

- (b) Parliament's reliance upon the broad notions of "compromise" and "arrangement" to establish the framework within which the parties may work to put forward a restructuring plan; and in
- (c) the creation of the statutory mechanism binding all creditors in classes to the compromise or arrangement once it has surpassed the high "double majority" voting threshold and obtained court sanction as "fair and reasonable".

Therein lies the expression of Parliament's intention to permit the parties to negotiate and vote on, and the court to sanction, third-party releases relating to a restructuring.

[59] Sections 4 and 6 of the CCAA state:

4. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company, of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs. [page530]

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6. Where a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding

- (a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and
- (b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has been made under the Bankruptcy and

Insolvency Act or is in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

Compromise or arrangement

[60] While there may be little practical distinction between "compromise" and "arrangement" in many respects, the two are not necessarily the same. "Arrangement" is broader than "compromise" and would appear to include any scheme for reorganizing the affairs of the debtor: L.W. Houlden and C.H. Morawetz, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada*, looseleaf, 3rd ed., vol. 4 (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1992) at 10A-12.2, N10. It has been said to be "a very wide and indefinite [word]": Reference re Timber Regulations, [1935] A.C. 184, [1935] 2 D.L.R. 1 (P.C.), at p. 197 A.C., affg [1933] S.C.R. 616, [1933] S.C.J. No. 53. See also Guardian Assurance Co. (Re), [1917] 1 Ch. 431 (C.A.), at pp. 448, 450 Ch.; T&N Ltd. and Others (No. 3) (Re), [2007] 1 All E.R. 851, [2006] E.W.H.C. 1447 (Ch.).

[61] The CCAA is a sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest. Parliament wisely avoided attempting to anticipate the myriad of business deals that could evolve from the fertile and creative minds of negotiators restructuring their financial affairs. It left the shape and details of those deals to be worked out within the framework of the comprehensive and flexible concepts of a "compromise" and "arrangement". I see no reason why a release in favour of a third party, negotiated as part of a package between a debtor and creditor and reasonably relating to the proposed restructuring cannot fall within that framework.

[62] A proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (the "BIA") is a contract: *Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ideal Petroleum (1959) Ltd.*, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 230, [1976] S.C.J. No. 114, at p. 239 S.C.R.; [page531] *Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Armitage* (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 688,

[2000] O.J. No. 3993 (C.A.), at para. 11. In my view, a compromise or arrangement under the CCAA is directly analogous to a proposal for these purposes and, therefore, is to be treated as a contract between the debtor and its creditors. Consequently, parties are entitled to put anything into such a plan that could lawfully be incorporated into any contract. See *Air Canada (Re)*, [2004] O.J. No. 1909, 2 C.B.R. (5th) 4 (S.C.J.), at para. 6; *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re)* (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500, [1993] O.J. No. 545 (Gen. Div.), at p. 518 O.R.

[63] There is nothing to prevent a debtor and a creditor from including in a contract between them a term providing that the creditor release a third party. The term is binding as between the debtor and creditor. In the CCAA context, therefore, a plan of compromise or arrangement may propose that creditors agree to compromise claims against the debtor and to release third parties, just as any debtor and creditor might agree to such a term in a contract between them. Once the statutory mechanism regarding voter approval and court sanctioning has been complied with, the plan -- including the provision for releases -- becomes binding on all creditors (including the dissenting minority).

[64] *T&N Ltd. and Others (Re)*, *supra*, is instructive in this regard. It is a rare example of a court focusing on and examining the meaning and breadth of the term "arrangement". T&N and its associated companies were engaged in the manufacture, distribution and sale of asbestos-containing products. They became the subject of many claims by former employees, who had been exposed to asbestos dust in the course of their employment, and their dependents. The T&N companies applied for protection under s. 425 of the U.K. Companies Act 1985, a provision virtually identical to the scheme of the CCAA -- including the concepts of compromise or arrangement. [See Note 4 below]

[65] T&N carried employers' liability insurance. However, the employers' liability insurers (the "EL insurers") denied coverage. This issue was litigated and ultimately resolved through the establishment of a multi-million pound fund against which the employees and their dependants (the EL claimants)

would assert their claims. In return, T&N's former employees and dependants (the EL claimants) agreed to forego any further claims against the EL insurers. This settlement was incorporated into the plan of [page532] compromise and arrangement between the T&N companies and the EL claimants that was voted on and put forward for court sanction.

[66] Certain creditors argued that the court could not sanction the plan because it did not constitute a "compromise or arrangement" between T&N and the EL claimants since it did not purport to affect rights as between them but only the EL claimants' rights against the EL insurers. The court rejected this argument. Richards J. adopted previous jurisprudence -- cited earlier in these reasons -- to the effect that the word "arrangement" has a very broad meaning and that, while both a compromise and an arrangement involve some "give and take", an arrangement need not involve a compromise or be confined to a case of dispute or difficulty (paras. 46-51). He referred to what would be the equivalent of a solvent arrangement under Canadian corporate legislation as an example. [See Note 5 below] Finally, he pointed out that the compromised rights of the EL claimants against the EL insurers were not unconnected with the EL claimants' rights against the T&N companies; the scheme of arrangement involving the EL insurers was "an integral part of a single proposal affecting all the parties" (para. 52). He concluded his reasoning with these observations (para. 53):

In my judgment it is not a necessary element of an arrangement for the purposes of s 425 of the 1985 Act that it should alter the rights existing between the company and the creditors or members with whom it is made. No doubt in most cases it will alter those rights. But, provided that the context and content of the scheme are such as properly to constitute an arrangement between the company and the members or creditors concerned, it will fall within s 425. It is ... neither necessary nor desirable to attempt a definition of arrangement. The legislature has not done so. To insist on an alteration of rights, or a termination of rights as in the case of schemes to effect takeovers or mergers, is to impose a restriction which is neither warranted by the statutory language nor justified by the courts' approach over many

years to give the term its widest meaning. Nor is an arrangement necessarily outside the section, because its effect is to alter the rights of creditors against another party or because such alteration could be achieved by a scheme of arrangement with that party.

(Emphasis added)

[67] I find Richard J.'s analysis helpful and persuasive. In effect, the claimants in T&N were being asked to release their claims against the EL insurers in exchange for a call on the fund. Here, the appellants are being required to release their claims against certain financial third parties in exchange for what is anticipated to be an improved position for all ABCP Noteholders, stemming from the contributions the financial [page533] third parties are making to the ABCP restructuring. The situations are quite comparable.

The binding mechanism

[68] Parliament's reliance on the expansive terms "compromise" or "arrangement" does not stand alone, however. Effective insolvency restructurings would not be possible without a statutory mechanism to bind an unwilling minority of creditors. Unanimity is frequently impossible in such situations. But the minority must be protected too. Parliament's solution to this quandary was to permit a wide range of proposals to be negotiated and put forward (the compromise or arrangement) and to bind all creditors by class to the terms of the plan, but to do so only where the proposal can gain the support of the requisite "double majority" of votes [See Note 6 below] and obtain the sanction of the court on the basis that it is fair and reasonable. In this way, the scheme of the CCAA supports the intention of Parliament to encourage a wide variety of solutions to corporate insolvencies without unjustifiably overriding the rights of dissenting creditors.

The required nexus

[69] In keeping with this scheme and purpose, I do not suggest that any and all releases between creditors of the debtor company seeking to restructure and third parties may be

made the subject of a compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. Nor do I think the fact that the releases may be "necessary" in the sense that the third parties or the debtor may refuse to proceed without them, of itself, advances the argument in favour of finding jurisdiction (although it may well be relevant in terms of the fairness and reasonableness analysis).

[70] The release of the claim in question must be justified as part of the compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. In short, there must be a reasonable connection between the third-party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of the third-party release in the plan. This nexus exists here, in my view.

[71] In the course of his reasons, the application judge made the following findings, all of which are amply supported on the record:

- (a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor; [page534]
- (b) the claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it;
- (c) the Plan cannot succeed without the releases;
- (d) the parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan; and
- (e) the Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders generally.

[72] Here, then -- as was the case in T&N -- there is a close connection between the claims being released and the restructuring proposal. The tort claims arise out of the sale and distribution of the ABCP Notes and their collapse in value, as do the contractual claims of the creditors against the debtor companies. The purpose of the restructuring is to stabilize and shore up the value of those notes in the long run. The third parties being released are making separate contributions to enable those results to materialize. Those contributions are identified earlier, at para. 31 of these reasons. The application judge found that the claims being

released are not independent of or unrelated to the claims that the Noteholders have against the debtor companies; they are closely connected to the value of the ABCP Notes and are required for the Plan to succeed. At paras. 76-77, he said:

I do not consider that the Plan in this case involves a change in relationship among creditors "that does not directly involve the Company." Those who support the Plan and are to be released are "directly involved in the Company" in the sense that many are foregoing immediate rights to assets and are providing real and tangible input for the preservation and enhancement of the Notes. It would be unduly restrictive to suggest that the moving parties' claims against released parties do not involve the Company, since the claims are directly related to the value of the Notes. The value of the Notes is in this case the value of the Company.

This Plan, as it deals with releases, doesn't change the relationship of the creditors apart from involving the Company and its Notes.

[73] I am satisfied that the wording of the CCAA -- construed in light of the purpose, objects and scheme of the Act and in accordance with the modern principles of statutory interpretation -- supports the court's jurisdiction and authority to sanction the Plan proposed here, including the contested third-party releases contained in it.

The jurisprudence

[74] Third-party releases have become a frequent feature in Canadian restructurings since the decision of the Alberta Court of Queen's [page535] Bench in *Canadian Airlines Corp. (Re)*, [2000] A.J. No. 771, 265 A.R. 201 (Q.B.), leave to appeal refused by *Resurgence Asset Management LLC v. Canadian Airlines Corp.*, [2000] A.J. No. 1028, 266 A.R. 131 (C.A.), and [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 60, 293 A.R. 351. In *Muscletech Research and Development Inc. (Re)*, [2006] O.J. No. 4087, 25 C.B.R. (5th) 231 (S.C.J.), Justice Ground remarked (para. 8):

[It] is not uncommon in CCAA proceedings, in the context of a plan of compromise and arrangement, to compromise claims against the Applicants and other parties against whom such claims or related claims are made.

[75] We were referred to at least a dozen court-approved CCAA plans from across the country that included broad third-party releases. With the exception of *Canadian Airlines (Re)*, however, the releases in those restructurings -- including *Muscletech* -- were not opposed. The appellants argue that those cases are wrongly decided because the court simply does not have the authority to approve such releases.

[76] In *Canadian Airlines (Re)* the releases in question were opposed, however. Paperny J. (as she then was) concluded the court had jurisdiction to approve them and her decision is said to be the wellspring of the trend towards third-party releases referred to above. Based on the foregoing analysis, I agree with her conclusion although for reasons that differ from those cited by her.

[77] Justice Paperny began her analysis of the release issue with the observation, at para. 87, that "[p]rior to 1997, the CCAA did not provide for compromises of claims against anyone other than the petitioning company". It will be apparent from the analysis in these reasons that I do not accept that premise, notwithstanding the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Michaud v. Steinberg*, [See Note 7 below] of which her comment may have been reflective. Paperny J.'s reference to 1997 was a reference to the amendments of that year adding s. 5.1 to the CCAA, which provides for limited releases in favour of directors. Given the limited scope of s. 5.1, Justice Paperny was thus faced with the argument -- dealt with later in these reasons -- that Parliament must not have intended to extend the authority to approve third-party releases beyond the scope of this section. She chose to address this contention by concluding that, although the amendments "[did] not authorize a release of claims against third parties other than directors, [they did] not prohibit such releases either" (para. 92). [page536]

[78] Respectfully, I would not adopt the interpretive

principle that the CCAA permits releases because it does not expressly prohibit them. Rather, as I explain in these reasons, I believe the open-ended CCAA permits third-party releases that are reasonably related to the restructuring at issue because they are encompassed in the comprehensive terms "compromise" and "arrangement" and because of the double-voting majority and court-sanctioning statutory mechanism that makes them binding on unwilling creditors.

[79] The appellants rely on a number of authorities, which they submit support the proposition that the CCAA may not be used to compromise claims as between anyone other than the debtor company and its creditors. Principal amongst these are *Michaud v. Steinberg*, supra; *NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc.* (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 514, [1999] O.J. No. 4749 (C.A.); *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada*, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2580, 19 B.L.R. (3d) 286 (S.C.); and *Stelco Inc. (Re)* (2005), 78 O.R. (3d) 241, [2005] O.J. No. 4883 (C.A.) ("*Stelco I*"). I do not think these cases assist the appellants, however. With the exception of *Steinberg*, they do not involve third-party claims that were reasonably connected to the restructuring. As I shall explain, it is my opinion that *Steinberg* does not express a correct view of the law, and I decline to follow it.

[80] In *Pacific Coastal Airlines*, Tysoe J. made the following comment, at para. 24:

[The purpose of the CCAA proceeding] is not to deal with disputes between a creditor of a company and a third party, even if the company was also involved in the subject matter of the dispute. While issues between the debtor company and non-creditors are sometimes dealt with in CCAA proceedings, it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company.

[81] This statement must be understood in its context, however. *Pacific Coastal Airlines* had been a regional carrier for Canadian Airlines prior to the CCAA reorganization of the latter in 2000. In the action in question, it was seeking to assert separate tort claims against Air Canada for contractual interference and inducing breach of contract in relation to

certain rights it had to the use of Canadian's flight designator code prior to the CCAA proceeding. Air Canada sought to have the action dismissed on grounds of res judicata or issue estoppel because of the CCAA proceeding. Tysoe J. rejected the argument.

