens toutefois pas cela comme facteur militant contre l'ordonnance parce que, si elle est accordée et que les documents confidentiels ne sont pas nécessaires, il n'y aura alors aucun effet préjudiciable ni sur l'intérêt du public à la liberté d'expression ni sur les droits commerciaux ou le droit de l'appelante à un procès

scenario discussed above where the order is denied and the possibility arises that the appellant's commercial interests will be prejudiced with no corresponding public benefit. As a result, the fact that the Confidential Documents may not be required is a factor which weighs in favour of granting the confidentiality order.

In summary, the core freedom of expression values of seeking the truth and promoting an open political process are most closely linked to the principle of open courts, and most affected by an order restricting that openness. However, in the context of this case, the confidentiality order would only marginally impede, and in some respects would even promote, the pursuit of these values. As such, the order would not have significant deleterious effects on freedom of expression.

VII. Conclusion

In balancing the various rights and interests engaged, I note that the confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, and freedom of expression. On the other hand, the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on the principle of open courts and freedom of expression would be minimal. In addition, if the order is not granted and in the course of the judicial review application the appellant is not required to mount a defence under the *CEAA*, there is a possibility that the appellant will have suffered the harm of having disclosed confidential information in breach of its obligations with no corresponding benefit to the right of the public to freedom of expression. As a result, I find that the salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects, and the order should be granted.

Consequently, I would allow the appeal with costs throughout, set aside the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, and grant the confidentiality order on the terms requested by the appellant under Rule 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*.

équitable. Cette issue neutre contraste avec le scénario susmentionné où il y a un refus de l'ordonnance et possibilité d'atteinte aux droits commerciaux de l'appelante sans avantage correspondant pour le public. Par conséquent, le fait que les documents confidentiels puissent ne pas être nécessaires est un facteur en faveur de l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

En résumé, les valeurs centrales de la liberté d'expression que sont la recherche de la vérité et la promotion d'un processus politique ouvert sont très étroitement liées au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, et sont les plus touchées par une ordonnance limitant cette publicité. Toutefois, dans le contexte en l'espèce, l'ordonnance de confidentialité n'entraverait que légèrement la poursuite de ces valeurs, et pourrait même les favoriser à certains égards. À ce titre, l'ordonnance n'aurait pas d'effets préjudiciables importants sur la liberté d'expression.

VII. Conclusion

Dans la pondération des divers droits et intérêts en jeu, je note que l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques importants sur le droit de l'appelante à un procès équitable et sur la liberté d'expression. D'autre part, les effets préjudiciables de l'ordonnance de confidentialité sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et la liberté d'expression seraient minimes. En outre, si l'ordonnance est refusée et qu'au cours du contrôle judiciaire l'appelante n'est pas amenée à invoquer les moyens de défense prévus dans la *LCÉE*, il se peut qu'elle subisse le préjudice d'avoir communiqué des renseignements confidentiels en violation de ses obligations sans avantage correspondant pour le droit du public à la liberté d'expression. Je conclus donc que les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, et qu'il y a lieu d'accorder l'ordonnance.

Je suis donc d'avis d'accueillir le pourvoi avec dépens devant toutes les cours, d'annuler l'arrêt de la Cour d'appel fédérale, et d'accorder l'ordonnance de confidentialité selon les modalités demandées par l'appelante en vertu de la règle 151 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998)*.

90

91

92

Appeal allowed with costs.

Solicitors for the appellant: Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt, Toronto.

Solicitors for the respondent Sierra Club of Canada: Timothy J. Howard, Vancouver; Franklin S. Gertler, Montréal.

Solicitor for the respondents the Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada: The Deputy Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa.

Pourvoi accueilli avec dépens.

Procureurs de l'appelante : Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt, Toronto.

Procureurs de l'intimé Sierra Club du Canada : Timothy J. Howard, Vancouver; Franklin S. Gertler, Montréal.

Procureur des intimés le ministre des Finances du Canada, le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada, le ministre du Commerce international du Canada et le procureur général du Canada : Le sous-procureur général du Canada, Ottawa.