[82] The facts in Pacific Coastal are not analogous to the circumstances of this case, however. There is no suggestion that a resolution of Pacific Coastal's separate tort claim against Air Canada was in any way connected to the Canadian Airlines restructuring, even though Canadian -- at a contractual level -- may have had some involvement with the particular dispute. [page537] Here, however, the disputes that are the subject matter of the impugned releases are not simply "disputes between parties other than the debtor company". They are closely connected to the disputes being resolved between the debtor companies and their creditors and to the restructuring itself.

[83] Nor is the decision of this court in the NBD Bank case dispositive. It arose out of the financial collapse of Algoma Steel, a wholly owned subsidiary of Dofasco. The bank had advanced funds to Algoma allegedly on the strength of misrepresentations by Algoma's Vice-President, James Melville. The plan of compromise and arrangement that was sanctioned by Farley J. in the Algoma CCAA restructuring contained a clause releasing Algoma from all claims creditors "may have had against Algoma or its directors, officers, employees and advisors". Mr. Melville was found liable for negligent misrepresentation in a subsequent action by the bank. On appeal, he argued that since the bank was barred from suing Algoma for misrepresentation by its officers, permitting it to pursue the same cause of action against him personally would subvert the CCAA process -- in short, he was personally protected by the CCAA release.

[84] Rosenberg J.A., writing for this court, rejected this argument. The appellants here rely particularly upon his following observations, at paras. 53-54:

In my view, the appellant has not demonstrated that

allowing the respondent to pursue its claim against him would undermine or subvert the purposes of the Act. As this court noted in *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 at p. 297, . . . the CCAA is remedial legislation "intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both". It is a means of avoiding a liquidation that may yield little for the creditors, especially unsecured creditors like the respondent, and the debtor company shareholders. However, the appellant has not shown that allowing a creditor to continue an action against an officer for negligent misrepresentation would erode the effectiveness of the Act.

In fact, to refuse on policy grounds to impose liability on an officer of the corporation for negligent misrepresentation would contradict the policy of Parliament as demonstrated in recent amendments to the CCAA and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. Those Acts now contemplate that an arrangement or proposal may include a term for compromise of certain types of claims against directors of the company except claims that "are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors". L.W. Houlden and C.H. Morawetz, the editors of *The 2000 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at p. 192 are of the view that the policy behind the provision is to encourage directors of an insolvent corporation to remain in office so that the affairs of the corporation can be reorganized. I can see no similar policy interest in barring an action against an officer of the company who, prior to the insolvency, has misrepresented the financial affairs of the corporation to its creditors. It may be necessary to permit the compromise of claims against the debtor corporation, otherwise it may [page538] not be possible to successfully reorganize the corporation. The same considerations do not apply to individual officers. Rather, it would seem to me that it would be contrary to good policy to immunize officers from the consequences of their negligent statements which might otherwise be made in anticipation of being forgiven under a subsequent corporate proposal or arrangement.

(Footnote omitted)

[85] Once again, this statement must be assessed in context. Whether Justice Farley had the authority in the earlier Algoma CCAA proceedings to sanction a plan that included third-party releases was not under consideration at all. What the court was determining in NBD Bank was whether the release extended by its terms to protect a third party. In fact, on its face, it does not appear to do so. Justice Rosenberg concluded only that not allowing Mr. Melville to rely upon the release did not subvert the purpose of the CCAA. As the application judge here observed, "there is little factual similarity in NBD to the facts now before the Court" (para. 71). Contrary to the facts of this case, in NBD Bank the creditors had not agreed to grant a release to officers; they had not voted on such a release and the court had not assessed the fairness and reasonableness of such a release as a term of a complex arrangement involving significant contributions by the beneficiaries of the release -- as is the situation here. Thus, NBD Bank is of little assistance in determining whether the court has authority to sanction a plan that calls for third-party releases.

[86] The appellants also rely upon the decision of this court in *Stelco I*. There, the court was dealing with the scope of the CCAA in connection with a dispute over what were called the "Turnover Payments". Under an inter-creditor agreement, one group of creditors had subordinated their rights to another group and agreed to hold in trust and "turn over" any proceeds received from Stelco until the senior group was paid in full. On a disputed classification motion, the Subordinated Debt Holders argued that they should be in a separate class from the Senior Debt Holders. Farley J. refused to make such an order in the court below, stating:

[Sections] 4, 5 and 6 [of the CCAA] talk of compromises or arrangements between a company and its creditors. There is no mention of this extending by statute to encompass a change of relationship among the creditors vis--vis the creditors themselves and not directly involving the company.

(Citations omitted; emphasis added)

See *Stelco Inc. (Re)*, [2005] O.J. No. 4814, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297 (S.C.J.), at para. 7.

[87] This court upheld that decision. The legal relationship between each group of creditors and Stelco was the same, albeit there were inter-creditor differences, and creditors were to be classified in accordance with their legal rights. In addition, the [page539] need for timely classification and voting decisions in the CCAA process militated against enmeshing the classification process in the vagaries of inter-corporate disputes. In short, the issues before the court were quite different from those raised on this appeal.

[88] Indeed, the Stelco plan, as sanctioned, included third-party releases (albeit uncontested ones). This court subsequently dealt with the same inter-creditor agreement on an appeal where the Subordinated Debt Holders argued that the inter-creditor subordination provisions were beyond the reach of the CCAA and, therefore, that they were entitled to a separate civil action to determine their rights under the agreement: *Stelco Inc. (Re)*, [2006] O.J. No. 1996, 21 C.B.R. (5th) 157 (C.A.) ("*Stelco II*"). The court rejected that argument and held that where the creditors' rights amongst themselves were sufficiently related to the debtor and its plan, they were properly brought within the scope of the CCAA plan. The court said (para. 11):

In [*Stelco I*] -- the classification case -- the court observed that it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company . . . [H]owever, the present case is not simply an inter-creditor dispute that does not involve the debtor company; it is a dispute that is inextricably connected to the restructuring process.
(Emphasis added)

[89] The approach I would take to the disposition of this appeal is consistent with that view. As I have noted, the third-party releases here are very closely connected to the ABCP restructuring process.

[90] Some of the appellants -- particularly those represented by Mr. Woods -- rely heavily upon the decision of the Quebec

Court of Appeal in *Michaud v. Steinberg*, *supra*. They say that it is determinative of the release issue. In *Steinberg*, the court held that the CCAA, as worded at the time, did not permit the release of directors of the debtor corporation and that third-party releases were not within the purview of the Act. Deschamps J.A. (as she then was) said (paras. 42, 54 and 58 -- English translation):

Even if one can understand the extreme pressure weighing on the creditors and the respondent at the time of the sanctioning, a plan of arrangement is not the appropriate forum to settle disputes other than the claims that are the subject of the arrangement. In other words, one cannot, under the pretext of an absence of formal directives in the Act, transform an arrangement into a potpourri.

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The Act offers the respondent a way to arrive at a compromise with its creditors. It does not go so far as to offer an umbrella to all the persons within its orbit by permitting them to shelter themselves from any recourse.

. [page540]

The [CCAA] and the case law clearly do not permit extending the application of an arrangement to persons other than the respondent and its creditors and, consequently, the plan should not have been sanctioned as is [that is, including the releases of the directors].

[91] Justices Vallerand and Delisle, in separate judgments, agreed. Justice Vallerand summarized his view of the consequences of extending the scope of the CCAA to third-party releases in this fashion (para. 7):

In short, the Act will have become the Companies' and Their Officers and Employees Creditors Arrangement Act -- an awful mess -- and likely not attain its purpose, which is to enable the company to survive in the face of its creditors and through their will, and not in the face of the creditors of its officers. This is why I feel, just like my colleague, that such a clause is contrary to the Act's mode of

operation, contrary to its purposes and, for this reason, is to be banned.

[92] Justice Delisle, on the other hand, appears to have rejected the releases because of their broad nature -- they released directors from all claims, including those that were altogether unrelated to their corporate duties with the debtor company -- rather than because of a lack of authority to sanction under the Act. Indeed, he seems to have recognized the wide range of circumstances that could be included within the term "compromise or arrangement". He is the only one who addressed that term. At para., 90 he said:

The CCAA is drafted in general terms. It does not specify, among other things, what must be understood by "compromise or arrangement". However, it may be inferred from the purpose of this [A]ct that these terms encompass all that should enable the person who has recourse to it to fully dispose of his debts, both those that exist on the date when he has recourse to the statute and those contingent on the insolvency in which he finds himself . . .

(Emphasis added)

[93] The decision of the court did not reflect a view that the terms of a compromise or arrangement should "encompass all that should enable the person who has recourse to [the Act] to dispose of his debts ... and those contingent on the insolvency in which he finds himself", however. On occasion, such an outlook might embrace third parties other than the debtor and its creditors in order to make the arrangement work. Nor would it be surprising that, in such circumstances, the third parties might seek the protection of releases, or that the debtor might do so on their behalf. Thus, the perspective adopted by the majority in *Steinberg*, in my view, is too narrow, having regard to the language, purpose and objects of the CCAA and the intention of Parliament. They made no attempt to consider and explain why a compromise or arrangement could not include third-party releases. In addition, the decision [page541] appears to have been based, at least partly, on a rejection of the use of contract-law concepts in analyzing the Act -- an approach inconsistent with the jurisprudence referred to above.

[94] Finally, the majority in *Steinberg* seems to have proceeded on the basis that the CCAA cannot interfere with civil or property rights under Quebec law. Mr. Woods advanced this argument before this court in his *factum*, but did not press it in oral argument. Indeed, he conceded that if the Act encompasses the authority to sanction a plan containing third-party releases -- as I have concluded it does -- the provisions of the CCAA, as valid federal insolvency legislation, are paramount over provincial legislation. I shall return to the constitutional issues raised by the appellants later in these reasons.

[95] Accordingly, to the extent *Steinberg* stands for the proposition that the court does not have authority under the CCAA to sanction a plan that incorporates third-party releases, I do not believe it to be a correct statement of the law and I respectfully decline to follow it. The modern approach to interpretation of the Act in accordance with its nature and purpose militates against a narrow interpretation and towards one that facilitates and encourages compromises and arrangements. Had the majority in *Steinberg* considered the broad nature of the terms "compromise" and "arrangement" and the jurisprudence I have referred to above, they might well have come to a different conclusion.

The 1997 amendments

[96] *Steinberg* led to amendments to the CCAA, however. In 1997, s. 5.1 was added, dealing specifically with releases pertaining to directors of the debtor company. It states:

5.1(1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.

Exception

(2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that

- (a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or
- (b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.

Powers of court

(3) The court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances. [page542]

Resignation or removal of directors

(4) Where all of the directors have resigned or have been removed by the shareholders without replacement, any person who manages or supervises the management of the business and affairs of the debtor company shall be deemed to be a director for the purposes of this section.

[97] Perhaps the appellants' strongest argument is that these amendments confirm a prior lack of authority in the court to sanction a plan including third-party releases. If the power existed, why would Parliament feel it necessary to add an amendment specifically permitting such releases (subject to the exceptions indicated) in favour of directors? *Expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, is the Latin maxim sometimes relied on to articulate the principle of interpretation implied in that question: to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.

[98] The maxim is not helpful in these circumstances, however. The reality is that there may be another explanation why Parliament acted as it did. As one commentator has noted: [See Note 8 below]

Far from being a rule, [the maxim *expressio unius*] is not

even lexicographically accurate, because it is simply not true, generally, that the mere express conferral of a right or privilege in one kind of situation implies the denial of the equivalent right or privilege in other kinds. Sometimes it does and sometimes it does not, and whether it does or does not depends on the particular circumstances of context. Without contextual support, therefore there is not even a mild presumption here. Accordingly, the maxim is at best a description, after the fact, of what the court has discovered from context.

[99] As I have said, the 1997 amendments to the CCAA providing for releases in favour of directors of debtor companies in limited circumstances were a response to the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Steinberg*. A similar amendment was made with respect to proposals in the BIA at the same time. The rationale behind these amendments was to encourage directors of an insolvent company to remain in office during a restructuring rather than resign. The assumption was that by remaining in office the directors would provide some stability while the affairs of the company were being reorganized: see *Houlden and Morawetz*, vol. 1, *supra*, at 2-144, ¶11A; *Dans l'affaire de la proposition de: Le Royal Penfield inc. et Groupe Thibault Van Houtte et Associés ltée*, [2003] J.Q. no. 9223, [2003] R.J.Q. 2157 (C.S.), at paras. 44-46.

[100] Parliament thus had a particular focus and a particular purpose in enacting the 1997 amendments to the CCAA and the [page543] BIA. While there is some merit in the appellants' argument on this point, at the end of the day I do not accept that Parliament intended to signal by its enactment of s. 5.1 that it was depriving the court of authority to sanction plans of compromise or arrangement in all circumstances where they incorporate third-party releases in favour of anyone other than the debtor's directors. For the reasons articulated above, I am satisfied that the court does have the authority to do so. Whether it sanctions the plan is a matter for the fairness hearing.

The deprivation of proprietary rights

[101] Mr. Shapray very effectively led the appellants' argument that legislation must not be construed so as to interfere with or prejudice established contractual or proprietary rights -- including the right to bring an action -- in the absence of a clear indication of legislative intention to that effect: Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed. reissue, vol. 44(1) (London: Butterworths, 1995) at paras. 1438, 1464 and 1467; Driedger, 2nd ed., *supra*, at 183; E.A. Driedger and Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes*, 4th ed., (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2002) at 399. I accept the importance of this principle. For the reasons I have explained, however, I am satisfied that Parliament's intention to clothe the court with authority to consider and sanction a plan that contains third-party releases is expressed with sufficient clarity in the "compromise or arrangement" language of the CCAA coupled with the statutory voting and sanctioning mechanism making the provisions of the plan binding on all creditors. This is not a situation of impermissible "gap-filling" in the case of legislation severely affecting property rights; it is a question of finding meaning in the language of the Act itself. I would therefore not give effect to the appellants' submissions in this regard.

The division of powers and paramountcy

[102] Mr. Woods and Mr. Sternberg submit that extending the reach of the CCAA process to the compromise of claims as between solvent creditors of the debtor company and solvent third parties to the proceeding is constitutionally impermissible. They say that under the guise of the federal insolvency power pursuant to s. 91(21) of the Constitution Act, 1867, this approach would improperly affect the rights of civil claimants to assert their causes of action, a provincial matter falling within s. 92(13), and contravene the rules of public order pursuant to the Civil Code of Quebec. [page544]

[103] I do not accept these submissions. It has long been established that the CCAA is valid federal legislation under the federal insolvency power: Reference re: Constitutional Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada), [1934] S.C.R. 659, [1934] S.C.J. No. 46. As the Supreme Court confirmed in that case (p.

661 S.C.R.), citing Viscount Cave L.C. in *Royal Bank of Canada v. Larue*, [1928] A.C. 187 (J.C.P.C.), "the exclusive legislative authority to deal with all matters within the domain of bankruptcy and insolvency is vested in Parliament". Chief Justice Duff elaborated:

Matters normally constituting part of a bankruptcy scheme but not in their essence matters of bankruptcy and insolvency may, of course, from another point of view and in another aspect be dealt with by a provincial legislature; but, when treated as matters pertaining to bankruptcy and insolvency, they clearly fall within the legislative authority of the Dominion.

[104] That is exactly the case here. The power to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement that contains third-party releases of the type opposed by the appellants is embedded in the wording of the CCAA. The fact that this may interfere with a claimant's right to pursue a civil action -- normally a matter of provincial concern -- or trump Quebec rules of public order is constitutionally immaterial. The CCAA is a valid exercise of federal power. Provided the matter in question falls within the legislation directly or as necessarily incidental to the exercise of that power, the CCAA governs. To the extent that its provisions are inconsistent with provincial legislation, the federal legislation is paramount. Mr. Woods properly conceded this during argument.

Conclusion with respect to legal authority

[105] For all of the foregoing reasons, then, I conclude that the application judge had the jurisdiction and legal authority to sanction the Plan as put forward.

(2) The Plan is "fair and reasonable"

[106] The second major attack on the application judge's decision is that he erred in finding that the Plan is "fair and reasonable" and in sanctioning it on that basis. This attack is centred on the nature of the third-party releases contemplated and, in particular, on the fact that they will permit the release of some claims based in fraud.

[107] Whether a plan of compromise or arrangement is fair and reasonable is a matter of mixed fact and law, and one on which the application judge exercises a large measure of discretion. The standard of review on this issue is therefore one of deference. In [page545] the absence of a demonstrable error, an appellate court will not interfere: see *Ravelston Corp. Ltd. (Re)*, [2007] O.J. No. 1389, 31 C.B.R. (5th) 233 (C.A.).

[108] I would not interfere with the application judge's decision in this regard. While the notion of releases in favour of third parties -- including leading Canadian financial institutions -- that extend to claims of fraud is distasteful, there is no legal impediment to the inclusion of a release for claims based in fraud in a plan of compromise or arrangement. The application judge had been living with and supervising the ABCP restructuring from its outset. He was intimately attuned to its dynamics. In the end, he concluded that the benefits of the Plan to the creditors as a whole, and to the debtor companies, outweighed the negative aspects of compelling the unwilling appellants to execute the releases as finally put forward.

[109] The application judge was concerned about the inclusion of fraud in the contemplated releases and at the May hearing adjourned the final disposition of the sanctioning hearing in an effort to encourage the parties to negotiate a resolution. The result was the "fraud carve-out" referred to earlier in these reasons.

[110] The appellants argue that the fraud carve-out is inadequate because of its narrow scope. It (i) applies only to ABCP Dealers; (ii) limits the type of damages that may be claimed (no punitive damages, for example); (iii) defines "fraud" narrowly, excluding many rights that would be protected by common law, equity and the Quebec concept of public order; and (iv) limits claims to representations made directly to Noteholders. The appellants submit it is contrary to public policy to sanction a plan containing such a limited restriction on the type of fraud claims that may be pursued against the third parties.

[111] The law does not condone fraud. It is the most serious kind of civil claim. There is, therefore, some force to the appellants' submission. On the other hand, as noted, there is no legal impediment to granting the release of an antecedent claim in fraud, provided the claim is in the contemplation of the parties to the release at the time it is given: *Fotini's Restaurant Corp. v. White Spot Ltd.*, [1998] B.C.J. No. 598, 38 B.L.R. (2d) 251 (S.C.), at paras. 9 and 18. There may be disputes about the scope or extent of what is released, but parties are entitled to settle allegations of fraud in civil proceedings -- the claims here all being untested allegations of fraud -- and to include releases of such claims as part of that settlement.

[112] The application judge was alive to the merits of the appellants' submissions. He was satisfied in the end, however, [page546] that the need "to avoid the potential cascade of litigation that . . . would result if a broader 'carve out' were to be allowed" (para. 113) outweighed the negative aspects of approving releases with the narrower carve-out provision. Implementation of the Plan, in his view, would work to the overall greater benefit of the Noteholders as a whole. I can find no error in principle in the exercise of his discretion in arriving at this decision. It was his call to make.

[113] At para. 71, above, I recited a number of factual findings the application judge made in concluding that approval of the Plan was within his jurisdiction under the CCAA and that it was fair and reasonable. For convenience, I reiterate them here -- with two additional findings -- because they provide an important foundation for his analysis concerning the fairness and reasonableness of the Plan. The application judge found that:

- (a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;
- (b) the claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it;
- (c) the Plan cannot succeed without the releases;
- (d) the parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the

Plan;

- (e) the Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders generally;
- (f) the voting creditors who have approved the Plan did so with knowledge of the nature and effect of the releases; and that,
- (g) the releases are fair and reasonable and not overly broad or offensive to public policy.

[114] These findings are all supported on the record. Contrary to the submission of some of the appellants, they do not constitute a new and hitherto untried "test" for the sanctioning of a plan under the CCAA. They simply represent findings of fact and inferences on the part of the application judge that underpin his conclusions on jurisdiction and fairness.

[115] The appellants all contend that the obligation to release the third parties from claims in fraud, tort, breach of fiduciary duty, etc. is confiscatory and amounts to a requirement that they -- as individual creditors -- make the equivalent of a greater financial contribution to the Plan. In his usual lively fashion, [page547] Mr. Sternberg asked us the same rhetorical question he posed to the application judge. As he put it, how could the court countenance the compromise of what in the future might turn out to be fraud perpetrated at the highest levels of Canadian and foreign banks? Several appellants complain that the proposed Plan is unfair to them because they will make very little additional recovery if the Plan goes forward, but will be required to forfeit a cause of action against third-party financial institutions that may yield them significant recovery. Others protest that they are being treated unequally because they are ineligible for relief programs that Liquidity Providers such as Canaccord have made available to other smaller investors.

[116] All of these arguments are persuasive to varying degrees when considered in isolation. The application judge did not have that luxury, however. He was required to consider the circumstances of the restructuring as a whole, including the reality that many of the financial institutions were not only

acting as Dealers or brokers of the ABCP Notes (with the impugned releases relating to the financial institutions in these capacities, for the most part) but also as Asset and Liquidity Providers (with the financial institutions making significant contributions to the restructuring in these capacities).

[117] In insolvency restructuring proceedings, almost everyone loses something. To the extent that creditors are required to compromise their claims, it can always be proclaimed that their rights are being unfairly confiscated and that they are being called upon to make the equivalent of a further financial contribution to the compromise or arrangement. Judges have observed on a number of occasions that CCAA proceedings involve "a balancing of prejudices", inasmuch as everyone is adversely affected in some fashion.

[118] Here, the debtor corporations being restructured represent the issuers of the more than \$32 billion in non-bank sponsored ABCP Notes. The proposed compromise and arrangement affects that entire segment of the ABCP market and the financial markets as a whole. In that respect, the application judge was correct in adverting to the importance of the restructuring to the resolution of the ABCP liquidity crisis and to the need to restore confidence in the financial system in Canada. He was required to consider and balance the interests of all Noteholders, not just the interests of the appellants, whose notes represent only about 3 per cent of that total. That is what he did.

[119] The application judge noted, at para. 126, that the Plan represented "a reasonable balance between benefit to all Noteholders and enhanced recovery for those who can make out [page548] specific claims in fraud" within the fraud carve-out provisions of the releases. He also recognized, at para. 134, that:

No Plan of this size and complexity could be expected to satisfy all affected by it. The size of the majority who have approved it is testament to its overall fairness. No plan to address a crisis of this magnitude can work perfect equity

among all stakeholders.

[120] In my view, we ought not to interfere with his decision that the Plan is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances.

D. Disposition

[121] For the foregoing reasons, I would grant leave to appeal from the decision of Justice Campbell, but dismiss the appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

SCHEDULE "A" -- CONDUITS

Apollo Trust

Apsley Trust

Aria Trust

Aurora Trust

Comet Trust

Encore Trust

Gemini Trust

Ironstone Trust

MMAI-I Trust

Newshore Canadian Trust

Opus Trust

Planet Trust

Rocket Trust

Selkirk Funding Trust

Silverstone Trust

Slate Trust

Structured Asset Trust

Structured Investment Trust III

Symphony Trust

Whitehall Trust

SCHEDULE "B" -- APPLICANTS

ATB Financial

Caisse de dpt et placement du Qubec

Canaccord Capital Corporation [page549]

Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation

Canada Post Corporation

Credit Union Central Alberta Limited

Credit Union Central of BC

Credit Union Central of Canada

Credit Union Central of Ontario
Credit Union Central of Saskatchewan
Desjardins Group
Magna International Inc.
National Bank of Canada/National Bank Financial
Inc.
NAV Canada

Northwater Capital Management Inc.
Public Sector Pension Investment Board
The Governors of the University of Alberta

SCHEDULE "C" -- COUNSEL

- (1) Benjamin Zarnett and Frederick L. Myers, for the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee
- (2) Aubrey E. Kauffman and Stuart Brotman, for 4446372 Canada Inc. and 6932819 Canada Inc.
- (3) Peter F.C. Howard, and Samaneh Hosseini, for Bank of America N.A.; Citibank N.A.; Citibank Canada, in its capacity as Credit Derivative Swap Counterparty and not in any other capacity; Deutsche Bank AG; HSBC Bank Canada; HSBC Bank USA, National Association; Merrill Lynch International; Merill Lynch Capital Services, Inc.; Swiss Re Financial Products Corporation; and UBS AG
- (4) Kenneth T. Rosenberg, Lily Harmer, and Max Starnino, for Jura Energy Corporation and Redcorp Ventures Ltd.
- (5) Craig J. Hill and Sam P. Rappos, for the Monitors (ABCP Appeals)
- (6) Jeffrey C. Carhart and Joseph Marin, for Ad Hoc Committee and Pricewaterhouse Coopers Inc., in its capacity as Financial Advisor
- (7) Mario J. Forte, for Caisse de Dpt et Placement du Qubec
- (8) John B. Laskin, for National Bank Financial Inc. and National Bank of Canada [page550]
- (9) Thomas McRae and Arthur O. Jacques, for Ad Hoc Retail Creditors Committee (Brian Hunter, et al.)
- (10) Howard Shapray, Q.C. and Stephen Fitterman for Ivanhoe Mines Ltd.
- (11) Kevin P. McElcheran and Heather L. Meredith for Canadian Banks, BMO, CIBC RBC, Bank of Nova Scotia and T.D. Bank
- (12) Jeffrey S. Leon, for CIBC Mellon Trust Company, Computershare Trust Company of Canada and BNY Trust Company of Canada, as Indenture Trustees

- (13) Usman Sheikh, for Coventree Capital Inc.
- (14) Allan Sternberg and Sam R. Sasso, for Brookfield Asset Management and Partners Ltd. and Hy Bloom Inc. and Cardacian Mortgage Services Inc.
- (15) Neil C. Saxe, for Dominion Bond Rating Service
- (16) James A. Woods, Sbastien Richemont and Marie-Anne Paquette, for Air Transat A.T. Inc., Transat Tours Canada Inc., The Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc., Aroports de Montral, Aroports de Montral Capital Inc., Pomerleau Ontario Inc., Pomerleau Inc., Labopharm Inc., Agence Mtropolitaine de Transport (AMT), Giro Inc., Vtements de sports RGR Inc., 131519 Canada Inc., Tecsys Inc., New Gold Inc. and Jazz Air LP
- (17) Scott A. Turner, for Webtech Wireless Inc., Wynn Capital Corporation Inc., West Energy Ltd., Sabre Energy Ltd., Petrolifera Petroleum Ltd., Vaquero Resources Ltd., and Standard Energy Ltd.
- (18) R. Graham Phoenix, for Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp., Quanto Financial Corporation and Metcalfe & Mansfield Capital Corp.

Notes

Note 1: Section 5.1 of the CCAA specifically authorizes the granting of releases to directors in certain circumstances.

Note 2: Georgina R. Jackson and Janis P. Sarra, "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters" in Sarra, ed., Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2007 (Vancouver, B.C.: Carswell, 2007).

Note 3: Citing Gibbs J.A. in Chef Ready Foods, *supra*, at pp. 319-20 C.B.R.

Note 4: The legislative debates at the time the CCAA was introduced in Parliament in April 1933 make it clear that the CCAA is patterned after the predecessor provisions of s. 425 of the Companies Act 1985 (U.K.): see House of Commons Debates (Hansard), *supra*.

Note 5: See Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 192; Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, s. 182.

Note 6: A majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors (s. 6).

Note 7: Steinberg was originally reported in French: Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud, [1993] J.Q. no. 1076, [1993] R.J.Q. 1684 (C.A.). All paragraph references to Steinberg in this judgment are from the unofficial English translation available at 1993 CarswellQue 2055.

Note 8: Reed Dickerson, *The Interpretation and Application of Statutes* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1975) at pp. 234-35, cited in Bryan A. Garner, ed., *Black's Law Dictionary*, 8th ed. (West Group, St. Paul, Minn., 2004) at p. 621.

CITATION: Sino-Forest Corporation (Re), 2012 ONSC 7050
COURT FILE NO.: CV-12-9667-00CL
DATE: 20121212

**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

**AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR
ARRANGEMENT OF SINO-FOREST CORPORATION, Applicant**

BEFORE: MORAWETZ J.

COUNSEL: Robert W. Staley, Kevin Zych, Derek J. Bell and Jonathan Bell, for Sino-Forest Corporation

Derrick Tay, Jennifer Stam, and Cliff Prophet for the Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Robert Chadwick and Brendan O'Neill, for the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders

Kenneth Rosenberg, Kirk Baert, Max Starnino, and A. Dimitri Lascaris, for the Class Action Plaintiffs

Won J. Kim, James C. Orr, Michael C. Spencer, and Megan B. McPhee, for Invesco Canada Ltd., Northwest & Ethical Investments LP and Comité Syndicale Nationale de Retraite Bâtirente Inc.

Peter Griffin, Peter Osborne and Shara Roy, for Ernst & Young Inc.

Peter Greene and Ken Dekkar, for BDO Limited

Edward A. Sellers and Larry Lowenstein, for the Board of Directors of Sino-Forest Corporation

John Pirie and David Gadsden, for Poyry (Beijing)

James Doris, for the Plaintiff in the New York Class Action

David Bish, for the Underwriters

Simon Bieber and Erin Pleet, for David Horsley

James Grout, for the Ontario Securities Commission

Emily Cole and Joseph Marin, for Allen Chan

Susan E. Freedman and Brandon Barnes, for Kai Kit Poon

Paul Emerson, for ACE/Chubb

Sam Sasso, for Travelers

HEARD: DECEMBER 7, 2012

ENDORSED: DECEMBER 10, 2012

REASONS: DECEMBER 12, 2012

ENDORSEMENT

[1] On December 10, 2012, I released an endorsement granting this motion with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

Overview

[2] The Applicant, Sino-Forest Corporation (“SFC”), seeks an order sanctioning (the “Sanction Order”) a plan of compromise and reorganization dated December 3, 2012 as modified, amended, varied or supplemented in accordance with its terms (the “Plan”) pursuant to section 6 of the *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act* (“CCAA”).

[3] With the exception of one party, SFC’s position is either supported or is not opposed.

[4] Invesco Canada Ltd., Northwest & Ethical Investments LP and Comité Syndicale Nationale de Retraite Bâtirente Inc. (collectively, the “Funds”) object to the proposed Sanction Order. The Funds requested an adjournment for a period of one month. I denied the Funds’ adjournment request in a separate endorsement released on December 10, 2012 (*Re Sino-Forest Corporation*, 2012 ONSC 7041). Alternatively, the Funds requested that the Plan be altered so as to remove Article 11 “Settlement of Claims Against Third Party Defendants”.

[5] The defined terms have been taken from the motion record.

[6] SFC’s counsel submits that the Plan represents a fair and reasonable compromise reached with SFC’s creditors following months of negotiation. SFC’s counsel submits that the Plan, including its treatment of holders of equity claims, complies with CCAA requirements and is consistent with this court’s decision on the equity claims motions (the “Equity Claims Decision”)

(2012 ONSC 4377, 92 C.B.R. (5th) 99), which was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal for Ontario (2012 ONCA 816).

[7] Counsel submits that the classification of creditors for the purpose of voting on the Plan was proper and consistent with the CCAA, existing law and prior orders of this court, including the Equity Claims Decision and the Plan Filing and Meeting Order.

[8] The Plan has the support of the following parties:

- (a) the Monitor;
- (b) SFC's largest creditors, the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders (the "Ad Hoc Noteholders");
- (c) Ernst & Young LLP ("E&Y");
- (d) BDO Limited ("BDO"); and
- (e) the Underwriters.

[9] The Ad Hoc Committee of Purchasers of the Applicant's Securities (the "Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee", also referred to as the "Class Action Plaintiffs") has agreed not to oppose the Plan. The Monitor has considered possible alternatives to the Plan, including liquidation and bankruptcy, and has concluded that the Plan is the preferable option.

[10] The Plan was approved by an overwhelming majority of Affected Creditors voting in person or by proxy. In total, 99% in number, and greater than 99% in value, of those Affected Creditors voting favoured the Plan.

[11] Options and alternatives to the Plan have been explored throughout these proceedings. SFC carried out a court-supervised sales process (the "Sales Process"), pursuant to the sales process order (the "Sales Process Order"), to seek out potential qualified strategic and financial purchasers of SFC's global assets. After a canvassing of the market, SFC determined that there were no qualified purchasers offering to acquire its assets for qualified consideration ("Qualified Consideration"), which was set at 85% of the value of the outstanding amount owing under the notes (the "Notes").

[12] SFC's counsel submits that the Plan achieves the objective stated at the commencement of the CCAA proceedings (namely, to provide a "clean break" between the business operations of the global SFC enterprise as a whole ("Sino-Forest") and the problems facing SFC, with the aspiration of saving and preserving the value of SFC's underlying business for the benefit of SFC's creditors).

Facts

[13] SFC is an integrated forest plantation operator and forest products company, with most of its assets and the majority of its business operations located in the southern and eastern regions of the People's Republic of China ("PRC"). SFC's registered office is located in Toronto and its principal business office is located in Hong Kong.

[14] SFC is a holding company with six direct subsidiaries (the "Subsidiaries") and an indirect majority interest in Greenheart Group Limited (Bermuda), a publicly-traded company. Including SFC and the Subsidiaries, there are 137 entities that make up Sino-Forest: 67 companies incorporated in PRC, 58 companies incorporated in British Virgin Islands, 7 companies incorporated in Hong Kong, 2 companies incorporated in Canada and 3 companies incorporated elsewhere.

[15] On June 2, 2011, Muddy Waters LLC ("Muddy Waters"), a short-seller of SFC's securities, released a report alleging that SFC was a "near total fraud" and a "Ponzi scheme". SFC subsequently became embroiled in multiple class actions across Canada and the United States and was subjected to investigations and regulatory proceedings by the Ontario Securities Commission ("OSC"), Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

[16] SFC was unable to file its 2011 third quarter financial statements, resulting in a default under its note indentures.

[17] Following extensive arm's length negotiations between SFC and the Ad Hoc Noteholders, the parties agreed on a framework for a consensual resolution of SFC's defaults under its note indentures and the restructuring of its business. The parties ultimately entered into a restructuring support agreement (the "Support Agreement") on March 30, 2012, which was initially executed by holders of 40% of the aggregate principal amount of SFC's Notes. Additional consenting noteholders subsequently executed joinder agreements, resulting in noteholders representing a total of more than 72% of aggregate principal amount of the Notes agreeing to support the restructuring.

[18] The restructuring contemplated by the Support Agreement was commercially designed to separate Sino-Forest's business operations from the problems facing the parent holding company outside of PRC, with the intention of saving and preserving the value of SFC's underlying business. Two possible transactions were contemplated:

- (a) First, a court-supervised Sales Process to determine if any person or group of persons would purchase SFC's business operations for an amount in excess of the 85% Qualified Consideration;
- (b) Second, if the Sales Process was not successful, a transfer of six immediate holding companies (that own SFC's operating business) to an acquisition vehicle to be owned by Affected Creditors in compromise of their claims against SFC. Further, the creation of a litigation trust (including funding) (the "Litigation Trust") to enable SFC's litigation claims against any person not otherwise released within the CCAA proceedings,

preserved and pursued for the benefit of SFC's stakeholders in accordance with the Support Agreement (concurrently, the "Restructuring Transaction").

[19] SFC applied and obtained an initial order under the CCAA on March 30, 2012 (the "Initial Order"), pursuant to which a limited stay of proceedings ("Stay of Proceedings") was also granted in respect of the Subsidiaries. The Stay of Proceedings was subsequently extended by orders dated May 31, September 28, October 10, and November 23, 2012, and unless further extended, will expire on February 1, 2013.

[20] On March 30, 2012, the Sales Process Order was granted. While a number of Letters of Intent were received in respect of this process, none were qualified Letters of Intent, because none of them offered to acquire SFC's assets for the Qualified Consideration. As such, on July 10, 2012, SFC announced the termination of the Sales Process and its intention to proceed with the Restructuring Transaction.

[21] On May 14, 2012, this court granted an order (the "Claims Procedure Order") which approved the Claims Process that was developed by SFC in consultation with the Monitor.

[22] As of the date of filing, SFC had approximately \$1.8 billion of principal amount of debt owing under the Notes, plus accrued and unpaid interest. As of May 15, 2012, Noteholders holding in aggregate approximately 72% of the principal amount of the Notes, and representing more than 66.67% of the principal amount of each of the four series of Notes, agreed to support the Plan.

[23] After the Muddy Waters report was released, SFC and certain of its officers, directors and employees, along with SFC's former auditors, technical consultants and Underwriters involved in prior equity and debt offerings, were named as defendants in a number of proposed class action lawsuits. Presently, there are active proposed class actions in four jurisdictions: Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan and New York (the "Class Action Claims").

[24] *The Labourers v. Sino-Forest Corporation Class Action* (the "Ontario Class Action") was commenced in Ontario by Koskie Minsky LLP and Siskinds LLP. It has the following two components: first, there is a shareholder claim (the "Shareholder Class Action Claims") brought on behalf of current and former shareholders of SFC seeking damages in the amount of \$6.5 billion for general damages, \$174.8 million in connection with a prospectus issued in June 2007, \$330 million in relation to a prospectus issued in June 2009, and \$319.2 million in relation to a prospectus issued in December 2009; second, there is a \$1.8 billion noteholder claim (the "Noteholder Class Action Claims") brought on behalf of former holders of SFC's Notes. The noteholder component seeks damages for loss of value in the Notes.

[25] The Quebec Class Action is similar in nature to the Ontario Class Action, and both plaintiffs filed proof of claim in this proceeding. The plaintiffs in the Saskatchewan Class Action did not file a proof of claim in this proceeding, whereas the plaintiffs in the New York Class Action did file a proof of claim in this proceeding. A few shareholders filed proofs of claim separately, but no proof of claim was filed by the Funds.

[26] In this proceeding, the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee - represented by Siskinds LLP, Koskie Minsky, and Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP - has appeared to represent the interests of the shareholders and noteholders who have asserted Class Action Claims against SFC and others.

[27] Since 2000, SFC has had the following two auditors (“Auditors”): E&Y from 2000 to 2004 and 2007 to 2012 and BDO from 2005 to 2006.

[28] The Auditors have asserted claims against SFC for contribution and indemnity for any amounts paid or payable in respect of the Shareholder Class Action Claims, with each of the Auditors having asserted claims in excess of \$6.5 billion. The Auditors have also asserted indemnification claims in respect the Noteholder Class Action Claims.

[29] The Underwriters have similarly filed claims against SFC seeking contribution and indemnity for the Shareholder Class Action Claims and Noteholder Class Action Claims.

[30] The Ontario Securities Commission (“OSC”) has also investigated matters relating to SFC. The OSC has advised that they are not seeking any monetary sanctions against SFC and are not seeking monetary sanctions in excess of \$100 million against SFC’s directors and officers (this amount was later reduced to \$84 million).

[31] SFC has very few trade creditors by virtue of its status as a holding company whose business is substantially carried out through its Subsidiaries in PRC and Hong Kong.

[32] On June 26, 2012, SFC brought a motion for an order declaring that all claims made against SFC arising in connection with the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest in SFC and related indemnity claims to be “equity claims” (as defined in section 2 of the CCAA). These claims encapsulate the commenced Shareholder Class Action Claims asserted against SFC. The Equity Claims Decision did not purport to deal with the Noteholder Class Action Claims.

[33] In reasons released on July 27, 2012, I granted the relief sought by SFC in the Equity Claims Decision, finding that the “the claims advanced in the shareholder claims are clearly equity claims.” The Auditors and Underwriters appealed the decision and on November 23, 2012, the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal.

[34] On August 31, 2012, an order was issued approving the filing of the Plan (the “Plan Filing and Meeting Order”).

[35] According to SFC’s counsel, the Plan endeavours to achieve the following purposes:

- (a) to effect a full, final and irrevocable compromise, release, discharge, cancellation and bar of all affected claims;
- (b) to effect the distribution of the consideration provided in the Plan in respect of proven claims;

- (c) to transfer ownership of the Sino-Forest business to Newco and then to Newco II, in each case free and clear of all claims against SFC and certain related claims against the Subsidiaries so as to enable the Sino-Forest business to continue on a viable, going concern basis for the benefit of the Affected Creditors; and
- (d) to allow Affected Creditors and Noteholder Class Action Claimants to benefit from contingent value that may be derived from litigation claims to be advanced by the litigation trustee.

[36] Pursuant to the Plan, the shares of Newco ("Newco Shares") will be distributed to the Affected Creditors. Newco will immediately transfer the acquired assets to Newco II.

[37] SFC's counsel submits that the Plan represents the best available outcome in the circumstances and those with an economic interest in SFC, when considered as a whole, will derive greater benefit from the implementation of the Plan and the continuation of the business as a going concern than would result from bankruptcy or liquidation of SFC. Counsel further submits that the Plan fairly and equitably considers the interests of the Third Party Defendants, who seek indemnity and contribution from SFC and its Subsidiaries on a contingent basis, in the event that they are found to be liable to SFC's stakeholders. Counsel further notes that the three most significant Third Party Defendants (E&Y, BDO and the Underwriters) support the Plan.

[38] SFC filed a version of the Plan in August 2012. Subsequent amendments were made over the following months, leading to further revised versions in October and November 2012, and a final version dated December 3, 2012 which was voted on and approved at the meeting. Further amendments were made to obtain the support of E&Y and the Underwriters. BDO availed itself of those terms on December 5, 2012.

[39] The current form of the Plan does not settle the Class Action Claims. However, the Plan does contain terms that would be engaged if certain conditions are met, including if the class action settlement with E&Y receives court approval.

[40] Affected Creditors with proven claims are entitled to receive distributions under the Plan of (i) Newco Shares, (ii) Newco notes in the aggregate principal amount of U.S. \$300 million that are secured and guaranteed by the subsidiary guarantors (the "Newco Notes"), and (iii) Litigation Trust Interests.

[41] Affected Creditors with proven claims will be entitled under the Plan to: (a) their *pro rata* share of 92.5% of the Newco Shares with early consenting noteholders also being entitled to their *pro rata* share of the remaining 7.5% of the Newco Shares; and (b) their *pro rata* share of the Newco Notes. Affected Creditors with proven claims will be concurrently entitled to their *pro rata* share of 75% of the Litigation Trust Interests; the Noteholder Class Action Claimants will be entitled to their *pro rata* share of the remaining 25% of the Litigation Trust Interests.

[42] With respect to the indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claims, these relate to claims by former noteholders against third parties who, in turn, have alleged corresponding indemnification claims against SFC. The Class Action Plaintiffs have agreed that the aggregate

amount of those former noteholder claims will not exceed the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit of \$150 million. In turn, indemnification claims of Third Party Defendants against SFC with respect to indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claims are also limited to the \$150 million Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit.

[43] The Plan includes releases for, among others, (a) the subsidiary; (b) the Underwriters' liability for Noteholder Class Action Claims in excess of the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit; (c) E&Y in the event that all of the preconditions to the E&Y settlement with the Ontario Class Action plaintiffs are met; and (d) certain current and former directors and officers of SFC (collectively, the "Named Directors and Officers"). It was emphasized that non-released D&O Claims (being claims for fraud or criminal conduct), conspiracy claims and section 5.1 (2) D&O Claims are not being released pursuant to the Plan.

[44] The Plan also contemplates that recovery in respect of claims of the Named Directors and Officers of SFC in respect of any section 5.1 (2) D&O Claims and any conspiracy claims shall be directed and limited to insurance proceeds available from SFC's maintained insurance policies.

[45] The meeting was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Plan Filing and Meeting Order and that the meeting materials were sent to stakeholders in the manner required by the Plan Filing and Meeting Order. The Plan supplement was authorized and distributed in accordance with the Plan Filing and Meeting Order.

[46] The meeting was ultimately held on December 3, 2012 and the results of the meeting were as follows:

(a) the number of voting claims that voted on the Plan and their value for and against the Plan;

(b) The results of the Meeting were as follows:

a. the number of Voting Claims that voted on the Plan and their value for and against the Plan:

	Number of Votes	%	Value of Votes	%
Total Claims Voting For	250	98.81%	\$ 1,465,766,204	99.97%
Total Claims Voting Against	3	1.19%	\$ 414,087	0.03%
Total Claims Voting	253	100.00%	\$ 1,466,180,291	100.00%

b. the number of votes for and against the Plan in connection with Class Action Indemnity Claims in respect of Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Claims up to the Indemnified Noteholder Limit:

	Vote For	Vote Against	Total Votes
Class Action Indemnity Claims	4	1	5

- c. the number of Defence Costs Claims votes for and against the Plan and their value:

	Number of Votes	%	Value of Votes	%
Total Claims Voting For	12	92.31%	\$ 8,375,016	96.10%
Total Claims Voting Against	1	7.69%	\$ 340,000	3.90%
Total Claims Voting	13	100.00%	\$ 8,715,016	100.00%

- d. the overall impact on the approval of the Plan if the count were to include Total Unresolved Claims (including Defence Costs Claims) and, in order to demonstrate the "worst case scenario" if the entire \$150 million of the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit had been voted a "no" vote (even though 4 of 5 votes were "yes" votes and the remaining "no" vote was from BDO, who has now agreed to support the Plan):

	Number of Votes	%	Value of Votes	%
Total Claims Voting For	263	98.50%	\$ 1,474,149,082	90.72%
Total Claims Voting Against	4	1.50%	\$ 150,754,087	9.28%
Total Claims Voting	267	100.00%	\$ 1,624,903,169	100.00%

[47] E&Y has now entered into a settlement ("E&Y Settlement") with the Ontario plaintiffs and the Quebec plaintiffs, subject to several conditions and approval of the E&Y Settlement itself.

[48] As noted in the endorsement dated December 10, 2012, which denied the Funds' adjournment request, the E&Y Settlement does not form part of the Sanction Order and no relief is being sought on this motion with respect to the E&Y Settlement. Rather, section 11.1 of the Plan contains provisions that provide a framework pursuant to which a release of the E&Y claims under the Plan will be effective if several conditions are met. That release will only be granted if all conditions are met, including further court approval.

[49] Further, SFC's counsel acknowledges that any issues relating to the E&Y Settlement, including fairness, continuing discovery rights in the Ontario Class Action or Quebec Class Action, or opt out rights, are to dealt with at a further court-approval hearing.

Law and Argument

[50] Section 6(1) of the CCAA provides that courts may sanction a plan of compromise if the plan has achieved the support of a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors.

[51] To establish the court's approval of a plan of compromise, the debtor company must establish the following:

- (a) there has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements and adherence to previous orders of the court;

(b) nothing has been done or purported to be done that is not authorized by the CCAA; and

(c) the plan is fair and reasonable.

(See *Re Canadian Airlines Corporation*, 2000 ABQB 442, leave to appeal denied, 2000 ABCA 238, aff'd 2001 ABCA 9, leave to appeal to SCC refused July 21, 2001, [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 60 and *Re Nelson Financial Group Limited*, 2011 ONSC 2750, 79 C.B.R. (5th) 307).

[52] SFC submits that there has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements.

[53] On the initial application, I found that SFC was a “debtor company” to which the CCAA applies. SFC is a corporation continued under the *Canada Business Corporations Act* (“CBCA”) and is a “company” as defined in the CCAA. SFC was “reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within a reasonable proximity of time” prior to the Initial Order and, as such, was and continues to be insolvent. SFC has total claims and liabilities against it substantially in excess of the \$5 million statutory threshold.

[54] The Notice of Creditors’ Meeting was sent in accordance with the Meeting Order and the revised Noteholder Mailing Process Order and, further, the Plan supplement and the voting procedures were posted on the Monitor’s website and emailed to each of the ordinary Affected Creditors. It was also delivered by email to the Trustees and DTC, as well as to Globic who disseminated the information to the Registered Noteholders. The final version of the Plan was emailed to the Affected Creditors, posted on the Monitor’s website, and made available for review at the meeting.

[55] SFC also submits that the creditors were properly classified at the meeting as Affected Creditors constituted a single class for the purposes of considering the voting on the Plan. Further, and consistent with the Equity Claims Decision, equity claimants constituted a single class but were not entitled to vote on the Plan. Unaffected Creditors were not entitled to vote on the Plan.

[56] Counsel submits that the classification of creditors as a single class in the present case complies with the commonality of interests test. See *Re Canadian Airlines Corporation*.

[57] Courts have consistently held that relevant interests to consider are the legal interests of the creditors hold *qua* creditor in relationship to the debtor prior to and under the plan. Further, the commonality of interests should be considered purposively, bearing in mind the object of the CCAA, namely, to facilitate reorganizations if possible. See *Stelco Inc.* (2005), 78 O.R. (3d) 241 (Ont. C.A.), *Re Canadian Airlines Corporation*, and *Re Nortel Networks Corporation* (2009) O.J. No. 2166 (Ont. S.C.). Further, courts should resist classification approaches that potentially jeopardize viable plans.

[58] In this case, the Affected Creditors voted in one class, consistent with the commonality of interests among Affected Creditors, considering their legal interests as creditors. The classification was consistent with the Equity Claims Decision.

[59] I am satisfied that the meeting was properly constituted and the voting was properly carried out. As described above, 99% in number, and more than 99% in value, voting at the meeting favoured the Plan.

[60] SFC's counsel also submits that SFC has not taken any steps unauthorized by the CCAA or by court orders. SFC has regularly filed affidavits and the Monitor has provided regular reports and has consistently opined that SFC is acting in good faith and with due diligence. The court has so ruled on this issue on every stay extension order that has been granted.

[61] In *Nelson Financial*, I articulated relevant factors on the sanction hearing. The following list of factors is similar to those set out in *Re Canwest Global Communications Corporation*, 2010 ONSC 4209, 70 C.B.R. (5th) 1:

1. The claims must have been properly classified, there must be no secret arrangements to give an advantage to a creditor or creditor; the approval of the plan by the requisite majority of creditors is most important;
2. It is helpful if the Monitor or some other disinterested person has prepared an analysis of anticipated receipts and liquidation or bankruptcy;
3. If other options or alternatives have been explored and rejected as workable, this will be significant;
4. Consideration of the oppression rights of certain creditors; and
5. Unfairness to shareholders.
6. The court will consider the public interest.

[62] The Monitor has considered the liquidation and bankruptcy alternatives and has determined that it does not believe that liquidation or bankruptcy would be a preferable alternative to the Plan. There have been no other viable alternatives presented that would be acceptable to SFC and to the Affected Creditors. The treatment of shareholder claims and related indemnity claims are, in my view, fair and consistent with CCAA and the Equity Claims Decision.

[63] In addition, 99% of Affected Creditors voted in favour of the Plan and the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee have agreed not to oppose the Plan. I agree with SFC's submission to the effect that these are exercises of those parties' business judgment and ought not to be displaced.

[64] I am satisfied that the Plan provides a fair and reasonable balance among SFC's stakeholders while simultaneously providing the ability for the Sino-Forest business to continue as a going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders.

[65] The Plan adequately considers the public interest. I accept the submission of counsel that the Plan will remove uncertainty for Sino-Forest's employees, suppliers, customers and other stakeholders and provide a path for recovery of the debt owed to SFC's non-subordinated creditors. In addition, the Plan preserves the rights of aggrieved parties, including SFC through the Litigation Trust, to pursue (in litigation or settlement) those parties that are alleged to share some or all of the responsibility for the problems that led SFC to file for CCAA protection. In addition, releases are not being granted to individuals who have been charged by OSC staff, or to other individuals against whom the Ad Hoc Securities Purchasers Committee wishes to preserve litigation claims.

[66] In addition to the consideration that is payable to Affected Creditors, Early Consent Noteholders will receive their *pro rata* share of an additional 7.5% of the Newco Shares ("Early Consent Consideration"). Plans do not need to provide the same recovery to all creditors to be considered fair and reasonable and there are several plans which have been sanctioned by the courts featuring differential treatment for one creditor or one class of creditors. See, for example, *Canwest Global* and *Re Armbro Enterprises Inc.* (1993), 22 C.B.R. (3d) 80 (Ont. Gen. Div.). A common theme permeating such cases has been that differential treatment does not necessarily result in a finding that the Plan is unfair, as long as there is a sufficient rational explanation.

[67] In this case, SFC's counsel points out that the Early Consent Consideration has been a feature of the restructuring since its inception. It was made available to any and all noteholders and noteholders who wished to become Early Consent Noteholders were invited and permitted to do so until the early consent deadline of May 15, 2012. I previously determined that SFC made available to the noteholders all information needed to decide whether they should sign a joinder agreement and receive the Early Consent Consideration, and that there was no prejudice to the noteholders in being put to that election early in this proceeding.

[68] As noted by SFC's counsel, there was a rational purpose for the Early Consent Consideration. The Early Consent Noteholders supported the restructuring through the CCAA proceedings which, in turn, provided increased confidence in the Plan and facilitated the negotiations and approval of the Plan. I am satisfied that this feature of the Plan is fair and reasonable.

[69] With respect to the Indemnified Noteholder Class Action Limit, I have considered SFC's written submissions and accept that the \$150 million agreed-upon amount reflects risks faced by both sides. The selection of a \$150 million cap reflects the business judgment of the parties making assessments of the risk associated with the noteholder component of the Ontario Class Action and, in my view, is within the "general range of acceptability on a commercially reasonable basis". See *Re Ravelston Corporation*, (2005) 14 C.B.R. (5th) 207 (Ont. S.C). Further, as noted by SFC's counsel, while the New York Class Action Plaintiffs filed a proof of claim, they have not appeared in this proceeding and have not stated any opposition to the Plan, which has included this concept since its inception.

[70] Turning now to the issue of releases of the Subsidiaries, counsel to SFC submits that the unchallenged record demonstrates that there can be no effective restructuring of SFC's business and separation from its Canadian parent if the claims asserted against the Subsidiaries arising out of or connected to claims against SFC remain outstanding. The Monitor has examined all of the releases in the Plan and has stated that it believes that they are fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

[71] The Court of Appeal in *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corporation*, 2008 ONCA 587, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 stated that the "court has authority to sanction plans incorporating third party releases that are reasonably related to the proposed restructuring".

[72] In this case, counsel submits that the release of Subsidiaries is necessary and essential to the restructuring of SFC. The primary purpose of the CCAA proceedings was to extricate the business of Sino-Forest, through the operation of SFC's Subsidiaries (which were protected by the Stay of Proceedings), from the cloud of uncertainty surrounding SFC. Accordingly, counsel submits that there is a clear and rational connection between the release of the Subsidiaries in the Plan. Further, it is difficult to see how any viable plan could be made that does not cleanse the Subsidiaries of the claims made against SFC.

[73] Counsel points out that the Subsidiaries who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan. The Subsidiaries are effectively contributing their assets to SFC to satisfy SFC's obligations under their guarantees of SFC's note indebtedness, for the benefit of the Affected Creditors. As such, counsel submits the releases benefit SFC and the creditors generally.

[74] In my view, the basis for the release falls within the guidelines previously set out by this court in *ATB Financial, Re Nortel Networks*, 2010 ONSC 1708, and *Re Kitchener Frame Limited*, 2012 ONSC 234, 86 C.B.R. (5th) 274. Further, it seems to me that the Plan cannot succeed without the releases of the Subsidiaries. I am satisfied that the releases are fair and reasonable and are rationally connected to the overall purpose of the Plan.

[75] With respect to the Named Directors and Officers release, counsel submits that this release is necessary to effect a greater recovery for SFC's creditors, rather than having those directors and officers assert indemnity claims against SFC. Without these releases, the quantum of the unresolved claims reserve would have to be materially increased and, to the extent that any such indemnity claim was found to be a proven claim, there would have been a corresponding dilution of consideration paid to Affected Creditors.

[76] It was also pointed out that the release of the Named Directors and Officers is not unlimited; among other things, claims for fraud or criminal conduct, conspiracy claims, and section 5.1 (2) D&O Claims are excluded.

[77] I am satisfied that there is a reasonable connection between the claims being compromised and the Plan to warrant inclusion of this release.

[78] Finally, in my view, it is necessary to provide brief comment on the alternative argument of the Funds, namely, the Plan be altered so as to remove Article 11 “Settlement of Claims Against Third Party Defendants”. The Plan was presented to the meeting with Article 11 in place. This was the Plan that was subject to the vote and this is the Plan that is the subject of this motion. The alternative proposed by the Funds was not considered at the meeting and, in my view, it is not appropriate to consider such an alternative on this motion.

Disposition

[79] Having considered the foregoing, I am satisfied that SFC has established that:

- (i) there has been strict compliance with all statutory requirements and adherence to the previous orders of the court;
- (ii) nothing has been done or purported to be done that is not authorized by the CCAA; and
- (iii) the Plan is fair and reasonable.

[80] Accordingly, the motion is granted and the Plan is sanctioned. An order has been signed substantially in the form of the draft Sanction Order.

MORAWETZ J.

Date: December 12, 2012

CITATION: Zaniewicz v. Zungui Haixi Corporation, 2013 ONSC 5490
COURT FILE NO.: 11-CV-436360-00CP
DATE: August 27, 2013

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE**

BETWEEN:

JERZY ROBERT ZANIEWICZ and
EDWARD C. CLARKE

Plaintiffs

– and –

ZUNGUI HAIXI CORPORATION, E&Y,
FENGYI CAI, JIXU CAI, YANDA CAI,
MICHELLE GOBIN, MICHAEL W.
MANLEY, PATRICK A. RYAN,
ELLIOTT WAHLE, MARGARET
CORNISH, CIBC WORLD MARKETS
INC., CANACCORD GENUITY CORP.
(f.k.a. CANACCORD FINANCIAL LTD).,
GMP SECURITIES LP and MACKIE
RESEARCH CAPITAL CORPORATION
(f.k.a. RESEARCH CAPITAL
CORPORATION)

Defendants

Charles M. Wright and Douglas M. Worndl
for the Plaintiffs

Deborah Berlach for the Defendant Zungui
Haizi Corporation

Margaret L. Waddell for the Defendant
Michelle Gobin

Michael A. Eizenga for the Defendant
Michael W. Manley

James S.F. Wilson for the Defendants,
Patrick A. Ryan, Elliott Wahle, and Margaret
Cornish

Linda L. Fuerst for the Defendant Ernst
&Young LLP.

Kent Thomson and Derek Ricci for the
Defendants CIBC World Markets Inc.,
Canaccord Genuity Corp. (f.k.a. Canaccord
Financial Ltd.) and Mackie Research Capital
Corporation (f.k.a. Research Capital
Corporation and GMP Securities LP.

Proceeding under the *Class Proceedings Act*

HEARD: August 27, 2013

PERELL, J.

REASONS FOR DECISION

A. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

[1] This is a securities class action under the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*, S.O. 1992, c. 6 and the Ontario *Securities Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5. The Plaintiffs Jerzy Robert Zaniewicz and Edward C. Clarke advance common law tort claims and also statutory claims with respect to the sale of the shares of Zungui Haizi Corporation in the primary and secondary markets.

[2] The Plaintiffs bring this motion for: (a) certification for settlement purposes as against the Defendants CIBC World Markets Inc., Canaccord Genuity Corp., GMP Securities LP, and Mackie Research Capital Corporation (the “Underwriting Syndicate”); (b) approval of three settlements; (c) ancillary orders, including the appointment of an administrator; (d) approval of the notice program; and (e) approval of the plan of distribution (the “Plan of Allocation”) for the settlement funds.

[3] Class Counsel also bring a motion for approval of its counsel fees and disbursements. Class Counsel seeks \$2,250,000.00, plus disbursements, interest on disbursements, and applicable taxes. The total request is for \$2,807,037.56.

[4] For the reasons that follow, I certify the action as against the Underwriting Syndicate for settlement purposes. I approve the three settlements and Class Counsel’s request for counsel fees. I approve the requests for ancillary orders. However, I do not approve the proposed Plan of Allocation, and, rather, I have varied the plan and approved a modified Plan of Allocation.

[5] As I will explain, in this case, the court has the jurisdiction to approve the settlement agreements and then establish a plan of distribution that is different than the plan of distribution proposed by the parties.

B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE CLASS ACTION

[6] See *Zaniewicz v. Zungui Haixi Corp.*, 2013 ONSC 2959, which sets out most of the factual background and the procedural history. See also: *Zaniewicz v. Zungui Haixi Corp.*, *Zaniewicz v. Zungui Haixi Corp.*, 2012 ONSC 4842, *Zaniewicz v. Zungui Haixi Corp.*, 2012 ONSC 4904, and *Zaniewicz v. Zungui Haixi Corp.*, 2012 ONSC 6061.

[7] In December 2009, Zungui made an initial public offering (“IPO”), and it raised approximately \$40 million in Ontario’s capital markets.

[8] Zungui and its directors and officers had a statutory obligation under the Ontario *Securities Act* to provide Zungui’s investors with timely and accurate disclosure regarding the business of Zungui, including disclosure in Zungui’s interim and annual financial statements.

[9] In its interim and annual financial statements, Zungui and the Defendants Yanda, Fengyi, and Zungui Cai (the “Cai Brothers”) assured investors that Zungui’s financial statements presented fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of Zungui in accordance with GAAP. They represented that the Zungui’s offering documents contained full true and plain disclosure of all material facts relating to the offering of securities.

[10] The Plaintiffs are residents of Ontario. Each purchased common shares of Zungui in the primary market. Mr. Clarke also purchased common shares of Zungui in the secondary market.

[11] On August 22, 2011, Zungui issued a press release announcing that its auditor, Ernst & Young LLP (“E&Y”), had suspended its audit of Zungui’s financial statements for the year ended June 30, 2011. With that announcement, Zungui’s shares immediately lost 77% of their value. Subsequently, Zungui’s shares became the subject of various temporary and permanent cease trade orders, and they are now worthless.

[12] On September 22, 2011, Zungui’s Chief Financial Officer and all independent members of the Board resigned, in part, because the special committee formed to investigate E&Y’s concerns had been prevented from fulfilling its mandate.

[13] On September 23, 2011, E&Y resigned as Zungui’s auditor. E&Y withdrew its opinions that Zungui’s financial statements were GAAP compliant.

[14] On February 2, 2012, the Ontario Securities Commission (“OSC”) ruled that Yanda, Fengyi, and Zungui Cai had engaged in conduct contrary to the public interest, and on August 28, 2012, the OSC ordered, among other things, that Yanda and Fengyi resign as directors or officers of Zungui and be permanently prohibited from acting as directors or officers of any issuer.

[15] The OSC investigation revealed that when E&Y resigned, it advised that all of its audit opinions that formed part of the IPO Prospectus, as well as Zungui’s June 2010 financial statements could no longer be relied upon.

[16] On October 3, 2011, Mr. Zaniewicz, commenced the action by the issuance of a Notice of Action. On November 2, 2011, he filed his Statement of Claim. On February 7, 2012 and February 10, 2012, I made orders granting leave to amend the Statement of Claim to add Mr. Clarke as a plaintiff and to correct the description of two of the Underwriters incorrectly described in the style of cause.

[17] On February 8, 2012, the Plaintiffs filed their Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim.

[18] In the action, the Plaintiffs sue not only Zungui and the Cai Brothers, but others allegedly responsible for ensuring that Zungui’s public disclosure to primary and secondary market investors was timely and accurate in accordance with securities law. The Plaintiffs allege various statutory claims under the Ontario *Securities Act* and also common law claims.

[19] The Plaintiffs allege that Zungui's IPO Prospectus was misleading as it contained material misrepresentations. The Plaintiffs allege that the representations were materially false, and Zungui's financial statements contained in the prospectus, and other financial statements later prepared and disseminated in the secondary securities market, were neither accurate nor reliable in respect of reported revenues, net income, assets, and shareholders' equity. Moreover, the Plaintiffs allege that the financial statements did not fairly present, in all material respects, the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of Zungui for the reporting periods presented.

[20] Alan Mak, who is a chartered accountant, a member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario, and a member of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners opined that the audits conducted by Ernst & Young were not in accordance with GAAP and that Ernst & Young's unqualified audit opinions should not have been given for the 2006 through 2010 reporting periods. E&Y does not admit that it was negligent.

[21] In the class action, the Class Definition is as follows:

All persons or entities wherever they may reside or be domiciled, other than Excluded Persons and Opt-Out Parties, who acquired Eligible Shares.

Eligible Shares means the Shares acquired by a Class Member or Opt-Out Party during the Class Period.

Class Period means the period from and including August 11, 2009 to and including August 22, 2011.

Excluded Persons means each Defendant, the past or present subsidiaries or affiliates, officers, directors, partners, legal representatives, consultants, agents, successors and assigns of Zungui and any member of each Defendant's families, their heirs, successors or assigns, and includes any Southern Zungui Acquirers who acted as a consultant or provided other professional services to Zungui or its subsidiaries in connection with the IPO.

[22] The Class is comprised of three (3) types of acquirers of Zungui common shares: (1) primary market purchasers; (2) secondary market purchasers; and (3) share exchange acquirors (i.e. anyone who was a shareholder of Zungui's subsidiary, Southern Trends International Holding Company (BVI), who entered into an agreement with Zungui, before its IPO, to exchange their Southern Trends shares for Zungui common shares on a basis of 1:5,000.

[23] Paul Mulholland, a US based certified forensic accountant, was retained by the Plaintiffs, to among other things, calculate the damages of class members. Mr. Mulholland's estimate of damages was \$23.76 million comprised of: (a) \$10.1 million in damage to primary market purchasers; \$12.9 million in damage to secondary market Purchasers; and \$0.7 million in damage to share exchange acquirors. (The original Statement of Claim sought damages of \$30 million.)

[24] The Defendants, of course, do not admit liability or the amount of the Class Member's alleged losses.

C. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES

[25] I have already certified this action for settlement purposes as against Zungui, Michelle Gobin, Michael W. Manley, Patrick A. Ryan, Elliott Wahle, and Margaret Cornish (the “Zungui Defendants”) and against Ernst & Young LLP and the Cai Brothers.

[26] I am satisfied that that action should now be certified for settlement purposes as against the Underwriting Syndicate, and an Order should issue accordingly.

D. SETTLEMENT APPROVAL

[27] The Plaintiffs have concluded three settlements: (1) the Auditor Settlement; (2) the Zungui Settlement; and (3) Underwriter Settlement.

[28] The Auditor Settlement is for \$2 million. The Zungui Settlement is for \$8 million, and the Underwriter Settlement is for \$750,000.00.

[29] The Zungui Defendants have agreed to contribute an additional \$100,000.00 if the Plaintiffs: (a) settled their claims against the Underwriting Syndicate before the scheduled settlement approval hearings for the Auditor Settlement and the Zungui Settlement; and (b) obtained the Court’s approval of a settlement with the Underwriting Syndicate. Thus, if all the settlements are approved, the settlement funds will total \$10,850,000.00 plus interest before deductions for counsel fee and administrative expenses.

[30] The settlement funds under the Auditor Settlement were received on May 17, 2013, and have been accruing interest since that date. The settlement funds under the Zungui Settlement were received on May 24, 2013, and have been accruing interest since February 22, 2013. The settlement funds under the Underwriter Settlement will be paid within fourteen days of execution of the Underwriter Agreement (i.e., by September 2, 2013).

[31] The Settlement Amounts that have been received are currently invested at RBC in interest bearing accounts. Each settlement amount is held in a separate escrow account.

[32] Class Counsel has been informed that, as of August 16, 2013, the escrow accounts contain: (1) Zungui Escrow Account, \$7,984,781.20; and (2) Auditor Escrow Account, \$1,995,373.52. These accounts reflect the payment of \$48,931.32 for the publication of the First Notice (allocated, \$39,145.07 from the Zungui Escrow Account and \$9,786.25 from the Auditor Escrow Account) and the accrual of \$23,926.27 in interest on the Zungui Settlement Amount and \$5,159.68 in interest on the Auditor Settlement Amount.

[33] Notice of the certification of the action as against the Zungui Defendants, Ernst & Young LLP, and the Cai Brothers has been given to the Class Members. There were

no opt-outs. The notice also provided notice of the Auditor Settlement and the Zungui Settlement.

[34] Notice of the proposed Underwriter Settlement has recently been given to the Class Members pursuant to a recent court order made at a case conference. Having already had a right to opt-out, class members do not have a right to opt-out with respect to the certification of the action as against the Underwriting Syndicate. When there are partial or progressive certifications of a class action, provided that there was adequate notice, the right to opt-out is a procedural right that may only be exercised once: *Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG*, 2012 ONSC 7299 at paras. 29-32; *Nutech Brands Inc. v. Air Canada*, [2008] O.J. No. 1065 (SCJ).

[35] Under the settlements, the Plaintiffs and the Class will provide releases to all of the Defendants. The Cai Brothers will be released as part of the Zungui Settlement. The settlements, if approved, would complete the class action.

[36] The key terms of the settlement agreements are as follows:

- The settlement will be administered by an Administrator;
- the Defendants will pay their respective settlement amounts for the benefit of the Class;
- the settlement funds will be distributed, after payment of any administration expenses and Class Counsel fees, disbursements, and taxes as awarded by the Court;
- the settlement funds will be distributed in accordance with a Plan of Allocation that is in a form satisfactory to the Defendants or as fixed by the Court;
- if the settlement is approved by the court, the Notices of the Settlement will provide Class Members with information concerning their right to participate by filing a Claim Form;
- the settlement funds will be distributed among all Class Members who timely submit valid Claim Forms to the Administrator;
- there are no rights of reversion;
- the Plan of Allocation provides for the possibility of a *cy près* distribution to the Small Investor Protection Association Canada in the event that less than \$25,000.00 remains 180 days from the date on which the Administrator distributes the net settlement amount; and
- the Plaintiffs and the Class Members will release the Defendants and certain identified associated entities.

[37] Under the Plan of Notice, the Short Form Notice of Settlement will be published: (a) in the English language, in the business/legal section of the national weekend editions of the *National Post* and the *Globe and Mail*; (b) in the French language, in the business section of *La Presse*; and (c) in the French and English languages across *Marketwire*, a major business newswire in Canada.

[38] Under the Plan of Notice, the Long Form Notice of Settlement will be: (a) posted in both the French and English languages on www.classaction.ca; (b) posted in both the French and English languages on the Administrator's website; and (c) mailed or emailed, along with the Claim Form and the Opt-Out Form, directly to persons that have contacted Class Counsel and have provided their contact information.

[39] Also in accordance with the Plan of Notice, the Long Form Notice of Settlement and the Claim Form will be sent by the Administrator: (a) directly to persons identified as Class Members by way of a computer-generated list provided by Zungui's litigation receiver to Class Counsel and the Administrator; and (b) to the brokerage firms in the Administrator's proprietary databases, requesting that these firms either send a copy of these materials to all individuals and entities identified as Class Members, or to send the names and addresses of all such individuals and entities to the Administrator, who will mail these materials to the individuals and entities so identified.

[40] The estimated cost of implementing the Plan of Notice, excluding the First Notice that has already been published and paid for, will be approximately \$140,000.00 (before tax). Of that amount, approximately \$85,000.00 is attributable to the cost of effecting direct notice.

[41] David Weir, the President of NPT RicePoint Class Action Services, the proposed Administrator, deposes that the broker outreach portion of the notice plan is likely to bring the settlement to the attention of the Class Members in a manner consistent with other notice programs in securities class actions.

[42] Class Counsel believes that the Approval Notices, disseminated in accordance with the Plan of Notice, will come to the attention of a substantial portion of the Class.

[43] Class Counsel recommends that the court approve the settlements. Class Counsel is of the view that the settlement terms and conditions are fair and reasonable, and represent a significant recovery for Class Members in a securities class action.

[44] Based on the expert opinion of Paul Mulholland, CFA, Class Counsel believes that the combined settlement amounts represent close to 50% of the damages allegedly suffered by the Class Members as calculated by Mr. Mulholland. I would calculate the class's gross recovery as 46% of the damages allegedly suffered and the class's net recovery after the payment of administrative expenses and legal fees, as claimed, as approximately 33%.

[45] The Plaintiffs have instructed Class Counsel to seek approval of the settlements.

[46] No objections to the quantum of the Settlements have been received to date. However, Class Counsel has received: (a) one objection to the release provisions in the Zungui Agreement insofar as they apply to the Cai Brothers; and (b) one written objection to the proposed Plan of Allocation, discussed below, concerning the proposed ineligibility for any payment to Class Members for shares purchased in the secondary market after the alleged corrective press release on August 22, 2011.

[47] Section 29(2) of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992* provides that a settlement of a class proceeding is not binding unless approved by the court. To approve a settlement of a class proceeding, the court must find that, in all the circumstances, the settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class: *Fantl v. Transamerica Life Canada*, [2009] O.J. No. 3366 (S.C.J.) at para 57; *Farkas v. Sunnybrook and Women's Health Sciences Centre*, [2009] O.J. No. 3533 (S.C.J.), at para. 43; *Kidd v. Canada Life Assurance Company*, 2013 ONSC 1868.

[48] In determining whether a settlement is reasonable and in the best interests of the class, the following factors may be considered: (a) the likelihood of recovery or likelihood of success; (b) the amount and nature of discovery, evidence or investigation; (c) the proposed settlement terms and conditions; (d) the recommendation and experience of counsel; (e) the future expense and likely duration of litigation; (f) the number of objectors and nature of objections; (g) the presence of good faith, arm's-length bargaining and the absence of collusion; (h) the information conveying to the court the dynamics of, and the positions taken by, the parties during the negotiations; and, (i) the nature of communications by counsel and the representative plaintiff with class members during the litigation. See: *Fantl v. Transamerica Life Canada*, *supra* at para 59; *Corless v. KPMG LLP*, [2008] O.J. No. 3092 (S.C.J.), at para. 38; *Farkas v. Sunnybrook and Women's Health Sciences Centre*, *supra*, at para. 45; *Kidd v. Canada Life Assurance Company*, 2013 ONSC 1868.

[49] In my opinion - independent of the matter of the Plan of Allocation (the plan of distribution) - having regard to the various criteria set out above, the three settlement agreements taken together are fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the Class Members.

[50] Therefore, independent of the matter of the Plan of Allocation, which I will discuss next, I approve the three settlements.

E. DISTRIBUTION PLAN

1. The Court's Jurisdiction to Approve the Distribution Plan

[51] In the case at bar, the court's authority to approve the plan of distribution, the Plan of Allocation, comes from the settlement agreements, where the plan of distribution is referred to as a Plan of Allocation.

[52] The settlement agreements define the "Plan of Allocation" as follows:

Plan of Allocation means the distribution plan distributing the proposed settlement in a form satisfactory to the Settling Defendants or as fixed by the Court.

[53] As I interpret the settlement agreements, and as confirmed by the Plaintiffs during argument, I can approve the settlements independent of approving the Plan of Allocation, which is what I have done. In other words, I have approved the settlements, which are now binding on the parties and on the Class Members, and I shall determine or fix the Plan of Allocation.

[54] For reasons that I will set out below, I do not approve of the Plan of Allocation proposed by the parties, but I shall vary it, and I shall approve a different plan of distribution.

[55] Had the settlement agreements in the case at bar not left it to the court to ultimately determine what is an appropriate plan of distribution, I would not have approved the settlements, because I do not think the proposed Plan of Allocation is fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the class. I also would not have approved Class Counsel's fees because the settlements would not have been approved.

2. The Test for Approving a Distribution Plan

[56] In the situation where there is a judgment in a certified class action, the court's authority to determine or approve a plan of distribution comes from s. 26 of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*, which states:

Judgment distribution

26. (1) The court may direct any means of distribution of amounts awarded under section 24 or 25 that it considers appropriate.

Idem

(2) In giving directions under subsection (1), the court may order that,

(a) the defendant distribute directly to class members the amount of monetary relief to which each class member is entitled by any means authorized by the court, including abatement and credit;

(b) the defendant pay into court or some other appropriate depository the total amount of the defendant's liability to the class until further order of the court; and

(c) any person other than the defendant distribute directly to class members the amount of monetary relief to which each member is entitled by any means authorized by the court.

Idem

(3) In deciding whether to make an order under clause (2) (a), the court shall consider whether distribution by the defendant is the most practical way of distributing the award for any reason, including the fact that the amount of monetary relief to which each class member is entitled can be determined from the records of the defendant.

Idem

(4) The court may order that all or a part of an award under section 24 that has not been distributed within a time set by the court be applied in any manner that may reasonably be expected to benefit class members, even though the order does not provide for monetary relief to individual class members, if the court is satisfied that a reasonable number of class members who would not otherwise receive monetary relief would benefit from the order.

Idem

- (5) The court may make an order under subsection (4) whether or not all class members can be identified or all of their shares can be exactly determined.

Idem

- (6) The court may make an order under subsection (4) even if the order would benefit,
- (a) persons who are not class members; or
 - (b) persons who may otherwise receive monetary relief as a result of the class proceeding.

Supervisory role of the court

- (7) The court shall supervise the execution of judgments and the distribution of awards under section 24 or 25 and may stay the whole or any part of an execution or distribution for a reasonable period on such terms as it considers appropriate.

Payment of awards

- (8) The court may order that an award made under section 24 or 25 be paid,
- (a) in a lump sum, forthwith or within a time set by the court; or
 - (b) in instalments, on such terms as the court considers appropriate.

Costs of distribution

- (9) The court may order that the costs of distribution of an award under section 24 or 25, including the costs of notice associated with the distribution and the fees payable to a person administering the distribution, be paid out of the proceeds of the judgment or may make such other order as it considers appropriate.

Return of unclaimed amounts

- (10) Any part of an award for division among individual class members that remains unclaimed or otherwise undistributed after a time set by the court shall be returned to the party against whom the award was made, without further order of the court.

[57] It may be noted that under s. 26(1) of the *Class Proceedings Act, 1992*, the court may direct any means of distribution of amounts awarded that it considers appropriate. I am not aware of any caselaw actually applying s. 26(1), although numerous cases have suggested that the court has ample discretion and ample scope for creativity in employing s. 26.

[58] In the case at bar, as noted above, the court's authority to approve the plan of distribution comes from the settlement agreements, where the plan of distribution is referred to as a Plan of Allocation, and, as noted above, as I interpret the settlement agreements, I can determine or fix the Plan of Allocation as I think appropriate.

[59] In determining what is appropriate, I intend to apply the same test or standard that the court applies when deciding whether to approve a settlement. Thus, a plan of

distribution will be appropriate if in all the circumstances, the plan of distribution is fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

3. *The Proposed Plan of Allocation*

[60] For reasons that I will set out below, I do not approve of the Plan of Allocation proposed by the parties, but I shall vary it and approve a different plan of distribution.

[61] Class Counsel, with Mr. Mulholland's assistance, developed the Plan of Allocation. This plan was structured to reflect Mr. Mulholland's opinion that Zungui suffered two share price falls that were statistically significant, net of external market factors. These events occurred on: (1) June 2, 2011, when Muddy Waters LLC issued a report about Sino-Forest Corporation in which a fraud was alleged; and (2) August 22, 2011, when Zungui issued the press release announcing the suspension of 2011 audit procedures by Ernst & Young LLP.

[62] The Plaintiffs' damages theory is that the value of Zungui's common shares was at all times artificially inflated by misrepresentation and that the artificial inflation, equivalent to \$1.52 per share, was removed from the share value by the close of TSX-V trading on August 22, 2011. The Plaintiff's theory is that the artificial inflation was removed: in part, on June 2, 2011, in an amount of \$0.26; and in balance, on August 22, 2011, in an amount of \$1.26.

[63] The amount of each Class Member's compensation will depend upon: whether the Class Member is a Primary Market Purchaser and/or a Secondary Market Purchaser and/or Share Exchange Acquiror; the number and price of Zungui common shares purchased by the Class Member during the Class Period; whether and when the Class Member sold Zungui common shares purchased during the Class Period, and the price at which these common shares were sold; whether the Class Member continues to hold some or all of the Zungui common shares purchased during the Class Period; and the total number and value of all claims for compensation filed with the Administrator.

[64] The Plan of Allocation provides that no compensation shall be paid for any shares disposed of before June 2, 2011, which is consistent with Mr. Mulholland's opinion that June 2, 2011 was the first time that Zungui's common shares were subject to a statistically significant event, net of external market factors.

[65] The Plan of Allocation provides that no compensation shall be paid for any shares purchased after the time of the making of the alleged corrective disclosure on August 22, 2011. The main rationale for the disqualification of these shares is that they purchased when it was publicly known that audit issues existed. I note, however, that it was not until another month later that E&Y disavowed that Zungui's financial statements were GAAP compliant.

[66] In any event, although a purchaser of Zungai shares on Aug 22, 2011 is a Class Member, under the proposed Plan of Allocation, he or she is not entitled to receive compensation.

[67] These background circumstances bring me to the written objection to the Plan of Allocation delivered by Dr. Christopher Lane, which I set out below:

My name is Dr. Christopher Lane (psychologist) and I would like to register an objection to the terms of the proposed “Plan of Allocation,” particularly under the heading “Secondary Market Purchasers,” and under “VII” which states: “No Nominal Entitlement shall be recognized for any Eligible Shares purchased after the time of the making of the alleged corrective disclosure on August 22, 2011.” This statement appears to eliminate the right of anyone who purchased shares of ZUN on August 22, 2011 to receive any compensation whatsoever and to thereby lose 100% of their investment. I happen to be one of those individuals who purchased shares on that fateful August 22, 2011 day, as did my brother, Brian Lane. Indeed, I bought a total of 117,000 shares of ZUN that day at a “book value” (according to my bank statements) of \$47,735.83 (average cost per share of 40.8 cents). As one might expect, I am very upset by the wording of the proposed “Plan of Allocation” and would like to offer a suggestion of a fairer settlement, as the one proposed is, in my mind, overly punitive and leaves investors in my position with a feeling of defeat and lack of justice.

.... While it is true that the announcement indicated that Ernst & Young suspended procedures until Zungui “clarifies and substantiates its position with respect to issues pertaining to the current and prior year” this does not clearly foreshadow the events that followed, which turned out to be devastating to the investors who held the stock and represented a “worst case scenario” with the stock never trading again after August 22, 2011. Clearly this was bad news and sent the stock tumbling from approximately 1.50 down to trading around 40 cents per share for most of the day on August 22, 2011 and ending the day around 34 cents per share. Of course, in hindsight it is easy to suggest that one shouldn’t have bought stock in ZUN that day, but at that time there were also many who felt the negative reaction was entirely overblow and that clarification of the issues could logically prevail and substantiate the position of the company. In short, there was no way of knowing that the worst possible outcome would come to pass, with investors unable to trade their shares ever again.

I submit that eliminating shareholders who bought ZUN stock on August 22, 2011 from any form of compensation is overly harsh and punitive. It was clear that an important issue existed at that time but issues emerge with Venture Exchange listed stocks quite frequently but without these catastrophic consequences. And it is important to note that investors such as myself have suffered considerably due to this loss of capital. In my case, I lost all of my RRSP, almost all of my cash trading account holdings and a good part of my TFSA. With children entering university I am hard-pressed to pay my part of the costs as well as funding home and business expenses. Indeed, these losses have had a significant negative effect on my quality of life and that of my family and have led to me working long hours to pay for our needs, thereby creating significant hardship.

Hence, I ask that the court consider changing the section dealing with ZUN purchasers of August 22, 2011 to include them in providing some compensation in the class action lawsuit. Of course, I believe that to be fair, the compensation for purchasers on August 22, 2011 should be much less than for those who purchased earlier at prices of \$1.52 per share or higher. I would suggest that a discount of 80% of the amount often quoted in the “Plan of Allocation” (\$1.52) would be appropriate, which would amount to payment of 30.4 cents per share for individuals who bought shares of ZUN on August 22, 2011. I ask that the court consider this proposal to be fair to all shareholders of ZUN without singling out any in a harsh or punitive manner. We all lost money in this investment and have suffered as a result and it’s unfair to single out a subsection of individuals for exclusion of all compensation.

[68] The Plan of Allocation contemplates that for some Class Member's entitlements, a notional amount of damage based on the application of the calculations in the Plan of Allocation before distribution proration, will be discounted to reflect the risks facing the claimants. Class Counsel considered that the question of whether a discount to a Nominal Entitlement ought to apply for a particular type of acquisition should be determined by considering the particular strengths and weaknesses of the common law and statutory claims are common to all groups

[69] With a view to ensuring that any discount was arrived at in a manner that was objective and fair, a formal mediation session was held on April 29, 2013. Joel Wiesenfeld was the mediator. Mr. Wiesenfeld practiced law as a broker/dealer litigation and securities regulatory counsel for 31 years.

[70] At the mediation, the claimant groups were represented by Class Members holding Eligible Shares as follows: (a) the Plaintiffs, who bought substantially all of their shares in Zungui's IPO, represented Primary Market Purchasers; (b) Nick Angellotti CA, IFA and President and Managing Director of Williams & Partners Forensic Accountants Inc., the representative of a partnership that purchased Zungui's shares in the secondary market, represented Secondary Market Purchasers; and (c) Avi Grewal, President and Chief Executive Officer of Cinaport Capital Inc., a private investment firm which acts as advisor for the Cinaport China Opportunity Fund, a fund with investments in private and public PRC based companies, represented Share Exchange Acquirors.

[71] The representatives were represented by counsel; namely: Charles Wright and Nicholas Baker of Siskinds LLP for the Plaintiffs; Kirk Baert of Koskie Minsky LLP for Mr. Angellotti; and John J. Longo of Aird & Berlis LLP for Mr. Grewal.

[72] I pause here to note that nobody represented the interests of secondary market purchasers who, like Dr. Lane, purchased shares on August 22, 2011.

[73] The negotiations were all conducted at arm's length and the position of each claimant group was advanced by their counsel. The full-day mediation session concluded with the Primary Market Purchasers and Secondary Market Purchasers reaching agreement that the proposed Plan of Allocation should provide for the Nominal Entitlements of primary market purchasers to be undiscounted and the Nominal Entitlements of secondary market purchasers should be discounted by 8%.

[74] The representatives were unable to agree on a discount to be applied to the claims of Share Exchange Acquirors at the mediation, and so the Plaintiffs proposed (and posted on Class Counsel's website) a draft Plan of Allocation with a discount of 60% for Share Exchange Acquiror claims. Subsequently, Class Counsel agreed, to amend the Share Exchange Acquiror Discount to 40 %.

[75] Class Counsel submits that an 8% discount for secondary market purchasers is fair and reflects that: (a) the secondary market purchasers were required to obtain leave under Part XXIII.1 of the Ontario *Securities Act* before asserting the right of action for

misrepresentation in Zungui's secondary market disclosure documents, and such leave would be contested; (b) Part XXIII.1 provides defendants with a number of defences to liability for secondary market misrepresentation, and in this case, the secondary market purchasers could expect to face the "reasonable investigation" defence, an expert reliance defence, and a due diligence; and (c) the secondary market purchasers may not be able to recover the full estimated damages they have suffered, due to liability limits.

[76] Class Counsel submits that no discount for primary market purchasers is fair because it reflects that: (a) these purchasers did not need to obtain leave of the Court to assert their claim; (b) damages are not limited for primary market purchasers in the same way as they are limited for secondary market purchasers; (c) if a prospectus is found to have contained a misrepresentation, then the issuer is strictly liable, (d) certain defendants, such as the issuer's directors and officers, are generally liable, unless they demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that they exercised reasonable diligence prior to issuance of the prospectus; and (e) liability is joint and several and damages can be recovered from any defendant with the means to pay.

[77] Class Counsel initially considered that a 60% discount for Share Exchange Acquirors was fair. However, the Significant Shareholder Group through their counsel at Aird and Berlis LLP, and certain members of the Significant Shareholder Group indicated that they had higher expectations than a settlement with the Underwriting Syndicate at \$750,000.00, in part, based on the fact that the Underwriting Syndicate had earned fees of approximately \$2.75 million for underwriting the IPO.

[78] However, the Significant Shareholder Group were prepared to support the proposed settlement with the Underwriting Syndicate if two (2) conditions were met: (1) Class Counsel would limit their request for Class Counsel Fees to an agreed amount; and (2) the discount applicable to Share Exchange Acquirors under the proposed Plan of Allocation would be amended from 60% to 40%.

[79] Class Counsel estimates that the impact on the combined settlement fund of the amendment to the discount applicable to Share Exchange Acquirors under the proposed Plan of Allocation will be at most \$262,200.00 and more likely the impact will be less, because the maximum impact assumes no proration, which is unlikely to be the case.

[80] Class Counsel communicated with each Class Member who participated in the mediation relating to the Plan of Allocation, and they have instructed that the proposed amended discount applicable to Share Exchange Acquirors is acceptable.

[81] The Plan of Allocation provides for the possibility of a *cy près* distribution to the Small Investor Protection Association Canada in the event that less than \$25,000.00 remains in the Allocation Pool 180 days from the date on which the Administrator distributes the Net Settlement Amount to Authorized Claimants.

[82] Notwithstanding the objection to the Plan of Distribution, Class Counsel is of the view that the Plan of Allocation was carefully considered and promotes the interests of the class as a whole, and that it is fair and reasonable and ought to be approved.

[83] At the argument of the fairness hearing, Class Counsel argued that should the court consider it appropriate to have purchasers like Dr. Lane participants in the Plan of Allocation, their claims should be discounted by 98.5%.

4. *Discussion and Analysis of the Proposed Plan of Allocation*

[84] I do not regard the Proposed Plan of Allocation as appropriate, fair, reasonable, or in the best interests of the class.

[85] In my opinion, Dr. Lane's objection to the Plan of Allocation and his suggestion as to how the plan should be revised has considerable merit.

[86] Although perhaps unlikely to occur, it seems inappropriate and unfair to me that the proposed Plan of Allocation provides for a *cy près* distribution to a small investor association and does not provide any compensation for an investor like Dr. Lane, who is a member of the class. More to the point, in my opinion, it is inappropriate and unfair to include August 22, 2011 purchasers as Class Members and then exclude them from the Plan of Allocation.

[87] Notwithstanding that it was the Defendants who urged that these purchasers be included as Class Members as part of the bargaining for the settlements, once Class Counsel and the Representative Plaintiffs agreed to the joinder of these Class Members, it was unfair and inappropriate for Class Counsel and the Representative Plaintiffs to advocate a theory of the case that August 22, 2011 purchasers were not eligible for any compensation at all.

[88] If Dr. Lane, his brother, and other August 22, 2011 purchasers had appreciated that the parties had included them in the class as a bargaining chip but had excluded them from the theory of the claim and would exclude them from the Plan of Allocation, these putative class members sensibly should have opted-out of the class action rather than add the unrequited value of their releases to the consideration or *quid quo pro* that the Defendants will be receiving for the settlement payments. As it stands, Dr. Lane and those similarly situated are bound by the settlement but receive nothing themselves for being a Class Member.

[89] In my opinion, the appropriate Plan of Allocation is the one proposed by Dr. Lane.

[90] Accordingly, I shall revise the Plan of Allocation in accord with Dr. Lane's suggestion, which I regard as fair and reasonable, and I approve the Plan of Allocation as revised.

F. ADMINISTRATION OF THE SETTLEMENT

[91] Class Counsel proposes the appointment of NPT RicePoint Class Action Services as the Administrator. NPT has already served as the Notice Advisor in the Action. NPT has also been administering bilingual class action settlements for over 9

years. In Class Counsel's opinion, NPT has the experience and resources that make them capable of administering the Settlements.

[92] NPT's administration proposal provides for a minimum administration fee of \$35,000, and a maximum administration fee cap of \$195,000.00, before taxes.

[93] I approve the appointment of NPT RicePoint Class Action Services as the Administrator.

G. FEE APPROVAL

[94] Turning to the matter of Class Counsel's fee request of \$2,807,037.56.

[95] The Retainer Agreements with the Plaintiffs provide that Class Counsel may seek a fee of up to 30% of the recovery. Class Counsel are seeking a recovery of 20.75% (a 3.3 multiplier).

[96] As at August 12, 2013, Class Counsel had docketed time of \$648,386.00, excluding applicable taxes, disbursements of \$226,670.44, exclusive of applicable taxes.

[97] Class Counsel is not seeking to recover, and will not return to request payment of the time and disbursements required to complete the administration of the settlement, which is estimated to be at least \$50,000.00.

[98] Class Counsel has agreed to pay, from Class Counsel's fee award the accounts of Aird & Berlis LLP rendered to the Significant Shareholder Group in the amount of \$105,796.50, taxes in the amount of \$13,896.73 and disbursements in the amount of \$1,101.36.

[99] Class Counsel proposes to pay Wolf Popper LLP \$105,689.00 (US\$) in fees, and (US\$) \$1,466.73 in disbursements from the Class Counsel's fee award. Mr. Clarke, a representative plaintiff, initially contacted this U.S. law firm to investigate his potential claim. Ms. Patricia Avery, of Wolf Popper LLP, has been a member of the Class Counsel team prosecuting the Action, and Wolf Popper LLP undertook certain tasks that were within the competence of the firm, such as researching risk disclosure practices in North American securities offering documents for issuers with substantial operations in the People's Republic of China.

[100] The disbursements included \$40,465.42 in agent fees for investigations in the People's Republic of China, location of the Cai Brothers, translation of correspondence and pleadings, Hague Convention service on the Cai Brothers and the cost of paying for independent counsel to attend at the Plan of Allocation mediation.

[101] The disbursements include \$156,842.05 in expert fees and mediation fees for Mr. Mulholland, Mr. Mak, William H. Purcell, a U.S. investment banking expert, in relation to underwriting due diligence practices for companies with substantially all operations in the People's Republic of China, and Mr. Wisenfeld.

[102] The fairness and reasonableness of the fee awarded in respect of class proceedings is to be determined in light of the risk undertaken by the lawyer in conducting the litigation and the degree of success or result achieved: *Parsons v. Canadian Red Cross Society*, [2000] O.J. No. 2374 (S.C.J.), at para. 13; *Smith v. National Money Mart*, [2010] O.J. No. 873 (S.C.J.), at paras. 19-20; *Fischer v. I.G. Investment Management Ltd.*, [2010] O.J. No. 5649 (S.C.J.), at para 25.

[103] Factors relevant in assessing the reasonableness of the fees of class counsel include: (a) the factual and legal complexities of the matters dealt with; (b) the risk undertaken, including the risk that the matter might not be certified; (c) the degree of responsibility assumed by class counsel; (d) the monetary value of the matters in issue; (e) the importance of the matter to the class; (f) the degree of skill and competence demonstrated by class counsel; (g) the results achieved; (h) the ability of the class to pay; (i) the expectations of the class as to the amount of the fees; (j) the opportunity cost to class counsel in the expenditure of time in pursuit of the litigation and settlement: *Smith v. National Money Mart*, *supra*, at paras. 19-20; *Fischer v. I.G. Investment Management Ltd.*, *supra*, at para 28.

[104] Having regard to these various factors, I approve Class Counsel's request for approval of its legal fees.

H. CONCLUSION

[105] Orders accordingly.

Perell, J.

Released: August 27, 2013